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Abstract
The objective of this research is to evaluate the employment of the Canadian 
Navy in a maritime enforcement role within the Canadian maritime zones. 
This investigation is comprised of two main parts: an analysis of the Canadian 
political and regulatory structures, as well as an analysis of naval enforcement 
operations. The marine geography of Atlantic Canada is described through six 
key ocean-use sectors, followed by an analysis of important oceans policy 
initiatives, and the federal government’s ad hoc approach to security and 
defence policy formulation. The mandates, jurisdictions, and general 
capabilities of Canadian federal departments with either direct or indirect links 
to marine security and maritime enforcement are discussed, as well as the 
legal framework for the use of Canadian military forces for domestic 
operations. The second part of the thesis analyses the capabilities that the 
Navy brings to maritime security and enforcement operations. These include 
the contribution to maritime domain awareness, government “presence” 
derived through aerial surveillance, search and rescue operations, and naval 
support to fisheries enforcement. An analysis of patrol patterns is offered, as 
well as spatial analyses of at-sea inspection data. Two exploratory studies 
that address the perceived deterrent value of naval support to fisheries 
enforcement, and public opinion as it pertains to naval support to constabulary 
operations are presented, as well as the effect that fisheries support missions 
have on the combat readiness of warships. The thesis suggests that the 
Canadian Navy could take on a greater role in domestic enforcement, and a 
proposal is made for enhanced legal powers. The thesis ends by summarizing 
the Navy’s important role championing and enabling improvement in the 
government’s Marine Security Response System, as well as a whole-of- 
government approach to maritime surveillance planning.
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
On April 6, 1995, twenty-eight days after the arrest of the fishing trawler 
Estai on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, the Toronto Sun carried a 
provocative front page that displayed a periscope photograph of a Spanish 
stern trawler at close range. Published during the so-called "Turbot Crisis," a 
fisheries dispute between Canada and the European Union, the newspaper 
story conveyed the notion that Canadian submarines were enforcing Canada's 
contested jurisdiction over fish stocks on the continental shelf. This dispute 
brought fisheries and sovereignty issues into focus for Canadians. Moreover, 
the reporting of this unusual employment of a submarine was, for many 
Canadians, their first indication that their navy played an active role in the 
enforcement of domestic and international law in Canada’s maritime zones and 
approaches.
'How we ever walked away!’
...------------------------------------- • • fr it  M M .  H *  4
Rill i f  aalibt 
f ir  leafs, 1. 181
OEAl STRUCK IN  THE TURBOT TROUBLES
Canada to Spain: 
We re watching you
AND THIS IS HOW WE DO II
EXCLUSIVE: saaaiu m « t«  c w « h m  A t*  la c m h i m  wa s o n u m :  i m  r
Figure 1-1. Periscope Photo on Front Page
Source: Toronto Sun (Toronto), 6 April 1995.
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This news story should not have come as a surprise to informed 
Canadians, given that the naval component of Canada’s armed forces has 
always been active in the nation’s maritime affairs. However, the manner by 
which naval forces contribute to oceans management has been largely 
misunderstood by both Canadian government and public alike. This research 
project will help advance the understanding of Canadian oceans management as 
it pertains to the use of naval forces for domestic purposes.
1.2 Aim of the Study
J.R.V. Prescott observes in The Political Geography of the Oceans that 
political geographers with interests in marine geography have tended to focus 
their research on five main themes. These are the role of the sea in influencing 
national characteristics, the role of the sea in determining national policies, the 
political significance of coastal features, landlocked states and their access to 
the sea, and Law of the Sea.1 While this thesis touches on all but one of these 
topics, its principal thrust pertains to aspects in the execution of national 
maritime policy by the Government of Canada. Several government 
departments are mandated to deliver a variety of maritime programs; this thesis 
will concentrate on the naval component of the armed forces.
The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the current employment of the 
Canadian Navy in maritime enforcement within Canadian waters and their 
seaward approaches.2 The basic thesis statement is that “the Canadian Navy 
has a key role in domestic maritime enforcement.” The study will validate this 
thesis by determining whether there is a coherent government policy framework 
within which the Navy forms an integral part and, by both qualitative and 
quantitative measures, how the Navy contributes to domestic maritime
1 J.R.V. Prescott, The Political Geography of the Oceans, (London: David & Charles, 1975), 13.
2 In 1968, the Canadian Forces Reorganization Act dissolved the Canadian Army, Royal 
Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force. In their stead, the Act created a single armed 
Service called the “Canadian Armed Forces.” Thereafter, the former army, navy and air force 
were referred to as the “land, sea and air elements.” The descriptor “Armed” was dropped later 
from the Service’s title; it is now referred to as the “Canadian Forces.” Over time, the land, sea 
and air elements reintroduced, unofficially, the terms army, navy and air force. For simplicity in 
this thesis, the sea element of the Canadian Forces will be referred to as the “Canadian Navy.”
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enforcement through its compilation of whole of government maritime domain 
awareness analyses and patrol activities. The second research supposition is 
that employment of naval forces in a maritime enforcement role is of value to the 
Canadian Navy. In pursuing these two main avenues of inquiry, several 
additional objectives will be met, such as determining whether the pattern of 
enforcement activities changes with proximity to international or Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) boundaries, and whether sea patrols by naval ships are 
an effective use of assets.
1.3 Geography versus Political Science
This research was undertaken from a marine geography perspective. 
While there is a strong political geography thrust to the study, it is not a political 
science dissertation. During the conduct of the research, there was continual 
tension between the geographical and political elements, primarily because most 
of the literature and verbal debate pertaining to sovereignty, security, and 
enforcement originates from within the political realm. Moreover, any discussion 
of naval roles tends to gravitate towards the use of sea power for expeditionary 
military and diplomatic purposes rather than constabulary functions. This thesis 
deviates from this more common focus of sea power, and concentrates on its 
less frequently discussed role in non-defence applications.
1.4 Scope of Study and Study Area
The task of evaluating in detail every contribution made by the Canadian 
Navy to the federal government would be beyond the limits of this thesis. Thus, 
the research has been constrained to an examination of relevant elements of 
federal policy that deal with national security and sovereignty protection, and 
both a quantitative and geographical assessment of the principal activities 
undertaken by the Navy to support these policy aims.
Of the three oceans that delimit Canada, the Atlantic had been foremost 
in the country’s history and development, largely because Canada was settled 
by Europeans from east to west. While its role in trade, commerce, resource 
development, and security is widely acknowledged, the increasing importance to
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Canada of the Pacific and Arctic, other two oceans, cannot be discounted. The 
economic and geopolitical importance of the Pacific coast is growing. Canada’s 
ties to other nations of the Pacific Rim have become even closer through more 
open immigration policies over the past 30 years that have encouraged larger 
numbers of immigrants to make Canada their home. Trade in the Pacific region 
has increased significantly since the 1970s, and Vancouver now ranks as 
Canada’s busiest port.
Global warming is expected to accelerate the opening up of the last 
Canadian frontier, the Arctic. In the past the waters of the Arctic Archipelago 
have seen little use for sea borne commercial traffic due to the harshness of the 
environment, particularly during the long winter months when most of the bays 
and straits are blocked by sea ice. Analysts predict that, as average annual 
temperatures increase making safe navigation more viable, the Northwest 
Passage will become a desirable commercial conduit and will provide better 
access to the substantial hydrocarbon deposits in the Beaufort Sea, the 
MacKenzie Delta, the Svendurp Basin, and the Baffin Bay region.3
It had been intended to carry out this study from a national perspective, 
that is to say, to include the Pacific and Arctic regions as well as the Atlantic. 
However, as the project commenced, it quickly was determined that this would 
not be feasible in the time allotted. The sheer vastness of Canada made travel 
to the west and arctic coasts expensive and time-consuming, and made difficult 
the development of a network of contacts from whom the primary data would be 
derived. Although the marine geography of each region is different, the 
relationship of the Navy to the public and private sectors in each region is 
essentially the same. Accordingly, the observations made in the Atlantic are 
largely applicable to other regions, except where differences that affect findings 
have been noted.
3 The term “Northwest Passage” is no longer officially sanctioned by the Canadian government. 
Rather, officials refer to this feature simply as “Canadian Internal Waters.”
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Thus, the study area selected was the Atlantic region of Canada. This 
region is defined broadly as the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, 
Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador and their associated coastal 
zones. For some defence tasks, such as search and rescue, the Navy has 
responsibility for operations as far west as 95 degrees west longitude, including 
the province of Quebec and the territories of Nunavut and the Northwest 
Territories, and these additional areas are included whenever a specific issue 
dictates.
1.5 The Structure of the Research
In order to evaluate Canadian naval employment in maritime 
enforcement, it was necessary to understand the marine geography of the study 
area, to identify the regulatory and policy framework extant in the region, and to 
examine the relationships between the responsible enforcement agencies in the 
context of their capabilities and limitations. This research formed the foundation 
upon which the thesis could be addressed. The second part was an evaluation 
or measurement, in a spatial context, of the manner by which the Navy exercised 
its enforcement mandate.
These two complementary parts are presented in a thesis comprised of 
several chapters. Chapter One outlines the philosophy and template of the 
project. Chapter Two explains the methods used to establish the context for the 
study, and the manner in which research problem was investigated. Chapter 
Three describes the marine geography of the Atlantic region with reference to 
physical and political boundaries, the location of ports, areas of shipping, oil and 
gas exploration, fishing and conservation areas, and search and rescue zones. 
The purpose of this background is to demonstrate both the complexity and the 
significance of the coastal zone to Atlantic Canada, and to place the remaining 
chapters of the thesis in proper context.
Chapter Four is an examination of national oceans policy, security policy, 
and defence policy. The chapter briefly describes how each policy theme 
developed in Canada, with the most recent policy documents receiving the most
5
detailed treatment. The objective of this section is to determine the congruence 
of the various elements of national policy in order to frame the Navy’s 
participation in oceans management.
Chapter Five flows directly from the review of policy to the enabling 
statutes for each federal department that has a security or enforcement 
responsibility. This part of the thesis examines in greater detail the mandates 
and capabilities of selected departments with the aim of understanding the 
unique attributes of each department and what part that department plays in the 
overall constabulary framework of the federal government.
Chapter Six is a study of the security and oceans-related interaction 
between federal government departments at both the regional and national 
levels. This chapter examines the methods of informal and formal co-operation 
and collaboration through the various working group and committee structures 
and the flow of communications between departments. The purpose of this 
chapter is to understand how the various organs of the federal government deal 
with security and sovereignty issues on a proactive and reactive basis.
It is in Chapter Seven that the Navy’s contribution to domestic maritime 
enforcement is articulated in both qualitative and quantitative terms. The main 
focus of this chapter is how the Navy collates various data and information from 
diverse sources to develop a snapshot or “recognized maritime picture” of what 
marine activities are being undertaken in Canada’s maritime zones and 
approaches. Also examined is what the Navy provides in maritime surveillance 
capability in co-operation with other government departments.
Chapter Eight continues with an examination of the Navy’s patrol and 
response efforts to support enforcement. The nature, scope and spatial 
distribution of search and rescue activities occupy the first part of the chapter. 
The investigation then shifts focus to naval fisheries patrol support to Fisheries 
and Oceans Canada with a view to portraying patterns of enforcement activity 
over a multi-year time frame.
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Chapter Nine explores what benefit the Navy might derive from its 
participation in maritime enforcement efforts. The issue is examined first through 
a study that assesses the perceived deterrent value of naval fisheries patrols. 
This is followed by the results of a year-long media content analysis that 
evaluates the impact on public opinion of naval-related newstories. The third 
element of the chapter is an examination of the effect that deployment on naval 
fisheries patrols has on the combat readiness of Canadian warships.
Chapter Ten presents an analysis that suggests that the Canadian Navy 
could take on a greater role in domestic maritime enforcement. In addition the 
evolving state of Canada’s marine security response system is discussed, with 
reference to the Navy’s key function as both champion and enabler for a whole- 
of-government approach to this important task.
The final chapter, Chapter Eleven, presents the conclusions, and further 
research recommendations.
1.6 Significance of the Study
In an era of downsizing and budgetary constraint, maritime nations must 
allocate enforcement resources efficiently, particularly those nations with small 
or medium-sized fleets. This research will assist Canadian policy makers and 
the naval leadership with difficult choices regarding employment of naval forces 
in constabulary roles.
1.7 Previous Research
There is precious little in the literature that pertains directly to the 
Canadian Navy and its role in domestic maritime enforcement. The literature 
that addresses naval matters tends to do so as a subset of defence policy as it 
relates to national power. Its authors fall into three broad categories. The first are 
those analysts who study the concepts of maritime strategy in a general political 
context without reference to a specific region. Next are scholars who examine 
maritime power in the context of a particular country and the third group are the
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few writers who narrow the discussion to how navies are implicated in 
sovereignty operations.
Moving beyond the age of sail into an era more that closely resembles our 
own, many would argue that any discussion of maritime power should 
commence with reference to Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer. In 
1890, Mahan expressed his ideas on maritime strategy as The Influence of Sea 
Power Upon History 1660-1783, a book that garnered as much attention in 
Europe as it did at home in the United States. Mahan outlined the six principles 
that, in his assessment, contributed to a strong sea power. Four of these have 
clear linkages to geography. Mahan’s six elements were: geographic position, 
more specifically access to sea lanes; physical features that are suitable for 
ports and harbours; territorial extent large enough to supply material wealth but 
not so large as to be indefensible; a population sufficiently large to man the 
nation’s ships, a people of seafaring character; and finally, a government with 
the character to support naval policy.
Mahan believed that sea power’s primary use was for the attainment of 
strategic goals established by a navy’s government. Mahan understood the 
strategic importance of commerce and was the first to articulate accepted 
maritime strategic concepts such as command of the sea, sea control, sea 
denial, and the idea of a fleet-in-being. Mahan believed that a strong navy was 
one designed to fight and win in all-or-nothing engagements and on that point 
other respected strategists of the day such as Julian Stafford Corbett challenged 
him. Corbett placed more emphasis on manoeuvre and maintenance of what we 
now call sea lines of communication, and was less concerned with the big naval 
battle. Notwithstanding this criticism, in speaking of Mahan and his 1890 treatise, 
some writers suggest that “no other single person has so directly and profoundly 
influenced the theory of sea power and naval strategy.4”
4 Margaret Sprout as quoted in Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age. (London: 
MacMillan, 1982),p. 28.
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Other strategic writers followed Mahan and Corbett, men with alternate 
viewpoints who formed the Jeune Ecole that offered weaker powers a different 
maritime strategy and was characterised by its detailed prescriptions for the 
offensive use of naval forces to counter direct battle or blockade. The strategy 
that arose from this era was the concept of the guerre de course or merchant 
vessel raiding, which led to the use of convoys as a counter-tactic. This strategy 
was employed to great effect during both World Wars.
The maritime strategies above were expressed before the wane of the 
great empires when navies were maintained for imperial purposes, and the 
range of a shore-based cannon defined the extent of a nation’s sovereignty to 
seaward. The concept of coastal state rights ascribed by a formal convention on 
law of the sea was at the very least a half a century away. Since then, modern 
naval analysts such as Richard Hill, Eric Grove, and Geoffrey Till have studied 
the strategic implications of the naval conflicts of the twentieth century. They 
have written extensively on how sea power is evolving through the age of 
nuclear power and weaponry into the future. The backdrop of their study is a 
global maritime environment in which the United Nations, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO), and coalitions of nations play major roles in the 
management of international crises rather than the imperial powers of the past. 
Following Richard Hill’s earlier works, Ken Booth in Navies and Foreign Policy 
expands the naval role beyond warfare to include a diplomatic role as well as 
coast-guard and nation building functions that he calls the “policing” role. This 
trinity of naval roles, linked by their use of the sea to carry out these roles, is 
commonly referred to now in international naval circles as “Booth’s Triangle.”5
The main effort of the writings to date has been dedicated to analysing the 
expeditionary aspect of sea power in the modern context, at the higher levels of 
the conflict spectrum. In addition, the works of Hill, Grove, Till, and Booth 
incorporate comment on naval force structure, i.e., types and capabilities of hulls
5 See Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1979); Geoffrey 
Till, Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age. (London: MacMillan, 1982); J.R. Hill, Maritime 
Strategy for Medium Power Navies. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986); Eric Grove,
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and platforms, as well as weapons technologies available. Less has been written 
about the use of naval power at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, the 
policing or constabulary roles. One author, Michael Pugh, in Policing the Seas: 
The Challenge of Good Governance, suggests that navies should be implicated 
in fisheries protection, anti-smuggling operations, and anti-piracy activities as a 
constituent element of good governance of a nation’s maritime jurisdiction.6
In Canada, the locus for the study of maritime strategy is the Centre for 
Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University. The two senior Research Fellows 
at the Centre, Fred Crickard and Peter Haydon, have written prolifically about the 
role of the Canadian Navy in international and domestic affairs. In the early 
1990s, Crickard led the Centre’s independent Canada’s Oceans Strategy Project 
that identified the long-term needs of a national marine policy, as well as an 
integrated strategy to protect the nation’s vital maritime interests. Out of this 
study came an acknowledgement that surveillance and government “presence” 
would be essential tasks for protection of maritime sovereignty.7 Working with 
Haydon and others, Crickard went on to develop an Integrated Maritime 
Enforcement model that identifies the tasks that coastal state must undertake to 
effectively govern its maritime domain. Crickard lists these functions as the 
management of marine resources, the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, maintenance of maritime sovereignty, prevention of illegal activity, 
and regulating marine safety. Crickard categorised the maritime enforcement 
responses available to a coastal state as operational responses undertaken by 
navies and coast guards, as well as political, legal, and non-government 
responses.8
The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990).
6 Michael Pugh, “Policing the Seas: The Challenge of Good Governance,” In The Role of 
European Naval Forces after the Cold War, edited by G. de Nooy. (Netherlands: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), 106.
7 Fred W. Crickard and Glen J. Herbert, Canada's Oceans Strategies Project - The Atlantic: Final 
Report (Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1997); Fred 
W.Crickard and Glen Herbert, “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic: Applications to 
Maritime Enforcement,” In Maritime Security Working Papers Number 7/8, edited by E.L. 
Tummers. (Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, December, 1997).
8 Francois N. Bailet, Fred W. Crickard, and Glen J. Herbert, Integrated Maritime Enforcement: A 
Handbook (Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 2000).
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Haydon’s writings have tended to focus on naval policy as a subset of 
defence policy, and the force structure of the navy in relation to tasks as set forth 
in policy. Haydon emphasises that for a coastal state to exercise sovereignty at 
sea, the nation must have the capacity to control the activities in waters under its 
maritime jurisdiction. Haydon points out that to have sea control over a body of 
water, the coastal state must know exactly who is using those waters and for 
what purpose. As well, he argues, an unequivocal expression of government 
authority in those waters must be maintained; and the government must be able 
to respond quickly and effectively to violations of the law or threats to national 
security.9 Common throughout the analyses of both Crickard and Haydon is an 
emphasis on surveillance and integration of efforts between responsible 
departments, as well as a call to employ emerging technology to best advantage.
There is a similar body of work by Sam Bateman, Dick Sherwood, and 
Anthony Bergin through the Australian Defence Studies Centre, and associated 
with the University of Wollongong and the University of South Wales. These 
Australian defence fellows offer complementary analyses to those of Crickard 
and Haydon; indeed the similarities between Australia and Canada are striking in 
terms of geography, size of maritime zones, size of population, and structure of 
maritime forces. The Australian analysts echo the assertions made by the 
Canadian research fellows in terms of the tasks that nations must undertake to 
effectively govern their maritime domains as well as the nature of the responses 
available to the coastal state. Where there are differences they are attributable to 
the Australian legal and regulatory framework rather than divergence of opinion 
between the Australian and Canadian writers.10
9 Peter T. Haydon, Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning Framework, IRPP 
Working Paper Number 2004-12, November 2004. p.9.
10 See Sam Bateman, “Oceans Management Policy: Catalyst for Cooperation?" In Oceans 
Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 1, 
edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. (Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, 
University of Wollongong, 1995); Sam Bateman, “Strategic Change and Naval Roles,” In 
Strategic Change and Naval Roles: Issues for a Medium Naval Power: Canberra Papers 102, 
edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
The Australian National University, 1993); Sam Bateman and Eric Grove, “Maritime Enforcement 
in the Southern Ocean: Some Operational and Policy Considerations,” In Southern Ocean 
Fishing: Policy Challenges for Australia: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 7, edited by 
Sam Bateman and Donald R. Rothwell. (Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy,
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In terms of graduate studies that pertain to the naval role in enforcement 
or sovereignty operations, there are three projects that warrant mention. In 
1992, a Royal Navy officer, Lieutenant Commander Steven Haines presented his 
PhD thesis, The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain’s Maritime 
Domain. In the context of a post-UN Convention on Law of the Sea III 
environment in which there was widespread extension to maritime boundaries by 
many coastal states, Haines examined the process by which the United 
Kingdom’s maritime jurisdiction was extended and how, concomitant with that 
process, Britain’s civil authority was also extended seaward. Haines identified 
the doctrinal framework that permits British military forces to support civilian 
authorities within the United Kingdom, and related this regulatory basis to the 
maritime zones and approaches.
Haines reviewed the majority of marine security tasks, such as protection 
of offshore hydrocarbon installations, prevention of terrorist attacks, support to 
HM Customs, search and rescue, fisheries protection, and military aid to the civil 
power. Haines concluded that despite a significant amount of military assistance 
to the maritime community, particularly in terms of search and rescue and 
humanitarian relief, what little doctrine that existed in 1992 concerning military 
aid to civil authorities was biased towards requirements on land rather than what 
was needed at sea. Haines also observed that naval involvement in fisheries 
protection has always been regarded as a natural fit; indeed the Royal Navy 
continues to maintain a squadron of ships for the express purpose of fisheries 
protection. Haines noted also that naval support is appropriate in certain
University of Wollongong, 1998); Anthony Bergin, “Inter-Departmental Coordination: The 
Australian Experience.” In Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate, edited by Jack 
McCaffrie. (Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995); Dick Sherwood, “Implications 
for Naval Roles.” In Policing Australia's Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong 
Paper on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. (Wollongong, 
Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1997); Dick Sherwood, The 
Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension: Canberra Paper No. 109 (Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1994); Peter Briggs, 
“The ADF's Role in Policing the Offshore Zones.” In Policing Australia's Offshore Zones:
Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug 
MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. (Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of 
Wollongong, 1997).
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circumstances for customs, salvage, and pollution control. In addition, he 
emphasized the significant contribution that the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force 
make to search and rescue around the British Isles.11
Brent Hobson’s 1999 M.A. thesis, New Solutions for Old Problems: 
Canadian Naval Support of Sovereignty: 1971-2000, examined Canada’s 
sovereignty support requirements and the policy developments that drove these 
requirements. His examination of the Navy’s role was biased towards naval force 
structure, as well as the technologies available to Canadian naval forces such as 
radar, sonar, communications, and data management capabilities. He also 
examined interdepartmental co-operation through the lens of changes to 
Canadian oceans policy. Hobson concluded that the importance of protection of 
national sovereignty increased in the public’s mind since the 1970s, and that 
although the government officially tasked the Navy with sovereignty protection as 
an official “role,” with it came no reduction in extant naval tasks nor any 
appreciable increase in resources. Moreover, Hobson called into question the 
Government of Canada’s true commitment to this policy, since it was not 
reflected in any defence structure review nor by increased defence procurement 
that could be linked to sovereignty protection. Hobson identified gains made in 
inter-departmental co-operation, but was disappointed that the technological 
advantage that the Navy possessed in comparison to other government 
departments (OGD) was not leveraged for greater effect in sovereignty 
operations. Hobson posited that the Navy’s championing of increased used of 
emerging technologies such as High Frequency Surface Wave Radar, Radar 
Satellites, and wide area networks accessible by OGDs, would be one area in 
which the future of sovereignty support could result in demonstrated 
improvement.12
More recently, Andrew Forbes examined the Royal Australian Navy’s 
(RAN) role in conducting sovereignty support operations in Australia’s Exclusive
11 Steven W. Haines, “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain's Maritime 
Domain.” (Ph.D. dissertation, Aberdeen University, 1992).
12 Brent A. Hobson, “New Solutions for Old Problems? Canadian Naval Support of Sovereignty:
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Economic Zone in his 2001 M.P.A. project, Protecting the National Interest: 
Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. In his 
paper, he compared the various policy documents that factored into protecting 
the sovereignty of Australian maritime zones, and re-stated the basic concepts of 
sea power and naval strategy articulated by earlier naval analysts. Forbes 
suggested that the Australian Defence Force contributes considerably more to 
coastal surveillance than is recognised by the Australian public and echoed 
Hobson’s sentiments about the important role that a Navy plays in providing 
OGDs with access to sophisticated communications networks, intelligence data 
and assessment, and planning expertise. Forbes concluded that better 
integration between Australian oceans and defence policy was required, and that 
Australian maritime doctrine be linked to future force development. Forbes 
challenged the existing RAN force structure, noting that coastal surveillance 
requirements for patrol boats had not been assessed, but that the capacity of the 
RAN to undertake constabulary operations was affected by insufficient 
resources.13
What differentiates this thesis from the earlier work described above is 
that the research goes beyond a discussion of policy and strategy in the 
maritime context, and evaluates exactly what the Canadian Navy actually does 
to support domestic enforcement efforts and, just as important, where the Navy 
does it. Earlier works, for instance, cite their navies’ contributions to fisheries 
protection in terms of the number of “sea days” provided by naval vessels, but 
analyse the sea day no further. However, this thesis will examine, for example, 
what the naval vessels did during those sea days assigned for fisheries support, 
where it was done, and whether it made any difference in terms of 
interdepartmental co-operation and effectiveness.
1971 - 2000.” (M.A. dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1992).
13 Andrew Forbes, “Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary Operations in Australia’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone.” (M.P.A. project, Queen’s University, 2001).
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1.8 Effect of Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001
Since the Second World War, ocean governance in Canada had evolved 
in a relatively benign threat environment. While Canadian fisheries may have 
been susceptible to over-fishing or pollution of fish habitat, and smuggling of 
contraband and persons occurred on an ongoing basis, these were largely non­
violent threats. Since the end of the Cold War, large co-ordinated attacks on 
continental North America by either state or non-state actors were considered 
highly unlikely. Maritime security was taken for granted by most Canadians, 
including those employed in the government ministries responsible for 
monitoring and enforcing Canada’s sovereignty.
That dynamic changed with the terrorist attacks in New York City on 11 
September 2001. Although the assault occurred on American soil, there were 
repercussions on both sides of the Canada/United States border. The lethargic 
Canadian government was poked out of its slumber and forced to address 
national security issues it had long ignored.
Why is this relevant? This research project was started in 1998, three 
years before the terrorist attacks in New York. Both the structure of Canadian 
government departments and the relationship among one another were different 
then. The events of 11 September brought about notable changes to the federal 
structure to address the heightened security threat. In some cases, entirely new 
departments were established, or morphed from one or two former organs of 
government. This thesis depicts existing structures and relationships that exist 
in 2006. Where significant change has occurred since 2001, it has been noted 
where relevant to this thesis.
1.9 Summary
This thesis takes a geographic approach to studying the role and 
contribution to domestic maritime enforcement by a nation’s naval forces. Only a 
handful of other scholars have undertaken similar studies, and their studies 
examined the cases of foreign navies. This thesis contributes to knowledge by 
going beyond the mere discussion of policy and strategy, and undertakes a
15
spatial analysis of the enforcement effort to measure and evaluate the execution 
of oceans, security and defence policy. Moreover, this thesis does so in the 
uniquely Canadian maritime context.
The next chapter will outline how the research was structured to best 
determine what role the Canadian Navy plays a key role in domestic maritime 
enforcement in Canada, and whether this employment is of value to the 
Canadian Navy.
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Chapter Two 
RESEARCH METHODS
2.1 Overview of Research Plan
The overall objective of this thesis was to evaluate the employment of 
the Canadian Navy in a maritime enforcement role within Canadian waters and 
their seaward approaches. This research was intended to validate two 
suppositions. The first is that the Canadian Navy plays a key role in domestic 
maritime enforcement in Canada. The second is that employment of naval 
forces in an enforcement role is of value to the Canadian Navy.
There are many ways to approach such a research problem. The 
temptation is great to direct the research towards a comparative study among 
the navies of Canada and other like-minded democracies whose government 
fleets are of similar size and character. However, to adequately validate the 
two thesis suppositions, my approach to the research problem was to augment 
a policy framework assessment with a measurement and analysis of the 
operational results. In other words, this research has taken into account the 
mandate for enforcement that the Government of Canada has given to the 
Navy and, in turn, how the Navy executes that mandate.
Thus, this investigation was comprised of two main parts. They are:
a. an analysis of political and regulatory structures; and
b. an analysis of enforcement operations.
The first part is an examination of the policy and regulatory framework 
that governs the enforcement components of oceans management and national 
security in Canada. It is in this part that answers are found for the questions of 
what constitutes the defence department’s role, what is maritime enforcement, 
and how does it relate to defence and security. Also addressed are the 
questions as to which departments and agencies have responsibilities for 
maritime enforcement and what is the expected contribution of the Navy in this 
regard.
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The second part of the investigation is a determination of the Navy’s 
contribution to domestic maritime enforcement, but pursued through the lens of 
marine geography, i.e., spatial analyses. What goes on in Canada’s maritime 
zones, what are the patterns of marine traffic and activity, what resources are 
allocated for enforcement, and where the resources are focussed are the key 
questions that will be addressed. In addition, the second part will demonstrate 
the value that the Navy accrues from this type of employment.
The relationship between the Navy and other government departments 
is multi-layered and complex. Thus, investigation of the enforcement linkages 
alone is insufficient to provide an understanding of how the Navy contributes to 
both oceans management and national security. Accordingly, I considered that 
the Navy’s role in the conduct of domestic operations was worthy of treatment 
on its own.
2.2 Thesis Structure
To evaluate the employment of the Canadian Navy in a maritime 
enforcement role within Canadian waters and their seaward approaches six key 
themes were explored. These themes are:
a. geographical description of study area;
b. policy and regulatory framework;
c. interdepartmental relationships in domestic operations;
d. naval contribution to maritime domain awareness;
e. naval contribution to patrol and response; and
f. value of naval enforcement activity.
2.3 Research Design
To investigate these six themes of inquiry, a variety of methods were 
incorporated in the research design. Literature reviews and interviews would 
address the first three themes. Researching archival sources for reconstruction 
of historical enforcement patrol activity would partially address the naval 
contribution to domain awareness and patrol themes. Gathering of primary 
data by survey, and a media content analysis would address the final theme. A
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desktop computer geographic information system (GIS) was used for statistical 
analysis where appropriate, as well as for map analysis of the primary data.
2.3.1 Theme - Geographical Description of Study Area
The objective of this theme of inquiry was to demonstrate the 
dimensions of the physical features, distribution of marine and air transportation 
infrastructure, clusters of marine activity, patterns of movement, and economic 
impact of the sea on the study area. This theme allowed an understanding of 
the jurisdictional complexity and interdependence of the study area, and 
provided the marine geographical context for the thesis.
There were two methods employed to address this section. A literature 
review was conducted to enable a general description of the geographical 
study area. Additionally, a series of maps were developed to accompany and 
clarify the description. The key sources of map data were obtained from the 
offices of DFO, the DND Hydrographic Services Office (HSO), Transport 
Canada (TC), Maritime Air Component Atlantic (MAC(A)), Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Board (CNSOPB), Canada Newfoundland Offshore 
Petroleum Board (CNOPB), Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Halifax (JRCC), 
and Natural Resources Canada (NRCan). Table 2-1 lists the data sets 
acquired by the research for creation of the maps that addressed the marine 
geography of the study area.
2.3.2 Theme - Policy and Regulatory Framework
The objective of this theme is to understand from whence the mandate 
for naval support to maritime enforcement is derived. The use of maritime 
power is not confined to a single policy domain. Rather, oceans, security, and 
defence policies are all implicated by employment of naval forces. While the 
mandate for enforcement may be prescribed as strategic-level policy 
objectives, the execution of the mandate requires an operational-level 
regulatory framework to support it. This avenue of inquiry provides a 
comprehension of the evolution of the main policy areas that influence naval 
operations, and to understand where the Canadian Navy fits into the overall 
framework.
19
TABLE 2 - 1
DATA SETS REQUIRED TO ILLUSTRATE MARINE GEOGRAPHY OF STUDY AREA
Map intended to Show Data set / Shapefile Sources
Limits of total Canadian EEZ 
Limits of CANLANT Area 
Distribution of ports and ferries 
Distribution of airports 
MARLANT operational exercise areas 
Military patrol aircraft patrol areas 
Limits of NAFO regulatory areas 
DFO marine conservation areas 
Changes to VTMS for whale protection 
Limits of Canadian lobster fishing areas 
Limits of Canadian crab fishing areas 
Distribution of submarine cables 
Extent of past offshore drilling 
Current hydrocarbon drill rig locations 
Offshore Petroleum Boards Jurisdiction 
Current parcels of oil & gas exploration 
Limits of federal dept jurisdictions 
Boundaries of Halifax SAR Region 
Shipping areas served by VTMS 
Areas of compulsory pilotage
Common Data Sets for All Maps______
Cdn EEZ co-ordinates 
CANLANT co-ordinates 
Ports co-ordinates 
Runway co-ordinates 
Exercise grid co-ords 
Air exercise grid co-ords 
NAFO grid co-ordinates 
Area co-ordinates 
VTMS co-ordinates 
Area co-ordinates 
Area co-ordinates 
Cable co-ordinates 
Old well co-ordinates 
Drill Rig co-ordinates 
Area co-ordinates 
Land co-ordinates 
Jurisdiction co-ordinates 
SRR co-ordinates 
VTMS co-ordinates 
Pilotage co-ordinates
DFO, DND HSO, NRCan
DND HSO
Internet sources, TC
Internet sources, TC
DND HSO
MAC(A), DND HSO
Internet sources, NAFO
DFO, NSOPB
DFO, TC, Internet
DFO
DFO
Telecomms companies 
CNSOPB, CNOPB 
JRCC, CNSOPB, CNOPB 
CNSOPB, CNOPB 
CNSOPB, CNOPB 
Various federal depts 
JRCC Halifax 
DFO, TC, Internet 
Internet sources, TC
Canada/US border on landmass 
NB/NS provincial borders on landmass 
QC/NB provincial borders on landmass 
QC/NL provincial borders on landmass 
Limits of Hague Line between Canada/US 
Limits of French EEZ in Canadian waters 
Limits of Cdn EEZ in study area 
Limits of Cdn territorial sea in study area 
1000 metre isobath
Cdn/US border co-ords DND HSO, NRCan
NB/NS border co-ords DND HSO, NRCan
QC/NB border co-ords DND HSO, NRCan
QC/NB border co-ords DND HSO, NRCan
Cdn/US border co-ords DFO, DND HSO, NRCan
French EEZ co-ords DFO, DND HSO, NRCan
Cdn EEZ co-ordinates DFO, DND HSO, NRCan
Cdn TS co-ordinates DFO, DND HSO, NRCan
Isobath co-ordinates DFO, DND HSO_______
To achieve this understanding, a literature review was undertaken to 
determine gaps, overlaps, and common themes in strategic-level policy that 
affect naval support to maritime security. This review also examined the 
mandates and operational capabilities of the federal departments and agencies 
that have responsibility for maritime affairs in Canada. The main source 
material was government policy documents, federal statutes, and government 
Internet sites. The aim of this facet of research was to identify direct and 
indirect links to maritime enforcement, and to explain the statutory relationships 
between government departments and agencies. This inclusion of this 
framework in this thesis was necessary since there is no Canadian equivalent 
to the UK Civil Services Handbook that would have satisfied the aim. Rather,
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each Canadian department maintains its own Internet web-site that changes 
frequently, and no common standard exists as to the type of information or the 
level of detail to be found on these sites.14
To provide the spatial element to this analysis, a series of maps were 
designed to show the jurisdictional dimensions of each federal department that 
had a mandate for marine affairs. The data sets required for these maps were 
the same as those listed in the common data set section of Table 2-1, except 
for Fisheries and Oceans Canada. This department delimits its operational 
jurisdiction over water rather than using political boundaries over landmasses. 
Thus, DFO was contacted to obtain this particular data set.
2.3.3 Theme -  Interdepartmental Relationships in Domestic Operations
The objective of this theme was to understand how the Navy and 
government departments interact and co-operate in domestic operations and 
maritime enforcement activities. This understanding requires knowledge of the 
levels of co-operation and the processes that departments employ to co­
ordinate their operations. This avenue of inquiry provides a comprehension of 
both the evolution of interdepartmental operations as well as, an understanding 
of how the Canadian Navy contributes to the overall Government of Canada 
maritime security effort.
There were two methods employed to address this section. The first 
was a literature review of departmental standard operating procedures, 
operations plans, operations orders, as well as guidance documents such the 
Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations and the Federal Emergency 
Response Plan. The minutes of national level interdepartmental working groups 
and committees were also requisitioned and reviewed.
The second method of data collection involved active participation, as a 
member, in Regional Director General level interdepartmental working groups
14 Had there been a compendium that describes Canadian federal departmental mandates and 
statutory relationships, I would have referred to that rather than incorporate Chapter Five into 
this thesis.
21
and committees. This opportunity capitalised on the access afforded to me by 
my employment, and allowed an assessment to be made of real 
interdepartmental processes as opposed to theoretical ones. The assessment 
was derived from observations as a key participant in interdepartmental 
planning teams and working groups and, in particular, as the Chair of the 
Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee (ECIMOC), 
and as a member of the Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Committee. 
While I made a concerted effort to observe and describe the interdepartmental 
processes as objectively as I could, the potential for the perception of bias is 
unavoidable given my position as both committee member and Chair. However,
I don’t believe that this detracts from the overall thesis, since my observations
form only a small component of the research, and the majority of my
observations are corroborated by other sources.
2.3.4 Theme -  Naval Contribution to Marine Domain Awareness
An understanding of what is happening and what is likely to happen in 
the maritime zones and approaches to a coastal state is known as “maritime 
domain awareness.” The objective of this theme was to examine the elements 
that comprise maritime domain awareness. This theme provides an
understanding by what means marine domain awareness is achieved, which 
departments and agencies contribute to this awareness, and to understand the 
Navy’s role in this key element of marine security.
To achieve this objective, process mapping was undertaken to
understand the components of marine domain awareness. This included 
determining the level of human activity in the maritime approaches, the manner 
and level of effort expended by federal departments to monitor this activity, and 
the spatial context of the monitoring effort.
Analysis focused on the federal government’s maritime surveillance 
activities and, through this surveillance, identification of patterns of marine 
activity. There were several methods employed to achieve this aim. The first 
was a search for Government of Canada guidance on maritime surveillance. 
This was followed by a review of DND standard operating procedures,
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surveillance plans, and operations orders. A process map was then created to 
chart the multi-agency surveillance process. In addition, in order to understand 
better the capabilities of Fisheries and Oceans contracted aircraft (Provincial 
Airlines Limited, or PAL), an observation ride was completed during a five-hour 
DFO surveillance flight over the Grand Banks of Newfoundland.
To evaluate the level of effort and spatial context of the federal 
government’s maritime surveillance operations, the results of military and other 
government department (OGD) surveillance aircraft patrols for the year 2002 
were reconstructed for analysis. The analysis consisted of three paths:
a. determination of patrol asset “presence” in Canada’s maritime zones;
b. determination of patterns in marine activity in these zones; and
c. comparison of government presence to the marine activity.
The main contributors to government presence in Canada’s maritime 
zones are military patrol aircraft, DFO/CCG patrol aircraft, naval vessels, and 
DFO/CCG vessels. The inherent speed of a patrol aircraft allows it to cover an 
area eight to twenty times more rapidly than the fastest government ship, and 
aircraft are tasked for surveillance patrols on every day of the year. Given the 
distinct advantage as surveillance platforms that aircraft have over ships, I 
decided to concentrate on reconstruction of surveillance aircraft patrols to 
evaluate the naval contribution to maritime domain awareness.
2.3.5 Theme -  Naval Contribution to Patrol and Response
The objective of this theme was to ascertain how the Navy contributes to 
the patrol and response objectives in Canadian oceans management regime, 
and to gauge the magnitude of contribution in these activities. This theme 
provides the opportunity to quantify the level of direct support to maritime 
enforcement in Canada.
The patrol activities described in this section pertain to ship patrols in 
support of enforcement activities, as opposed to aircraft patrols in support of 
recognised maritime picture compilation identified the preceding section.
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Specifically, this section will demonstrate the naval contribution to fisheries 
enforcement. The questions to be answered are who is fishing in Canadian and 
North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) waters, where do we conduct our 
patrols, and where are the gaps? Is the enforcement presence where it ought 
to be? In addition, search and rescue (SAR) is considered a response activity 
in the framework of maritime enforcement. The questions to be answered are 
what is the frequency and pattern of SAR incidents in the study area, do they 
change over time, and are SAR response assets based appropriately to 
respond to these incidents.
To evaluate the level of effort and spatial context of the Navy’s 
contribution to patrol and response, data from enforcement activities that the 
Navy is required to support, whether by federal statute or through departmental 
Memoranda of Understanding were assessed. Thus, the main avenues for 
inquiry of this sub-theme are support to search and rescue and support to 
fisheries enforcement.
To demonstrate the naval contribution to fisheries enforcement four 
aspects of enforcement support in Canada’s maritime zones and approaches 
were assessed. These were:
a. location and pattern of fishing activity;
b. pattern of naval vessel presence and level of effort in enforcement 
support;
c. pattern and level of effort of inspection of fishing vessels; and
d. relative contribution of naval vessels to the inspection effort.
There were two methods employed to address this section. The first 
was a literature review of DND and Canadian Coast Guard standard operating 
procedures, operations plans, operations orders, as well as guidance 
documents such the National SAR Manual. A literature review would also be 
performed of DND and DFO Memoranda of Understanding, standard operating 
procedures for both departments, and operations orders for fisheries patrols. In 
addition, the literature was analysed to ascertain the evolution of the naval role
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in fisheries enforcement to understand how that might affect current operations. 
The second method for both search and rescue and naval fisheries patrol 
support was a spatial analysis of SAR incident data and naval fisheries patrols. 
The aim was to demonstrate the distribution of all SAR incidents over a 5-year 
period and naval fisheries patrols on Canada's Atlantic coast for the past two 
decades.
2.3.6 Theme - Value of Naval Enforcement Activity
While the analysis of naval operations for maritime security in Canada in 
both geographic and political contexts contributes to knowledge, another 
purpose of this research is to determine whether or not the employment of 
naval forces in a maritime enforcement role is of value to the Canadian Navy. 
This assessment is important within government circles since there continues 
to be pressure to cease routine naval support to enforcement on the basis that 
it is an inefficient use of maritime combat power.
To determine the value of enforcement support to the naval institution, 
three elements were examined. These elements were the deterrent value of 
naval fisheries patrols, the value of naval enforcement activities on public 
opinion, and the effect that fisheries support has on the combat readiness of 
warships, i.e. the ability of ships to complete combat readiness training on 
patrol.
Of particular interest to the Navy is whether or not patrols by naval 
vessels deter illegal activities in the areas of Canadian maritime jurisdiction. 
The Navy’s obligation through Memoranda of Understanding with other 
government departments requires that it spend several millions of dollars per 
year on fuel and other costs associated with fisheries and counter-narcotic 
patrols. If the deterrent effect is minimal, then the expenditure is questionable, 
and a review of those Memoranda of Understanding might be warranted.
The area in which the Navy conducts patrols and assumes surveillance 
responsibility is vast, encompassing the coastal zones of all of the Atlantic 
provinces, Quebec, and the northern administrative regions of Nunavut and the
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Northwest Territories as far west as 95 degrees west longitude.15 The 
distribution of operations, exercises, and patrols in this geographic area is not 
uniform; naval operations tend to be concentrated in the military operating 
areas in the vicinity of Halifax, and naval fisheries patrols are normally 
conducted in support of the Newfoundland Region of DFO. Accordingly, a 
survey of fishermen from all the Atlantic provinces would be needed to 
determine the perception of naval presence in the region.
In addition to the overall deterrent value of naval fisheries patrols, one 
should suppose that support to government departments, including fisheries 
patrols, provides inherent value to the Navy from the perspective of public 
opinion. Anecdotally, federal departments receive “good press” for their efforts 
to control international and domestic harvesting activities in fisheries that have 
experienced severe decline in the past two decades, as well as stemming the 
flow of illegal narcotics into Canada.
An additional method employed in this section to determine the value of 
naval enforcement activity, from a public perception point of view, was to 
answer the question, "How is the Canadian Navy portrayed in its support of 
other government department operations, in particular, fisheries enforcement?” 
To measure public opinion a media content analysis was employed.
One of oft-cited reasons for the reluctance of senior naval officers to 
embrace warship participation in constabulary operations is that this type of 
employment offers limited training value, and diminishes combats skills and 
war-fighting capability of naval crews. In order to examine this supposition with 
the aim of determining the training value of naval fisheries patrols, a means to 
measure the value of maritime enforcement to the Navy as a training impact 
needed to be developed.
In generating maritime forces that are ready for a variety of naval 
operations, the Navy maintains a series of combat readiness requirements for
15 The Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic routinely quotes 3.7 million square kilometres as
26
each class of vessel. These readiness requirements vary depending upon 
where the vessel is in its operational cycle and what the operations plan 
dictates. These formalized requirements are known as Combat Readiness 
Requirements (CRRs), and are reported to higher headquarters on a monthly 
basis. Commanding Officers of naval vessels are required to train their crews 
and to achieve the CRRs appropriate to the crew’s status in the Navy’s tiered 
readiness structure.
To measure the impact that naval fisheries patrols have on the ability of 
warship Commanding Officers to train their crews to assigned levels of 
operational readiness, monthly combat readiness statistics were acquired. 
These statistics were reported to Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters 
(MARLANT) by each warship in the Atlantic region. The combat readiness 
statistics of twenty-nine warships that conducted fisheries patrols over a three- 
year period were examined. The combat readiness levels achieved during each 
fisheries patrol were compared against those reported by the same ships in the 
months leading up to and after they had undertaken fisheries patrols. This 
comparison permitted an assessment of the effect, either an increase or 
decline in the combat readiness levels, due to employment of the ships on 
single vessel fisheries patrols. In addition, the combat readiness levels of three 
warships that had participated in multi-ship international exercises were 
compared against the single ship fisheries patrol statistics to determine whether 
single ship operations, such as fisheries patrols, affected the attainment of 
higher combat readiness levels.
2.4 Data Collection and Analysis
A major component of monitoring and maritime enforcement is the 
development of maritime domain awareness. There are two components to 
establishing this situational awareness: obtaining an accurate “snapshot” of the 
marine traffic and activity, and obtaining the intelligence, indicators and 
warnings of influences that could cause the marine activity to change. The 
Canadian Navy is involved in both of these aspects; multiple departments and
his maritime area of responsibility, an area that extends well beyond the Canadian EEZ.
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agencies are involved in providing the intelligence and indicators, but the Navy 
is the de facto lead department for piecing together the “snapshot” or what is 
known in security circles as the “recognised maritime picture.”
There are multiple inputs into development of the recognised maritime 
picture. However, the security classification associated with the source and 
nature of the some of the sensors constrained what could be used in this 
project to establish patterns of maritime activity. So, for the purposes of data 
collection, the input that provided the best level of fidelity of data in an 
unclassified format was the vessel detection data derived from PAL 
surveillance flights. The data from PAL sources was used as the primary 
means to conduct the spatial analysis of marine activity in the Canadian 
maritime zones.
2.4.1 Surveillance Data Collection
There are several methods one can use to determine government 
“presence” in the maritime zones and approaches. The most accurate is to 
obtain frequent geographic positions of a patrol asset while it is on patrol, and 
then determine the relative amount of time the patrol platform spent in a 
particular area. If the actual “track” of the aircraft is known, a GIS can be used 
to determine the density of geographic positions in the patrol area. This density 
plot, or surface model, will provide an indication of relative presence of a patrol 
asset in a given area. The sum of multiple patrols provides a good indicator of 
presence for that type of ship or aircraft.
Surveillance data was obtained for CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol 
aircraft presence (DND) in addition to contracted PAL aircraft patrol presence 
(DFO). These two types of aircraft provide virtually the complete aerial 
surveillance picture off of Canada’s coasts.16 Unfortunately, data for individual 
track reconstruction was not available for either aircraft type prior to 2003; 
however, the geographic limits of their individual patrol boxes were known. For 
consistency of comparison, data for both aircraft types were collected for the
16 This assertion excludes a limited amount of space-based data not releasable for this thesis.
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year 2002 Data collected for determination of patterns of marine activity 
included the mission designator, date, time, geographic co-ordinates of the 
patrol area, as well as information on vessels detected during each patrol, such 
as geographic co-ordinates, vessel name, nationality, and type of vessel.
For the CP-140 Aurora patrols, since individual track data was not 
available for data collection, recording was completed for the predefined sector 
in which the CP-140 flew then, once the desired period of inquiry had passed, 
the number of times aircraft flew missions in a given sector was determined.17 
The totals for each sector provided an indication of the relative presence of the 
patrol aircraft for a given period. Data was collected from the Maritime 
Operations Centre, which provided post-mission summaries, known within the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as Forms Purple. Each message 
contained the length of the patrol in hours, the overall geographic area 
assigned for the patrol, the percentage of the area that the air crew estimated 
that they’d actually patrolled, and a summary of the contacts detected. The 
data was then collated in an Excel spreadsheet.
The data collection method for PAL aircraft presence was the same as 
that used to measure the presence element of military surveillance aircraft. 
Since the PAL aircraft used the NAFO grid for surveillance planning and 
reporting, the totals for each NAFO area would provide an indication of the 
relative presence of the PAL patrol aircraft for a given period. All mission data 
extracted from PAL surveillance flights are stored in the Surveillance 
Information System (SIS) server at PAL’s facility in St. John’s, NL. The 
Department of National Defence has access to this server, and is able to view 
mission profiles and tracks, but they are stored as raster images. Figures 2-1 
provides an example of the type of raster image available.
17 Maps of the predetermined patrol grids are found in Figures 3-7 and 3-8 of Chapter Three.
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Figure 2-1. PAL Flight Summary -  Newfoundland Region Example
Source: DFO/PAL Surveillance Information Server, 2002.
Data for PAL flight summaries were again obtained from the Maritime 
Operations Centre. The data collected included the mission designator, date, 
and the NAFO area and sub-divisions that the aircraft flew over during the 
patrol for each post-mission summary, which was then collated to an MS Excel 
spreadsheet.
For the spatial analysis of SAR incident data, the aim was to 
demonstrate the distribution of all SAR incidents over a 5-year period from 
1998 through to 2002. This period was chosen for two reasons. The first 
reason was that this data would be more easily obtained than data from other 
years. Prior to 1998, the Canadian Coast Guard had compiled their SAR data 
in a different format and the conversion would have been cumbersome and 
unreliable. The second reason was that I needed to analyse the SAR data over 
multiple years in order to determine whether the data collected for 2002 (the 
year chosen for comparison with other elements of this thesis) was normal or 
abnormal.
Through the Halifax Joint Rescue and Co-ordination Centre, Halifax 
region search and rescue incident data were collected for incident date,
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incident type, classification of incident, initial geographic co-ordinates, incident 
cause, and type of unit requiring assistance. Data were extracted from 
databases in Canadian Coast Guard national headquarters in Ottawa, and the 
data were provided in the form of three MS Excel files.
In order to analyze the contribution to fisheries enforcement over two 
decades, two main categories of data would be needed for this theme of 
inquiry. The first would be archival data extracted from naval ships’ logs stored 
at the National Library and Archives of Canada. This data would allow ship 
tracks to be reconstructed, as well as to obtain data on inspections of vessels, 
SAR responses, and helicopter operations during naval fisheries patrols. 
Primary data derived from the Archives would span a period of 17 years, 1980 
to 1997. From these logs data were collected on distance steamed per day, 
dates of departure and arrival at various ports, and the number of inspections 
carried out. The data also included the number of minutes that the embarked 
helicopter had flown, the names of any violators arrested, and whether or not 
the ship had been involved in a search and rescue activity during the fisheries 
patrol.
In addition, to analyze recent fisheries patrols, data was acquired from 
ships employed in fisheries enforcement support from 1999 to 2003. Positional 
information, fuel consumption, detection ranges of vessels, location of 
inspections and other related information were collected for the more recent 
patrols.
Ships’ logs were also requested from the Archives to identify vessels 
that had conducted other OGD operations. There were an insufficient number 
of logs to warrant further effort.
2.4.2 Observation
During the study period, I was employed as the Commanding Officer of 
a Canadian Halifax-class frigate for 18 months. My ship was tasked to conduct 
a fisheries patrol on the Grand Banks from 2 to 19 June 2000. This task 
provided me with first-hand experience in the conduct of a naval fisheries
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patrol, and allowed me to place data collected by other frigates in their proper 
context.
Additionally, midway during the June 2000 fisheries patrol, there was an 
opportunity for me to embark aboard a contracted DFO aircraft for a 
surveillance mission over the 3NO NAFO area of the Grand Banks.18 This 
provided me with an understanding of how PAL surveillance missions were 
planned, and the process by which surveillance data were recorded by PAL 
and shared among stakeholders.
2.4.3 Map Analysis
Two types of maps were developed for this thesis. The first were those 
maps that were purely illustrative in nature that did not depict data derived from 
primary sources. These maps illustrated departmental jurisdictions, locations of 
transportation nodes, etc. They are found mainly in Chapter Three, and 
augment the description of the marine geography of the study area. The
second type of map presented data obtained from primary sources, usually 
point data. These maps depicted naval vessel tracks, marine traffic densities, 
the locations of search and rescue incidents, and other similar information.
2.4.3.1 Standard Map Format and Attributes
The coverage of the “standard” map was set 40 degrees to 52 degrees 
North latitude and from 43 degrees to 68 degrees West longitude, reflecting the 
dimensions of the study area.19 Map coverage further north would be 
necessary for some specific maps, and would be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis. The ArcGIS projection selected was conic; the central meridian was 
minus 54.9077890356 degrees, and the mathematical relationship was 
equidistant.20 This Equidistance Conic projection was chosen to preserve the 
scale along the meridians and is the preferred projection for measuring 
distances.
18 DFO/PAL Mission # BKNF00-180 aboard aircraft C-GMWR on 10 June 2000. Flight time 4.9 
hours.
19 The reasons for these limits are explained in the next chapter.
20 In most GIS software, west longitudes and southern latitudes are entered as negative 
numbers.
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Standard map attributes were applied. The landmass displayed would 
be the Atlantic region provinces and, as required, the Arctic landmasses. All 
maps would display the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone and Canadian 
Territorial Sea, 200 nautical miles and 12 nautical miles respectively. As well, 
the Canada/United States maritime boundary, also known as the Hague Line, 
and the Canada/France maritime boundary would be included. The land 
borders between Canada and the United States, New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia, Quebec and New Brunswick, and Quebec and Labrador would be 
displayed on all maps.
Standard maps would display the 1000 metre isobath. The main reason 
for inclusion of the 1000 metre isobath is that where this isobath intersects a 
line representing the EEZ, the Nose and the Tail of the Grand Banks are clearly 
delineated. These are two key geo-political features of the Canadian maritime 
approaches. Standard maps would display latitude and longitude delimited 
every five degrees, and the ellipsoid reference system would be the World 
Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84).
Once in receipt of the data sets required to create the maps, geographic 
co-ordinates were converted into degrees/minutes/seconds format in MS Excel. 
Table 2-2 depicts the potential input that the researcher might receive for the 
position 47 degrees 38 minutes 42 seconds North latitude 50 degrees 42 
minutes 51 seconds West longitude. A conversion utility program was used to 
render all map data sets into a format that would allow the spatial data to be 
processed, stored, and managed by the ArcView or ArcGIS software.
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TABLE 2 - 2
DIVERSE CO-ORDINATE FORMATS BY SOURCE
Source Latitude Longitude Remarks
SIS Server N4738.71 W5042.85 Format used for reports created by contracted 
DFO surveillance aircraft; accessed from DFO 
Surveillance Information System (SIS) website
GCCS N4738.71 W5042.85 Format used for military Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS); data captured from 
warship onboard command and control system
GPS N47°38.710 W050°42.851 One format of electronic GPS data capture. 
Used by scientific community, some ships
GPS 47.645000 -50.714167 One format of electronic GPS data capture. 
Used by scientific community, some ships. This 
is the format required by ArcGIS
Manual record 47.38.71 50.42.85 Although researcher requested co-ordinates to 
be recorded as degrees, minutes, seconds 
some ships provided data in degrees, minutes, 
tenths of minutes
Manual record 47.38.71 N 50.42.85W Although researcher requested co-ordinates to 
be recorded as degrees, minutes, seconds 
some ships provided data in degrees, minutes, 
tenths of minutes with N and W added
Manual record 4738.71 5042.85 Although researcher requested co-ordinates to 
be recorded as degrees, minutes, seconds 
some ships provided data in degrees, minutes, 
tenths of minutes minus period after degrees
Manual record N4738.71 W5042.85 Although researcher requested co-ordinates to 
be recorded as degrees, minutes, seconds 
some ships provided data in degrees, minutes, 
tenths of minutes minus period after degrees 
with N and W added
Form Purple 4737N1 5042W1 Format used for post-mission formatted reports 
created by military CP-140 aircraft; Data 
recorded as degrees and whole minutes with 
check sums (all digits summed to confirm 
message was not garbled in transmission)
With the assistance of a GIS technician at the Hydrographic Services 
Office, data sets were entered in the GIS to render the required maps. Where 
necessary, the ArcView Spatial Analyst module was used to measure the 
relative densities of the point data, and a surface model or choropleth map was 
rendered that depicted the densities in varying orders of magnitude.
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For surveillance analysis, maps were created that depicted the NAFO 
areas and military sectors most frequently patrolled by PAL and CP-140 
aircraft. For the spatial analysis of SAR incident data, surface model maps 
were created for the period of 1999-2002 inclusive, depicting individual months, 
as well as seasons, and by category of SAR incident, i.e., marine, air, or 
humanitarian nature of the case.
For the spatial aspects of naval fisheries support, maps of the track and 
radar coverage of a typical frigate and a minor warship on fisheries patrols 
would provide an appreciation of the large area that naval vessels are capable 
of patrolling and surveying. Individual tracks of naval ships over a 23 year 
period, as well as showing the cumulative tracks of naval ships during the 
periods 1980 to 1997 and 1999 to 2003, would depict the patterns of patrol, 
and would indicate the relative enforcement presence of naval vessels. 
Mapping would permit the spatial analysis of the cumulative inspections by 
government vessels from 1990 to 2002 in comparison to just those inspections 
carried out by DND vessels.
In the case of naval fisheries patrols during the period 1980 to 1997, 
ship’s logs were reviewed at the National Library and Archives, and geographic 
positions of the ship were extracted from the logs for every watch and entered 
into an Excel file. The ships’ positional information was converted into decimal 
degrees and the files, and using an ArcView extension called X-Tools, the point 
data was converted into line data that represented individual ship tracks. Data 
from recent naval fisheries patrols, i.e., 1999 to 2003, were collected to record 
ships’ positions every hour, weather data, and vessel contact logs that 
identified the ranges at which marine traffic contacts were detected by the 
ships’ radars or other sensors. The patrol report survey also collated the fuel 
expended, costs, detection ranges of contacts encountered for each patrol. 
Examples of these templates and summaries can be found at Appendices L 
and M.
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2.4.3.2 Map Analysis Methods
Comparison of marine activity and government presence was performed 
by a visual comparison of maps with a view to identify patterns of marine 
activity by month and season against the backdrop of patrol effort for the entire 
year.
A proximity analysis was performed on the boarding/inspection data sets 
using the Nearest Feature Extension. This tool was used to calculate the 
distance in kilometres from each fisheries boarding/inspection to the Canadian 
EEZ, both inside and outside the line. A similar proximity analysis was 
performed using the same tool to calculate the distance from each fisheries 
boarding/inspection to DND and DFO airfields and vessel home ports. The 
purpose of these two analyses was to determine whether there is a correlation 
between where fishing vessels are inspected, and proximity to a maritime 
political boundary, as well as to patrol bases.
2.4.4 Media Content Analysis
In order to determine whether naval enforcement activities provide 
inherent value to the Navy from the perspective of public opinion, the Navy’s 
senior public affairs officer was consulted, and it was discovered that the 
Director General Public Affairs (DGPA) conducts, on almost an annual basis, 
periodic nation-wide public polling. Although during the mid-1990s, the poll 
sought Canadians’ opinions on the use of its military to assist police forces, 
prevent illegal fishing, prevent illegal drugs and immigrants from entering 
Canada, the majority of questions in DGPA’s “Canadians on Defence” public 
opinion poll were not germane to this thesis. Moreover, DGPA advised that the 
DND-commissioned poll questions would remain broad in their outlook, and 
could not be adjusted to obtain the public’s perspective for a single Service 
such as the Navy. Rather, the DGPA instrument could only be used for the 
questions pertaining to the Canadian Forces as a whole.21
21 Canada. Department of National Defence, Canadians on Defence: Public Perception of the 
Canadian Forces. December 1999. <http://dgpa-dgap.mil.ca/DGPA/Polling/jan99/eng/dec 
_e_99.htm> (16 February 2002).
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It seemed necessary to answer the question, "How does media portray 
the Canadian Navy in its support of other government department operations, 
in particular, fisheries enforcement?” Accordingly, a media content analysis 
was designed to gauge the public relations value of naval fisheries patrols. A 
qualitative media content analysis was conducted largely because one of the 
aims of this part of the study was to determine the bias of data being collected. 
A qualitative media content analysis of print media would facilitate the coding of 
data based on an interpretation of the data by the collector.
News articles from 1993 and later were reviewed because it was in 1993 
that DGPA established the means to capture electronic newspaper stories from 
over 30 Canadian newspapers, and made them available to anyone with a 
DND-networked computer. This made it possible to monitor a large number of 
electronic print stories and all articles relating to “naval” stories could be 
identified easily since the network system used “key words” to categorize the 
electronic articles. The complete list of DGPA’s “naval” key words is found at 
Appendix Q.
It is common in media content analysis to include many data sources, 
such as visual presentation, diversity of sources, photos, amount of area on the 
page devoted to the article in addition the story theme and author.22 However, 
this additional data was not considered relevant to the study. Thus, media 
content analysis focused on naval stories and whether or not they could be 
interpreted as depicting the Navy in a positive, negative or neutral light.
A pilot project was conducted for a 3-month period, whereby through the 
DGPA web-site relevant stories were rated according to theme and categorized 
as to whether the print media portrayed the Canadian Navy in a positive, 
negative, or neutral light. The result identified 10 themes and, if they related to 
support to other government departments, an additional sub-theme. These 
findings provided the basis for the media content analysis. The front page of 
the template employed for the media content analysis is found at Appendix Q.
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A period of one year, 2002, was chosen for analysis since a year would 
provide a sufficient number of articles and would incorporate a full cycle of 
seasons. This aspect was considered important, since many of the articles that 
would have a naval angle, such as search and rescue or relating to fisheries 
openings and closings, would have a seasonal element to them. A one-year 
media content analysis would then be compared to the annual DGPA public 
opinion poll.
To avoid bias in interpretation of the data, a single reviewer compiled all 
the data to assess the positive, negative or neutral bias for each media piece. 
Instructions were provided on how to interpret the stories, categorization 
criteria, and which stories to include. Since the DGPA web-site includes only 
complete news stories as they appeared in on-line newspapers, no instructions 
were necessary for non-inclusion from extraneous matter (i.e., paid advertising, 
promotional references, sports stories, or stories from gossip columns or 
blogs).
The reviewer was instructed to include articles about the Canadian 
Forces or Minister of National Defence, and articles referring to the Armed 
Forces that had any potential application to the Navy (i.e., articles about pay 
raises, quality of life in the military, stress of military life). Additionally, any 
reference to the Sea King helicopters, Aurora aircraft and search and rescue 
were counted as naval assets for the purposes of this media content analysis. 
Only the first appearance of a syndicated story would be counted, rather than 
multiple counts as the same story by the same author might appear in other 
newspapers.
The reviewer was also instructed to exclude stories in French, as well as 
television or radio items, and letters to the editor, and any stories relating to the 
Army or Air Force that had no direct or indirect bearing on the Navy. The 
analysis did not include stories about the Merchant Marine, or articles about the
22 Stacy Lynch and Limor Peer, Analyzing Newspaper Content: A How-To Guide (Chicago:
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Minister of National Defence or Prime Minister if the articles were political in 
content with scant reference to the Navy.
2.4.4.1 Media Content Analysis Criteria
The reviewer was given instructions to guide in determining whether an 
article had a specific bias. The criteria for classifying an article as having a 
positive bias were those that leave a general feeling or impression that the 
military is good. Almost anything to do with Op APOLLO would be a positive 
article because the public was very supportive of the military right after 9/11.23 
Often there are articles that criticize politicians and the government but are 
supportive of how the Canadian Forces is managing despite them. “People” 
stories are usually positive, as are articles about search and rescue in which 
the military aids individuals in distress.
The criteria for an article with a negative bias were those articles that left 
a general feeling or impression that the military was out of touch with reality as 
to how its people were actually doing. Such an article might suggest that the 
military did “too little too late” or tried to be politically correct in what it said. The 
article might contain examples that refuted the “official word” or made the 
military look inept, incompetent or that it was merely paying lip service, or trying 
to hide something. Articles that portrayed the Navy as negligent or wasteful of 
taxpayers money, or had the appearance of not checking fully into 
circumstances were considered negatively biased, as were those that 
portrayed the military as not an organisation at which anyone would want to 
work.
Neutrally biased articles were those that were flat, unemotional, purely 
factual articles. While an article might have been very negative where the 
government is concerned, such as with the Sea King helicopter replacement 
programme, the article neither praised nor condemned the military.
Northwestern University, Readership Institute, 2002), 4.
23 Operation APOLLO was the name given to the deployment of Canadian Forces to 
Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
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2.4.5 Data Sources
In the design of this project, ship and aircraft activity data were collected 
from various sources for patrol reconstruction purposes, and for measurement 
of the naval contribution to maritime surveillance. The major source of these 
data was the Navy’s Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax. Three other 
significant sources were the National Library and Archives in Ottawa, the 
Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, and the Conservation and 
Protection Branch of DFO Newfoundland Region.
There are many formats and data collection methods used to report 
governmental operations both within the region and to the strategic 
headquarters. In reconstructing the operational activities of surveillance aircraft 
and ship patrols, the next few paragraphs will discuss the sources available 
and their utility for reconstruction of events.
CP-140 Aurora aircraft surveillance flights were reconstructed from post­
mission summary messages (NATO Form Purple) generated by flight aircraft 
crews in 2002 and sent electronically for review and archiving to the Maritime 
Air Component Commander (Atlantic), who is co-located with the Maritime 
Operations Centre. Forms Purple are submitted immediately upon return to 
base of the aircraft, and are the most accurate flight summaries available. The 
patrol area and vessel detection data from the Forms Purple was extracted by 
the Maritime Operations Centre staff, and provided for reconstruction in MS 
Excel spreadsheets. Table G-1 at Appendix G contains the dates and areas 
patrolled by CP-140 Aurora aircraft in 2002.
Contracted PAL aircraft surveillance flights were reconstructed from 
post-mission reports archived in the DFO/PAL Surveillance Information System 
server. Mission reports are saved to disk from the aircraft computer, then 
downloaded to the shore-based server immediately upon return to base of the 
aircraft. These are the most accurate summaries of PAL flight activity available. 
In 2002, selected staff at the Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax had dial-up 
access to the server, and could download the mission summaries generated by 
flight aircraft crews, and convert the data MS Excel spreadsheets. I obtained
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access to the PAL patrol area and vessel detection data from the Maritime 
Operations Centre staff. Table H-1 at Appendix H contains the dates and 
areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft under contract for fisheries 
enforcement in 2002.
Search and rescue data were obtained from the national headquarters of 
the Canadian Coast Guard by placing a request through the Officer-in-Charge 
of the Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre (JRCC). The data were 
provided to the JRCC in data MS Excel format. I obtained the data, which 
included incident date, type, classification, geographic co-ordinates, and cause 
from the OIC JRCC.
Reconstruction of ship patrol activities proved to be more complicated. In 
order to compare fisheries patrol support over an extended period, I needed to 
locate sources that would indicate when and where ships conducted patrols, 
and what occurred on the patrols. As a naval officer, I was aware of a variety 
of reporting mechanisms and investigated each to determine their utility. 
Operations schedules, individual ship “flex” schedules, electronic ship activity 
reports, annual historical reports, post-deployment reports, and Officer-of-the- 
Watch notebooks were investigated as possible sources of data. I quickly 
determined that none of these sources were either reliable in terms of 
consistency of submission, or in completeness of content.24
Ship’s logs proved to be the best primary source for reconstruction of 
pre-1998 ship operations available to me. Ship’s logs form the official legal 
record of the ship’s activities, and are sent to the National Library and Archives 
of Canada for storage. At the Archives, I was able to draw the logs of ships 
that had completed fisheries patrols, and could manually record one 
geographic position for every four hour block of time, or “watch” as it’s referred 
to by mariners. In addition to the positional information, the ship’s logs provided
24 For a detailed description of the accuracy and reliability of naval ship activity source material 
see Canada. Department of National Defence, Ship activity related data and information in the 
age of business planning and performance measurement, by LCdr P. L. Massel and Jay 
Adamson, Operational Research Division Ottawa DOR(CAM) Research Note RN 9815, 
December 1998.
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data pertaining to length of patrols, duration of patrols, contacts detected per 
patrol, boardings and arrests per patrol, helicopter hours flown, and search and 
rescue incidents on patrol. In total, 84 naval fisheries patrols were 
reconstructed from ship’s logs. A list of the vessels and dates of the patrols is 
found at Appendix K.
While ship’s logs were the only reliable means of reconstructing naval 
fisheries patrols prior to the 1998 commencement of this project, I was able to 
acquire data from ships employed in fisheries enforcement support from 1999 
to 2003. Electronic templates were provided to naval ship Commanding 
Officers for the collection of positional information, fuel consumption, detection 
ranges of vessels, location of inspections and other related information. In total, 
33 naval fisheries or preventative patrols were reconstructed from templates 
supplied by the researcher. A list of vessel patrols and dates is found at 
Appendix K.
In all, during the project I determined that 214 fisheries patrols had been 
conducted in the Atlantic between 1980 and 2003. Of these, I was able to 
reconstruct and map the tracks of 119 vessel patrols. Although I was unable to 
obtain positional data on 83 of the 214 patrols, I was able, nevertheless, to use 
some data, such as boarding and inspection data, to further the research. No 
data, other than the dates of the patrols, was available for 14 of the 214 patrols.
Ship’s logs and templates provided data on boardings and inspections 
carried out during naval fisheries patrols, but the data from some of these 
sources were found to be incomplete. Better quality data were extracted from 
the Canadian Fisheries Information Network System (CFINS) by the staff of 
Conservation and Protection Branch, DFO Region Newfoundland. These data 
were provided in the form of a MS Excel file covering the years 1990 to 2002, 
and contained the date, time, name of patrol vessel, name of vessel inspected, 
nationality, and geographic position of the vessel.
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The data sources used to create the standard map format, e.g. political 
boundaries, isobaths, etc and illustrative maps in the next chapter were 
identified earlier in at Table 2-1 in section 2.3.1.
2.5 Quality Control
To ensure that the data collection method accurately represented aircraft 
patrol surveillance, actual track data for some of the long-range patrol aircraft 
were acquired for the period covering 2003. It was not possible to obtain this 
data for all military patrol aircraft, only those that had avionics packages 
designed for anti-submarine warfare. Thus although more accurate, as three of 
the aircraft in the operational squadrons were not fitted with the necessary 
avionics package, and they performed roughly half of the surveillance missions, 
sufficient data would not be available. However, what the track data could 
provide a measure of “ground truth” for the aircrews’ estimates of sector 
coverage.
To determine the relative accuracy of the aircrews’ estimates of sector 
coverage, 32 missions over a two-month period were obtained for the CP-140 
tracks at the end of 2003. The tracks were reconstructed and mapped against 
the patrol grid to determine whether the aircraft had actually covered the 
percentage of the sectors claimed in the formatted message summaries.
In virtually every case, it was determined that the radar of the aircraft 
had covered more area than the aircrew had estimated. In less than five 
percent of the missions the aircraft did not achieve the coverage estimated by 
the aircrew. This confirmed that the method of counting of sectors covered by 
patrol aircraft provided a reasonable representation of CP-140 presence in the 
Atlantic region.
Figure 2-2 is a post-flight reconstruction of a CP-140 patrol that shows 
the “ground truth” of the planned 4-sided patrol area versus the coverage 
achieved. This graphic is based on the actual aircraft track and two values for 
radar range, 150 nautical miles and 75 nautical miles (the radar horizons for the
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search and identification altitudes normally flown by that type of aircraft.) The 
figure also records all of the vessel contacts detected during that flight.
Figure 2-2. Patrol Reconstruction - CP-140 Aircraft 26 September 2002
Source: Derived from data supplied by Maritime Air Component Commander 
(Atlantic).
In late 2003, DFO agreed to allow PAL to generate an automatic ASCII 
flight summary of aircraft track and contact data. As with the CP-140, GIS 
software was used to plot almost all PAL tracks. The same 75 nautical mile 
buffer was applied to both sides of the tracks, which were then mapped against 
the NAFO grid to determine what percentage of the NAFO areas the aircraft 
had actually covered. Again in virtually every case, the radar coverage of the 
PAL aircraft was equal to or greater than 90 percent the sub-division counted. 
This confirmed that counting the NAFO areas by sub-division that were 
overflown by patrol aircraft provided a reasonable representation of PAL 
surveillance aircraft presence in the Atlantic region.
2.6 Interviews and Questionnaire Design, Format and Distribution
To address the issue of the value of the deterrent effect, views of those 
individuals who spend considerable time on the water in the Canadian maritime 
zones was sought. Through interviews and a questionnaire format, individuals 
could comment upon the perceived presence of maritime patrol ships and 
aircraft, as well as the observed effect of this presence on those who would be
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inclined break the law. Ideally, the best respondents would be commercial 
fishermen, drug smugglers, and illegal migrants.
The latter two categories of potential respondents would be problematic. 
First, it would be virtually impossible to identify those with a propensity to 
violate these laws, unless they had been apprehended doing so in the past. 
This was simply out of the question because no police agency would conduct 
such a search without a bona fide judicial requirement. Moreover, the sample 
would be restricted to only those individuals who had been caught and 
convicted of breaking the law, and would not incorporate the much larger 
percentage of individuals who conduct smuggling activities but who have not 
yet been brought to justice. Additionally, the fact that the overall number of 
persons with convictions for smuggling and migrations offences is small in 
comparison with the large number of persons actively engaged in fishing in the 
Atlantic provinces. There was a much better chance of success at obtaining 
credible data from the population of fishers, and there would be no need to 
handle sensitive personal information with potential legal implications. 
Accordingly, fishermen were used as respondents for survey purposes.25
To prepare the survey, an interview was conducted with a former 
commercial fisherman in the Atlantic region.26 During this interview, the types 
of questions were clarified, and aided in forming the language and jargon for 
subsequent interviews and questionnaire development. It also reinforced the 
mistrusting nature of all levels of government and, in particular DFO who 
fishermen blame for mismanaging fish stocks in the region. Moreover, the 
survey sought information about a potentially sensitive issue, the nature of law 
breaking. Some of the respondents would have violated various regulations, or 
knew those who had, and might be uncomfortable being questioned about the 
subject. To better attract participation, the questionnaire and its administration 
should not be perceived, and was thus clarified, as being associated with any
25 The term “fishermen” refers to persons of both genders who engage in fishing as a means of 
support. The researcher found, in the Atlantic region at least, that females who fished for a 
living genuinely chafed at the more gender-neutral term “fishers” favoured by government and 
academia.
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arm of the federal or provincial government. For this reason the survey was 
designed to avoid directly seeking responses about the Navy in isolation. 
Rather, the questionnaire posed questions concerning the maritime patrol 
activities of all appropriate federal departments in a comparative manner, and 
the naval data was culled as required.
2.6.1 Questionnaire Development
The questionnaire was designed to measure the deterrent effect of 
government enforcement assets in the Atlantic region. This survey required the 
development of a suitable instrument, the sampling of an appropriate 
population, and the analysis of the responses. The questionnaire design 
incorporated a section from which information about the person’s fishing 
experience and geographical areas fished, as well as a section designed to 
elicit responses that made comparisons between surveillance ships and 
aircraft. In addition, some questions attempted to determine what percentage 
of time fishermen felt that fisheries and law enforcement officers were aboard 
naval vessels and aircraft. The questionnaire can be found in Appendix P.
The questionnaire was reviewed by an experienced social researcher 
with extensive experience in survey methods and practice within the 
Department of National Defence. The deterrence questionnaire was also 
reviewed by a representative audience for content, a fisherman who 
represented the local union and also one representing the Fishermen's 
Association. The intent was to confirm that the questions and language would 
make sense to the sample population, and that the questionnaire was 
structured and formatted in a manner that would encourage completion of the 
instrument.
Given the vastness of the study area, it would was not possible to 
administer the questionnaire “face-to-face” at all Atlantic region fisheries 
associations. Accordingly, a decision was made to distribute through a mail
26 Lieutenant(N) Colin Warman, interview by author, 12 March 2001, Fifth Maritime Operations 
Group, Halifax, Nova Scotia.
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survey.27 An initial mailing was sent to the fisheries associations that 
represented those fishers who fished the inshore and offshore waters. Those 
associations representing the aquaculture industry, or those whose members 
fished internal or fresh waters were excluded from the initial mailing. Also 
excluded were all aboriginal fisheries associations due to ongoing tensions 
over aboriginal fishery rights in various locations throughout the Maritime 
provinces. It was felt that the questionnaire might be construed by the natives 
as an intrusion in an ongoing struggle between natives, government officials, 
and scientists.
The questionnaire also included an introduction covering the key "who, 
what , where, when, how" information as well as a self-addressed stamped 
envelope for a return card on which the association could agree or decline to 
participate. The return card also prompted the association for the number of 
questionnaire copies that it would require. In order to distance the research 
from any arm of government, all survey correspondence was directed to a post 
office box address. The initial mailing consisted of letters to 76 fisheries 
associations.
2.6.2 Questionnaire Responses
Responses to the survey were as follows: five envelopes were returned 
as undeliverable due to unknown addresses or persons; the majority of return 
cards, 84 percent, simply were not returned. Of the fisheries associations that 
had responded favourably to the letter of introduction, the numbers of 
questionnaires requested was low relative to number of members in an 
association, i.e., five copies desired for a membership of over 100 fishermen.
In all 144 questionnaires were mailed out to 14 different fisheries 
associations; 51 questionnaires were returned completed. The final 
questionnaire response was 35.4 percent.
27 George Gray and Neil Guppy, Successful Surveys: Research Methods and Practice 
(Toronto: Harcourt, 1999), 134. To increase the chance that a sample population will participate
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2.7 Stakeholder Involvement
The issue of release of military data was handled by obtaining verbal 
permission in January 1999 from the Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic, 
Rear-Admiral Duncan Miller, for release of the data, and for the use of naval 
ship and air assets for survey and data collection purposes. Subsequently, 
continuation of the research was obtained from each incoming authority, listed 
in Table R-1 of Appendix R. All military data released to me passed through 
the Maritime Operations Centre, Maritime Air Component (Atlantic) or the 
commanding officers of ships tasked with data collection. These officers and 
their staffs provided a “sober second-look” to ensure that no sensitive data 
made it to the public domain.
2.8 Role of Researcher, Opportunities and Constraints
Through my employment as a senior serving naval officer, positions, 
appointments and delegated authorities provided me access to maritime 
operations in general, and security and enforcement operations in particular. 
Duties related to surveillance and enforcement operations included an 
appointment to command of a high-readiness frigate that conducted a fisheries 
patrol in 2000. This operation allowed direct experience first-hand the process 
from start to finish. In addition, from 2001 to 2003, I held the appointment of 
senior operations officer for Maritime Forces Atlantic.28 In this capacity, I had 
direct dealings with national headquarters at the strategic level, and was the 
region’s senior military liaison officer to other government departments; and 
was responsible for the planning and co-ordination of domestic operations, 
fisheries patrols, and counter-drug operations. Moreover, the appointment 
furnished direct access to the local federal departments’ Regional Directors 
General, and entailed membership on various high-level interdepartmental 
committees. In 2003, I chaired the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Marine 
Operations Committee.
in a mail survey, it is important to create a good impression and make a survey easy to 
complete.
28 The official title of the position is Assistant Chief of Staff - Plans and Operations.
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In my capacity as a warship commanding officer, and subsequent senior 
operations appointment, the conduct of day-to-day business allowed immediate 
insight into the issues that encompassed both the planning and execution of 
maritime enforcement operations, and to understand the perspectives of the 
other agencies involved.
2.8.1 Constraints
Certain factors had an impact on research design. In order to conduct 
spatial analyses to understand the Navy’s effect in establishing maritime 
domain awareness, geographic data would need to be collected from airborne, 
ship-borne, and shore-based surveillance platforms and sensors conducting 
current operations, as well as defence and other government department 
databases. This data includes geographic co-ordinates of government patrol 
assets as well as those of marine traffic, and potentially “vessels of interest.” 
Depending upon its nature, some of the data is “sensitive” and restricted for 
release. Moreover, in the case of data originating from other government 
departments, some data is statute-restricted for release to third-parties for 
purposes other than those for which the data were collected.
The sensitivity of classified data usually decreases with the passage of 
time, particularly data that associates government assets with current 
geographic positions. To mitigate any reticence to release data, the research 
design called for the use of data that would be at least five years old at the time 
of thesis submission. By using this older data, no argument could be sustained 
that current enforcement operations might be compromised once the thesis 
entered the public realm.
Research design was affected by concern over release of data in 
another way. While analysis of the full spectrum of constabulary activities 
would provide as complete a picture of maritime enforcement as one could 
hope for, some operations are significantly more dangerous than others. 
Counter-narcotics operations are particularly sensitive; the police have a need 
to protect their “sources” and, as far as civil authorities are concerned, the less
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that is in the public domain about the capabilities of enforcement agencies and 
patterns of drug interdiction, the better.
While the loss of life associated with the drug trade is well recognised, 
few people are murdered over fish. In light of this, the research design focused 
on fisheries enforcement and the naval contribution to this facet of sovereignty 
protection, in the expectation that federal authorities would be more willing to 
release fisheries data than they would counter-narcotics information.
This was not entirely the case. Significant bureaucratic resistance was 
also encountered to release of fisheries data directly from the former 
Scotia/Fundy Region Fisheries and Oceans Canada office in Halifax. However, 
through participation in various oceans management forums and working 
groups, contacts were established to acquire a decade’s worth of boarding and 
inspection data from the Fisheries and Oceans Canada national database. 
This data was provided by Mr. Tilman Bieger, Director of Enforcement 
Operations, Conservation and Protection Branch, DFO Newfoundland Region. 
The data was released for academic purposes without caveat.
In order to derive the best appreciation of marine traffic, clusters of 
activity, and patrol patterns, the design intent was to analyse data that covered 
a common period of investigation. However, the diverse sources from which 
the data were obtained were unable provide data that encapsulated a common 
time frame. While some of the data sets span up to twenty years, 2002 was 
the sole year that was common to almost all of the data sets available for 
analysis.
In reconstruction of the naval vessel fisheries patrols from 1980 to 2003, 
some ship’s logs could not be located for the year 1997 and none could be 
located for 1998. This was because the logs had only just been received in the 
National Library and Archives, and had not been entered into the Archives 
holdings for viewing by researchers. Consequently, I was unable to reconstruct 
naval fisheries patrols during that period, and therefore unable to analyse a 
complete, unbroken 20-year period of patrol activity.
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In calculating the “presence” of a patrol aircraft, if the actual track of the 
aircraft is known, a geographic information system can be used to determine 
the density of geographic positions in the patrol area. This density plot will 
provide an indication of relative presence of a patrol asset in a given area. 
However, prior to 2003, there was no means to obtain track data for CP-140 or 
PAL aircraft, either by electronic data capture, or by manual recording of 
positional information by aircrew. In order to evaluate surveillance presence in 
2002, I was limited to assessing presence based upon the predefined sector in 
which the CP-140 or PAL flew then, once the desired period of inquiry had 
passed, adding up the number of times aircraft flew missions in a given 
sector.29 The totals for each sector would provide an indication of the relative 
presence of the patrol aircraft for a given period.
This method was less accurate than conducting a density calculation on 
track positions. Some of the sectors in the patrol grid cover vast areas. In this 
method if an aircraft enters the sector, the entire sector is counted for 
presence, even though the aircraft may have favoured only a small portion of 
the area. Notwithstanding this limitation, considering the timeframe limitations 
for data collection, this method was employed as the best means available to 
me, and I assess that it sufficiently addresses the concept of enforcement 
presence.
With regard to survey data collection, although much simpler and less 
expensive to administer, a survey of fishermen belonging to one or two 
fisheries associations representing a small geographic area would not reflect 
the spatial implications of a large area with few patrol assets. If the only 
fishermen surveyed were those that fished in an area that the Navy rarely 
patrolled, the results of the survey would be skewed. As such, ideally a poll of 
fishermen distributed throughout huge area of study would have been desired. 
Regrettably, conditions for completion of the survey would be less controlled, 
i.e. the researcher would not be present, and there would be potential for fewer
29 Maps of the predetermined patrol grids are found in Figures 3-7 and 3-8 of Chapter Three.
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respondents; however, these disadvantages would be offset by the greater 
credibility resulting from a wider distribution of respondents within the entire 
study area.
A limitation of the Nearest Feature Extension tool for ArcGIS software is 
that it cannot measure distances point to point; the tool is constrained to 
measuring line to point. Due to the limitations of this extension, the patrol bases 
point theme data were reformatted manually to line theme data by placing short 
lines over the point data at a zero scale for accuracy. This manual method 
introduced error into the distances of less than one kilometre. This error would 
not be considered significant for the purposes of this thesis.
This chapter has explained the framework upon which the research was 
carried out. The next chapter will provide a geographical description of the 
study area that will provide the necessary context for interpretation of the 
remaining material in the thesis.
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Chapter Three
MARINE GEOGRAPHY OF ATLANTIC CANADA 
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the marine geography of the 
Atlantic region so that the remainder of this thesis can be placed in proper 
context. By understanding the region’s dimensions, patterns of movement, 
disposition of population and clusters of various activities, the reader will better 
appreciate the complexity of the enforcement challenge in the study area.
This chapter opens with a general description of Atlantic Canada, with 
reference to the national situation when this comparison lends better insight to 
the subject. This is followed by a review of Canada's maritime zones as they are 
founded in international Law of the Sea and domestic statute. Included is a short 
synopsis of Canada's maritime boundary disputes. The chapter then narrows its 
focus to six key ocean-use sectors in Atlantic Canada, with a discussion of their 
economic importance to the study area. Critical infrastructure will be treated in 
each of the sectors rather than as a separate category.30
3.2 General Description of Atlantic Canada
As stated in Chapter One, the study area is the Atlantic region of Canada 
that comprises the four provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince 
Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland and Labrador. However, reference will 
be made to the province of Quebec, and Nunavut and the Northwest Territories 
when their inclusion provides a greater context to a specific aspect to the marine 
geography of the east coast of Canada.
The main study area is that between 40 degrees to 52 degrees North 
latitude and 43 degrees to 68 degrees West longitude. The limits of this area 
were chosen because the majority of the Atlantic region’s population resides 
within these boundaries, and the associated human marine activity is 
concentrated in this area. Beyond these limits, the land is sparsely populated to
30 Critical infrastructure are those elements whose loss or damage would have a significant 
strategic impact on the nation as a whole, or an impact on the regional economy and population.
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the north, and search and rescue is largely the only marine activity relevant to 
this thesis. Beyond these limits to the west, the area becomes less a maritime 
region than the hub of Canada’s industrial base and centre of population.
As can be seen in Figure 3-1, the Atlantic region shares, in addition to the 
relatively short land border between New Brunswick and the United States, 
maritime territorial boundaries with the United States to the south, and Denmark 
(Greenland) to the north. The eastern frontier is the Atlantic Ocean, in which 
Canada and France share maritime boundaries at the islands of Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon, a few kilometres south of Newfoundland. The rest of Canada lies to 
the west along land and sea provincial borders.
Area
Figure 3-1. Atlantic Canada and Main Study Area
The physical geography of the Atlantic region is greatly varied. With the 
exception of Prince Edward Island, each province has abrupt transitions from 
gentle rolling lowlands to locally high uplands. A large block of mountains is 
found in northern New Brunswick and another in western Newfoundland. A 
linear belt of uplands stretches across southern New Brunswick and northern 
mainland Nova Scotia. Another linear block runs easterly through northern 
mainland Nova Scotia and into the Cape Breton highlands. These upland blocks
GREEN
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serve to divide the region not only physically but psychologically as well. The 
isolated valleys provide areas where general subsistence farming can be carried 
out, although the Annapolis Valley in Nova Scotia and the south-eastern portion 
of New Brunswick have well developed agriculture activities. Most of the interior 
regions of the area are heavily forested with the eastern boreal forest dominating 
in Newfoundland and Labrador and the rest of the region having mixed, 
predominantly softwood forests. Prince Edward Island stands unique in the 
Atlantic region, being mostly low-lying and rolling with well-developed soils 
supporting a high level of commercial agriculture.31
The climate of the region is as varied as the physical geography and often 
geography is the main determinant to climatic differences. The climate zone 
ranges from moist mid-latitude with mild winters in south-western Nova Scotia to 
almost polar in western Newfoundland. Much of this difference is simply a 
function of size as the area stretches from 43 degrees to 51 degrees north 
latitude; however, proximity to the Atlantic Ocean also plays a key part. The 
ocean moderates both summer and winter temperatures making for warmer 
winters and cooler summers near the coast.
The mid-latitude location also means the region is on or near the path of 
seasonal storms. The hurricanes and tropical storms move up the coast and 
bring heavy rains to the eastern part of the region during late summer and early 
autumn. In the winter, while most of Canada is under the influence of a polar 
high, the Atlantic region is often affected by a north-east moving low, called the 
“Nor-Easter”. These storms are the winter equivalent of a hurricane and bring 
with them high winds and heavy snowfall. In the early summer months the 
warmer air temperatures combined with cold sea surface temperatures mean fog 
is a regular occurrence with an average of 122 days at the Halifax Airport, 80 
days at Sydney, Nova Scotia and 206 days at Argentia, Newfoundland. Another 
marine hazard, sea ice, is found predominantly in the Gulf of St Lawrence and 
Straits of Belle Isle area, as well as off the east coast of Newfoundland.
31 Ian Brookes, “The Physical Geography of the Atlantic Provinces,” in Studies in Canadian 
Geography: The Atlantic Provinces, ed. Alan G. MacPherson (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1972), 14-28.
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Hurricanes, “Nor-Easters”, fog and sea ice all combine to make maritime 
operations difficult in the Atlantic region.32
3.2.1 Population
The Atlantic region has a small population, less than eight percent of the 
total Canadian population if Quebec is not taken into consideration.33 Most of 
the population lives in the coastal periphery and is more rural than in the rest of 
Canada. Halifax, with a population of 359,183 persons, is the only major 
metropolis in the region, and was ranked 13th among major census metropolitan 
areas (CMA) in Canada in 2001. St John’s, Newfoundland, ranked 19th among 
Canadian CMAs during the same census, is only half the population of Halifax.34 
Labrador is to a large extent, unpopulated.
The population is ethnically much more homogeneous than the rest of 
modern day Canada and, is in many ways, reflective of an old style Canada. 
Atlantic Canada’s population is overwhelmingly Anglophone of British origins 
with roots in the region going back several generations. Of the four Atlantic 
Provinces, only New Brunswick has a significant Francophone representation, 
roughly one third of its overall population.
There is very little immigration (except in Halifax) in comparison to rest of 
Canada. Outside Halifax, there is slow to negligible population growth.
32 Canada, Environment Canada, Climate o f the Atlantic Provinces, 23 December 2004 
<http://atlantic-web1.ns.ec.gc.ca/climatecentre/default.asp?lang=En&n=7D7FE131-0> (8 August 
2006).
33 Eighty percent of the Quebec population, approximately 5 million people, lives far from the sea 
in urban areas that make up six Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA). These are Montreal,
Quebec City, Gatineau, Saguenay, Sherbrooke, and Trois-Rivieres. See Gouvernement du 
Quebec, Vivre au Quebec: La population, 11 April 2005 <http://www.immigration- 
quebec.gouv.qc.ca/ vivrequebec/section9/9_1-fr.htm> (17 April 2006).
34 Canada, Statistics Canada, Population and Dwelling Counts for Census Metropolitan Areas 
and Census Agglomerations, 2001 and 1996 Censuses -100% Data , 16 July 2002 
<http://www12. statcan.ca/english/census01/products/standard/popdwell/Table-CMA- 
N.cfm?T=1&SR=126&S= 3&0=D5> (8 August 2006).
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TABLE 3-1
POPULATION -  ATLANTIC CANADA
2005
Population35
Percent
English36
Percent
French
Percent
Aboriginal
Canada 32,270,500 58.5 22.6 3.3
Atlantic Canada 9,942,100 71.4 24.4 1.9
Nfld and Labrador 516,000 98.3 0.4 3.6
Nova Scotia 937,900 92.7 3.8 1.9
New Brunswick 752,000 64.6 32.8 2.3
Prince Edward Island 138,100 93.8 4.2 1.0
Quebec 7,598,100 7.8 80.8 1.1
Sources: Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by year, by province and
territory, 2006; Canada, Statistics Canada, 2001 Census.
3.2.2 Critical Infrastructure -  Road, Rail and Air
To frame the later discussion of marine transportation, it is worth 
understanding how the critical infrastructure of road and rail transportation 
renders the marine link strategic to Canadian security and by extension, its 
economy.
The Atlantic region is connected by road to the rest of Canada and to the 
United States. Perhaps the single most significant part of the road network lies 
outside of the region in Quebec in the vicinity of Riviere-du-Loup, since this 
represents the only road connection to the rest of Canada that lies wholly within 
the Canadian landmass. Similarly the Trans-Canada Highway near the Nova 
Scotia/New Brunswick border is the only road connection linking Nova Scotia, 
and by extension Newfoundland, with the rest of Canada. The Canso Causeway 
is the only land link for Nova Scotia’s Cape Breton Island (and by extension 
Newfoundland) with the Canadian mainland.
35 Figures for 2005 are estimates. The last official census took place in May 2006 with data not 
yet available. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by year, by province and territory, 3 
March 2006 <http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo02.htm> (16 April 2006).
36 Percentages are taken from 2001 census. See Canada, Statistics Canada, Population by 
mother tongue, by province and territory (2001 Census), 27 January 2005 
<http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo11a.htm> (16 April 2006); Canada, Statistics Canada, 
Aboriginal Identity Population, 2001 Counts, for Canada, Provinces and Territories -20% Sample 
Data, 13 August 2004 <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/highlight/Aboriginal/ 
Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&View=1 a&Table=1 &StartRec=1 &Sort=2&B1 =Counts01 &B2=T otal 
> (16 April 2006).
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The Halifax-Montreal rail link is the principal rail line in the region. It is 
strategically important for the movement of cargo between east coast ports and 
the interior of Canada and the United States. There is no longer a rail network in 
PEI or Newfoundland.
The principal commercial airports in the region are shown in Figure 3-2. 
Halifax acts as the regional hub. Its closure by bad weather, a rather frequent 
occurrence, has significant short-term impacts.
Of national strategic important are the Air Traffic Control (ATC) Centres at 
Moncton and Gander. Moncton has responsibility for the control of all air traffic 
in Eastern Canada. Gander controls all trans-Atlantic travel between North 
America and Europe. Some 1,000 flights carrying approximately 200,000 
passengers pass though the Gander ATC region every day.
There are also four major military airfields in the region whose aircraft are 
primarily concerned with maritime operations. 12 Wing, located at Shearwater, 
Nova Scotia is the location of the air squadrons that provide the anti-submarine 
helicopter support to the Atlantic naval fleet. 14 Wing, located at Greenwood, 
Nova Scotia, is the largest Air Force Wing on the east coast, and provides fixed- 
wing air support for maritime operations, mainly CP-140 Aurora long-range 
maritime patrol aircraft, although several Cormorant helicopters are based there 
for search and rescue. Other search and rescue helicopters are located at the 
third air base, 9 Wing in Gander Newfoundland. The last airfield in the region is 
5 Wing located at Goose Bay Labrador. This airbase was established to allow 
low-level flight training over the Arctic barrens, but in recent years as allied Air 
Forces have reduced training flights at this base it has diminished in significance. 
German and Italian Air Forces continue to operate from Goose Bay, but the only 
Canadian unit is a squadron of CH-124 Griffon helicopters that are used for 
emergencies at the base or in a secondary role of local search and rescue.37
37 Canada, Department of National Defence, Welcome to 5 Wing, 29 March 2006 <http://www. 
airforce.forces.gc.ca/5wing/about_us/index_e.asp> (8 August 2006).
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Figure 3-2. Major and Minor Airports -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Transport Canada, Canada’s Transportation System, Canada’s Major Airports,
2005.
of CH-124 Griffon helicopters that are used for emergencies at the base or in a 
secondary role of local search and rescue.37
Although the land and air portions of the area are important, the defining 
characteristic of the Atlantic region is the maritime dimension. No place in the 
Atlantic provinces is more than several hours from the ocean, and this proximity 
has come to define the people and their way of life.
3.2.3 Ocean Dimension of Canada and Atlantic Region
Canada has the longest coastline and shoreline in the world.38 The latter 
is some 57,759 kilometres in length, excluding the shoreline of most islands. 
When the perimeter of the 52,626 surveyed Canadian islands are included, that 
figure jumps to an enormous length of 243,042 kilometres. By contrast, the
37 Canada, Department of National Defence, Welcome to 5 Wing, 29 March 2006 <http://www. 
airforce.forces.gc.ca/5wing/about_us/index_e.asp> (8 August 2006).
38 Shoreline is the more exact measure of the perimeter along the water’s edge. The term 
coastline refers to the general line of a coast, where straight lines may be used to join bays or 
other indentations to the coast. See Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Coastline and 
Shoreline, 9 May 2005 <http://atlas.gc.ca/site/english/learningresources/facts/coastline.html#c4>
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shoreline in the Atlantic region is approximately 53,387 kilometres, roughly 22 
percent of the entire Canadian coast.
TABLE 3-2
LENGTH OF CANADIAN SHORELINE
Province Mainland Perimeter of Perimeter of Total
Coast Major Islands Minor Islands
Nfld and Labrador 8,172 11,548 9,236 28,956
Nova Scotia 4,051 1,883 1,645 7,579
New Brunswick 1,524 177 568 2,269
Prince Edward Island n/a 1,107 153 1,260
Quebec 10,389 554 2,380 13,323
Rest of Canada 33,623 97,653 58,379 189,655
Totals 57,759 112,922 72,361 243,042
Source: Sebert, L.M., and M. R. Munro. 1972. Dimensions and Areas of Maps of the 
National Topographic System of Canada. Technical Report 72-1. Ottawa: 
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources, Surveys and Mapping Branch.
Canada is one of only three nations in the world that borders three 
oceans, the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic Oceans. Canada has the second largest 
continental shelf in the world, covering roughly 6.4 million square kilometres 
(km2). As well, Canada is one of only seven Arctic nations, and has the longest 
Arctic coastline in the world.39
Just over 1,606,000 km2 of the country's land area is made up of islands, 
including one entire province. Three of Canada's provincial capital cities are 
located on islands. Two of these are in the Atlantic region, Charlottetown in 
Prince Edward Island and St. John's in Newfoundland.40
Canada has the second largest landmass in the world at 9,984,670 km2. 
The stated size of the Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone EEZ varies 
depending on whether the calculation included large bodies of inland marine 
waters, such as Hudson Bay and the Gulf of the St. Lawrence. As well, 
contested maritime boundaries with the United States in the Arctic and North 
Pacific Ocean also affect the final outcome of the calculation. Whichever figure 
is used, the Canadian ocean areas are approximately two-thirds to three-
(15 April 2006).
R. McNab, ed., Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of Canadian 
Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans (Dartmouth: 
Geological Survey of Canada, 1994),17.
40 Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Sea Islands, 10 March 2004 <http://atlas.gc.ca/ 
site/english/learningresources/facts/islands.html > (15 April 2006).
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quarters the size of the landmass thus, as depicted in Figure 3-3, creating a 
second country to seaward.41
TABLE 3-3
SIZE OF CANADIAN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Region Size of Area
Atlantic Exclusive Economic Zone 1,400,000 km"
Pacific Exclusive Economic Zone 380,000 km2
Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone 2,920,000 km2
Internal Arctic Waters 3,380,000 km2
TOTAL 8,080,000 km2
Continental Margin beyond EEZ 1,800,000 km2
Source: Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy Project: Phase One Report on 
National Requirements, Dalhousie University, 1992.
Figure 3-3. Canadian Exclusive Economic Zone
Source: Compiled from DND data set by Hydrographic Services Office Halifax.
41 The size of the Canadian EEZ is given as 4,698,968 km2 (1,370,000 square nautical miles) in 
Martin Pratt, ed., Janes Exclusive Economic Zones (Surrey: Selwood Printing, 1999), 28; as 
5,543,913 km2 in Canada’s Marine Areas: Integrating the Boundaries of Politics and Nature, 
<http://www.whc.org/documents/MarineAreasMapText.doc> (16 April 2006); and as 6,380,000 
km2 in R. McNab, ed., Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of 
Canadian Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans 
(Dartmouth: Geological Survey of Canada, 1994).
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3.2.4 Canada's Maritime Spaces and International Sea Law
The capacity of a coastal state to conduct more effective oceans 
management increased as a consequence of the evolution of international law. 
The most recent convention, the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention III (UNCLOS 111), establishes certain maritime zones and affords 
coastal states jurisdiction in these waters to varying degrees depending upon the 
zone. From Canada’s perspective, among the most important of the UNCLOS 
Convention's provisions are:
ARTICLE 3: Entitles each coastal state to a territorial sea extending 12 nautical 
miles from shore, within which the nation has complete sovereignty.
ARTICLE 33: Entitles each coastal state to establish a contiguous zone of up to 
24 nautical miles width from the shore within which the state may prevent the 
infringement of its national laws relating to customs, fiscal matters, immigration 
and sanitation.
ARTICLE 57: Entitles each coastal state to establish an Exclusive Economic 
Zone extending 200 nautical miles from its shores. ARTICLE 56: Gives the 
coastal state sovereign rights over the resources of the EEZ. This includes the 
right to control exploration and development, the right to conserve and manage 
resources, either living or non-living, and the right to establish and enforce 
regulations to protect and preserve the marine environment.
ARTICLE 66: Gives coastal states extensive rights to manage stock levels and 
fishing for "anadromous" species, i.e. salmon. This provision is of great 
importance to Canada, and especially to British Columbia.
ARTICLE 76: Gives coastal states the right to lay claim to areas of the seabed 
up to the continental shelf or out to 200 nautical miles should the continental 
shelf not extend that far. In certain cases, coastal states may also lay claim to 
areas extending beyond the 200 mile EEZ limit, up to a maximum of 350 nautical 
miles. In order to claim areas beyond 200 nautical miles, they must lie within 60 
miles of the foot of the continental slope. To claim beyond that to the 350
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nautical mile maximum, the thickness of sedimentary rocks must be at least 
1 per cent of the shortest distance from the foot of the continental slope. Not 
included in these claims are seamounts or submarine ridges
ARTICLE 77: Gives coastal states exclusive rights to explore or exploit the 
natural resources lying on the surface of, or below their continental shelf, 
whether living or non-living. This includes the right to regulate drilling on the 
continental shelf.
SECTION 5 (ARTICLES 207-212): Charges states with extensive responsibility 
in relation to controlling and preventing marine pollution from a variety of 
sources.
SECTION 6 (ARTICLES 213-222): Charges coastal states with extensive 
responsibilities for enforcing anti-pollution rules and regulations in their territorial 
sea, EEZ and continental shelf areas.
ARTICLE 234: Gives coastal states possessing ice-covered areas within their 
EEZ the right to make special laws for the protection of the marine environment 
in such areas. This article reinforces the existing provisions of Canada's Arctic 
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (1970).
When the UNCLOS III came into force 16 November 1994, it allowed 
Canada to claim sovereign rights, jurisdiction or control over an area almost 10 
million square kilometres in size. In response to the UNCLOS III provisions, 
Canada’s Oceans Act was passed by the House of Commons October 21, 1996 
came into effect January 31, 1997. It describes Canada's maritime zones in 
much the same language as that of UNCLOS III. More importantly, it codified 
the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of Canada in these zones. For instance, as 
in the UNCLOS III Article 33 example above, Section 12(1 )of the Oceans Act 
specifies that in respect to customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary law "every 
basic power of arrest, entry, search or seizure, or other power that could be 
exercised in Canada ... may also be exercised in the contiguous zone of 
Canada."
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Figure 3-4 is a smaller scale map of the southern maritime region that 
depicts the limits of Canada's declared maritime zones and their relationship to 
the continental shelf. Three offshore features that that figure prominently in 
Atlantic Canada's maritime affairs are the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks of 
Newfoundland and the Flemish Cap.
Figure 3-4. Territorial Sea, Contiguous and Exclusive Economic Zones
Source: Compiled from DND data sets by HSO Halifax.
3.2.5 Maritime Boundary disputes
Canada's maritime jurisdictions are well-established and internationally 
recognized. There are several unsettled maritime boundaries with the United 
States in areas of valuable fishery and seabed resource exploitation, both actual 
and potential. However, the two countries have developed amicable means of 
managing these disputes, including co-operative development or mutual, non­
prejudicial use agreements for disputed areas.
The two most contentious and long-standing maritime boundary disputes 
in the Atlantic region between Canada and other parties were settled through 
judicial and third party resolution processes. The first was a dispute with the
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United States over the international boundary on Georges Bank, south west of 
Nova Scotia. In that case, the International Court of Justice at the Hague 
established a boundary in 1984 that bisected the rich scallop fishing grounds of 
the bank.
The most serious and protracted dispute was with France, and concerned 
that nation's claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone around the islands of St. 
Pierre and Miquelon, south of Newfoundland. Through third party arbitration, on 
10 June 1992, a decision was reached that established a narrow corridor to the 
south of the islands. The ruling gave Canada control over about 80 percent of 
the disputed area. The settlement allowed France a 24 nautical mile zone 
around the islands, and a 10.5 nautical mile wide corridor from the islands south 
through the 200 nautical mile limit EEZ. Consequently, 2,537 of the 13,703 
square nautical miles fall under French jurisdiction.
At present, there remain six maritime boundary disputes between Canada 
and other nations. Of these, three are in the study area.
3.2.5.1 Northwest Passage (Canada/United States)
At present, the United States does not recognize the Canadian claim that 
the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters. The US position is that the 
Northwest Passage is an international strait within the meaning of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Thus, the United States is claiming 
the right to pass unhindered through Canadian waters of the Northwest Passage 
in the "normal mode of transit." In 1985 Canada announced that it would draw 
straight baselines around the islands of the Arctic archipelago, declaring all 
marine areas encompassed by the process to be internal waters. The new 
regime came into effect on 1 January 1986. It is worth noting in this regard that 
Canada's 12 nautical mile territorial limit effectively closes off Barrow Strait, one 
of the narrows within the Northwest Passage.
In January 1988, Canada and the United States concluded an Arctic co­
operation agreement with respect to Canadian control over Arctic waters for the 
regulation of commercial and icebreaker navigation. It requires that the United
65
States seek Canada's consent prior to navigation of the Northwest Passage by 
American icebreakers. The agreement does not address the issue of submarine 
activity in the Canadian Arctic.
3.2.5.2 Hans Island (Canada/Denmark)
Another dispute involves Hans Island, lying on the maritime boundary 
between Ellesmere Island and Greenland. Canada and Denmark/Greenland 
have agreed to a maritime boundary off Ellesmere Island, notwithstanding the 
disagreement over Hans Island. In 1973, in order to establish the maritime 
boundary between Canada and Greenland, the island itself was simply not 
included in the boundary. This dispute was largely dormant until 2004, when 
the Opposition party used the dispute to argue that the government was not 
supplying sufficient military funding for sovereignty purposes. Canadian national 
newspapers published a number of short articles about Hans Island, and 
reported that the Danes had sent ships north in the vicinity of the island in 2002 
and 2003. In 2005, Canada and Denmark agreed to resolve the dispute 
peacefully, but there has been no further progress towards resolution since then.
3.2.5.3 Machias Seal Island (Canada/United States)
The other island dispute is over Machias Seal Island, which lies at the 
landward and unsettled end of the maritime boundary established by the 
International Court between Nova Scotia and the United States. The island has 
little inherent value, and is not a major issue in resolving the disputed boundary. 
In addition to being maritime boundary dispute, it remains the sole terrestrial 
sovereignty dispute between the two North American neighbours.
The remaining contested maritime boundaries lie outside the study area 
on the Pacific Coast. All of the disputes are between Canada and the United 
States. The disputes concern the Beaufort Sea, Dixon Entrance and the Strait of 
Juan de Fuca.
3.2.6 Military and Search and Rescue Zones
The ocean area that Canada is responsible for defending under a 
combination of NATO and Canada-US defence treaties and agreements equals
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an even greater 11,000,000 square kilometres. In defence circles, this zone is 
known as the Canadian Atlantic (CANLANT) area of responsibility (AOR). It 
encompasses a vast amount of water space and extends well beyond the 
Canadian EEZ. The delimitation of this AOR was derived through negotiated 
defence agreements with Allied and NATO partners. Figure 3-5 depicts the 
limits of the CANLANT AOR. These limits span 3979 kilometres east/west, 5627 
kilometres north/south, and encompass an area of 5,931,757 square kilometres.
Figure 3-5. CANLANT Area of Responsibility
Source: Compiled from DND data set by HSO Halifax.
The allocation of particular military training activities to designated areas 
of ocean helps to reduce the amount of interference between air, surface, and 
sub-surface military units, and assists civilian ships and aircraft to avoid areas in 
which military operations are being conducted. This process also can assist in 
limiting the impact that military training activities have on the marine environment 
by co-ordinating and thus reducing the presence and type of activity in areas of 
biological sensitivity.
The current Maritime Forces Atlantic Operating Areas (MARLOAs) 
depicted in Figure 3-6, were promulgated in 1996. They replaced the Maritime 
Command Exercise and Firing Ranges that had formerly been used as practice
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areas by naval and air units of the Canadian Forces, and before 1967 by the 
Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force. The current MARLOAs 
encompass virtually all of the waters of Canada's eastern continental shelf and 
the Gulf of St Lawrence, not including the area surrounding the French islands of 
St. Pierre and Miquelon. This gives a much wider area of control for air and 
water space management.
Warning of military exercises and activities are promulgated to civilian 
maritime traffic in the form of Canadian Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) and 
civilian air traffic by Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). Surface naval gunnery and air 
defence exercises take place in the operating areas to a maximum altitude of
30,000 feet.
The major naval and military base on Canada's east coast is Canadian 
Forces Base Halifax, located at Halifax, Nova Scotia. The naval dockyard 
located in Halifax Harbour has been in continuous operation since the 1700s and 
is currently home to the eastern naval headquarters, Maritime Forces Atlantic 
(MARLANT), as well as the eastern naval fleet.
Overlying the MARLOAS is a series of air traffic zones and air maritime 
patrol areas off the eastern coast of North America. These zones, like their 
surface equivalents, provide a means for military air control authorities to 
separate aircraft and minimise mutual interference between aircraft. In the 
Canadian maritime region a number of patrol areas have also been established 
as a means of managing long-range maritime patrol aircraft flights in the 
CANLANT AOR.
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Figure 3-6. Maritime Forces Atlantic Operating Areas (MARLOAs)
Source: Compiled from DND data set by HSO Halifax.
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Figure 3-7. Air Traffic Active and Restricted Danger Zones
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) staff, 2003.
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Given Canada’s immense land and sea area, responsibility for Search 
and Rescue has been divided into three geographic regions, each controlled at a 
Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC). The first of these JRCC’s is located 
at Victoria and serves the region west of the Alberta/British Columbia border and 
the Nunavut/Yukon borders. JRCC Trenton serves Canada east of British 
Coumbia to central Quebec, and north to the high Arctic. JRCC Halifax is 
responsible for the Atlantic region and into the Arctic east of Baffin Island. 
Additionally, JRCC Halifax is assisted by two Marine Rescue Sub-Centres 
(MRSC) located at Quebec City and St John’s. The two MRSCs co-ordinate 
responses to marine search and rescue incidents in their areas. Figures 3-9 and 
3-10 depict these SAR zones.
Note that the Canadian EEZ extends beyond Halifax Search and Rescue 
Region. This results in the unusual situation whereby search and rescue is 
administered within a portion of the Canadian EEZ by the United States through 
rescue co-ordination centres in Boston and Norfolk.
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Figure 3-10. Sub-Regions -  Halifax Search and Rescue Region
Source: Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.
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3.3 Economic Impact of Atlantic Canada’s Maritime Zones
The ocean-use sectors that will be reviewed in this chapter are renewable 
natural resources, non-renewable natural resources, marine construction and 
ship repair, marine transportation, and ocean tourism.
3.3.1 Renewable Natural Resources
3.3.1.1 Commercial Fishery
For a number of years up until 1988, Canada was the leading fish 
exporter in the world. Despite well-known difficulties within the fishery, Canada 
remains the world’s fifth largest exporter of fish and seafood products. The value 
of fish exports, measured in US dollars (2004), was just over $3.5 billion. This 
represents just under five percent of the value of the international fish export 
market. Furthermore, the United States is Canada's leading market for fish 
products, receiving 69 percent of the export volume. Japan and the European 
Economic Community (EEC) are Canada’s next largest customers, receiving 11 
and 10 percent of exports, respectively. By comparison, the world's leading fish 
exporter, China, sold $6.79 billion in fish abroad in 2004.42
A 1987 study by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans estimated that, 
of the $8 billion spent annually on ocean-related activity in this country, 30 
percent was spent on the fishery and directly related activities.43
In early 1992, due to grave concern that the Atlantic cod fishery was being 
over-depleted, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans reduced quotas for that 
fishery, and increased diplomatic pressure on EEC states that exceeded 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) quotas on the "Nose and Tail" 
of the Grand Banks, just outside the 200 mile limit of Canada's fisheries 
protection zone. At the same time, he closed the commercial salmon fishery in 
the Atlantic for an indefinite period, again, as a stock conservation measure.
42 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Exports by Major Producing Countries, 2000-2004, 6 
July 2006 <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/world_trade/export_data/ 
wxv0004_e.htm> (8 August 2006); Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Domestic Exports of 
Selected Commodities by Major Market and Country, December 2004, 6 July 2006 <http:// 
www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/canadian_trade/export_data/xmkt04_e.htm> (8 
August 2006).
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With concern for the fishery mounting, on 2 July 1992 the Minster of 
Fisheries closed the $700 million Newfoundland cod fishery for two years. The 
moratorium applied to an area from the south and east coasts of Newfoundland's 
Avalon Peninsula, along the north-eastern coast of Newfoundland and extended 
north along the entire Labrador coast. The fishing ban put an estimated 20,000 
fishermen in almost 400 communities out of work.44 By early 1997 the 
Newfoundland cod fishery was just beginning to reopen and continues to be a 
shadow of what it was before the moratorium.
Canada has three main fisheries in terms of species groupings: 
groundfish (i.e., cod, haddock, redfish, halibut, pollock); pelagics and other finfish 
(i.e., salmon, herring, mackerel, tuna, capelin); and shellfish (i.e., lobster, 
scallops, crab, shrimp, clams). Of these three fisheries, shellfish is the most 
valuable in terms of landings, at $ 1.7 billion. Groundfish were the second most 
valuable category, worth $ 267 million. Pelagic landings were worth $ 172 million 
(all measured in 2004 dollars).45
Measured according to the value of species landings, the Atlantic queen 
crab fishery was the nation's most important in 2004, worth more than $613 
million. The Atlantic lobster fishery was the second most valuable, worth $588 
million. The Atlantic shrimp fishery was the third most valuable, at $247 million. 
These three species accounted for $1448 million -  almost two-thirds of the value 
of national landings in 2004.46
After the lean years of the mid-1990s, the fishery in Atlantic Canada is 
starting to show signs of a slow recovery. Although it is unlikely that the loss of 
the Atlantic cod fishery will ever be replaced, landings are starting to rebound
43 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans: An Economic Overview and 
a Guide to Federal Government Activities Communications Directorate DO, Ottawa, 1987, 13.
44 “Rage greets fishery closing,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 3 July 1992.
45 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2004 Value of Atlantic & Pacific Coasts Commercial 
Landings, by Province 12 May 2006 <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/commercial/ 
Iandings/seafisheries/s2004pv_e.htm> (8 August 2006).
46 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2004 Value of Atlantic & Pacific Coasts Commercial Landings, 
by Province.
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with the development of non-traditional fisheries and the expansion of foreign 
markets.
TABLE 3-4
CANADIAN COMMERCIAL FISHERY 1995-2000
Primary___________ |___________Aquaculture
Year Volume of Value of 
Landings Landings 
(‘000 tons) ($ million)
Employment
(FTE)
Volume 
(‘000 tons)
Value 
($ million)
Employment
(FTE)
National
1995 861 1,783 32,621 63 326 3,950
1996 927 1,577 27,572 67 330 4,240
1997 986 1,621 24,893 82 361 5,230
1998 1,003 1,578 22,998 87 409 5,550
1999 1,010 1,888 22,243 108 533 6,620
2000 1,016 2,134 21,000 122 573 6,950
Atlantic Region
1995 638 1,359 24,529 29 146 1,840
1996 686 1,149 21,481 32 159 2,040
1997 735 1,215 18,847 36 177 2,250
1998 785 1,294 19,005 38 171 2,390
1999 792 1,571 18,353 52 231 3,130
2000 873 1,790 18,500 66 281 3,530
Sources: Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Statistical Services, Ottawa; 
Canada, Statistics Canada, Canadian Aquaculture Production Statistics, Ottawa.
From a geographer’s perspective, the spatial management of the fishing 
areas off Canada’s East Coast appears to be a conglomeration of unrelated 
grids that vary by regulatory regime. Nationally, regulation of the fishing grounds 
is the responsibility of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) for waters under 
Canadian jurisdiction. This federal department has divided the Atlantic region 
into four administrative areas by province and has several different geographic 
grids that are employed for managing separate species.
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Figure 3-11. Commercial Fishery Annual Landings -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Statistical Services, Ottawa.
Overlaid on the DFO national areas is a grid correlating to the other main 
regulatory body associated with the east coast fishery, the Northwest Atlantic 
Fishery Organization. NAFO is an international organization that had its genesis 
when 11 nations met to develop a means to prevent overexploitation of many 
aquatic species in the northwest Atlantic. The 1980 NAFO Convention 
prescribes a regulatory area that stretches offshore from the northern edge of 
Baffin Bay to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.
Figure 3-12 shows the limits of the NAFO regulatory area. The eastern 
boundary is the 42nd meridian of longitude that runs through the southern tip of 
Greenland. In accordance with its enabling convention, NAFO exercises 
jurisdiction for fishery control only outside the areas claimed by the adjoining 
states, and therefore concentrations of fish generally are much lower in the 
NAFO area than within the adjoining 200-mile zones of Canada and the United 
States. However, fish densities are higher in the Flemish Cap area east of St. 
John’s, Newfoundland and in the “Nose and Tail” of the Grand Banks that lie 
more than 200 miles offshore. NAFO assigns each nation quotas for the major 
species managed. These include squid, redfish, capelin, American plaice, 
Atlantic cod, yellowtail flounder, and witch flounder.
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Source: NAFO Convention, Annex III, 1980.
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Figure 3-14. Lobster Fishing Areas -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Compiled from Fisheries and Oceans Canada data set by HSO Halifax.
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Figure 3-15. Crab Fishing Areas -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Compiled from Fisheries and Oceans Canada data set by HSO Halifax.
77
While NAFO has no authority inside the Canadian EEZ, Canada does 
report catches in the various NAFO regulatory areas. Moreover, as a signatory 
to the NAFO Convention, Canada is bound to ensure that the fishery inside the 
EEZ is consistent with the aims of NAFO in the open ocean.
3.3.2 Non-renewable Natural Resources
3.3.2.1 Offshore Non-Fuel Mineral Resources
Off the coasts of British Columbia and Nova Scotia, placer gold deposits 
with good potential have been identified. High purity silica sand deposits have 
been located in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. These silica sands can be used for 
glass making, solar cells, or fibre optics cables. Most of the national demand for 
high-grade silica sands is located near these deposits in Ontario and Quebec. At 
present, a significant portion of this market is satisfied by imports. Some high- 
grade marine clay deposits off the British Columbia coast are already being 
exploited for the cosmetics industry. Calcium carbonate concentrations exist in a 
number of places off our shores. Similar deposits are already mined off the 
coasts of Ireland, Australia and the United States for use in agriculture - the 
application of calcium carbonate to acidic soils can substantially increase crop 
yields.
Seawater is a complex solution in which a number of valuable minerals 
are suspended, among them, deuterium, magnesium, iodine, bromide, and 
lithium. Deuterium has already been extracted in Nova Scotia at Point Tupper 
and Glace Bay, where it was used to manufacture heavy water. The Sea Mining 
Corporation of Aguathuna, Newfoundland developed a small magnesium 
hydroxide extraction plant to serve the pulp and paper industry. While this facility 
has since closed, it did prove the potential of such operations. With the growing 
use of lithium in the manufacture of high energy storage batteries with lithium 
metal anodes, the market for this commodity may also expand at a rate that 
would warrant extraction from seawater.47
47 Wendy Martin, Once Upon a Mine: Story o f Pre-Confederation Mines on the Island of 
Newfoundland, Chapter V: Isle of Iron, Men of Steel, 1983<http://www.heritage.nf.ca 
environment/mine/ch5p12.html> (14 April 2006).
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Many large commercially viable sand and gravel deposits have been 
identified in the offshore, and could be exploited without danger to the marine 
environment. Millions of cubic metres of sand and gravel have already been 
extracted to build over 30 artificial islands in the Canadian Beaufort Sea since 
1972 to support oil and gas exploration. Similar projects could supply sand and 
gravel for construction of artificial islands on Canada's east coast as oil and gas 
development there continues to progress. Sand and gravel dredged from the 
ocean bottom may also be used to develop such projects like the Fundy Tidal 
Power Project, in harbour expansion projects, or for road construction. Seabed 
extraction of these resources has already been attempted successfully, 
profitably, and in an ecologically sound manner in the United Kingdom, France 
and Japan.
These are just some of the minerals that current technologies offer the 
promise of exploiting. Other more exotic seabed resources like poly-metallic 
sulphides also occur in Canadian waters, and may yet be harvested when have 
the ability to safely and economically do so is realized. The three products most 
likely to be extracted commercially in the short term are sand and gravel, silica 
sands, and gold.
3.3.2.2 Offshore Hydrocarbons
During the 1980s, extensive oil and gas exploration took place off 
Canadian coasts. This activity identified significant and extremely valuable 
reserves of both oil and natural gas. It is estimated that more than 50 percent of 
Canada's frontier oil reserves lie in Canada's offshore.48 The following tables 
provide an indication of the extent of this wealth in oil and gas. Figures 3-16 and 
3-17 show the extent of exploration permits and spatial distribution of former well 
sites. Figure 3-18 shows the location of current wells.
48 Naval Officers Association of Canada, A Maritime Policy for Canada (Ottawa: Naval Officers 
Association of Canada, 1990), 49.
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TABLE 3-5
OFFSHORE PETROCARBON INVENTORY
Region Oil
(‘000,000 cums)
Gas
(‘000,000 cums)
Discovered Resources
Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea 256.4 322.7
Arctic Islands-Eastern Arctic 65.7 416.4
Newfoundland Offshore 235.2 148.7
Nova Scotia Offshore 23.7 164.7
TOTAL 581.0 1,052.5
Potential Reserves
West Coast 50.0 270.0
Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea 1,112.0 1,918.0
Arctic Islands-Eastern Arctic 873.0 3,156.0
Hudson Bay 127.0 88.0
Newfoundland Offshore 894.0 1,649.0
Nova Scotia Offshore 318.0 663.0
TOTAL 3,374.0 7,744.0
Source: 1989 Canadian Oil and Gas Lands Administration Annual Report
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Figure 3-16. Oil and Gas Exploration Lands 2004 -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board; Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.
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11, Global Santa Fe Grand Banks
12, Sea Rose FSPO
Figure 3-18. Oil and Gas Rigs in 2006
Source: Halifax Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, January 2006.
50°W60“W
81
In view of the fact that the costs of extraction for these resources are not 
yet known, and because the prices for oil and gas are subject to constant 
fluctuation, it is not possible to place a reliable value on them. However, it goes 
without saying that these resources have a potential value in the magnitude of 
multiple billions of dollars, and will generate billions more in economic activity as 
production commences.
The first commercial offshore oil development to commence production in 
Canada was the Cohasset-Panuke field, located off Sable Island, NS. Cohasset- 
Panuke was been developed by a partnership of LASMO Nova Scotia, and the 
provincial Crown Corporation Nova Scotia Resources Limited and went into 
production during May 1992. Cohasset-Panuke was a relatively small field with 
an estimated 49 million recoverable barrels. The field was decommissioned in 
1999 after producing 44.5 million barrels and infused about $500 million into the 
Nova Scotia economy.
Before the Cohasset-Panuke development, there had been interest in the 
natural gas fields off of Sable Island. Although interest waned during the latter 
1980s, for the past several years the Sable Island Offshore Energy Project 
(SOEP) has seen resurgence of interest and effort. At present, the SOEP 
produces between 400 and 500 million cubic feet of natural gas and 20,000 
barrels of natural gas liquids every day. In addition to the offshore development, 
the Golboro gas plant in Guysborough County, Nova Scotia processes the gas, 
and a plant has been constructed at Point Tupper, Nova Scotia to further 
process the natural gas liquids from the Goldboro plant. In addition to these 
projects there are several proposals in the Atlantic region for the construction of 
liquid natural gas storage facilities and pipelines to transport gas into the 
lucrative market of the north-eastern United States. The six platforms of the 
SOEP account for roughly three percent of all Canadian natural gas production. 
The only fixed conduit from the SOEP ashore is a single pipeline. Thus, much of 
the gas is transported by ship.49
49 ExxonMobil, Sable Project -Operations < http://www.soep.com/cgi-bin/getpage7pageicM/0/0> 
(9 August 2006).
82
In 1988, the Canadian and Newfoundland governments signed a $5.2 
billion agreement to begin development of the Hibernia oil field. Hibernia was 
expected to tap between 525 and 650 million barrels of oil, with peak output of 
about 110,000 barrels per day. The federal government assumed a $2.7 billion 
stake in the development, with each of four commercial partners committing $1 
billion to the project. It had been expected to generate about 14,500 construction 
jobs, and 1,100 production jobs over an 18 year period and was projected to fill 
12 percent of Canada's light oil requirements. The development's future was 
thrown into doubt in February 1992 when one of the partners, Gulf Canada, 
decided to withdraw from the project. Between February and October 1992, work 
on the project was curtailed and daily expenditures of about $3 million were cut 
in half. The slowdown put about 800 people out of work and delayed production 
by a year, from 1996 to 1997.
On 9 October 1992, with an announcement on Texaco's involvement in 
the project imminent, the work slowdown was lifted and oil first flowed in late 
1997. By the end of 2005, almost 200,000 barrels were flowing per day from 
Hibernia, and the development had produced a total of 455.7 million barrels.
Two other substantial oil fields are found in the Newfoundland offshore. 
The Terra Nova field south of Hibernia went into production in 2002 and flows 
about 99,000 barrels per day with a total production of 164 million barrels. To 
the east of Newfoundland is the White Rose Field. This source flows just under
50,000 barrels per day and since has produced 2.5 million barrels from 
commissioning in November 2005 to the end of the year. Newfoundland oil 
production accounts for about 15 percent of the total Canadian oil production, 
approximately 146 million barrels per annum.50
Once the oil arrives ashore from the offshore platforms, the three main 
refineries and terminals in the Atlantic region together produce 473,063 barrels 
of oil per day. Imperial Oil in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia produces 88, 009 barrels 
per day, Irving Oil in Saint John, New Brunswick produces 280,011 barrels per
50 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Mines and Energy, Oil and Gas Report -  January 
2006 <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/mines&en/oil/oil_gas_reportjan06.pdf > (9 August 2006).
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day, and North Atlantic Refining in Come-by-Chance, Newfoundland adds 
105,043 barrels per day. These three refineries represent approximately 20 
percent of the total Canadian refining capacity. They also produce over 70 
percent of all Canadian refined petroleum exports, and are a major supplier of 
gasoline and heating oil to the eastern seaboard of the United States.
Since over 50 percent of the homes in Atlantic region rely on oil for 
heating purposes, a much higher proportion than elsewhere in Canada, these 
refineries are critically important domestically as well as to the United States 
market.
To date, there have been 23 significant discoveries of oil and gas made in 
the Newfoundland offshore, with the promises of further prospects. The 
sedimentary basins of the Grand Banks as well as those that form the Laurentian 
Channel demonstrate great potential for Newfoundland to become a major 
player in national oil and gas production. Additionally, the basins in the vicinity of 
Sable Island and further south offshore Nova Scotia indicate that Nova Scotia 
may one day assume an equally important role. The region is now of national 
strategic importance as a major producer of oil with a lesser role in natural gas 
production. Uniquely, all production in the Atlantic region is derived from 
offshore wells. When combined with the high volume of refining carried out at 
the three refineries described above, it is clear that, although not as historically 
visible as the fishery, the hydrocarbon industry is a key element in the economy 
of Atlantic Canada and, more significantly, the nation as whole.
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TABLE 3-6
OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION - ATLANTIC CANADA 1995-2000
Year No. of 
Establishments
Production 
Labour Value of 
Force Marketable 
Production
(FTE) ($ million)
Net Cash 
Expenditures
($ million)
Total Labour 
Force
(FTE)
Total Value of 
Output*
($ million)
1995 14 106 197.1 1,499.10 2,129 1,696.20
1996 16 106 201.2 1,046.40 1,386 1,247.60
1997 17 75 126.7 1,109.80 1,681 1,236.50
1998 16 300 591 2,282.70 3,540 2,873.70
1999 18 524 1,052.10 2,992.00 4,490 4,044.10
2000 18 1,310 3,103.30 2,161.80 5,910 5,265.10
*Value of marketable production from processing and net cash expenditures on exploration, 
development, operating costs and royalties.
Source: Statistics Canada, The Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Industry (Annuals), Cat. 
No. 26-213.
3.3.3 Marine Construction/Ship Repair
The Canadian shipbuilding and ship repair industry contributed more than 
$200 million to the national GDP and provided work for more than 4,000 people 
during 2001. Table 3-7 indicates the tonnage and number of ships greater than 
100 gross tons that were on order or being built in Canada for the years 1995 - 
2000.51
During the early 1990s, there were four major Department of National 
Defence marine projects underway that provided stability to the shipbuilding 
industry in Canada. The Canadian Patrol Frigate programme, the Tribal Class 
Update and Modernization programme, the Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel 
Project and the Towed Array Sonar System had total approved expenditures for 
just under $12 billion. Once these programmes had completed by the late 
1990s, DND’s investment in the Canadian shipbuilding industry declined 
significantly, with a predictable and consequent negative impact. However, the 
federal government announced recently its intention to procure three joint supply 
ships to replace the Navy’s aging auxiliary replenishment vessels, and should 
provide a much-needed boost to the industry.
51 Acton White and Associates, Economic Study of Canada’s Marine and Ocean Industries, 29 
March 2001 <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inad-ad.nsf/vwapj/economicstudy.pdf/$file/ 
economicstudy.pdf> (9 August 2006).
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TABLE 3-7
CANADIAN MARINE CONSTRUCTION 1995-2000
Year Building Oil & Gas Marine Total Value- Employment
Construction Rigs Works ($ millions) added (FTE)
($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions) ($ millions)
National
1995 205.6 1,376.90 355.3 1,937.80 880.8 11,480
1996 226.1 881.4 273.2 1,380.70 617 8,300
1997 213.8 824 259.8 1,297.60 573 7,350
1998 229 2,013.60 302.1 2,544.70 1,125.00 11,580
1999 231.9 2,651.50 332.3 3,215.70 1,406.20 17,400
2000 227.2 1,678.10 342.2 2,247.50 948.3 12,200
Atlantic Region
1995 60.9 1,376.90 236.9 1,674.70 801.5 9,640
1996 68.1 881.4 156 1,105.50 530.6 6,390
1997 65.6 824 204.9 1,094.50 525.3 5,810
1998 71.9 2,013.60 226.6 2,312.10 1,109.80 9,960
1999 76.2 2,651.50 255.4 2,983.10 1,431.90 15,800
2000 75.3 1,678.10 261.3 2,014.70 967.1 10,600
Source: Statistics Canada, Capital Expenditures by Type of Asset, 1992-1996, Cat. 
No. 61-223; Public and Private Investment in Canada, Cat. No. 61-205; Statistics 
Canada, Capital Expenditures by Type of Asset, (Annuals from 1992), Cat. No. 61- 
223. Statistics Canada, Public and Private Investment in Canada, Cat. No. 61-205.
3.3.4 Marine Transportation
Of the world's industrialized nations, Canada ranks among those most 
heavily dependent upon trade for its economic well-being, foreign trade 
generating one quarter of Canada’s gross national product, and almost 55 
percent of that trade being transported by water.52 In terms of volume, 99 
percent of Canadian trade with nations other than the United States is 
waterborne.53
During 2003, the last year for which complete figures are available, 
Canadian ports handled almost 307 million tonnes of international cargo. This 
represented an increase of 8.5 percent over the previous year.54 Canada has 25 
deep-water ports and 650 smaller ports. There are also about 2,200 small craft 
harbour facilities along Canada’s coasts that are used exclusively for the fishery
52 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Annual Report 1985/86, Supply and Services 
Canada, Ottawa, 1986, 21.
53 NOAC, A Maritime Policy for Canada, 142.
54 Canada: A Portrait (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 161.
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or recreational boating.55 Figure 3-19 shows the major and secondary ports in 
the Atlantic region.
Figure 3-19. Ports and Main Ferries -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 23 February 2004.
A significant portion of the country’s water transport travels through the St. 
Lawrence Seaway, the world's longest canal system. This system extends over 
3,769 kilometres, from the Atlantic Ocean to the western end of Lake Superior, 
and incorporates a total rise of 177 metres. Bulk cargoes constitute about 85 
percent of tonnage moving through the St. Lawrence Seaway. Current estimates 
call for about 31 million tonnes of cargo to transit the Montreal-Lake Ontario 
section of the Seaway, with closer to 34 million tonnes moving through the 
Welland Canal.56 Figures 3-20 shows the major and secondary ports in the St 
Lawrence Seaway system.
55 Canada, Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 4 April 2005 <http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/ 
English/050404/d050404a.htm> (12 April 2006).
56 1991 Corpus Almanac & Canadian Sourcebook (Don Mills: Southam Business Information 
and Communications Group, 1991), 10-12; Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System, Tonnage 
Information, Seaway Monthly Traffic Results as of December 31, 2005 <http://www.greatlakes- 
seaway.com/en/pdf/tonnage2005_en.pdf > (9 August 2006).
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Figure 3-20. Ports -  St. Lawrence Seaway and Great Lakes
Source: Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity, 23 February 2004.
During 1987, 303 Canadian marine carriers generated operating revenues 
of $2.17 billion. Just over half of that total ($1.12 billion) was earned transporting 
commodities, with about 15 percent of the total ($307 million) being accounted 
for by towing services. Ten percent of revenues ($200 million) were generated 
by charters.57
Canada's busiest port is Vancouver. It is also the second largest port in 
North America, and the largest on the west coast of North or South America. In 
2003, Vancouver handled 67.9 million tonnes of cargo, representing 15 percent 
(by tonnage) of Canadian shipping for that year. Vancouver accounts for roughly 
half of all of the nation’s container traffic. The year 2005 heralded an increase to
76.4 million tonnes handled in Vancouver.58
Montreal is the country's leading container traffic port, in terms of tonnage 
handled, and the second largest container gateway on the Atlantic coast of North
57 Canada: A Portrait, 161-162.
58 Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity.
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America, after New York. In 2005, the port processed over 11.1 million tonnes of 
containerized cargo.59
During 2003, the country’s top 20 ports handled more than 349.8 million 
tonnes of goods. In the same year 443.0 million tonnes of cargo were handled 
nation wide.60 As seen in Table 3-8, all but one of Canada’s top 10 ports, based 
on metric tonnes handled, are located either in Atlantic Canada or are accessed 
from the Atlantic seaward approaches of the study area. Figure 3-21 shows the 
major shipping routes that service the Atlantic region.
During the period September 1990 to September 1991, more than 1.2 
million people entered or left Canada using marine transportation. The vast 
majority (761,036) of these travelled by commercial carrier. Most of the total 
entries or departures (999,197) were recorded by non-Canadian residents.
TABLE 3-8
CANADA’S TOP TEN PORTS IN 2005
Port Tonnage handled
Vancouver 76,481,000
Come-By-Chance 43,694,000 *
Saint John 27,500,000
Montreal 24,344,000
Port Hawkesbury 22,927,000 *
Quebec 22,500,000
Sept-lsles 17,500,000
Halifax 13,816,000
Port-Cartier 17,439,000 *
Nanticoke 12,359,511
* 2005 data not available. 2003 figures used. 
Sources: Each Port Authority’s Internet statistics 
page.
59 Montreal Port Authority, Statistics: Traffic summary 1995-2005 (metric tonnes) 
<http://www.port-montreal.com/site/6_0/ 6_4_11 .jsp?lang=en> (12 April 2006).
60 Statistics Canada, The Daily: Port activity.
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Figure 3-21. Major Shipping Routes in 2000 -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Bernard Kelly, Marine Commercial Vessel Traffic Activity in Canada’s Atlantic 
Region, Geocentric Mapping Consulting, June 2002.
The international cruise industry has grown at a compound rate of almost 
10 percent since 1970, according to the Cruise Lines International Association. 
This trend is being felt in Canadian ports as cruise ship visits increase and 
throughout Canada, more than 2 million cruise ship passengers visited the 
nation in 2005.61 The Port of Vancouver, hub of the international Alaska Cruise 
industry, hosted an incredible 910,172 cruise ship passengers in 2005.62 The 
cruise industry's local economic impact is enormous. For example, it has been 
estimated that the direct economic impact of Alaska cruises in 2005 was 
estimated at $588.5 million, including $341 million in marine services; which 
encompassed provisioning services, passenger handling and non-cruise 
transport, and $211 million in tourist spending.63 Cruise line passengers spend 
time and money in Vancouver, but they also spend millions on supplementary 
tours to the British Columbia and Alberta Rocky Mountains, and the Yukon
61 Association of Canadian Port Authorities, Industry Information -  Canadian Port Industry, 2005 
<http://www.acpa-ports.net/industry/industry.html> (10 August 2006).
62 Vancouver Port Authority, 2005 Statistical Summary, 2005 <http://www.portvancouver.com/ 
statistics/ 2005_statistical.html> (12 April 2006).
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territory. The cruise industry directly contributed 91 million dollars to the gross 
domestic product of Greater Vancouver in 2005, and generated an additional 
$11 million in federal and provincial tax revenues.64
On Canada’s East Coast, other Canadian destinations are also popular 
ports of call for the cruise lines. Two decades ago only one cruise line visited 
Montreal; by 2005 a dozen lines brought 45 cruise ships with 35,359 passengers 
aboard to the city. In 1991 local expenditures by passengers and cruise ships 
amounted to $9.4 million.65
The cruise industry has also become an important contributor to the 
economy of Halifax. In 2004, for example, 122 cruise ships carrying 212,834 
passengers visited the port. That figure was up from 104 calls in 2003. Further 
growth is expected in Halifax, which has already received bookings for 89 calls 
during 2006. Local spending by cruise ships passengers was estimated at $2.25 
million during 2005.66
The high volume of commercial and fishing traffic in the maritime 
approaches provides the basic elements for potential collisions at sea. To 
mitigate this concern, Canada has established 16 compulsory pilotage areas and 
several Vessel Traffic Management Schemes (VTMS) to coordinate the 
movement of shipping through key areas in the Atlantic Region. Determination of 
where compulsory pilotage is required is based on the degree of difficulty and 
hazard in the approaches and within the port itself , the amount of vessel 
movement and manoeuvrability and the size of the vessel, the design of 
wharves, slips, and actual space available for manoeuvring, the nature of cargo 
embarked, and the preservation of the ecosystem. Pilotage services in Atlantic 
Canada are provided by the Atlantic Pilotage Authority or, in the case of the Gulf 
of St Lawrence and the approaches to the St Lawrence River, the Laurentian
63 Vancouver Port Authority, Port o f Vancouver Economic Impact Study, May 2005 <http://www. 
portvancouver.com/the_port/docs/Economic_lmpact_Study.pdf> (10 August 2006).
Vancouver Port Authority, Port of Vancouver Economic Impact Study.
65 Montreal Port Authority, Statistics: Cruise traffic 2001-2005 <http://www.portmontreal.com/ 
site/6_0/ 6_4_11 .jsp?lang=en> (12 April 2006).
66 Halifax Port Authority, The Port o f Halifax, Annual Statistics, 2005 <http://www.portofhalifax.ca/ 
AbsPage.aspx?id=1245&siteid=1&lang=1> (12 April 2006).
91
Pilotage Authority. Figure 3-22 shows the compulsory pilotage areas in the 
Atlantic region.
With respect to Vessel Traffic Management Schemes, these areas 
typically include the approaches to busy ports and seaways, such as Halifax and 
Saint John, or congested straits and narrows like the Cabot Strait and the St 
Lawrence Seaway. Under the International Rules for Avoiding Collision at Sea 
(COLREGs), a government may also establish special routing rules. For 
example, there is a Canadian modification that requires a vessel making a 
transatlantic voyage to avoid crossing the Grand Banks north of latitude 43 
degrees north to minimize cargo ship traffic across the congested fishing 
grounds in the shallows of the Grand Banks. Figures 3-23 through 3-30 show 
the established VTMS regimes in Atlantic Canada.
Figure 3-22. Compulsory Pilotage Areas -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Transport Canada.
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Figure 3-25. VTMS -  Belle Isle
Source: Transport Canada.
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Figure 3-29. VTMS -  Bay of Fundy
Source: Transport Canada.
Figure 3-30. VTMS -  NORDREG Area
Source: Transport Canada.
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3.3.5 Ocean Tourism
3.3.5.1 Ocean Tourism
Although a relatively recent phenomenon, ocean tourism has become an 
important contributor to the Canadian economy, as seen at Table 3-9.
3.3.5.2 Recreational Fishery
In 2000, there were 3.6 million recreational fishermen in Canada. There 
were 4.7 million recreational fishing days recorded in salt water. This national 
industry represented $4.4 billion in direct and investment costs. In 1992, the 
recreational fishery generated spending of nearly $5 billion annually.67
TABLE 3-9
CANADIAN OCEAN TOURISM 1995-2000
Year Sport Fisheries
Number of Direct* 
Anglers Expenditures/ 
(‘000) Investment ($ 
millions)
Coastal
Tourism
Revenue 
/Investment 
($ millions)
Cruise Ship Tourism
Number of Visitor ** 
Visitors Expenditures 
(‘000) ($ millions)
Total 
Marine 
Tourism 
($ millions)
National
1995 483.4 768.3 273.7 705.5 38 1,080.00
1996 463.6 728.2 294.8 787.2 44.9 1,067.90
1997 441.8 682.2 318.6 946.5 53.4 1,054.20
1998 421.1 639.2 343.8 1,025.90 59.2 1,042.20
1999 401.3 599 365.2 1,148.40 68.8 1,033.00
2000 382.4 561.5 388.5 1,354.80 83 1,033.00
Atlantic Region
1995 186.1 234.5 91.3 108.8 6.5 332.3
1996 180.9 210.3 100.4 85.7 6 316.7
1997 171.2 177.2 111.8 130 7.3 296.3
1998 162.5 146.3 133.3 152.8 8.8 288.4
1999 154.3 118.8 149.5 200.8 12 280.3
2000 139.2 95.5 167.3 300.8 18.4 281.2
* Direct expenditures relate to food and lodging, transportation, fishing services, fishing 
supplies, packages, and other; investments relate to fishing equipment, boating 
equipment, camping equipment, special vehicles, land-buildings, and other purchases 
directly related to recreational fishing.
** Estimates based on average spending per trip (same-day visitors to Canada). 
Source: DFO, Survey of Recreational Fishing in Canada (1985, 1990, 1995,2000), 
Ottawa; Transport Canada, Cruise Industry Statistics. Statistics Canada, Tourism 
Scope, International Travel, Cat. No. 66-201. B.C. Government Annual Tourism 
Monitor.
67 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Joint Press Release, 29 July 1992.
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3.2.6 Conservation and Protection
Of increasing importance is the conservation and protection of the marine 
environment. In concert with strict pollution control laws, there are controls over 
the routing of vessels in conjunction with marine environmental interests. Four 
major conservation or protected areas have been identified in the Atlantic region 
to provide protection for the marine ecosystem; there are many other minor 
areas, such as protected nesting grounds in the many islands of the region. A 
ground-breaking moment in the co-operation between marine industries and 
environmentalists occurred in 2003 when the shipping lanes in and out of the 
Bay of Fundy were adjusted to avoid right whale breeding areas. Another right 
whale protected area was identified in the vicinity of Roseway Bank off 
southwest Nova Scotia and mariners are asked to avoid transiting through this 
area.
In 2004, a Maritime Protected Area (MPA) was established at the Sable 
Gully. As well, a section of Georges Bank was closed to ground fishing in order 
to protect deep sea coral habitat on the banks. Clearly the dawning of the new 
millennium has signalled a sea change in the collaboration between those that 
use the sea for economic gain and those who seek to preserve the marine 
ecosystems. Figures 3-31 shows the larger conservation areas and Sable Gully 
MPA. Figure 3-32 shows the new shipping lane that avoids right whale breeding 
areas superimposed on the former shipping lane in the Bay of Fundy.
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Source: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, 2003.
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Figure 3-32. Vessel Traffic Separation and Right Whales
Source: Transport Canada, Proposal: Routeing of Ships, Ship Reporting and Related 
Matters, 2002.
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The Atlantic region is both a node and conduit for many submarine cables 
that connect North America with the rest of the globe. Figure 3-33 shows the 
major cables that end in, or transect Canada’s eastern maritime approaches.
Figure 3-33. Submarine Cables -  Atlantic Canada
Source: United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency, 2000.
3.4 Summary
The Atlantic region of Canada comprises the four provinces of Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island (PEI) and Newfoundland and 
Labrador. Some reference may be made in this thesis to the province of 
Quebec, and Nunavut and the Northwest Territories where their inclusion has 
specific relevance to the operations of the Canadian Forces.
The main feature of the Atlantic region with its associated ocean zones is 
its sheer vastness. The total landmass is smaller in area than that of the 
province of Manitoba, but the physical extent of the region is far larger due to the 
adjacent maritime zones. The size of the Atlantic region’s Exclusive Economic 
Zone is larger than the landmasses of France, Germany, and Spain combined.
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Although vast, the lines of communication in the Atlantic region are quite 
linear, following the road and rail lines east to west and vice versa. The critical 
infrastructure tends to be linear as well, with strategic choke points that confer 
vulnerability to the region. The Atlantic region is the gateway to the markets of 
central Canada from European and US sea routes. The ocean sectors are 
critical to the Canadian way of life, generating huge contributions to the economy 
both domestically and through international trade. Tables 2-10 and 2-11 provide 
quantitative measures of the value of the ocean sectors to Atlantic Canada in 
relation to the rest of Canada. However, it should be borne in mind that in terms 
of “have” and “have not” provinces, the Atlantic region, with its “boom or bust” 
resource-based economy has traditionally been on the receiving end of financial 
assistance from central Canada.
From a political perspective, the four different provinces (five when the 
eastern extent of Quebec is considered) with their three levels of government, 
and the inclusion of a small piece of French territory at Saint Pierre and Miquelon 
introduce a level of jurisdictional and administrative complexity that is not 
replicated on Canada’s West Coast where there is only one province adjoining 
the sea. There is a distinct lack of uniformity as to how the Atlantic region is 
delimited for regulation of water space, air space, and resource exploitation; 
multiple grid systems and inconsistent boundaries duplicate responsibility for 
many of the same areas. Regulatory regimes created by international, national, 
and provincial bodies and enforced by a plethora of federal and provincial 
agencies with responsibility for the marine sector, makes it extremely difficult to 
apply a common framework to the question of maritime security and 
enforcement. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters.
101
TABLE 3-10
CANADIAN OCEAN INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT 1995-2000
Year Commercial
Fisheries
Oil &Gas Ocean
Transport
Tourism Marine
Const.
Mnfg & 
Services
Govt. Fed 
&
Provincial
Total
Full Time Equivalents (FTE)
National
1995 55,095 2,129 25,636 11,880 11,480 18,110 34,850 159,180
1996 49,964 1,386 23,626 11,560 8,300 19,010 34,910 147,763
1997 48,491 1,681 22,616 11,280 7,350 19,840 29,910 141,168
1998 47,320 3,540 22,485 11,160 11,580 20,070 29,350 145,505
1999 48,617 4,490 24,044 10,940 17,400 21,100 28,340 154,931
2000 48,110 5,910 25,158 10,560 12,200 21,880 28,150 151,968
Atlantic Region
1995 41,681 2,129 12,423 3,650 9,640 9,190 26,070 104,783
1996 38,621 1,386 12,229 3,430 6,390 9,210 26,080 97,346
1997 36,429 1,681 11,107 3,180 5,810 9,320 22,330 89,857
1998 37,256 3,540 11,443 3,080 9,960 9,370 21,640 96,289
1999 38,095 4,490 12,221 2,970 15,800 9,920 21,290 104,786
2000 39,530 5,910 12,227 2,880 10,600 10,300 21,180 102,627
Sources: Tables 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9.
TABLE 3-11
GROSS VALUE OF OUTPUT OF OCEAN SECTORS, CURRENT DOLLARS 1995 - 2000
Year Comm. Oil & Gas Ocean Ocean Marine Mnfg & Govt. Total
Fisheries Transport Tourism Construct. Services Federal & 
Provincial
($ million)
National
1995 3,300.40 1,696.20 3,823.50 1,080.00 1,937.80 1,694.90 7,149.10 20,681.90
1996 3,052.10 1,247.60 3,387.60 1,067.90 1,380.70 1,822.80 6,271.00 18,229.70
1997 3,100.30 1,236.50 3,184.10 1,054.20 1,297.60 1,965.50 5,549.40 17,387.60
1998 3,281.80 2,873.70 2,968.80 1,042.20 2,544.70 2,037.70 5,137.00 19,885.90
1999 3,738.90 4,044.10 3,127.50 1,033.00 3,215.70 2,243.00 4,887.40 22,289.60
2000 4,037.20 5,265.10 3,073.10 1,033.00 2,247.50 2,380.30 4,685.60 22,721.80
Atlantic Region
1995 2,326.40 1,696.20 2,057.20 332.3 1,674.70 802 5,347.60 14,236.40
1996 2,164.90 1,247.60 1,718.60 316.7 1,105.50 859.6 4,685.50 12,098.40
1997 2,328.60 1,236.50 1,504.20 296.3 1,094.50 916.2 4,142.30 11,518.60
1998 2,538.50 2,873.70 1,402.90 288.4 2,312.10 942.6 3,787.50 14,145.70
1999 2,836.60 4,044.10 1,420.00 280.3 2,983.10 1,063.50 3,643.60 16,271.20
2000 3,268.80 5,265.10 1,311.10 281.2 2,014.70 1,111.80 3,507.00 16,759.70
Sources: Tables 3-4, 3-6, 3-7, 3-9.
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This chapter has satisfied the objectives of the first of the six themes of 
inquiry, namely to furnish a geographical description of the study area in a 
maritime context. Chapter Four will address the first segment of the second 
research theme, the policy framework in which maritime enforcement in Canada 
is shaped.
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Chapter Four
CANADIAN MARITIME POLICY FRAMEWORK 
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter provided an overview of the marine geography of 
Canada’s Atlantic coast, in order to show the extent of the major ocean-use 
sectors in the study area, as well as its sheer vastness of scale. The purpose of 
this chapter is to build upon that foundation by reviewing the policy framework 
that shapes how the Canadian Navy functions in support of oceans 
management, safeguarding national security and exercising Canadian 
sovereignty.
The chapter opens with a simple strategic model to stimulate reflection on 
Canadian values and goals, leading to identification of Canada’s national 
maritime interests. This is followed by a description of the development of the 
three key oceans policy initiatives that constitute Canadian oceans governance 
in 2006. Next, the federal government’s ad hoc approach to security and 
defence policy formulation will be examined. It will be shown that, for Canada, 
the distinction between security and defence policy has been, and continues to 
be blurred. Within this discussion, the main elements of maritime security, as a 
component of national security, will be identified and the issue of sovereignty will 
be reviewed in detail. The concept of sea control, in the context of maritime 
security will be introduced. This policy examination will establish the relevant 
elements that influence how the Canadian government applies the policy that, in 
turn, affects the role of the Canadian Navy.
4.2 National Interests
To better grasp how oceans, security, and defence policy in Canada may 
have been shaped in the past decades, it is useful to understand what forms the 
basis of the models from which policy is derived. Don Macnamara and Ann Fitz­
Gerald observe that it is usual for strategic planning models to commence with 
the identification of national values and goals that portray the national interests 
that a country intends to uphold. These values and goals are considered in the 
context of issues and trends to develop a strategy that utilizes the human,
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technical and fiscal resources available to the nation.68 American authors William 
Ascher and William Overholt offer a simple strategic planning model to 
demonstrate this concept.
Interests + Environment = Strategy
National Values Domestic / International National Policies
National Goals • Political • Foreign/Diplomatic
• Economic • Economic
• Technological • Technological
• Socio-Cultural • Economic
• Military / Defence • Military / Defence
Figure 4-1. A Simple Strategic Model
Source: William Ascher and William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning and Forecasting (Toronto: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1983), as cited in W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, “A National 
Security Framework for Canada,” Policy Matters 3 (No. 10, October 2002): 1-27.
What this model shows is that the national strategy of a country is a set of 
policies, the product of understanding the impact that the perceived political, 
economic, socio-cultural and military environments, both domestic and 
international, have on the nation's interests. These interests are the country's 
assets, fundamental values, and its national goals.
While politicians frequently comment about an issue “being in the national 
interest,” there is no clear articulation by the federal government of Canadian 
national interests. However, it is possible to divine these interests by reviewing 
the goals outlined in various policy and constitutional documents. For example, 
the Canadian fundamental values, expressed in a 1995 foreign policy White 
Paper, are listed as respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and the 
environment. A similar set of values was incorporated into a Department of 
National Defence strategic plan. In this document, two additional values were 
expressed, those being sustainable economic well-being as well as peace, order 
and good government as defined in the Canadian constitution. Moreover, the 
foreign policy White Paper included as well specific goals that can be construed
68 W. D. Macnamara and Ann Fitz-Gerald, “A National Security Framework for Canada,” Policy 
Matters 3 (No. 10, October 2002): 1-27.
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to be national objectives. These were the promotion of prosperity and 
employment, the protection of Canadian security within a stable global 
framework, and projecting Canadian values and culture.69
These and other federal policy statements contain variations on the theme 
of fundamental Canadian values and goals. In summary, the values are 
democracy (freely elected, representative government), individual freedom (while 
respecting the rights of others, and social justice (intrinsic value of life). 
Canadian national goals may vary slightly from time to time, but invariably 
include security (including sovereignty), prosperity, rule-based international 
order, national unity, competitiveness, and sustainable development.
4.2.1 Vital and Secondary Interests
Two other terms used in conjunction with “national interests” are worthy of 
discussion. These terms are “vital” and “secondary” interests. A vital interest is a 
situation, event or trend that is of sufficient magnitude that it is perceived to 
threaten the survival or security of the nation. Since the threat is deemed so 
great, the nation would be prepared to counter it using strong measures 
including the use of military force. Such a scenario might include a direct attack 
on national territory, or a threat to national political or economic well-being such 
as endangered access to the energy supply. In any event, vital interests are 
those issues for which the state would be willing to go to war. By comparison, 
secondary interests are those goals that the state would like to attain but for 
which it would not resort to the use of force.
4.2.2 Canada as a Maritime Nation
What is missing from the Ascher and Overholt model is the role of the 
seas. A maritime strategy is an essential component of the overall national 
strategy; however, it is relevant only when addressed in the context of the policy 
concerns of other areas.
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Interests + Environment Strategy
National Values 
National Goals
Domestic / International
• Political
• Economic
• Technological
• Socio-Cultural
• Military / Defence
• Coast I Oceans
National Policies
• Foreign/Diplomatic
• Economic
• Technological
• Economic
• Military / Defence
• Maritime I Oceans
Figure 4-2. A Simple Strategic Model (adapted for maritime interests)
It should be apparent from the previous chapter that Canada, with the 
longest coastline of any country in the world and bounded by three oceans, is a 
maritime nation and, thus, should have a coherent maritime strategy. Canada 
has considerable offshore resources and is a trading nation heavily dependent 
on the free movement of goods upon the world's oceans. Certainly the 
composition of Canada's naval forces is in keeping with that of a maritime power, 
albeit a small one: a general purpose, expeditionary force.
Some scholars suggest that a people’s proximity to the sea influences the
national character.70 The Canadian population, concentrated as it has always
been in the centre of the country and thus far away from the coasts, has not
historically made the link between the use of the seas and economic prosperity.
Cynthia Lamson notes that,
for many Canadians, the oceans are simply beyond reach. Others 
take the oceans almost for granted and do not comprehend the 
need for special policy and management measures.”71
69 Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada in the World: 
Canadian Foreign Policy Review (Ottawa: 1995), 14.; Canada, Department of National Defence, 
Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: June 1999), 25.
70 E.C. Semple, Influences of Geography and Environment (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 282, 
quoted in J.R.V. Prescott, The Political Geography of the Oceans, (London: David & Charles, 
1975), 14.
71 Cynthia Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” in The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans 
Policy fora Complex World, ed. Cynthia Lamson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1994), 6.
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As a result, maritime interests have not been at the centre stage of political 
awareness.
4.2.3 Vital Maritime Interests
In 1991, the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies at Dalhousie University 
conducted a two-year study of Canada's maritime interests, primarily focussed 
on sustainable wealth generation and competitiveness. Fred Crickard, who led 
the study entitled Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy, identified the broad 
fields that a nation must take into account when developing a maritime strategy 
and applied these fields to the Canadian situation. In doing so, he identified 
Canada’s vital maritime interests. These are:
a. Marine transportation and trade. This interest comprises shipping, 
shipbuilding, ports, harbours and waterways, search and rescue, and 
response to marine emergencies;
b. Ocean environment. Protection of habitats, conservation of species, 
and pollution prevention are the main thrusts of this interest;
c. Resource development. This category includes renewable resources 
such as fisheries, aqua-culture, and alternatives for generating energy, 
as well as non-renewable resources such as offshore petroleum and 
natural gas, minerals, and aggregates;
d. Marine science and technology. Through this vital interest national 
capabilities in all oceans sectors are enhanced;
e. Maritime security and sovereignty. This interest spans sovereignty, law 
enforcement, defence, and international stability.72
72 M.E. Eames and C. Lamson, eds, Canadian Marine Policy and Strategy: National 
Requirements, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1993) as quoted 
in Fred Crickard, “Canada’s ocean and maritime security: A strategic forecast,” in Marine Policy 
19 (No. 4, 1995): 335-342.
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Given this brief overview of Canada’s broad national values, goals, and 
vital maritime interests, attention will be turned to how the federal government 
translates these interests into relevant policy. The first examination is a review 
of the evolution of oceans policy in Canada.
4.3 Oceans Policy
Throughout its history, Canada traditionally has taken a slow, ad hoc and 
sometimes painful approach to oceans policy development, a process that has 
been described as a “youthful or hybrid form of resource or environmental policy 
formulation.”73 Fred Crickard observes that this policy development has 
occurred “institutionally by sectors under a lead federal agency and is further 
fragmented by the division of federal-provincial powers.”74 Ronald Crowley and 
Raymond Bourgeois are less complimentary in their opinion of the Canadian 
approach:
There is probably not a single model to explain Canadian 
oceans policy development. Rather, what used to be called 
“muddling through” may provide the best explanation of 
individual commitments to oceans issues and the desire to 
improve management of our ocean space.75
4.3.1 Periods of Policy Development
While the Canadian approach may have been fragmented, according to 
Crickard there were three distinct periods of national oceans policy-making that 
correspond roughly to the three decades that make up the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s.76 The first period can be categorised as a response to increased 
offshore hydrocarbon exploration, over-fishing, and marine pollution concerns. 
During the 1970s, the federal government shifted its foreign policy approach in 
international affairs towards what would be called today a more “Canada-centric”
73 Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” 3.; Douglas Day, “Public Policy and Ocean 
Management in Canada,” Marine Policy 19, (No. 4, 1995): 251-256.; Cynthia Lamson, 
“Prospects: Towards a Three-Ocean, One-Nation Policy,” in The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans 
Policy fora Complex World, ed. Cynthia Lamson (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1994), 321.
74 Fred W. Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997: Divergent Courses or 
Making the Rendezvous? The Canadian Experience,” in Summit o f the Sea: The United Nations 
International Year of the Ocean, 1998: Maritime Security Working Papers Number 7/8, (Halifax: 
Dalhousie University, 1997): 9.
75 Ronald W. Crowley and Raymond C. Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean 
Policy,” Oceans ’89 Proceedings (Washington: Marine Technological Society, 1989), 178.
76 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,”11.
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posture. Whereas in the twenty-years previous, when participation in multilateral 
organizations was seen as an excellent means of extending Canadian influence, 
in the future foreign policy was to be an extension abroad of Canadian national 
policy.77
It was during this period that Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau introduced 
“sovereignty” into the federal government’s lexicon and placed the protection of 
sovereignty at the head of security and defence policymakers’ agendas. This 
occurred at a time when an increased awareness of the peaceful use of the 
oceans began to resonate with the Canadian public, coincident with a number of 
global marine pollution incidents. Likewise, the transits in 1969 and 1970 of the 
American vessel MV Manhattan through the Northwest Passage turned public 
attention northward. These challenges to Canadian sovereignty, along with 
concerns about environmental impact, over fishing on the East Coast, and 
unprecedented offshore petroleum exploration during an international oil crisis 
prompted a series of legislative measures. These included the declaration of a 
12 nautical mile territorial sea through the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act, 
the introduction of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in 1972, and the 
unilateral declaration of a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Fishing Zone in 1977. 
Some analysts suggest that the latter two initiatives were the key events that 
signalled Canada’s intent to be perceived as a coastal state.78 Moreover, the 
federal government tabled a National Oceans Policy in 1973 that sought to 
guarantee Canadian industry participation in development of offshore resources 
and promoted key marine science and technology development. Regrettably, 
little tangible action resulted from this policy; some analysts suggest that it was 
simply ahead of its time.79
By the early 1980s, a decline was registered in hydrocarbon exploration in 
Canada’s maritime zones due to lower world prices for oil and gas in concert 
with increased costs for their extraction offshore. This second period of oceans 
policy development saw environmental issues and the demise of fish stocks
77 J.L. Granastein, Canadian Foreign Policy, (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1986), 52.
78 Cynthia Lamson, “Oceans Policy for a Complex World,” 6.
79 Crowley and Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean Policy,” 172.
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supplant oil and gas exploration as the foci for oceans policy makers. By the 
mid-1980s, government officials realized that increased use of waters of direct 
interest to Canada called for a public examination rationalization of the diverse 
policies and regulations that had developed in the various oceans sectors. 
Responsibility for co-ordinating federal oceans policy was vested in the Minister 
of Fisheries and Oceans who, in 1987, tabled Canada’s first attempt at 
formulating a national oceans policy, a document titled Oceans Policy for 
Canada. This policy statement focussed on resource management as well as 
economic and technological opportunities in Canada’s maritime zones. It 
identified 75 ocean-related programs delivered by 14 federal departments at a 
cost of 1.3 billion dollars.80 Interestingly, the departments mentioned did not 
include the Navy, which at the time had a budget of 1.7 billion dollars. Oceans 
Policy for Canada was the first of a number Fisheries and Oceans national policy 
statements that grappled with resource exploitation and conservation themes but 
was largely void of consideration for maritime security, a trend that has 
continued to the present. However, the policy did articulate the need for co­
ordination between federal departments with oceans-related mandates, another 
first.
Also in the mid-1980s, the United States again challenged Canada’s claim 
to sovereignty in the Arctic by sending a Coast Guard ice-breaker, the USCGC 
Polar Sea, through the Northwest Passage in 1985 without prior permission from 
Canadian authorities. Although the Soviet submarine fleet remained North 
America’s main maritime security threat, some analysts believed the principal 
challenge to Canadian sovereignty would be by the nation’s close ally to the 
south. On a positive note, these incursions in the Arctic by the United States re­
kindled the sovereignty debate concerning Canada’s northern waters and 
focussed public attention on oceans issues.81
80 Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Canada’s Oceans: An Economic Overview and
a Guide to Federal Government Activities Communications Directorate DO, Ottawa, 1987, 54-65.
81 F.W. Crickard, “Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for Canada: Nuclear Powered 
Submarine and Other Canadian Military Options,” Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for 
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, November 1987), 3.; 
Crowley and Bourgeois, “The Development of Canada’s Ocean Policy,” 171.
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The third period of oceans policy development bore witness to increased 
emphasis on oceans governance and a shift from technology-based 
development to a regulatory-based approach to oceans management. With the 
1990 fall of the Berlin Wall, defence planners recognized that the main Soviet 
maritime threat, its vast submarine force, could no longer be sustained and 
would fall into decline. Non-military threats replaced those of the Soviet empire, 
and were manifested by increasing over-fishing, marine pollution, narcotics 
smuggling, and illegal immigration in Canada’s maritime zones. A House of 
Commons committee in 1990 re-defined sovereignty protection to include these 
non-military threats, and identified the “major challenge confronting Canadian 
maritime policy” as likely being “the effective control of our coast waters and the 
200 mile economic zone.”82
4.3.2 The Oceans Act
The Canadian government became increasingly aware of the oceans as a 
medium for sustainable wealth generation during the early 1990s. This 
increased awareness coincided with the coming into effect of the UNCLOS III 
Convention in 1997. However, more importantly, it was introduction of Canada’s 
Oceans Act in the same year that signalled that the government was truly 
serious about creating relevant policy in the management of Canada’s three 
oceans in a more comprehensive and balanced manner.83 The Oceans Act 
consolidated a number of extant ocean-related statutes into a single piece of 
legislation that promoted integrated coastal zone management, and paved the 
way for Canada’s 6 November 2003 ratification of the third United Nations 
Convention on Law of the Sea. More importantly, a legislative framework was 
created to support ocean governance in Canada.84 In 2001, five years after the 
enactment of the Oceans Act, a House of Commons committee found that the 
legislation had proved to be fundamentally sound.85
82 Canada, House of Commons, Maritime Sovereignty, Report of the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (Ottawa: November 1990), 2.
83 Crickard and Herbert, “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 27.
84 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,” 26.
85 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Report on the 
Oceans Act. October, 2001.< http://www.parl.gc.ca/infocomdoc/37/1/FOPO/Studies/Reports/ 
fopo01/07-intro-e.htm#INTRODUCTION> (11 April 2005).
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4.3.3 Canada’s Ocean Strategy
The Oceans Act designated Fisheries and Oceans Canada as the lead 
department for oceans policy development in this country. After five years of 
formulation, including a public consultation process, Canada’s Ocean Strategy 
(COS) was formally launched in 2002. The aim of the strategy is to set policy 
direction for oceans management and it sets out several overarching goals. The 
first goal is replace the existing fragmented approach to oceans management 
with a collaborative integrated approach coordinating the 23 federal departments 
and agencies that have ocean-related policies, legislation or activities. Other 
goals include expanding working partnerships in the oceans sector, 
understanding and protecting the marine environment, optimizing the sustainable 
economic potential of the oceans and positioning Canada as a world leader in 
oceans management.86
More importantly, Canada’s Ocean Strategy promotes effective ocean 
governance, including exercise of national sovereignty and security. The strategy 
recognizes the fundamental right in international law for Canada to exert 
sovereignty over its national maritime zones, and confirms that enforcement is 
key to the protection of Canadian sovereignty and maintenance of maritime 
order and security. Furthermore, Canada’s Ocean Strategy calls for a 
coordinated system of surveillance and monitoring of Canadian ocean space.87 
However, the document does not prescribe how to effect these surveillance and 
enforcement requirements, i.e., responsibilities by department, or which agency 
has the lead.
4.3.4 The Oceans Action Plan
In opening Parliament in the autumn of 2004, Prime Minister Paul Martin 
announced that “the Government will also move forward on its Oceans Action 
Plan by maximizing the use and development of oceans technology, establishing 
a network of marine protected areas, implementing integrated management 
plans, and enhancing the enforcement of rules governing oceans and fisheries,
86 Canada, Foreign Affairs Canada, Canada and the Oceans, 16 November 2004, 
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sustain/Environlssu/canOcean/oceans-enasp> (28 January 2005).
8f Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Strategy (Ottawa: 2002), 17-18.
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including rules governing straddling stocks.88” Unveiled in May 2005, this plan 
noted the failure of existing Canadian oceans management methods, due to a 
fragmented approach to complex issues by public and private sector 
stakeholders, a general lack of transparency, and a reactive posture to emerging 
problems rather than adoption of proactive strategies. This failure resulted in 
declining fish stocks, increased species at risk, and “growing user conflicts.”89
The Oceans Action Plan comprises the four central pillars of international 
leadership, sovereignty, and security; integrated oceans management for 
sustainable development; health of the oceans; and oceans science and 
technology. With regards to the first pillar, international leadership, sovereignty, 
and security, the sub-themes here are overseeing the implementation of UN Law 
of the Sea, oceans governance, maritime security, sovereignty in the Arctic and 
extension of jurisdiction over the continental shelf. The Oceans Action Plan 
confirms maritime security as being fundamental to oceans management, and 
endorses its links to the National Security Policy.90
The second pillar, integrated oceans management for sustainable 
development, is focussed on marine conservation, ecosystem-based and 
multiple-use oceans management, sustainable development of fisheries 
and aquaculture, and Aboriginal participation. The third pillar, health of 
the oceans, concentrates on the establishment of Marine Protected 
Areas, species at risk issues, pollution prevention, and the streamlining of 
environmental regulatory processes. The last main thrust of the Oceans 
Action Plan is oceans science and technology, including championing 
development of the oceans technology sector, the improvement of 
Canadian seabed mapping expertise, and ocean mapping for United 
Nations Law of the Sea purposes.91
88 Speech from the Throne: To Open the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament of Canada, 
October 5, 2004, p. 13.
89 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and 
Future Generations, 27 May 2005, p. 4. <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/oap- 
pao/pdf/oap_e.pdf> (22 December 2005).
0 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For Present and Future 
Generations, 6.
91 Ibid., 5.
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The Oceans Action Plan also calls for international partnerships for 
oceans stewardship, a bilateral council on the Gulf of Maine, adoption of an 
Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, and continued use of the North Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization to counter over-fishing. However, as in the case of Canada’s 
Ocean Strategy of 2002, the Oceans Action Plan does not prescribe 
interdepartmental responsibilities for maritime security, surveillance or 
enforcement 92
The Oceans Act, Canada’s Oceans Strategy, and the Ocean Action Plan 
are recent key policy initiatives that indicate that Canadian politicians are starting 
to recognize that national sovereignty and security are fundamental 
governmental duties, and that surveillance and monitoring of Canada’s offshore 
estate are important components of these responsibilities. However, what is less 
clear, from an oceans policy perspective, is where and how those responsibilities 
are to be co-ordinated within the framework of federal departments with maritime 
interests. One would reasonably expect that security and defence policy should 
provide greater clarity to this issue. The next part of this chapter examines 
exactly that.
4.4 National Security and Defence Policy
It should be noted at the start of this discussion that in the literature, the 
distinction between the security policy and defence policy is often blurred. 
Frequently the term security is used to mean defence and vice versa. For the 
purposes of this thesis, defence policy is deemed to be a sub-set of national 
security policy. In other words, defence is but one component to providing an 
umbrella of security for Canadians
The history of security and defence policy development in Canada has not 
been punctuated with startling epiphanies or tremendous foresight. In fact, up 
until 2004, no overarching national security policy had been committed to paper, 
and many political analysts note that Canada’s ad hoc national security policy­
92 Ibid., 11-12.
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making apparatus had been unable to bring policy coherence within 
government.93 One author argues that Canada’s fundamental inability to 
articulate its strategic interests, crucial in the formulation of a coherent security 
policy, reflects a fundamental lack of strategic culture.94 This inability has meant 
that crisis-based management of security and defence has been the norm. A 
dichotomy exists between the standard rhetoric of many governmental 
pronouncements on national security, be they written policy statements or public 
addresses by elected officials, and the actual choices that are made when 
prioritising and allocating human and fiscal resources to the departments 
responsible for providing this security.
Several authors suggest that the immense size of Canada, bounded by 
three oceans, and its proximity to the United States, makes it both indefensible 
yet largely free from the threat of invasion. These factors are cited by analysts 
as a partial explanation of why security and defence policy have seldom been 
high on the government agenda. Douglas Bland, Sean Maloney and Jeff 
Tasseron suggest that the de facto strategy of past Canadian Prime Ministers, 
perhaps more by design than omission, has been to maintain as little defence 
structure as the government could get away with. Tasseron also remarks on the 
“split personality” of Canadian defence policy, in which the elected officials claim 
security and defence of Canada as the number one priority, yet structure the 
Armed Forces for international military commitments.95
Having noted the rather loose process employed in defence policy 
development, it is useful to review the main documents that have lead up to 
Canada’s most recent defence policy statement. Following that, the latest 
development in security policy formulation will be reviewed.
93 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Campaigns for International Security: Canada’s 
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Leadership Policy Options 25, No. 1 (December 2003/January 2004): 56-61.
95 George Lindsey et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” Behind the Headlines, Vol 60, No. 2 
(Winter 2002/2003), 1-16; Bland and Maloney, Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the 
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From the end of the Second World War until the late 1960s, the primary 
focus of Canadian foreign policy was to support collective security through the 
United Nations and other security alliances. The effect of this approach was that 
defence policy gravitated towards Canadian participation North Atlantic Treaty 
Association (NATO) and North American Air Defence (NORAD) arrangements.96 
Defence policy aims shifted with the election of Pierre Trudeau in 1968. The 
new Prime Minister believed that, rather than have “participation” as the key 
policy objective, foreign and domestic policy both should be driven by national 
interests, with defence policy flowing directly from foreign policy. Trudeau’s 
understanding of the armed forces was poor, and his perception of their value 
was even less sophisticated. He rapidly commissioned reviews of defence and 
foreign policy during a period of increasing inflation that was having negative 
effects on the Canadian economy.97
By 1969, the defence review had been completed and three reports had 
been tabled by External Affairs, the Department of National Defence, and the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National 
Defence. All of these reports recommended Canada’s continued commitment to 
NATO, a course of action that held little allure for the Prime Minister. With 
European nations having recovered from the ruin of the Second World War, and 
a general development of detente between the superpowers, Trudeau reasoned 
that there was little rationale for continuing the nation’s contribution to NATO at 
existing levels. Trudeau directed that a special report be produced that more 
accurately reflected his thoughts on the direction in which defence policy should 
head. The secret report, Canadian Defence Policy -  A Study, recommended 
that Canada’s commitment to NATO be reduced, and that the military’s focus 
shift more towards domestic roles. Canadian Defence Policy -  A Study formed 
the basis for future Cabinet decision-making pertaining to defence.98
96 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1972),
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In April 1969, Trudeau publicly outlined a different philosophy for defence 
that held the armed forces were better employed domestically in Canada than in 
Europe. He continued by outlining the new defence priorities. These were 
surveillance of Canada’s territory and coastlines (sovereignty protection), 
defence of North America in co-operation with the United States, fulfilment of 
agree-upon commitments to NATO, and performance of international 
peacekeeping missions."
Trudeau left no doubt as to which of the defence priorities was most 
important. In a speech later that month, he opined that, “our first priority is the 
protection of Canadian sovereignty, in all the dimensions that it means.”100 He 
then tasked the Minister of National Defence to draft a Defence White Paper that 
incorporated the shift in priorities. White Papers are policy statements that the 
Canadian government normally tables to promulgate policy within a specific 
ministry or sector. They may “codify incremental policy decisions aggregated 
over time, reaffirm previous commitments, or outline new policy thrusts of the 
government of the day.”101 Crickard observes that Canadian Defence White 
Papers are both policy statements as well as force development statements.102 
The White Paper ordered by Trudeau was completed in 1971.
4.4.1 The 1971 Defence White Paper
Prime Minister Trudeau’s intent to shift away from NATO-driven defence 
objectives was articulated in the 1971 Defence White Paper, Defence in the 70s. 
The government, given the assumption that a state of detente existed between 
East and West, called for the reduction of Canadian military forces in Europe by 
half, in addition to personnel cuts at home, with concomitant reductions in 
defence expenditures. Defence in the 70s set the priority of the domestic
99 Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy, 182.
100 Trudeau, “The Relationship of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy.”
101 Fred Crickard, “The Role of Maritime Strategy in Ocean Development and Management,” in 
Canadian Ocean Law and Policy, ed. David Vanderzwaag (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), 515.
102 Force development is the process of determining the operational capabilities required by an 
armed service from guidance articulated in national strategies and policies. The armed service’s 
organizational, leadership, personnel, training, materiel, and education capability requirements 
are developed into programs and structure, to accomplish the service’s missions and functions.
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security, including protection against non-military threats, ahead of bilateral or 
NATO commitments which had, in the past, been what shaped defence policy 
development. The 1971 White Paper established the requirement to create 
military operations centres on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts to collaborate with 
other government departments on surveillance operations because, as it stated, 
“National Defence has, however, ultimate responsibility to ensure that overall an 
adequate Canadian surveillance and control capability exists for the protection of 
Canadian sovereignty and security.”103
Three short years after the Defence White Paper, another review was 
undertaken. This was the 1974 Defence Services Review.
4.4.2 The 1974 Defence Services Review
By the end of 1974, all federal departments were feeling the full effect that
double digit inflation had on operating budgets. At the Department of National
Defence, major equipment such as tanks, ships and combat aircraft, were either
at the end or approaching their useful lives. The Department was under
significant pressure to downsize and cut back on expenditures. The Minister of
National Defence, Mr. James Richardson, described the situation as follows,
With no major equipment purchases for almost ten years, and 
insufficient resources to met day-to-day operational needs, the 
Canadian Armed Forces were approaching the point where they 
could no longer carry out effectively the tasks assigned to them, 
either at home or abroad.104
The MND assembled a review committee to determine how the Armed Forces 
could best achieve its roles and missions within the reduced fiscal environment 
of the mid-Seventies. In essence, it was a capital acquisition plan with the aim of 
reversing the rapid decline in Canadian military capability. Fundamental to the 
committee’s recommendation was its assessment that detente rests on the 
maintenance of a balance of power, and that Canada had benefited from its 
collective security arrangements with its allies. Thus, in the Defence Services
103 Canada, Department of National Defence, Defence in the 70s (Ottawa: Information Canada, 
1971), 10.
104 C.J. Marshall, “Canada’s Forces take stock in Defence Structure Review," International 
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Review report there was a re-emergence of allied commitments as the key 
determinant of military force structure. In only three years, sovereignty 
protection had slipped from the number one priority to be replaced by 
participation in NATO.105
Protection of Canadian sovereignty would not remain on the back burner 
of federal priorities for long. In 1977, the Canadian government declared a 200 
nautical mile exclusive fisheries zone, thereby dramatically increasing the 
maritime waters over which Canada claimed jurisdiction by several million 
square kilometres. The federal government was responsible to monitor and 
enforce this vast area, and the Canadian Navy had a not insignificant role in 
sovereignty protection within this new maritime zone.
4.4.3 The 1987 Defence White Paper
In 1987, the same year that the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans 
promulgated Oceans Policy for Canada, the Minister of National Defence tabled 
a new White Paper titled Challenge and Commitment. Very much a Cold War 
document, this policy statement argued that “the first objective of Canada’s 
security policy” was to promote a stable international environment in which 
Canadian interests and values could prosper. The main thrust of Challenge and 
Commitment was that collective security and deterrence would continue to be 
supported through Canada’s engagement in NATO and NORAD. It called for the 
defence of domestic territory, largely through an expanded Reserve force, and it 
reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to land and air forces to Central Europe. 
Moreover, Canada’s military would be provided the requisite modern equipment 
needed to carry out its missions and to maintain credibility through a “steady, 
predictable, and honest funding program.” 106
While the capabilities of all elements of the armed forces were to be 
augmented, the maritime forces were the clear winners in this blueprint. Through 
Challenge and Commitment, a Canadian government had tabled for the first time
105 Ibid., 30.
106 Canada, Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment -  A Defence Policy for 
Canada (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987), 3.
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a defence policy statement that portrayed Canada as a maritime nation with vital 
security and sovereignty interests in three oceans, and portended the creation of 
a “Three Ocean Navy” concept.
Unfortunately, the Minister of National Defence who had championed the 
1987 White Paper left office shortly after its release, and within two years his 
replacement was also gone. In 1989, a new Minister announced the cancellation 
of fourteen of the major capital projects that the White Paper had called for, 
including the project to acquire nuclear-powered submarines for Arctic 
sovereignty patrols. Within another year, the Berlin Wall toppled, and the 
rationale behind the 1987 White Paper had been called into question. An 
election loomed in 1993, and during the campaign it became evident that all of 
the political parties expected that whatever the election’s outcome, the defence 
budget would be reduced as Canada reaped the “peace dividend” from the end 
of the Cold War.107
4.4.4 The 1994 Defence Review and Defence White Paper
In 1994 the new Liberal Minister of National Defence announced a 
defence policy review. The Minister promulgated a “Minister’s Guidance” 
document that specified the scope of the review, and it became clear that the 
exercise was designed to shift the focus of defence policy away from its Cold 
War emphasis towards a policy that was more internationalist. Included in the 
“Minister’s Guidance” were a suggested range of tasks that the Armed Forces 
could be expected to undertake. These included those normally associated with 
sovereignty protection, i.e. actions to support enforcement against illegal fishing, 
drug smuggling, human trafficking, and pollution. As well, the Canadian Forces 
could expect to support search and rescue operations and provide humanitarian 
aid. The guidance also included military support to both NATO and continental 
defence in co-operation with the United States.
107 Claire Turenne Sjolander, Cashing in on the ‘Peace Divident’: National Defence in the Post- 
Cold War World,” Gene Swimmer, ed. How Ottawa spends 1996-97: Life under the Knife 
(Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 253.
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The review committee issued its report in October 1994. Titled Security in 
a Changing World, the report recommended a number of policy positions. 
Foremost, the report recommended establishing the protection of sovereignty as 
the fundamental role of the Armed Forces. Moreover, it advocated a continued 
partnership with the United States in the defence of North America, and 
considered continued participation in NORAD as essential. Security in a 
Changing World, recommended that Canada retain membership in the NATO 
Alliance, and that the nation continue to participate in United Nations and other 
multinational peacekeeping missions. Also, for the first time, the report 
suggested that Canadian security pay more attention to the Pacific coast.108
The 1994 Defence White Paper was released one month following the 
tabling of the Special Joint Committee’s report. It was the first Defence White 
Paper published in the post-Cold War era. While the document very much 
reflected the government’s stated aim of reduced defence spending, it 
nevertheless reiterated the requirement for the Canadian Forces to deal with 
sovereignty challenges. To address sovereignty protection, the White Paper 
listed several naval roles that included rendering assistance to other government 
departments in achieving national goals such as environmental protection, 
disaster relief, drug interdiction, and fisheries protection, as well the continued 
maintenance of a search and rescue capability. Moreover, the 1994 White 
Paper charged the Navy with demonstrating, on a regular basis, the ability to 
monitor and control activity within the nation’s maritime zones. The 1994 
Defence White Paper would be the only defence policy document to serve 
Canadian defence community for over a decade.
Before examining the development of a much overdue security policy, the 
following points are offered to recap Canadian defence policy development post- 
World War II. Since the mid-sixties Defence White Papers have followed a 
simple basic template. Indeed, they contained some reference to strategic 
assessment, but were largely devoid of meaningful choices for defence.109
108 Canada, House of Commons, Security in a Changing World: The Report of the Special Joint 
Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy (Ottawa: 1994), 33.
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Bland and Maloney assert that these “copy-cat” White Papers reflected the 
strategic stalemate of the Cold War. They further argue that, traditionally, the 
armed forces have been viewed by politicians as a burden to the taxpayer, and 
the development of defence policy in Canada has been more about fitting it in 
around other policy objectives rather than prioritizing defence goals so that they 
can mutually support other policy themes.110
The lack of an established mechanism for national security operations in 
Canada has been recognized for some time. The responsibility for various 
aspects of national security has rested with several federal departments and 
agencies, with ad hoc coordination of issues being the norm. In the past, Bland 
and Maloney, as well as other analysts, have called for shifts in policy, 
organization and procedures to facilitate an adequate state of security. 
Specifically, they argued for the federal government to articulate a broad 
definition of national security and to introduce an overarching national security 
policy. As well, they suggested that the federal government develop the means 
to bring together under the aegis of a national security policy the diverse organs 
of government charged with security tasks. Their third recommendation was that 
responsibility for national security planning and operations be vested in a single 
minister ostensibly so that redundancies in staffing and delays in decision­
making could be reduced.111 For over 20 years, analysts criticised successive 
Canadian governments for failing to produce an overarching security policy, and 
it took until 2005, four full years after the attacks on North American soil at the 
World Trade Center, for such a policy to be realized.
4.4.5 The National Security Policy
The creation of a new federal department, known as Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), and the concomitant appointment 
on 12 December 2003 of Anne McLellan as the department’s responsible 
Minister were the first major federal initiatives to address the coordination issue. 
Then, in April 2004, the federal government tabled Securing an Open Society: 
Canada’s National Security Policy. This document attempts to set policy
110 Ibid.
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direction in an integrated fashion for effective multiple agency threat 
assessment, protection and prevention capabilities, and effective consequence 
management. The core national security interests articulated are protecting 
Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad, ensuring 
that Canada is not a base for threats to its allies, and contributing to international 
security.112
The National Security Policy breaks down the security conundrum into six 
key areas. These are in the domains of intelligence, emergency planning and 
management, public health, transport security, border security, and international 
security. For the purposes of this thesis, two of these are germane. In terms of 
intelligence, the policy speaks to increasing capabilities for intelligence 
collection, applying greater focus to security intelligence and, most importantly, 
creating a new integrated threat assessment centre.113 If executed, these 
initiatives will enhance the Navy’s ability to filter and act upon relevant 
information. The second area of interest to the Navy is transport security. In this 
section, the National Security Policy calls for an improvement to Canadian 
marine security by means of a six-point plan.114
Maritime security, as a component of national security, can be defined as 
the compilation of practices that a nation observes to protect its maritime 
interests abroad, along its coasts, and in its maritime approaches. It concerns 
how the nation deals with maritime commerce (ports and shipping), resource 
exploitation (offshore platforms and fishing), and national interests in 
international waters and foreign ports.115
Officials for Transport Canada suggest that the requisite activities that 
constitute a national maritime security system can be categorized into four 
general themes. The first is domain awareness. In developing this awareness,
111 Ibid., 200-201.
112 Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy 
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surveillance information from sensors and other inputs is fused with intelligence 
collected to produce both an analysis and an understandable picture of the 
marine and air traffic as well as other activities in a coastal state’s maritime 
zones. Successful domain awareness is the result of close coordination 
between domestic and international military, intelligence and law enforcement 
agencies, and the proof of success occurs when authorities are focussing 
attention on the right threats “in the right areas at the right time” on a routine 
basis.116 Domain awareness is largely a proactive preventative activity.
The second element of a marine security system is safeguarding. This 
term refers to measures taken to protect the marine infrastructure against 
physical harm. Safeguarding also includes efforts taken to prevent criminals or 
terrorists from gaining access to North America or any part of the marine 
transportation system.
Responsiveness is the third maritime security component. This reactive 
activity pertains to enforcement efforts undertaken by a coastal state to intercept 
and apprehend criminals, terrorists, or other threats to national security. All 
appropriate police and military forces, and mandated security agencies form part 
of this activity.
The final requisite theme in an effective system is collaboration. This 
element is integral to the afore-mentioned maritime security activities. 
Collaboration can be viewed as an “enabler” activity for all components of 
security.117 Collaboration entails effective sharing, both horizontal and vertical, 
of information among bodies vested with security mandates and, in terms of 
action, includes coordination, cooperation and acting in a unified manner on 
security issues. Collaboration is largely a proactive preventative activity whose 
importance to successful maritime security cannot be overstated.118
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The marine security plan described in Securing an Open Society sets out 
to enhance coordination by designating lead agency status among the various 
departments and agencies with security mandates. For example, the Minister of 
Transport has become the designated lead for marine security policy co­
ordination and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will 
retain the lead for enforcement and policing. In a new development, the Minister 
of National Defence has been assigned the lead for the “coordination of on-water 
response to a marine threat or a developing crisis in our Exclusive Economic 
Zone and along our coasts.”119
Another element of the six-part plan is the establishment of naval-led 
Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) at various locations in the country 
that will house representatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
Canadian Coast Guard, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Transport Canada, the 
Canadian Border Security Agency, and the United States Coast Guard. The 
purpose of these centres will be to capitalize on in-house interagency staffing to 
detect, assess, and respond to marine security threats.120 MSOCs went into 
operation in Halifax and Esquimalt in 2005, and a similar centre is being planned 
for the Great Lakes region, most likely to be situated at Niagara-on-the-Lake, 
Ontario.
The marine security plan also calls for increased patrols at sea, ostensibly 
to “better position . . .  to intervene, interdict, and board ships that may pose 
threats to Canada.”121 In addition, aerial surveillance by Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada in conjunction with DND is identified as an element requiring further 
effort. Increased co-operation with the United States is a stated objective of the 
plan, as well as strengthening the security of marine ports and facilities.122
The sixth component of the plan is designed to address the inability of the 
three government fleets to pass intelligence, surveillance, and common 
operating picture data electronically to one another and to shore authorities. The
119 Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.
120 Ibid., 38-39.
121 Ibid., 39.
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DND-led Maritime Information Management and Data Exchange (MIMDEX) 
project was established to rectify this gap in capability. The project uses multi­
agency legacy IT systems to link marine-related information into a common 
picture.123
As a policy document, Securing an Open Society succeeds in identifying 
clear priorities for harmonizing security in the post-911 environment. Top-level 
bureaucrats will find sufficient fodder within the policy to justify expenditures to 
programs that transcend departmental mandates. However, the shortcomings of 
this policy are three-fold. First, it struggles to remain a strategic-level document, 
and in almost every section reads like a report card for the current government, 
citing successes achieved and expenditures made to date for various initiatives. 
No reference is made to future expenditure, so it is difficult to gauge what the 
level of commitment might be to security issues in the future when governments 
will undoubtedly be under pressure for greater spending on social programs. 
Second, there is little mention of existing gaps in the current framework of 
security policies and processes, making it problematic to determine how current 
practices will tie into a cogent long-term strategy. Third, Securing an Open 
Society leaves the role of the Canadian Forces in national security largely 
unarticulated, except for passing mention in relation to maritime security.
A basic understanding of the components of maritime security is 
necessary to understand how it is dealt with in Canada, and what role the Navy 
plays in its maintenance. The next few paragraphs will examine maritime 
security and the issue of sovereignty in greater detail.
4.4.6 Maritime Sovereignty
In the area in which oceans, defence and security issues trisect, certain 
themes reappear and are common to all three policy objectives, namely 
maintenance of sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement. The first term,
122 Ibid.
123 There are officially only two government fleets, those of Fisheries and Oceans Canada and 
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sovereignty, is worthy of further discussion since the concept is often confused 
with the terms security and defence.
In the international system, sovereignty has come to mean the legal 
identity of a state. Within international law, it is recognized that sovereign states 
by right are permitted to exercise exclusive jurisdiction within their borders. In 
other words, sovereignty “signifies the capacity to make authoritative decisions 
with regard to the people and resources within the territory of the state.”124 This 
right includes ocean areas claimed as a nation’s territory. In 1990, the Standing 
Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA) developed a 
definition of Canadian sovereignty as a benchmark for their study on maritime 
sovereignty. SCONDVA defines sovereignty as:
the prevention of trespass, the provision of services and the
enforcement of national and international law with Canadian
territory, waters and airspace.125
Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett observes that sovereignty is perceived 
generally to mean “supreme dominion, authority or rule” within the bounds of 
territorial limits.126 In the maritime context in Law of the Sea, territorial limits 
means the waters of the territorial seas. However, Garnett also notes that with 
the evolution of international Law of the Sea, and its consequent establishment 
of a regime of different zones in which coastal states are afforded different rights, 
perhaps a broader definition of maritime sovereignty is in order.127 As codified 
by the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) III, and pursuant to 
Canada’s Oceans Act of 1996, the maritime offshore “real estate” of Canada is 
divided into three distinct zones, as described in Chapter Three. These zones 
are the territorial waters from the coast or baseline out to 12 nautical miles, the 
contiguous zone from 12 to 24 nautical miles, and the exclusive economic zone
124 Report o f the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The 
Responsibility to Protect, by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, co-chairs (Ottawa: 
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that extends to 200 nautical miles from shore. Under both international law and 
the Oceans Act, Canada’s sovereign rights diminish with increased distance 
from the coastline as depicted in Figure 4-3. Garnett points out that this situation 
stands in contrast to land-based sovereignty. In the terrestrial context, he notes 
that well-defined boundaries clearly delineate the limits of a state’s sovereignty. 
Thus, he proposes that Canada’s maritime sovereignty should permit the nation 
“to enforce internationally recognized jurisdictions and enjoy acknowledged 
national prerogatives in a nation’s various coastal zones.”128
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Figure 4-3. Rights of Coastal States in Offshore Zones
Sources: Figure drawn from text of United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, 10 Dec 1982, Parts II and V; and Oceans Act, R.S.C. 1996, c31, s.4 -  16.
A vital element of sovereignty is the willingness of a nation to protect its 
maritime zones against hostile acts or violations of domestic law. Nations that 
make claims of sovereignty yet do not demonstrate what Garnett terms “sea 
control” of their offshore estate can find their claims challenged on a legal basis. 
Put another way, “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary 
responsibility . . . lies with the state itself.”129 As Peter Haydon highlights, if 
Canadian laws are broken, a response must be initiated and executed by 
Canadians. It is a Canadian responsibility. He further stresses that not 
maintaining the capability to control all activities within a state’s coastal zones is
129 Evans and Sahnoun, Responsibility to Protect, xi.
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“tacit acceptance that others may use them as they please without regard or 
respect for the law. This is an abrogation of sovereignty.130
The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence (SCONSAD) 
remarked that both the 1971 and 1987 Defence White Papers spoke to the 
necessity of maintaining Canadian sovereignty, but stressed the civilian and 
military components differently. The 1971 White Paper articulated sovereignty to 
a greater degree in non-military or quasi-military terms, clearly influenced by 
concerns about the fisheries and the environment. By contrast, the 1987 White 
Paper emphasized the military component of sovereignty. SCONSAD concludes 
in Maritime Sovereignty that the Canadian government’s approach to 
sovereignty protection requires, as Martin Shadwick testified before the 
Committee, “a hybrid approach that takes into account the non-military, the 
quasi-military, and the military requirements . . .  a well-thought-out, flexible and 
multi-tasked approach to maritime sovereignty.”131
Robert W. Timbrell cautions that security and sovereignty cannot be 
considered the same entity:
Sovereignty is not the same as security. Without security, 
sovereignty cannot mean very much . . .  It would be possible for 
Canada to lose a large measure of sovereignty without increased 
danger of invasion, destruction, or loss of territory. Moreover, 
some of the sources that threaten our sovereignty could be our 
strongest allies for the preservation of security. Whereas our 
security is bound up with that of our allies, our sovereignty is our 
own problem, to be defended by ourselves alone.132
Douglas Bland agrees, although he asserts that tasks aimed at dealing 
with violations of sovereign territory cannot be separated from those performed
130 Peter Haydon, “Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century,” Council for Canadian 
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in the defence of North America.133 Bland cautions against confusing military 
defence tasks with those whose purpose is to maintain legal sovereignty. He 
contends that the use of military forces to exert sovereignty is not an efficient use 
of federal resources, particularly when there is no military threat, and there are 
other, better-suited departments or agencies present that can represent 
Canadian interests in this regard. Further, he argues that in the post-9/11 period 
when there is heightened concern about the threat of terrorism, the military 
should not become the lead agency in domestic situations.134
Bland is absolutely correct in his assertion that maintaining sovereignty is 
not exclusively a military activity; indeed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
the Canadian Coast Guard, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada bear the brunt of 
the sovereignty responsibility. But the Navy, and the Air Force when acting on 
the Navy’s behalf, should not be constrained from showing the flag whenever 
defence and sovereignty missions overlap, or other government departments are 
unable to maintain an appropriate presence for whatever the reason.
Although without question a nation’s laws can be enforced at sea by 
civilian agencies, effective law enforcement relies on the deterrent effect that 
sufficient force can be brought to bear to compel compliance. Canadian non­
military maritime agencies cannot provide this requisite criterion and cannot 
meet force with force in the event of an aggressive challenge to national 
security.135 Thus law enforcement at sea in Canada relies on the backing of the 
Navy to provide credible armed force because only the armed forces have the 
authority and legal justification to use violence in a major way in support of 
policy.
A sovereign coastal state must know what is going on above, below, and 
at the surface of its waters. This understanding includes not just the human 
spectre, but encompasses a complete awareness of the marine biosphere,
133 Douglas L. Bland and Sean M. Maloney, Defence Policy for the World Order Era: The First 
Steps -  Reconstitution and Transformation (Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2004), p.204.
134 Ibid., 204-205.
132
geography, climatology and oceanography of the offshore estate.136 Moreover, in 
order to exercise full sovereignty, a nation must be able to control the human 
activities in the waters under its jurisdiction. This requirement is termed sea 
control.
Sea control of a nation’s offshore estate can be achieved through
surveillance, monitoring, and response.137 In the maritime context, surveillance
requires current knowledge of who is on, above, or below the waters and implies
the maintenance of an infrastructure capable of detecting and reporting
situations of interest in the maritime zones. In Competitiveness and Security, the
1985 Green Paper on External Affairs noted that,
Control over our national territory, airspace, and coastal waters is 
essential, both for the assertion of our sovereignty and for 
preservation of our security. To be effective, control requires a 
surveillance and detection system able to provide an continuing 
picture of activities on land, in the air, and at sea. . . Most countries 
exert such control as a matter of routine. In our case, it is a 
daunting task, considering the length of our coastlines, the 
vastness of our territory, the hostility of our climate, and the 
disproportionately small size of our population.138
Monitoring is the second element of domestic sea control. It refers to 
active observation of the maritime domain through locating, identifying, tracking 
and inspecting human activities in the water column and super-adjacent 
airspace. Monitoring is an unmistakable expression of the government’s will and 
authority in the area of jurisdiction. The action that a state takes to respond to 
incidents that threaten national security or sovereignty or, in other words, an 
action that forces compliance with domestic and international laws, regulations 
and standards is known as enforcement.139
135 Amphion, “Do We Really Need a Navy?” Maritime Affairs (January, 1997): 12.
136 Garnett. “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty,” 3.
137 Crickard and Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 42.
138 Canada, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Competitiveness and Security (Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services, 1985), 85.
139 Amphion, “Do We Really Need a Navy?” 11; Peter Haydon, “Why Do We Need a Navy?” 
Naval Officers Association of British Columbia <http://www.noabc.com/default~area 
~docread~docid~141.htm> (29 March 2005).
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The third element of sea control of the offshore estate is response. 
Crickard and Herbert propose basic areas of marine activity that nations must 
control if they are to be taken seriously as coastal states.140 These areas include 
the management of renewable and non-renewable marine resources, the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of 
maritime sovereignty and prevention of illegal activity, and the maintenance of 
marine safety. These areas, according to Crickard and Herbert, require 
responses through the use of operational, legal, political, and non-government 
resources. Operational responses refer to the wide range of personnel, 
equipment, and platforms as well as command and control infrastructure used to 
exercise jurisdiction at sea. Legal responses are the national system of laws, 
regulations, standards and procedures applicable to the coastal state’s 
jurisdiction. They may also be regional or international treaties that have been 
incorporated into the state’s legal system. The nature of political responses can 
be intra-governmental, inter-departmental and inter-agency, as well as being 
regional or international in dimension. The non-government responses refer to 
the active participation of key stakeholders, such as industry, user groups, 
coastal communities, NGOs, and aboriginal groups in such a way as to promote 
sustainable oceans use and management. The mix of responses used by a 
nation depends upon its unique requirements and the resources at its 
disposal.141
4.5 Whither Surveillance Policy?
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the need for surveillance of Canada’s 
maritime zones is present in oceans, defence, and security policy frameworks. 
What is fascinating, though, is that until the promulgation of the National Security 
Policy in 2004, there has been virtually no articulation of the responsibility by any 
particular federal department for this surveillance requirement, except in defence
140 Fred W. Crickard, Bruce Donaldson, lain Stewart and Jeremy Conway, An Integrated 
Approach to Maritime Enforcement, (Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie 
University, 1992) as quoted in Fred W. Crickard and Glen J/ Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for 
the Northwest Atlantic: Applications to Maritime Enforcement.” In An Oceans Management 
Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic in the 21st Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 9, edited by 
Peter T. Haydon and Gregory L. Witol (Halifax: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 
1998): 39.
141 Crickard and Herbert. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic,” 41.
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policy documents. A 2003 study commissioned by the Department of National of 
National Defence to identify and evaluate national surveillance requirements 
determined that, despite over 50 studies and papers over the past decade, it was 
not possible to identify documents that referred to a national surveillance 
strategy.142
Indeed, through this lack of government direction, the Canadian Forces 
and the Navy in particular, have become the de facto co-ordinators of maritime 
surveillance for the federal government. While there is little in terms of policy 
guidance that explains with any precision the Navy’s responsibility towards 
maritime surveillance, it is possible to deduce a significant role based on federal 
statutes and military defence plans, and Memoranda of Understanding between 
federal departments.
The Constitution Act of 1867 asserts that it is lawful for the Queen to 
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada in relation to 
all matters not assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the provinces. The Act 
goes on to decree that Parliament’s authority extends to all matters concerning 
the regulation of trade and commerce; militia, military and naval service, and 
defence; beacons, buoys, and lighthouses; navigation and shipping; sea coast 
and inland fisheries. The Constitution Act also classifies shipping lines, railways, 
and canals, whether connecting the provinces or extending beyond the limits of 
the provinces “to be for the general advantage of Canada” and thus fall under 
the jurisdiction of Parliament.143
As a minister of the crown, the Minister of National Defence has a duty to 
support all parliamentary acts. Thus, there is an implied departmental obligation 
to identify maritime sovereignty and security elements embedded within all 
federal acts and regulations. As such, the Navy has an obligation to be prepared
142 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1150-1 (JFC3-3- 
3) National Surveillance Policy. 20 January 2003.
1 3 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91, 92.
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to conduct maritime surveillance and control in support of prevention and 
enforcement. Federal statutes that imply a maritime surveillance role for the 
Navy are the Oceans Act, which was covered in greater detail earlier in the 
chapter, the Fisheries Act, the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, the 
Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, and the National Defence Act.
While there has little in government policy that speaks directly to the 
requirement for federal departments and agencies to conduct surveillance, the 
1994 Defence White Paper did provide guidelines for the Canadian Forces in the 
broadest sense. The White Paper stated that “the provision of surveillance and 
control is an integral part of the Forces' activities in Canada . . .  the Forces must 
maintain and exercise the basic navy, army, and air force skills to ensure 
effective control over our territory, airspace, and maritime approaches.”144 This 
statement is strategic direction to Canada’s military to provide surveillance, albeit 
undefined, for the basic purposes of defence. However, to maintain a military 
capability, the capability must be developed and practised on a regular basis or 
the capability is lost. Thus, this statement in the White Paper implies that 
surveillance should be a routine operation and an explicit task for the Canadian 
Forces.
The 1994 White Paper asserted that, while the military may not be the 
lead agency for surveillance of areas Canadian jurisdiction, the Armed Forces 
may possess unique capability beyond that of civilian departments. The White 
Paper stated that,
Responsibility for many of the Government's activities in the 
surveillance and control of Canadian territory, airspace, and 
maritime areas of jurisdiction lies with civilian agencies such as the 
Department of Transport. The Canadian Forces, however, make a 
valuable contribution to this demanding task, which often requires 
capabilities of greater readiness and reach than those available to 
civilian agencies.145
144 Canada, Department of National Defence, 1994 White Paper on Defence, “Chapter 4 -
Protection of Canada,” 23 December 2002 <http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/ 
5116_e.htm> (12 August 2006).
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The diversity of the surveillance and control expected of the Armed 
Forces is captured in the following 1994 White Paper extracts,
The Department of National Defence and the Department of 
Transport now participate in a comprehensive federal effort, led by 
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Canadian Forces 
will devote a significant number of flying hours and ship days to 
fishery patrols . . . NORAD has a role in counter-narcotic 
monitoring and surveillance. This is an ancillary mission to which 
the capabilities of our maritime and land forces have also been 
applied . . .  the Department of National Defence has concluded a 
memorandum of understanding with the Department of the 
Environment with respect to the use of the Canadian Forces in 
environmental surveillance . . .  as the Forces carry out their routine 
surveillance missions, they will seek to identify and report potential 
and actual environmental problems.146
These passages refer to an obligation to support other government 
departments in accordance with existing Memoranda of Understanding, as well 
as expressing the explicit task of environmental surveillance as a secondary 
mission on an opportunity basis and not requiring a specific mission. To 
facilitate what is outlined requires a means of exchanging surveillance 
information exchange between departments and furnishes justification for 
maintaining an accurate and comprehensive recognised maritime picture.
The 1994 Defence White Paper also directed that the Armed Forces be 
able to respond to threats to sovereignty beyond 200 nautical miles and implied 
that the military should establish connectivity with other nations and authorities to 
share information beyond national maritime zones. The outer limit of this 
response was neither defined nor addressed in any other governing 
documentation.147
Having established surveillance of maritime zones and approaches as a 
legitimate government task, there remains one major policy document to be 
discussed. It was left for the end of this chapter because it is the federal
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government’s most recent articulation of defence policy, and incorporates 
elements of previous defence statements and the 2005 National Security Policy. 
This document, known within government as the 2005 Defence Policy 
Statement, was developed using a different, more holistic approach to policy 
formulation than has been employed in the past.
4.6 The 2005 Defence Policy Statement
In April of 2005, the government unveiled a new International Policy 
Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, that comprised four 
mutually-reinforcing documents that addressed foreign affairs, defence, 
development, and trade.148 The main thrust of the defence document, called the 
Defence Policy Statement (DPS), echoes the central theme of A Role of Pride 
and Influence in the World that being reinvigoration of Canada’s international 
role. In the DPS, this reinvigoration manifests itself as a reinvestment in a 
Canadian expeditionary military capability. The DPS directs much of Canada’s 
effort to be focussed on “failed or failing states,” where Canadian troops are to 
be prepared to conduct “three-block war” operations. This term, first coined by 
senior American military commanders, describes a situation in which combat, 
peace support, and humanitarian operations take place within a confined 
geographical space. This shift in emphasis reflects the appraisal that threats to 
security are more likely to come from non-state actors and terrorist groups or 
due to political instability in struggling countries, rather than the state versus 
state conflicts.
While there are noteworthy changes in this most recent document, much 
remains from previous defence statements. The Canadian Forces retain three 
principal roles: the defence of Canada, the defence of North America in co­
operation with the United States, and contribution to international security.149 
However, the DPS acknowledges weaknesses of previous policies when it states 
that,
147 Ibid.
148 The current buzzword used in the Canadian government and its bureaucracy is “three D’s and 
C." These stand for “diplomacy, defence, development and commerce.”
149 Canada, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, A Role of Pride and Influence in the 
World: Defence, (Ottawa: April 2005), 2.
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greater emphasis must be placed on the defence of Canada and 
North America than in the past. This must be the Canadian 
Forces’ first priority. Current threats demand that we pay 
increased attention to the safety and security of our citizens at 
home, the most fundamental responsibility of any government.150
The Defence Policy Statement is ambitious in both scope and scale, 
calling for a major restructuring of the Canadian Forces, adoption of the concept 
of Canada as a theatre of operations, and the establishment of a separate 
“Canada Command” for command and control of domestic operations. Moreover, 
the DPS calls for the generation of a Standing Contingency Task Force to 
respond to threats domestically and abroad.
Of significance to the Navy is the Defence Policy Statement’s pledge to 
increase surveillance of Canadian territory and areas of maritime jurisdiction, 
including the near-ice and ice-fee regions of the Arctic. Greater co-operation 
between civil authorities at all levels of government is called for in order to 
improve information and intelligence collection, analysis, and integration. The 
DPS reiterates commitments outlined in the National Security Policy. For the 
Navy, these responsibilities comprise the 6-point maritime security plan, and 
include taking the lead in the co-ordination of responses to developing on-water 
threats, as well as employing better use of maritime radars to develop a 
“common maritime picture”. The DPS calls for increased support to other 
government departments in “protecting endangered fish stocks, monitoring illegal 
drug and immigration activity, conducting environmental surveillance, and 
carrying out search and rescue operations.”151
The 2005 Defence Policy Statement component of A Role of Pride and 
Influence in the World has been described by one analyst as “the most 
integrated, even thoughtful, approach to Canada’s relations with the rest of the 
world in recent memory.”152 While this may be true, it is too early to tell whether 
the DPS will cause the requisite government framework to be established for
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., 17-19.
152 David Rudd, Canada’s New Defence Policy. Canadian Institute for Strategic Studies 
<http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_Newpolicy.htm> (5 August 2006).
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effective, relevant and responsive operations in support of Canadian maritime 
security and sovereignty.
4.7 Summary
Although Canada has existed as a sovereign state for almost 140 years, 
there has been no clear articulation by successive governments of what are 
Canadian national interests. Federal policy statements have tended to cite 
Canadian values and goals, the most commonly stated being democracy, 
individual freedom and social justice. In the absence of clear political guidance 
at the strategic level, Canadian policy makers have taken an ad hoc and “stove- 
piped” approach to development of oceans, security, and defence policies. It 
has only been post-911 that Canada has produced overarching oceans strategy 
and national security documents.
This somewhat muddled policy development process has seen the 
evolution of oceans policy over three decades that produced three key initiatives: 
the Oceans Act of 1997, Canada’s Oceans Strategy of 2002, and Canada’s 
Oceans Action Plan of 2005. These initiatives signal the federal government’s 
recognition at last that national sovereignty and security are integral but they fall 
short of prescribing a cogent means for coordination among federal departments 
with maritime responsibilities. The Oceans Act struck into Canadian law the 
maritime zones set forth by UNCLOS III, and provided federal government 
departments the legal authority for enforcement in these zones.
National security and national defence are two related but separate 
obligations of any government. Although defence is a sub-set of national 
security, the terms that are often used interchangeably, leading to confusion and 
lack of clarity of purpose. While Canadian governments have consistently 
delivered periodic policy documents in the form of Defence White Papers and 
Defence Policy Statements, it was not until 2005 that a National Security Policy 
was introduced.
A key priority of the Defence White Papers of the past 40 years has been 
protection of Canadian sovereignty. However, maintaining sovereignty is not
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exclusively a military activity; indeed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the 
Canadian Coast Guard, and Fisheries and Oceans Canada bear the brunt of the 
responsibility for sovereignty protection. But the Navy, and the Air Force when 
acting on the Navy’s behalf, should not be constrained from showing the flag 
whenever defence and sovereignty missions overlap, or other government 
departments are unable to maintain an appropriate presence for whatever the 
reason.
In the area in which oceans, defence and security issues trisect, certain 
themes reappear and are common to all three policy objectives, namely 
maintenance of sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement.
In many cases, tasks aimed at dealing with violations of sovereign 
territory cannot be separated from those performed in the defence of Canada. In 
much the same manner that the terms security and defence have become 
misused, the concepts of security and sovereignty can be difficult to differentiate, 
and often one term is used to mean the other. Moreover, in the post-911 era, 
the distinction between security and defence has become blurred.
Oceans
Policy
Sovereignty
Surveillance
Enforcement
Defence
Policy
Security
Policy
Figure 4-4. Trisection of Policy Objectives
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In many cases, tasks aimed at dealing with violations of sovereign 
territory cannot be separated from those performed in the defence of Canada. In 
much the same manner that the terms security and defence have become 
misused, the concepts of security and sovereignty can be difficult to differentiate, 
and often one term is used to mean the other. Moreover, in the post-911 era, 
the distinction between security and defence has become blurred.
The requirement for surveillance of Canada’s maritime zones is present in 
oceans, defence, and security policy frameworks. However, there is no national 
surveillance policy that articulates priorities or how surveillance is to be co­
ordinated by government. Individual federal departments are guided to some 
extent by their enabling statutes for their own surveillance interests, but there is 
no overarching concept for surveillance. Some defence policy documents 
charge the Armed Forces to be ready to conduct surveillance for defence 
purposes, but no federal body is mandated to co-ordinate surveillance efforts on 
behalf of the government.
There are basic areas of marine activity that nations must control if they 
are to be taken seriously as coastal states.153 These areas include the 
management of renewable and non-renewable marine resources, the protection 
and preservation of the marine environment, the maintenance of maritime 
sovereignty and prevention of illegal activity, and the maintenance of marine 
safety. These areas, according to Crickard and Herbert, require responses 
through the use of operational, legal, political, and non-government resources. 
The graphic at the end of this chapter summarises, in tabular form, the main 
maritime challenges and responses that Canada has endured for the past 40 
years.154
The most relevant strategic policy documents that enable maritime 
enforcement operations to be conducted in Canadian maritime zones and 
approaches are the Oceans Act, Canada’s Ocean Strategy, the Ocean Action 
Plan, the National Security Policy, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement.
153 Crickard, et al, An Integrated Approach to Maritime Enforcement, 39.
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This chapter has addressed the first segment of the second research 
theme, the policy and regulatory framework. The next chapter will continue this 
key theme by examining those federal departments responsible for enforcement 
tasks and the mandates prescribed in the above noted Acts.
154 Crickard, “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997,” 12, 16, 22.
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Chapter Five
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MARITIME ENFORCEMENT
5.1 Introduction
The last chapter examined how Canadian oceans, security, defence and 
surveillance policies shape the strategic environment in which the Canadian 
Navy fulfils a full range of roles at sea and ashore. The aim of this chapter is to 
build upon this examination by narrowing the focus to describe the principal 
Canadian regulatory and advisory bodies implicated in oceans management, in 
particular those concerned with maritime security and enforcement issues. This 
chapter identifies the mandates, jurisdictions, and general capabilities of the 
key federal departments with responsibility for oceans management, and either 
direct or indirect links to maritime enforcement. It does not treat how the 
federal agencies interact and co-operate in the current security environment. 
That will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
To establish the strategic setting for the discussion, the government 
bodies that have oceans management responsibilities will be introduced and 
their mandates and capabilities described. Included in this examination are 
joint federal-provincial agencies as well as various councils that have only 
indirect influence on maritime enforcement. Their inclusion in the discussion is 
important to comprehend the mosaic that forms the oceans governance 
structure in Canada, and how bodies lacking direct enforcement authority may 
influence security and enforcement activities.
While it is clear that the naval contribution to maritime enforcement is the 
main theme to this dissertation, the description in this chapter of the Navy’s 
organisation and capabilities is provided following those of all other federal 
departments and agencies. This order was chosen for two reasons. First and 
foremost, the Canadian Forces, of which the Navy is a component, has no legal 
mandate to enforce Canadian law; the Armed Forces act only in support of 
those government bodies that are so enabled by federal statute. Thus, it is 
useful to understand the other government departments’ roles and capabilities 
and, more importantly, their lack of capability, to place the naval contribution
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into perspective. Second, if the naval structure were to be discussed at the 
outset, reference would be made of support provided to specific departments, 
such as DFO and the RCMP. Since the organisation and capabilities of these 
other federal bodies would not yet have been examined, it would be difficult to 
put into context how the Navy’s contribution helps to “fill in the gaps” of the 
government’s enforcement framework.
The federal setting and examination of those bodies with primary 
responsibilities for enforcement will be followed by the introduction three 
important Memoranda of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and 
other federal government departments. These are discussed in the latter half 
of the chapter. Having been introduced to departmental mandates and 
capabilities, the reader will be better able to understand how the MOUs 
address the limitations of the affected departments. The chapter will conclude 
with a discussion of the legal framework for the use of Canadian military forces 
for domestic operations.
5.2 The Federal Setting
As can be seen in Tables 4-1 and 5-2, there are a plethora of 
government ministries, departments, agencies and councils at two levels of 
government as well as a host of non-government organisations that have 
vested interest in oceans governance. Although actual regulatory 
responsibilities of these bodies tend to be constrained exclusively to those laid 
down by their individual enabling statutes or charters, many of the bodies 
operate in an advisory capacity to other agencies, a capacity that spans 
multiple maritime sectors. Within the study area, the regulatory framework can 
be described by the following three categories:
a. Joint federal-provincial agencies and departments;
b. Federal agencies and departments;
c. Provincial agencies and departments.
Of these, the federal departments and agencies have the greatest interaction 
with the Navy. Transport Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the Canadian
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Coast Guard, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police interact largely with 
shore-based naval assets for routine day-to-day operations. Other departments 
such Environment Canada, and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service 
engage with the Navy as various situations warrant co-operation. While the 
Atlantic provinces have a limited part to play in maritime enforcement, the 
emphasis of inter-departmental co-operation is primarily at the federal level. It 
is the relationships at this level that will be discussed in this chapter.
TABLE 5-1
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT BODIES WITH OCEANS GOVERNANCE RESPONSIBILITIES
Ministries and Independent Advisory Councils Judicial and other
Departments Government Agencies bodies
• Fisheries and • Canada Border • Federal Regional • Justice Canada
Oceans Canada Services Agency Councils: • International
•  Canadian Coast • Canada Revenue - Nova Scotia Development
Guard Agency
Canadian
- Newfoundland Research
•  Transport Canada • - New Brunswick- Prince Edward
Centre
•  Public Safety Environmental Island
Canada Assessment - Quebec
•  Royal Canadian Agency - British Columbia
Mounted Police • Canadian - Yukon Territory
•  Environment Transportation - Nunavut
Canada Agency Territory
•  Natural Resources • Transportation - Northwest
Canada Safety Board Territories
•  Dept of National 
Defence
• Atlantic Pilotage 
Authority
• Canadian Council 
of Ministers of the 
Environment
•  Dept of Foreign • Pacific Pilotage • Canadian Marine
Affairs and Authority Advisory Council
International Trade • Canada- • Fisheries
•  Indian and Northern Newfoundland Resource
Affairs Canada Offshore Petroleum Conservation
•  Canadian Board Council
International • Canada-Nova
Development Scotia Offshore
Agency Petroleum Board
The principal tasks that these federal regulatory and advisory bodies 
undertake in support of Canada’s oceans management are surveillance and 
monitoring activities related to exercising national sovereignty, developing 
situational awareness of the maritime domain, and control of the sea 
approaches to ensure territorial security. Under these overarching aims, 
surveillance, monitoring and enforcement activities are conducted that pertain
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to the conservation and protection of marine resources, the enforcement of 
customs, immigration, marine transportation, and other domestic laws and 
international agreements. As well, many of these bodies play a role in 
managing scientific research activities aimed at improving the understanding of 
the marine environment and its resources.
With greater emphasis being given to potential sea-borne terrorism in 
the post-9/11 environment, government departments have begun to view 
enforcement as a component of the broader issue of marine security. Thus, 
whereas in the past, a department might not have had a stated marine 
enforcement role, there may be, at present, an implied function under the 
umbrella of “marine security.”
The Navy’s interaction with NGOs for the purposes of marine 
enforcement is virtually non-existent. Table 5-2 is included only to highlight the 
broad spectrum of special interest groups concerned with Canadian oceans 
management issues. As well, there is little operational linkage between the 
Navy and the four provincial governments in the Atlantic region, so these 
relationships will not be addressed in this thesis, except for two joint federal- 
provincial agencies that deal with offshore hydrocarbon exploitation.
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TABLE 5-2
NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS WITH OCEANS GOVERNANCE INTERESTS
• Alliance for Marine Remote Sensing
Association
• Aquatic Ecosystem Health &
Management Society
• Assembly of First Nations
• Atlantic Coastal Action Plan
• Atlantic Coastal Zone Steering
Committee
• Bay of Fundy Ecosystem Partnership
• Bay of Fundy Marine Resource Centre
• Canadian Arctic Resource Centre
• Canadian Centre for Marine
Communications
• Canadian Circumpolar Institute
• Canadian Climate Impacts and
Adaptation Research Network
• Canadian Geophysical Union
• Canadian International Development
Agency
• Canadian International Development
Series
• Canadian Meteorological and
Oceanographic Society
• Canadian Responsible Fisheries
Federation
• Centre for Marine Bio-diversity
• Climate Action Network Canada
• Coastal Education and Research
Foundation
Coastal Zone Canada Association
Cree Regional Authority
Fishermen and Scientists Research 
Society
Geoconnections Discovery Portal 
Huntsman Marine Science Centre
International Arctic Science 
Committee 
International Association of 
Hydrological Sciences 
International Institute of Fisheries 
Economics & Trade 
International Marine Mammal 
Association Inc 
International Ocean Institute 
Kivalliq Inuit Association
Living Oceans Society 
Marine Law Institute
Nunavut Research Institute
Ocean Innovation Conference Series
Ocean Management Research 
Network 
Ocean Technology Network 
Partnership for Observation of the 
Global Oceans 
Sierra Club
World Wildlife Fund
5.2.1 Joint Federal-Provincial Agencies -  Offshore Petroleum Boards
There are two joint petroleum boards in place, on behalf of the 
Government of Canada and the Governments of Nova Scotia, and 
Newfoundland and Labrador, to regulate exploration and resource extraction in 
Atlantic Canada’s offshore regions. The geographic area that these Boards 
regulate is shown at Figure 5-1.
The Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOPB) was 
created in March 1987, when the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord
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Implementation Act received royal assent, and was further affirmed by 
provincial statute, the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation 
Newfoundland and Labrador Act of 1990. Seven persons comprise the 
CNOPB: three are federally-appointed members, three are provincially-
appointed members, and a Chairperson is appointed jointly by both levels of 
government.155
Figure 5-1. Offshore Petroleum Board Jurisdiction -  Atlantic Canada
Source: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board; Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board.
The Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board (CNSOPB) was 
established in 1990 by the enactment of both the federal Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act and the provincial 
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation 
(Nova Scotia) Act. The CNSOPB is slightly smaller than the CNOPB, 
consisting of only five individuals: two are federally-appointed members, two
155 Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, c. 3, s. 9, 
and Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and 
Labrador Act, R.N.S.L. 1990, c. 2, s. 9.
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are provincially-appointed members and, as in the other board, the Chairperson 
is appointed jointly by the federal and provincial governments.156
Reporting jointly to the federal Minister of Natural Resources and to the 
each respective provincial energy ministers, the two boards have similar 
responsibilities. First and foremost, the boards manage and conserve offshore 
petroleum resources for optimised hydrocarbon recovery, waste avoidance, 
and the protection of the environment. The boards manage offshore land rights 
through the issuance of licences for exploration and development, and maintain 
safe working standards in offshore operations. In addition, the boards ensure 
statutory compliance by operators in matters of contracting, procurement, and 
employment to provide economic benefits to Canada and the provinces of 
Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.157
The offshore petroleum boards are relevant to Canadian maritime 
enforcement for several reasons. First among these is search and rescue. 
The boards will not approve any offshore oil and gas operation in the Atlantic 
region unless the operator has a comprehensive emergency response plan in 
place. These plans must cover a variety of situations, such as fires, 
explosions, evacuation of the platform, spills, damage to the rig, measures to 
deal with icebergs, and so on.158 The Department of National Defence also 
maintains agreements with offshore platforms to act as fuelling bases for 
military helicopters, thereby extending the range of search and rescue aircraft 
by at least 150 nautical miles. The Halifax Joint Rescue Coordination Centre
156 Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1988, 
c. 28, s. 9, and Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation 
(Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3, s. 9.
57 Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, C-NOPB Overview, 9 December 2003, 
<http://www.cnopb.nfnet.com/general/media/mediaen.htm> (14 December 2003) and Canada- 
Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board, CNSOPB Overviews, <http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/ 
Generalinfo/overviews.html> (14 December 2003).
158 The1982 sinking of the exploratory offshore drilling platform Ocean Ranger in the Hibernia 
oil field, with the loss of 84 lives, predated the creation of the CNOPB and CNSOPB. The 
investigation into the tragedy made 136 recommendations, including the creation of a National 
Search and Rescue Secretariat, major changes to both search and rescue and offshore 
exploration practices, particularly as they pertain to safety and training standards for workers, 
improvements to lifeboats and launching systems, and provision of survival suits to employees. 
See Canada, Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada), Hearings - 
Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada). (Ottawa: The Royal 
Commission, 1984-1985).
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hosts regular oil and gas seminars to promote exchange of information and 
best practices. The CNOPB and CNSOPB maintain routine contact with 
Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters for the passage of information 
concerning proposed exploratory activities in the offshore. This information 
forms another important input to the Navy’s surveillance picture. Lastly, the 
Boards can provide expert advice to military and police forces on the physical 
security of offshore platforms from criminal and terrorist attack.
5.2.2 Federal Regional Councils
Federal Regional Councils came into being during the early 1980s, 
primarily to allow senior public sector managers to better co-ordinate regional 
economic development initiatives. Over the past twenty years, issues for 
discussion at these meetings have increased in scope, and the councils have 
become an excellent forum for networking and sharing of information on a 
broad spectrum of federal initiatives ranging from public service renewal to 
improving program effectiveness and service delivery. This has taken on 
greater importance during a decade of budgetary cutbacks and a consequent 
emphasis within the Public Service on “horizontal co-operation” in policy 
development and program delivery.159
Federal regional councils are made up of the most senior bureaucrats in 
each of the federal departments or agencies represented in each province. 
The actual size of each council varies by province, but normally will be between 
20 to 50 persons. Federal councils provide a forum for generating support to 
departments with lead agency status regionally for issues such as economic 
development, aboriginal, youth and rural issues, as well as implementation of 
oceans policy. Also, these councils are viewed frequently by non-federal 
parties as being the single conduit through which all federal departments can 
be engaged on a particular issue.160 However, none of the federal regional 
councils have executive authority to implement action items. A council relies
159 Luc Juillet, A Report prepared for the Federal Regional Councils and the Treasury Board 
Secretariat, 1 October 2000, <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/frc-cfr/bkgrd-contexte/horizontality 
e.asp> (15 December 2003).
Canada, Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, The Role of Regional Councils, 8 January 
1999 <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/frc-cfr/bkgrd-contexte/role_e.asp> (14 December 2003).
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on the volunteer nature of its members to progress within their respective 
departments agreed-upon initiatives, few of which pertain to maritime security 
and enforcement.
Although all four Atlantic provinces maintain their respective federal 
regional councils, from the Navy’s perspective, the 53-member Nova Scotia 
Federal Council (NSFC) is pre-eminent. This is largely because the 
Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic is a member of this body, along with his 
Army counterpart, Commander Land Forces Atlantic Area. More importantly 
though, the NFSC sponsors a sub-committee that provides a forum for 
discussion of security and enforcement issues affecting Atlantic Canada. It is 
through the NSFC Security Committee that real improvement to working-level 
intergovernmental co-operation has been made. This will be discussed in 
greater detail later in Chapter Six. With regard to the other Atlantic federal 
regional councils, the Navy also participates as a member of the New 
Brunswick Federal Council Security Committee, but not in Prince Edward 
Island or Newfoundland, although potential naval participation in the latter was 
discussed in 2003.
In 2006 another interdepartmental security committee was established in 
the Atlantic Region. Known as the Atlantic Region Security Committee, it 
meets to address issues of national and provincial security with implications for 
Atlantic Canada as a whole, linking closely to provincial and national activities. 
Clearly, it is similar to the NSFC Security Committee in that it is comprised of 
federal officials representing departments with security, intelligence, and law 
enforcement roles. However, what is different about this committee is that 
provincial departments have seats at the table. Commander MARLANT, in his 
capacity as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic is a member of this 
committee as are the Deputy Ministers of the New Brunswick Department of 
Public Safety, Nova Scotia Attorney-General, Newfoundland Attorney-General, 
Prince Edward Island Attorney-General, as well as the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Atlantic Region. Additionally, the Regional Directors General 
for the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canadian Border 
Services Agency (CBSA), Transport Canada (TC), Public Safety and
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Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), Health Canada, and Justice 
Canada are represented, as are the Assistant Commissioners of the 
Newfoundland and Maritimes regions of the Canadian Coast Guard. The 
objectives of the Atlantic Region Security Committee are to align inter-agency 
policy and priorities, progress intergovernmental communication protocols, 
carry out strategic co-ordination of joint exercises and, most importantly, to 
develop a common understanding of the security threat environment.
5.2.3 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME)
The need for intergovernmental co-ordination of pan-jurisdictional 
environmental issues resulted in the establishment over a decade ago of the 
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. The council consists of 14 
ministers from federal, provincial, and territorial governments, and it meets on a 
yearly basis to determine national priorities for work on environmental policies. 
Common vision, objectives, and partnering principles are contained in the 
CCME-sponsored Canada-wide Accord on Environmental Harmonization. 
Pursuant to this accord, several sub-agreements have been derived, such as 
the Inspections and Enforcement Sub-agreement, endorsed in 2001.161
CCME’s work is aimed at the establishment of national environmental 
standards, maintenance of scientific data upon which sound environmental 
decisions can be based, strategic management of inter-jurisdictional matters, 
and the harmonization of environmental assessment and review procedures 
among its members.162 While the CCME plays a vital role in fostering co­
operation between different levels of government, and co-ordinating action on 
environmental policy development, the council has no executive authority to 
implement or enforce legislation. Rather, it is incumbent upon ministries in 
each jurisdiction to determine whether CCME proposals will be adopted.
161 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, About CCME, 26 November 2003, 
<http://www.ccme.ca/about/whatwedo.html> (16 December 2003).
162 Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, Statement of Interjurisdictional 
Coopereration on Environmental Matters, 26 November 2003, <http://www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/ 
stmt_intrjrsdctnl_cprtn_envt_matters_e.pdf> (16 December 2003).
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CCME has no direct role to maritime enforcement as it pertains to the 
Navy; any relevance is of a tertiary nature.
5.2.4 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA)
Created in 1987, the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency is tasked to 
promote the economic development of the Atlantic provinces “through policy, 
program and project development and implementation and through advocacy of 
the interests of Atlantic Canada in national economic policy, program and 
project development and implementation.163” Essentially, ACOA encourages 
entrepreneurship, with a focus on small to medium businesses, champions 
Atlantic Canada to national and international companies as a desirable location 
for setting up business, and is a portal through which business development 
grants are obtained.
Although ACOA’s mandate extends to Atlantic Canada’s coastal zones, 
in practice there is only indirect relevance to maritime enforcement activities, 
and this pertains to non-military federal departments.
5.2.5 Atlantic Pilotage Association (APA)
The term “pilotage” in its nautical sense usually refers to the 
control of a vessel through restricted waters unfamiliar to the vessel’s 
master, carried out by a local mariner certified to conduct this high 
standard of navigation. Since 1972 in the Atlantic region, pilotage has 
been regulated by a Crown Corporation known as the Atlantic Pilotage 
Authority. Deriving its authority from the Pilotage Act, and reporting to 
the Minister of Transport, the Atlantic Pilotage Authority has 
responsibility for the training, licensing and dispatching of pilots, 
establishing compulsory pilotage areas, prescribing the classes of 
vessels requiring compulsory pilotage, and other responsibilities
163 Atlantic Canada Opportunities Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.41, s.12. See also Canada, Atlantic 
Canada Opportunities Agency, Welcome to ACOA, 4 December 2003, <http://www.acoa.ca/ 
e/index.shtml> (15 December 2003).
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concerning terms of employment for pilots.164 A similar authority exists 
on Canada’s west coast for the regulation of pilotage in Pacific waters.165
As depicted in Figure 3-22, there are 16 compulsory pilotage areas in 
the Atlantic provinces. The criteria that the Atlantic Pilotage Authority uses to 
determine whether a port or passage should be a compulsory pilotage area 
pertain to the degree of difficulty for navigation and the hazards in the particular 
area, the amount of vessel traffic, the degree of maneuverability and size of 
vessels using the area, environmental considerations, and the nature of the 
cargo being carried.166
Departments with enforcement mandates have a vested interest in 
maintaining good liaison with the Atlantic Pilotage Association, in view of the 
cumulative hours that pilots spend aboard merchant vessels. They are 
additional sets of “eyes on the water,” and are in a position to notify appropriate 
authorities of suspicious activity or potential threats to security. The naval 
officer appointed as the Queen’s Harbour Master is the Navy’s official liaison 
with the Atlantic Pilotage Authority.
5.2.6 Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency (CEAA)
Created in 1994 under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency is the federal body vested 
with the responsibility for promoting environmental assessment as a planning 
tool for environmental protection and sustainment. Operating completely 
independently from other federal departments including Environment Canada, 
the CEAA reports to, and advises the federal Minister of the Environment, 
administers and promotes compliance with the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Act and sound environmental assessment processes, and 
provides opportunities for public participation in this process. The intent of the 
Act is to ensure that projects are carried out in a precautionary manner, that
Pilotage Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-14, s.20.
165 Canada, Pacific Pilotage Authority Canada, Welcome to the Pacific Pilotage Authority 
Website, <http://www.ppa.gc.ca/english/index.html> (14 December 2003).
166 Canada, Atlantic Pilotage Authority, Atlantic Region Pilot Areas, <http://www.atlanticpilotage. 
com/main/content/charts.htm> (14 December 2003).
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sustainable development is promoted, and that there is co-ordinated action 
between jurisdictions to prevent adverse environmental impact.167 The Navy 
has no direct or indirect interaction with this agency.
5.2.7 Canadian Transportation Agency (CTA)
Following the disbanding of the National Transportation Agency, 
Canadian Transportation Agency was created in 1996 through the passing of 
the Canada Transportation Act. With a staff of roughly 270, the CTA consists 
of seven members who make decisions on economic issues pertaining to 
federally-regulated rail, air, and marine transportation modes. In addition to 
serving as a dispute resolution authority, the CTA has the powers of a superior 
court to exercise its authority. From a maritime perspective, the CTA has 
responsibilities under the Coastal Trade Act, the St. Lawrence Seaway Act, the 
Pilotage Act, and the Shipping Conferences Exemptions Act. The CTA 
evaluates the fairness of tariffs, tolls, and fees in the various transportation 
sectors, and determines whether they are in the public’s best interest. In 
consultation with other federal departments, the CTA exercises regulatory 
responsibility for authorizing the use of foreign vessels in Canadian waters, 
while protecting the interests of Canadian-registered shipping. The Navy has 
no direct or indirect interaction with this agency.
5.2.8 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board
Known by its short title, the Transportation Safety Board (TSB), this 
organ was established in 1990 through the Canadian Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety Board Act as an independent body to investigate 
transportation “occurrences” in federally-regulated air, rail, and marine modes 
of transportation. The TSB’s mandate also calls for it to identify, report, and 
make recommendations on public safety deficiencies uncovered during 
investigations.168 A staff of 220 people support the five members appointed to 
the Board, who report to Parliament through the President of the Queen’s Privy 
Council. When the TSB investigates an accident, no other government
167 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C. 1992, c.37, as am. R.S.C. 1994, c.46, s.4.
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department except the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Department of 
National Defence may investigate for the purposes of making findings or 
determining cause.
From a maritime perspective, the TSB has jurisdiction in Canadian 
internal and territorial waters, and in the Exclusive Economic Zone above the 
continental shelf for marine occurrences related to resource exploitation. The 
TSB is required also to investigate any marine occurrence involving a ship 
registered or licenced in Canada, whether the incident took place in Canada or 
abroad. The Navy has only limited dealings with TSB, except in rare and 
unusual circumstances. One such example was the case of flight Swissair 111, 
a commercial passenger aircraft that crashed into Canadian territorial waters 
very close to the Nova Scotia coast. In this case, what started as a search and 
rescue effort, with the Navy as the lead agency, rapidly became a salvage 
operation, followed by an accident investigation. Lead agency status shifted 
four times between four federal departments or agencies in a matter of days.
5.3 Federal Departments -  Primary Responsibility for Enforcement
The first part of this chapter dealt with those bodies that have committee 
or agency status within the federal framework. While these bodies contribute to 
oceans management in the Atlantic region, their relationship to maritime 
enforcement is largely indirect. The next part of this thesis will examine those 
federal departments and agencies that have direct maritime enforcement 
functions.
5.3.1 Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO)
Under Canada’s Oceans Strategy, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is 
designated as the lead federal agency for oceans-related policy. Deriving its 
authority from the Oceans Act, DFO’s departmental responsibilities cover a 
wide range of ocean activities. This mandate includes fisheries management 
and research in coastal and inland waters, fisheries economic development,
168 Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, R.S.C. 1989, c. 3, s. 
7. See also Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Mandate, 18 September 2002, 
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/mandate.asp> (18 December 2003).
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international fisheries negotiations, fisheries enforcement, oceanographic 
research, hydrographic surveying and charting, and the development and 
administration of fishing and recreation harbours. To execute the above 
mandate, DFO has access to over 1200 small craft across Canada. As well, 
the department charters a limited number of aircraft and relies on the ship and 
helicopter resources of the Canadian Coast Guard. Three of the aircraft are 
equipped with sophisticated sensor suites that provide DFO with a significant 
maritime surveillance capability.169 Their use in surveillance and fisheries 
enforcement will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
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Figure 5-2. Jurisdictions -  Fisheries and Oceans Canada
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada; Oceans Act, Fisheries Act.
Under the Fisheries Act, the jurisdiction of DFO extends to the 200 
nautical mile EEZ for national fisheries enforcement. As well, on behalf of the 
North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), DFO Conservation and 
Protection officers act as NAFO inspectors beyond the 200 mile limit in waters 
managed by NAFO. DFO has divided the Atlantic maritime zones into four
169 The Beech King aircraft chartered from Provincial Air Lines (PAL) are equipped with a 
modern pulse-compressed radar, originally designed for detecting submarine periscopes, as 
well as an integrated onboard geographic information system.
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administrative regions: Quebec, Gulf, Newfoundland, and Maritimes.170 DFO’s 
legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted in Figure 5-2.
5.3.2 Canadian Coast Guard (CCG)
As a result of federal department restructuring in 1995, in addition to its 
scientific and oceans management mandate, DFO also has taken the Canadian 
Coast Guard under its umbrella. The overall mandate of the CCG is to ensure 
the provision of operational policies and programs for the use of water 
transportation interests. In the execution of this goal, the CCG provides 
oversight to the safe, efficient and economical conduct of marine activities and 
the protection of quality of the marine environment in waters under Canadian 
jurisdiction. The CCG mandate stipulates provision of marine navigation 
systems, including short and long range navigational aids, waterways, vessel 
traffic services, safety and public correspondence communications. Moreover, 
the CCG monitors potentially hazardous ice conditions, and provides route 
assistance through ice-infested waters. Other tasks include co-ordination of 
the re-supply of northern settlements, support of arctic research and 
development, and the promotion of boating safety with concomitant 
development, promulgation and enforcement of regulations and standards 
relative to marine transportation. The CCG also conducts marine emergency 
planning as well as pollution surveillance and clean-up.
The Canadian Coast Guard’s Marine Communications and Traffic 
Services (MCTS) are a key component of the enhanced vessel traffic and 
identification security effort. MCTS centres monitor communications traffic and 
obtain commercial vessel data as vessels enter Canadian waters. Certain of 
Canada’s waterways are operated as vessel traffic zones requiring reporting of 
movements within a zone. This is a responsive surveillance program that has 
the ability to alert authorities to deviations from accepted norms.
170 Formerly known as Scotia-Fundy Region.
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In organizational terms, the Canadian Coast Guard is deemed to be a 
“Special Operating Agency” within Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Drawing 
upon authority vested by the Oceans Act and Canada Shipping Act, Canadian 
Coast Guard jurisdiction extends to 200 nautical miles for issues of safety at 
sea, vessel traffic management, and marine environmental response. For 
search and rescue purposes the CCG operates in some parts of the maritime 
approaches beyond the 200 nautical mile EEZ in separate internationally- 
agreed upon SAR zones as depicted in Figures 3-9 and 3-10 of Chapter Three. 
Administratively, the CCG has divided the Atlantic maritime zones into three 
general regions: Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador, and Maritimes. The 
Arctic is administered through a regional headquarters in Sarnia, Ontario.
Figure 5-3. Jurisdictions -  Canadian Coast Guard
Source: Transport Canada; Oceans Act; Canada Shipping Act.
DFO/CCG marine assets include 32 aircraft and 108 vessels that are 
employed in icebreaking, tending and maintenance of navigation aids, search 
and rescue, fisheries enforcement, environmental monitoring and response, 
and channel sounding. In addition, the Canadian Coast Guard operates a 
number of smaller vessels and craft including 29 inshore rescue boats. The 
following tables depict the vessel and aircraft assets available to DFO and the 
CCG.
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The Canadian Coast Guard’s responsibilities for the marine SAR 
component of the national SAR program include the detection of marine 
incidents and, in conjunction with DND, the co-ordination, control, and conduct 
of SAR operations in marine SAR situations within Canadian areas of federal 
responsibility. In addition, the CCG provides marine resources, i.e., vessels 
and aircraft to help with air SAR operations, as necessary. The Canadian Coast 
Guard also oversees the activities of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, a 
volunteer organisation that assists in responding to marine SAR incidents.
TABLE 5-3
DFO / CCG VESSEL FLEET
Vessel Type Number
Watchkeeping Vessels
Heavy Gulf Icebreaker 2
Medium Gulf/River Icebreaker 3
Major Navaids Tender/Light Icebreaker 9
Medium Navaids Tender/Light Icebreaker 2
Medium Navaids Tender/Ice Strengthened 5
Shallow Draft River Navaids Tender 3
Ice-Strengthened Multi-task Patrol Cutter 1
Offshore Multi-task Patrol Cutter 3
Intermediate Multi-task Patrol Cutter 4
Offshore Fisheries Research Trawler 4
Offshore Research/Survey Vessel 2
Coastal Research/Survey Vessel 2
Total 41
Non-Watchkeeping Vessels
Small Navaids Tender 6
Inshore Fisheries Research Trawler 8
Multi-Hull Survey Vessel 3
Specialised Program Vessel 3
Research Barge 1
Small Multi-task Ice Strengthened Cutter 1
Small Multi-task Cutter 11
Small Multi-task Patrol Vessel 3
Hovercraft 3
High Endurance Lifeboat 12
Multi-task Lifeboat 7
Multi-task Utility Craft 9
Total 67
Total Vessels 108
162
TABLE 5-4
DFO / CCG AIRCRAFT FLEET
Aircraft Type Number
Sikorsky S-61 1
Bell 212 4
Bell 206L 4
Bell 206L-1 2
MBB BO-105 16
Dash 8 (TC Charter) 1
Twin Otter (TC Charter) 1
Beech King Air (PAL Charter) 3
Total Aircraft 32
The Canadian Hydrographic Service (CHS) provides an integral role in 
the collection, analysis and publication of charting and seabed data within 
Canadian waters. This information is a prerequisite to a number of national 
marine security activities.
The CCG icebreaker fleet is a primary provider of the Canadian 
presence north of 60 degrees latitude as well as providing a visible, significant 
federal presence in southern Canadian waters.171 As well, CCG ships 
undertaking Conservation and Protection missions for DFO provide a federal 
presence at the 200-mile economic zone perimeter, and provide an opportunity 
for collateral surveillance contribution.
On a day-to-day basis, the CCG works in concert with Navy and Air 
Force to direct marine research and rescue operations from the three Joint 
Rescue Co-ordination Centres. The establishment and employment of 
Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary organisations under the oversight of the 
Canadian Coast Guard enhance this commitment.172 As well, the Navy and the 
CCG work together to share information pertinent to developing situational
171 For practical purposes, most federal departments use the latitude 60 degrees North to 
delineate “the Canadian North” or “the Arctic” for jurisdictional purposes, rather than the actual 
Arctic circle. This latitude corresponds with the southernmost latitude of the political boundaries 
of the Yukon and Northwest Territories.
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awareness of merchant vessel activity and marine pollution monitoring in the 
Atlantic maritime approaches, as well as formulating inter-agency contingency 
plans. A permanent CCG liaison officer works at the Maritime Security 
Operations Centre in addition to the CCG officers assigned to the Joint Rescue 
Co-ordination Centre.
5.5.3 Transport Canada (TC)
Transport Canada is the federal department charged with regulatory 
responsibility for safety and security of rail, marine, road and air transportation 
systems in Canada. The department is responsible for enforcing transportation 
policies, regulations and standards through inspection, monitoring and 
performance measurement of the various transportation systems. Transport 
Canada also has a role in elements of marine infrastructure and the 
transportation of dangerous goods and cargo. Moreover, the department is 
mandated to operate continuously a national situation centre to monitor air, 
marine and surface traffic within or near Canada, in order to provide a warning 
of and an early response to terrorist acts.
Transport Canada’s Marine Safety division develops and enforces 
regulations and legislation for the construction, operation, and maintenance of 
commercial vessels, offshore drilling rigs, and air cushion vehicles. The 
division also is responsible for the qualification, and examination of officers and 
crews of merchant and government vessels. As well, the Marine Safety 
division maintains a Canadian ship registry, and licenses small commercial 
vessels. In addition to overseeing pilotage matters described earlier in this 
chapter, Transport Canada maintains vessel traffic management and 
separation systems for prevention of collision in the maritime approaches to 
Canadian ports and waterways.
Transport Canada has a major role the prevention of ship-source
172 The Canadian Marine Rescue Auxiliary is a network of individuals such as commercial 
fishermen or citizens in possession of recreational boats who can be called upon to provide 
volunteer search and rescue services in localised area searches.
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pollution, deriving its authority to prosecute from the Canada Shipping Act, the 
Migratory Birds Convention Act, the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 
the Fisheries Act, and the Arctic Waters Pollution Act. The department also 
maintains a port state control program for inspection of foreign vessels 
operating in Canadian waters. This program exists to ensure compliance with 
various international maritime conventions such as the International Convention 
for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and many others.
In response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on North American soil, 
Transport Canada was assigned responsibility for the oversight and 
development of policies, legislation, regulations, standards, and procedures for 
marine security. In 2004, this was reiterated in the National Security Policy and 
is codified in the Marine Transportation Security Act. The Act further provides 
the Minister of Transport with the statutory authority to formulate confidential 
security measures or request security rules for all vessel operators or marine 
facilities in Canada, and generally to require the implementation of security 
measures in all sectors of Canada’s marine industry.
Transport Canada owns and operates particular sections of the marine 
transportation system such as certain public ports and provides an oversight 
role for Canada Port Authorities. Transport Canada also appoints Enforcement 
Officers for the purposes of the Canada Marine Act and designates Port Traffic 
Control Officials also under the Canada Marine Act.
The Canada Shipping Act extends Transport Canada’s jurisdiction for 
enforcement beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea to the 200 nautical mile 
EEZ. For the purposes of administration, Transport Canada divides itself into 
three regions. Transport Canada’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions 
are depicted at Figure 5-4.
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Figure 5-4. Jurisdictions -  Transport Canada
Source: Transport Canada; Oceans Act; Canada Shipping Act.
Transport Canada operates three Dash 8 aircraft fitted with integrated 
sensor suites for pollution detection and monitoring. In addition, the 
department employs one Provincial Airlines surveillance aircraft contracted by 
DFO, but made available through a bilateral MOU. Through the Integrated 
Satellite Tracking of Polluters project (l-STOP),Transport Canada has 
pioneered the use of RADARSAT imagery for the detection and prosecution of 
marine polluters.173
The relationship between the Navy and Transport Canada has changed 
since the promulgation of the National Security Policy. Prior to 2004, there was 
limited interaction between the Navy and Transport Canada at a regional level. 
However, since the establishment of the Marine Security Operations Centre 
construct, Transport Canada has developed a new relationship with the Navy, 
much closer than that of the other government departments that are 
represented at the MSOCs.174
173 RADARSAT is a Canadian satellite fitted with synthetic aperture radar used for capturing 
data for environmental and natural resource purposes.
174 Interview with Captain(N) Bruce Belliveau, Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, 
Maritime Forces Atlantic, 2 March 2007.
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On a day-to-day basis, Transport Canada provides to the Navy a data 
feed from the automated INNAV system employed by the various vessel traffic 
management systems. This forms a large component of the recognized 
maritime picture developed by the Navy at the MSOCs. Additionally, contact 
data derived from l-STOP and Transport Canada’s pollution monitoring flights 
are added to the Navy’s overall surveillance picture. Transportation Canada 
background analysts are present in the MSOC, and the department also 
provides senior personnel to process Pre-arrival Information Reports (PAIR), 
the 96-hour pre-arrival notices from ships inbound to Canadian ports. These 
TC personnel work on a permanent basis on the watch floor in MARLANT 
Headquarters. They also co-ordinate the activity of Transport Canada’s Dash 7 
and Dash 8 aircraft conducting maritime surveillance and ice reconnaissance.
At the national level, both departments collaborate through various 
working bodies, such as the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working 
Group, in order to formulate inter-agency marine security policy and 
contingency plans.
5.3.4 Public Safety Canada (PSC)
Public Safety Canada, formerly Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness Canada, is a relatively new department that was introduced in 
the post-9/11 security environment. It can best be described as an 
amalgamation of the former Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and 
Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) and the Solicitor General.175
OCIPEP was a relatively short-lived department charged with leading a 
comprehensive and new national approach to protecting Canada's critical 
infrastructure, as well as becoming the government's primary agency for 
ensuring national civil emergency preparedness for all manner of
175 The new PSC portfolio also included the responsibilities of the National Crime Prevention 
Centre, but this entity will not be discussed further as it is not germane to maritime 
enforcement.
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emergencies.176 The mandate of OCIPEP was to maximise emergency 
preparedness and response to natural disaster and security emergencies by 
providing leadership in improving connections to provincial and territorial 
Emergency Measures Organisations as well as among all three levels of 
government. Created on 5 February 2001, OCIPEP was subsumed into 
PSEPC in 2004.
Prior to 2003, the Solicitor General was the Minister responsible for the 
protection of the public and “the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe 
society.”177 The powers, duties, and functions of the Solicitor General included 
all matters over which Parliament had jurisdiction that related to prisons or 
reformatories, parole, and law enforcement, and that were not assigned by law 
to other departments or agencies. More importantly, responsibility for the 
internal security of Canada with respect to threats to the security of Canada 
and security offences including terrorist activities rested with the Solicitor 
General’s department through the national police force, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
In 2003, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
assumed the majority of the responsibilities formerly held by the Solicitor 
General. The Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act 
directs the Minister to co-ordinate the activities of Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), the Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Canadian Firearms Centre, the Correctional 
Service of Canada and the National Parole Board in the domains of crime 
prevention, law enforcement, corrections (prisons), emergency measures, and 
national security.178 The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness is also the lead minister in counter-terrorism and counter-drug
176 Elements of critical infrastructure are, for example, key physical and cyber components of 
the energy and utilities, communications, services, transportation, safety and government 
sectors.
177 Canada, Solicitor General, 1997/98 Estimates, Part III: Expenditure Plan, Ottawa, 1998. p.7.
178 Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, R.S.C. 2005 c.10. Sections 
2 and 5; Canada, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, What We Do, 28 July 
2006 <http://www.psepc.gc.ca/abt/wwd/index-en.asp> (2 January 2007).
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issues. These responsibilities are fulfilled through the activities of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.
PSC’s responsibility for national security is within the 12 nautical mile 
territorial sea; however, through its co-ordinating function with the RCMP, 
CBSA and CSIS, it indirectly has influence over security matters extending to 
the 200 nautical mile EEZ. For the purposes of administration, PSC divides 
itself into regions that correspond with provincial land boundaries. PSC’s 
legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-5.
In view of its main function as a shore-based co-ordinating body, PSC 
maintains no marine vessels or aircraft. National security and enforcement 
actions are undertaken by federal departments that have the appropriate 
physical resources for maritime response.
On a routine basis, the Canadian Navy has little direct involvement with 
PSC except for limited interaction as part of ongoing contingency planning. This 
is due largely to the fact that PSC was established after the MSOC concept 
was agreed upon by the federal partners. Consequently, the department was 
not included in the concept or the funding for it. Moreover, PSC does not have 
a specifically mandated marine security operations or response role. However, 
during emergencies, natural or otherwise, the Navy becomes very much 
involved with PSC through the Maritime Operations Centre and the municipal 
and provincial Emergency Measures Operations Centres (EMOC). In addition, 
there is considerable day-to-day interaction between the Navy and three of the 
agencies or services that report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness, namely the RCMP, CSIS, and CBSA.
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5.3.5 Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
The RCMP is Canada’s national police force. Its authority is vested in 
Chapter 18 of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and, reporting to the 
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the RCMP is 
mandated to enforce laws, prevent crime, and maintain good order and security 
throughout Canada. There are no federal statutes for which the RCMP has sole 
enforcement responsibility; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and 
Regulations provides the authority for RCMP members to enforce any Act of 
Parliament. While enforcement responsibilities differ with each federal act, 
these enforcement duties are generally divided between the RCMP and the 
respective federal department or agency that maintains expertise in a particular 
field.
The RCMP also provides contract police services to all provinces 
(except Ontario and Quebec), the Yukon and Northwest Territories, Nunavut 
and, under separate municipal agreements, police services to over 200 
municipalities and 165 Aboriginal communities. The RCMP has over 750
U X D L A N D
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Figure 5-5. Jurisdictions -  Public Safety Canada
Source: Public Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada.
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detachments located throughout Canada. These detachments range in 
strength from 1 to 250 personnel.179
Although the RCMP is primarily a land-based policing organisation, it is 
responsible for certain federal and provincial policing matters in Canada’s 
maritime zones. This responsibility includes criminal, customs, immigration, 
and drug enforcement within the 12 nautical mile territorial sea. As well, 
policing responsibilities extend beyond 12 nautical miles in prescribed 
situations, i.e. violations to the Immigration Act (out to 24 nautical miles) or the 
Canada Shipping Act (200 nautical miles), assistance to other government 
departments, or hot pursuit.
Criminal Code offences are often used as the basis for marine security 
incidents and investigations. The RCMP is not the police force of jurisdiction at 
the major international container ports at Vancouver, Fraser Valley (New 
Westminster), Montreal, Saint John, Halifax or Windsor; these ports are policed 
by municipal police services. However, the RCMP is the police force of 
jurisdiction at some smaller ports. Protective responsibilities also arise in 
designated ports during times of tension. The RCMP did not assume the duties 
and responsibilities of the disbanded Ports Police.
From an administrative standpoint, each province forms a separate 
RCMP Division, designated by a letter from A through to O. The RCMP 
divisions in the Atlantic region are H Division (Nova Scotia and PEI), B Division 
(Newfoundland), C Division (Quebec) and J Division (New Brunswick.) The 
RCMP’s legislative and administrative jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-6.
The RCMP’s dedicated Marine Division was disbanded in 1970, but its 
various marine assets were transferred to other sections within the RCMP. At
179 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Marine Services, 14 November 2006 
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/marine/marine_e.htm> (30 December 2006). See also Canada, 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, About the RCMP, 11 October 2006 <http://www.rcmp.ca/ 
about/index_e.htm> (24 December 2006).
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present, the force employs a variety of small boats, as well as fixed and rotary 
wing aircraft to carry out its maritime operations. The largest of these small 
vessels is the catamaran patrol boat INKSTER. At 19.75 metres in length, it is 
roughly 2 metres longer than the remaining four Commissioner-class 
catamaran patrol boats. The catamarans are operated with 4-person double 
crews to provide 24/7 patrol and response capability and boast sustained 
speeds in excess of 25 knots. Four of the five catamarans are based on the 
West Coast; the sole Atlantic-based RCMP catamaran is the SIMMONDS, 
deployed out of Marystown, Newfoundland. In addition to the catamarans, the 
RCMP makes extensive use of numerous rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB) on 
both coasts and in the inland waterways. Most common are the 5.3 and 7.3 
metre vessels that are capable of speeds in excess of 30 and 40 knots 
respectively.180
N E W F O U N D L A N D
Figure 5-6. Jurisdictions -  Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Oceans Act, Criminal Code of Canada.
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The RCMP also operates an Air Services Branch that primarily supports 
the transport of personnel, be they Emergency Response Teams, prisoners, or
1RO Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, West Coast Marine Detachment, 24 March 2003 
<http:// members.shaw.ca/rcmpwcmd/Photogallery.htm> (30 December 2006).
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members on administrative or operational duties. RCMP aircraft have a limited 
search and rescue capability, but are capable of surveillance and monitoring of 
land-oriented activity. However, RCMP aircraft lack the sophisticated sensor 
suites necessary for effective maritime surveillance and, unlike the DFO 
chartered aircraft, they are not used in that capacity except in situations in 
which the targets of interest are localised already. In the Atlantic region, the 
RCMP maintains aircraft and Air Services support at Moncton, New Brunswick; 
Goose Bay, Labrador; and Iqaluit, Nunavut.
TABLE 5-5
RCMP VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT
Vessel Type Number
Patrol Vessel (> 9.2 metres) 5
Inland Water Transport (< 9.2 metres) 307
Total Vessels 312
Aircraft Type Number
Fixed Wing 25
Helicopters 8
Total Aircraft 33
Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Marine 
Services, 14 November 2006 <http://www.rcmp-
grc.gc.ca/marine/marine_e.htm> (30 December 2006) and 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Air Services: A snapshot 
of our people, places and equipment, 14 November 2006 
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/air/air_e.htm> (30 December 
2006).
The RCMP also co-ordinates a community-based coastal watch 
program. Launched initially in 1996 to counter narcotics importation on 
Canada’s West Coast, the program now extends to all coastal regions across 
the country. RCMP members and community volunteers familiar with normal 
marine activity meet regularly to disseminate information pertaining to on-water 
or coastal activities. The program educates individuals what to look for in terms 
of suspicious or illegal activity, and trains them how to effectively transmit this 
information to the appropriate law enforcement agency. The program solicits 
participation from recreational boaters, professional mariners, fishermen, fuel 
dock attendants, vessel brokers, or anyone who lives or works near the water.
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Some operations to counter criminal, customs, immigration, and 
narcotics violations require armed boardings by RCMP Emergency Response 
Teams. While the RCMP maintains a large number of vessels to exercise its 
mandateupon the water, in some cases the RCMP require vessels larger than 
those in the RCMP inventory in order to accommodate their ERTs or require 
speed and co-ercive force the the RCMP boats do not possess. When the 
RCMP requires larger vessel support to its law enforcement operations, the 
force must rely on other government department assets, specifically those of 
DND and DFO/CCG.
On a day-to-day basis, the Navy and the RCMP work together to share 
information and intelligence pertinent to developing situational awareness and 
assessment of marine-oriented national security threats as well as formulating 
inter-agency contingency plans. The RCMP maintains a representative at the 
Maritime Security Operations Centre housed at the regional naval headquarters 
in Halifax. This representative is a conduit to the RCMP’s Divisional 
Emergency Operations Centres (DEOC), staffed as required, and the National 
Operations Centre (NOC) staffed 24 hours/7 days a week.
5.3.6 Canadian Security intelligence Service (CSIS)
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established on 16 July 
1984 as a separate intelligence organization from its parent, the RCMP 
Security Service. Deriving its authority from the Canadian Security Intelligence 
Service Act, CSIS collects, analyses, and retains information and intelligence 
that is suspected of constituting a threat to the security of Canada, and advises 
the government in relation to these matters. CSIS considers the main threats 
to Canada to be terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
espionage, foreign interference and cyber-tampering that affects critical 
infrastructure. CSIS also provides security assessments, on request, to all 
federal departments and agencies.
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Figure 5-7. Jurisdictions -  Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CSIS maintains close links with Canadian Forces intelligence officers 
and, in the naval context, with the Maritime Security Operations Centres 
located in Halifax and Esquimalt. CSIS has no capability to deploy into the 
Canadian maritime zones; intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing is 
almost exclusively a shore-based activity. As in the case of PSEPC, CSIS was 
not included in the MSOC concept or nor the funding set aside for it. Moreover, 
CSIS does not have a specifically-mandated marine security operations or 
response role as outlined in its enabling statute or the National Security Policy. 
Administratively, CSIS divides itself into regions that reflect provincial land 
boundaries as depicted at Figure 5-7. CSIS has no marine vessels or aircraft.
5.3.7 Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
The Canada Border Services Agency was created on 12 December 
2003 as part of the same process that established its parent department, PSA 
(formerly PSEPC in 2003). CBSA is similar to PSA in that it is an 
amalgamation of previous departments and agencies. However, unlike PSA, 
the Canada Border Services Agency did not wholly subsume the legacy 
organisations. Rather, CBSA integrated the border functions of one federal
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department and two agencies. Specifically, these were the Customs branch of 
the former Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA),181 elements of the 
intelligence and enforcement services of Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
(CIC), and the Import Inspection at Ports of Entry program of the Canadian 
Food Inspection Agency (CFIA). The three legacy organisations continue to 
fulfil their other important functions.
Reporting to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
Canada and drawing its authority from the Canada Border Services Agency 
Act, CBSA serves Canada by protecting Canadian society with respect to the 
international movement of goods and people and advancing Canadian interests 
both nationally and internationally in these areas.
CBSA is tasked with responsibility for monitoring, control, entry, revenue 
collection and enforcement (goods, conveyances and persons), at Canada’s 
ports and designated points of entry. The Port of Entry Control section of 
CBSA provides guidance and support to local offices concerning examination 
procedures aimed at granting entry to persons determined to be admissible and 
refusing entry to those unable to comply with the requirements of the 
Immigration Act and regulations.
While most activities are restricted to port areas, some activities require 
other departments or private sector groups to provide support at sea. CBSA’s 
jurisdiction is limited, for customs issues as specified in the Customs Act, to the 
12 nautical mile territorial sea in accordance with the Territorial Sea and 
Fishing Zones Act. However, the Customs & Excise Offshore Application Act 
extends jurisdiction beyond the 12 nautical mile territorial sea to the outer edge 
of the continental shelf or 200 nautical miles, whichever is greater. Its impact is 
limited to the offshore, non-living, natural resource industries. All equipment,
181 The Canada Customs and Revenue Act was renamed the Canada Revenue Agency Act in 
2005. With this change, CCRA became the Canada Revenue Agency. With the its customs 
functions transferred to CBSA, Canada Revenue Agency now focuses on its principal role as 
the main revenue collector for the Government of Canada through income and business taxes, 
and other revenue streams.
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ships, drilling vessels et cetera, operating in the defined area are subject to 
Canadian Customs & Excise laws and regulations.
For the purposes of administration, CBSA divides itself into regions that 
correspond with provincial land borders. CBSA’s legislative and administrative 
jurisdictions are depicted at Figure 5-8.
CBSA capabilities include expertise and specialised equipment for 
rummaging vessels and expertise in collection and evaluation of maritime 
shipping information related to international trade. In addition, CBSA has 
expanded its programs to include the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a 
multi-national program that protects containerised shipping from exploitation or 
disruption by non-state actors.
CBSA deploys employees to foreign ports in co-operation with host 
nation officials so that cargo containers destined for Canada can be pre­
screened and examined prior to arrival in Canadian ports. CBSA also employs 
modern and emerging technologies to prevent dangerous cargo and 
contraband from entering Canada. These devices include stationary portal 
radiation detectors and mobile vehicle-mounted radiation detection systems 
designed to detect illegal radioactive materials, such as a dirty bombs and 
nuclear weapons in containers. Other technologies employed are ion mobility 
spectrometry (IMS) for detecting conventional explosives and narcotics, and 
gamma-ray technology that is used to create images of marine container 
interiors.
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Figure 5-8. Jurisdictions -  Canada Border Services Agency
Source: Canada Border Services Agency.
CBSA maintains small remotely-operated vehicles (ROVs) for inspecting 
the exterior of a vessel’s hull below the waterline but the agency does not have 
any vessels in its equipment inventory for transporting inspection teams. 
Normally CBSA waits until a vessel is berthed in a Canadian port before 
conducting an inspection. However, if the situation arises in which it is 
necessary carry out an inspection at sea, CBSA relies on other government 
department assets, specifically those of DND and DFO/CCG, to execute such a 
tasking.
On a day-to-day basis, the Navy and CBSA work together to share 
information and intelligence pertinent to developing situational awareness and 
assessment of marine-oriented national security threats as well as formulating 
inter-agency contingency plans. CBSA maintains a representative at the 
Maritime Security Operations Centre housed at the regional naval headquarters 
in Halifax.
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5.3.8 Environment Canada (EC)
Deriving its authority from the Canadian Environmental Protection Act 
(CEPA), this department’s primary objective is to preserve and enhance the 
quality of the environment. Departmental programs are designed to promote 
the establishment or adoption of objectives and standards relating either to 
environmental quality or pollution control, to ensure the wise use and 
management of renewable resources and to provide Canadians with 
environmental information of public interest.
Environment Canada maintains the Environmental Protection Branch, 
whose mandate is to ensure consistent application of the CEPA, the Fisheries 
Act, and other federal statutes through deterrence, monitoring, and response. 
While at first glance, the Fisheries Act may appear to be limited in scope only to 
fish, indeed it is one of the key pieces of federal legislation that affects the 
environment. This is because its applies to anything that might have an impact 
on fish or fish habitat.
Environment Canada is administered across the country through five 
regions. The provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland and 
Labrador, as well as PEI form the Atlantic region. Quebec is the other region 
represented on the Atlantic coast.
Although EC operates a number of smaller craft for local use, DFO/TC 
assets are used on a cost-recovery basis to carry out their major tasks of 
meteorological observations, research, enforcement of environmental 
regulations and pollution control.
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Figure 5-9. Jurisdictions -  Environment Canada
Source: Environment Canada.
While there are some operational planning linkages with EC through the 
Maritime Operations Centre, the most frequent liaison occurs between the 
Canadian Forces’ maritime patrol aircraft and Environment Canada in 
surveillance of maritime zones for incidents of marine pollution and ocean 
dumping. For example, in 2003, military CP-140 aircraft were responsible for 
the detection of 85 percent of the marine pollution violations reported.182 In 
addition, on an infrequent basis, staff from the Canadian Wildlife Service 
embark aboard naval vessels conducting exercises in the maritime approaches 
to carry out sea bird counts to provide greater insight into bird density in 
relation to shipping lanes.
5.3.9 Natural Resources Canada (NRCan)
Natural Resource Canada objectives are to promote the discovery, 
development and effective use of the country’s mineral and energy resources 
and to broaden the knowledge base of Canada’s landmass and seabed. DFO
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vessels provide the preponderance of support for NRCan geophysical 
research, mapping surveys and resource data collection programmes. The 
remaining services at sea are provided through contract, charter or multitasking 
of OGD vessels. NRCan has no day-to-day direct or indirect action with the 
Navy for maritime security purposes.
5.3.10 Department of National Defence (DND)
The Department of National Defence is comprised of two components: 
the Department which is an organ of the federal government made up of 
military and non-military bureaucrats, and the Canadian Forces, the uniformed 
combat arm of the Department. Deriving its authority from the British North 
America Act and the National Defence Act, the modern Canadian Forces was 
established in 1967 by the implementation of the Canadian Forces 
Reorganization Act that abolished the former three separate services and 
created a single service known as the Canadian Armed Forces.
Located in Ottawa, National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) houses an 
integrated staff that supports the Minister of National Defence and the top 
military officer, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). Also based at NDHQ are 
the “Chiefs” of the three “Environments,” formerly known as “Services.” The 
three Environments also correspond to three of the major commands of the 
Canadian Forces: Maritime Command, Land Force Command, and Air 
Command. The Environmental Chiefs report directly to the CDS, and are 
responsible for the day-to-day management and operational readiness of the 
forces assigned to them.
Given the naval flavour of this thesis, the discussion will focus on 
Maritime Command and elements of Air Command that support it. The head of 
Maritime Command, the Chief of the Maritime Staff, exercises overall command 
of Canadian maritime defence assets located on both the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts, as well as the Naval Reserve. The Commander Maritime Forces
182 Canada, Department of National Defence, Serving Canadians -  On Guard: Watching for 
Polluters and Illegal Fishing, 28 January 2003 <http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/athomedocs/
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Atlantic (Comd MARLANT) exercises operational command over east coast 
maritime forces from his headquarters in Halifax, Nova Scotia. From 
headquarters located in Esquimalt, British Columbia, the Commander Maritime 
Forces Pacific (Comd MAPAC) is delegated operational command of maritime 
forces on the west coast. The Commander Naval Reserve (Comd NAVRES) is 
located in Quebec City, PQ.
Within the unified structure of the Canadian Forces, 1 Canadian Air 
Division exercises full command over maritime aircraft through the Regional Air 
Co-ordination Elements (RACE) located in Halifax and Esquimalt. These air 
assets are subsequently placed under operational control of the Commanders 
of MARLANT and MARPAC.
The Chief of the Maritime Staff is responsible for all military Canadian 
maritime operations. When those operations are in Canadian waters, he 
exercises control of all maritime forces engaged in the defence of North 
America.183 As a national commander, he is responsible for Canadian naval 
force generation, co-ordination of maritime policy and plans, and pan-naval 
standards.184 Figure 3-5 of Chapter Three depicts the Navy’s area of 
responsibility in the Atlantic and arctic regions.
Maritime Command operates two bases and five stations across the 
country. One base and four stations are in the Atlantic region: Canadian Forces 
Base (CFB) Halifax, Canadian Forces Station (CFS) St. John’s in 
Newfoundland, CFS Mill Cove, CFS Shelburne, and CFS Newport Corners in 
Nova Scotia. The Navy also has a dockyard located in Halifax. The naval 
infrastructure also comprises a number of units and organisations designed to 
support naval training, marine engineering, ship repair and maintenance,
athodm4c_e.htm> (9 October 2003).
183 Under the terms of Canada/US defence agreements, he exercises control of US maritime 
forces engaged in the defence of North America when these units are operating in Canadian 
waters.
184 Force generation is a term used to describe the collective steps to prepare a particular force 
for operations. This would entail manning the units to the required strength, training the 
personnel for the expected missions, equipping the personnel, and ensuring that the equipment 
is in an appropriate, sustainable materiel state.
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harbour control, systems testing, information and communications systems, 
and diving. It also includes a range of supply and administrative support units.
Principal components of the naval fleet are organised into two Naval 
Task Groups, one based in Esquimalt, and one in Halifax. Each is comprised 
of a Task Group command ship, two or three general purpose frigates, and an 
integral operational support ship. When the mission dictates, the Task Group 
could include one or more submarines.
At present, the Canadian Navy’s order of battle includes three 
operational destroyers, twelve all-purpose frigates, four diesel-electric 
submarines, two auxiliary oil replenishment vessels, twelve maritime coastal 
defence vessels, three naval reserve tenders, and nineteen smaller auxiliary 
vessels. As well, the Navy supports the operation of two oceanographic 
research vessels. The composition of the Atlantic Fleet is shown at Table 5-6.
Maritime aircraft operate from three bases located at CFB Greenwood 
and CFB Shearwater in Nova Scotia, and CFB Gander in Newfoundland. 
There is one main maritime air base on the West Coast at CFB Comox, British 
Columbia. As well, a small helicopter detachment is located at Pat Bay, north of 
Esquimalt. Table 5-7 depicts the nominal number of aircraft by type that 
support maritime and naval missions in the Atlantic Region.
How are these ships, aircraft and supporting infrastructure used to 
achieve government objectives? That question will be treated in depth in 
Chapter Seven. However, for the purposes of comparing DND with the other 
departments, the traditional activities for which the Canadian Navy has 
provided support are fisheries management, counter-drug operations, search 
and rescue as a component of maritime safety, and environmental monitoring. 
The Department of National Defence maintains a number of agreements and 
contingency plans to provide assistance to other government departments 
charged with enforcement of specific statutes. This support has usually taken 
the form of information and data sharing as well as the provision of a particular 
type of platform, i.e. ship or aircraft, for a specific mission during which another
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government department has been lead agency. One of the recommendations 
made in the Senate study on the rationalization of government fleets was that 
the Navy play a greater role in the assertion of Canadian sovereignty.185
TABLE 5-6
NAVAL FLEET - ATLANTIC
Vessel Type Number
Submarines (4) 3
Destroyers (3) 2
Frigates (12) 7
Auxiliary Oil Replenishment Vessels (2) 1
Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (12) 6
Patrol Craft (Naval Reserve Tenders) (3) 0
Auxiliary vessels (19) 8
Total Vessels (55) 27
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate total number of 
vessels of that type on both coasts.
TABLE 5-7
NAVAL AIRCRAFT -  ATLANTIC
Aircraft Type Number
CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft (18) 13
CP-140A Arcturus Maritime Patrol Aircraft (3) 3
CH-124 Sea King Helicopters (29) 14
CH-129 Cormorant SAR Helicopters (15) 7
CH-146 Griffon Helicopters (SAR backup) 99) 4
Total Aircraft (164) 27
Note: Numbers in brackets indicate total number of 
aircraft of that type operated by the Canadian Forces. 
Unlike vessel numbers that remain relatively static, aircraft 
are allocated to each coast by 1 Canadian Air Division 
based on planning requirements and aircraft serviceability, 
resulting in frequent fluctuation of aircraft totals.
Perhaps the Navy’s greatest potential contribution to sovereignty 
protection is its efforts in maritime domain awareness and surveillance. In 
addition to the several types of patrol assets, all offering different levels of utility 
in the enforcement arena, there are the joint ocean surveillance and information 
centres at Halifax and Esquimalt. It is at these shore establishments that 
intelligence and surveillance data are compiled from military and other
185 Garnett, “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty,” 4.
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government department sources. The information is fused as required to 
create a plot that is shared with other agencies to enhance maritime domain 
awareness.
Having described in some detail the principal national regulatory and 
advisory bodies with interests or responsibilities for enforcement aspects of 
oceans management in Canada, the remainder of this chapter will cover certain 
provisions that further illustrate how the Navy fits into the regulatory framework.
5.4 Enabling Provisions for Naval Support
As noted earlier, the Navy not a designated law enforcement agency; 
however, support is provided to other government departments by military 
forces on a regular basis. This is done through inter-departmental Memoranda 
of Understanding, and the use of military forces for “domestic operations.”
5.4.1 Memoranda of Understanding
The Canadian Forces maintains a large number of Memoranda of 
Understanding with other government departments for a variety of operational 
requirements. Their purpose is to enable departments to provide support to 
each other in situations in which one department may not have the resources 
available to carry out a specifically-mandated task. However, another 
department may possess the resources, but may not have the mandate, legal 
or otherwise to conduct the task. The other pertinent aspect is that these 
support operations are frequent, so much so that the process of seeking and 
obtaining ministerial approval for support becomes an administrative burden. 
In these situations, a standing MOU makes good sense from an efficiency 
standpoint.
From a naval perspective, there are three key MOU that pertain to 
maritime enforcement. Memoranda of Understanding have been developed 
with Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the RCMP, and Environment Canada for
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counter-narcotics and fisheries enforcement, and aid to emergency 
environmental response.
5.4.1.1 Military Assistance to RCMP for Counter-drug Operations
The purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process of 
military support to the RCMP in support of drug law enforcement. There are 
two basic tenets to this MOU. The first is that military assistance shall only be 
sought once the RCMP have developed a concept of operations for a particular 
scenario and, in doing so, the RCMP has ascertained that it does not have the 
capability to carry out the operation without assistance that the military can 
provide. The second is that the RCMP shall retain responsibility for all direct 
law enforcement activities, and that military personnel will function in a support 
role where it is unlikely that they will be used directly for the apprehension of 
suspects. The MOU outlines the cost recovery process, and also the 
provisions for setting annual ceilings of naval ship days and aircraft flying 
hours. Historically, these have been in the order of 30 ship days and 1,000 
flying hours but, in many years, these ceilings have not been used.186
5.4.1.2 Military Assistance to DFO for Fisheries Enforcement
The purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process of 
military support to DFO for surveillance and fisheries enforcement for national 
purposes, and on behalf of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). 
The main premise of the agreement is that an allocation of ship days and 
aircraft flying hours shall be negotiated annually between DND and DFO, and 
once agreed upon, ships and aircraft will be provided for fisheries patrols on a 
no cost basis to DFO. The MOU specifies that ship and aircraft captains retain 
command and are responsible for the safe operation of their platforms, and 
DFO conservation and protection officers retain responsibility for all direct 
fisheries enforcement activities. The MOU outlines the cost recovery process, 
and also the provisions for setting annual ceilings of naval ship days and
186 Canada, Memorandum of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police concerning the Provision of Assistance by the Canadian Forces in 
Support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in its Drug Law Enforcement Role, 20 January 
2005.
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aircraft flying hours. Historically, these have been in the order of 125 ship days 
and 500 flying hours.187
5.4.1.3 Military Assistance to EC for Environmental Emergency Response
The purpose of this agreement is to define the nature and process for 
military support to Environment Canada in aid of environmental emergency 
response, in particular the use of the military’s robust command, control, and 
communications systems for management of environmental incidents. The 
purpose of the agreement is to establish designated points of contact between 
departments, and to outline the voice and data communications requirements 
needed for emergency environmental response, as well as procedures for the 
use of DND sites and property. Moreover, a section of the MOU discusses the 
use of naval vessels of opportunity that could be employed for sustained 
tracking of oil or hazardous material spills as well as estimation of dispersion 
patterns, provision of meteorological support, accommodation of EC personnel, 
and equipment stowage. Other provisions in the MOU articulate clearance 
diving support for underwater reconnaissance and surveys, as well as air 
reconnaissance and airlift by DND aircraft. The MOU outlines the cost recovery 
process, but unlike the RCMP and DFO MOUs discussed earlier, there are no 
annual ceilings for naval ship days and aircraft flying hours.188
Table 5-8 below shows the main interdepartmental Memoranda of 
Understanding that pertain to maritime enforcement at the present time.
187 Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada/Department of National Defence. Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Forces 
respecting Surface Ship Patrols and Aerial Fisheries Surveillance. Ottawa, May, 1999.
188 Canada. Department of the Environment/Department of National Defence. Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Department of the Environment and the Department of National 
Defence and the Canadian Forces relative to a Partnership for Environmental Emergency 
Response Assistance to the Department o f the Environment. Ottawa, March, 1994.
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TABLE 5-8
KEY INTER-DEPARTMENTAL MARITIME ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS
Memorandum Of Understanding Title DND RCMP DFO/CCG EC
Drug Law Enforcement X X
Surface ship patrols and aerial fisheries surveillance X X
Environmental Emergency Response X X
Counter-Drug Operations X X
Mutual Assistance between DFO and RCMP X X
Security and Defence of Canadian Deep-sea and 
Inland Water Ports during a period of tension or war
X X
Assistance to RCMP Law Enforcement X X
Employment of CCG ships and aircraft in a war or 
emergency
X X
Combating Oil Spills X X
Note : Memoranda of Understanding in italics have expired and are under review.
5.4.2 Domestic Operations
Drawing from Chapter Three and the discussion earlier in this chapter, in 
a domestic context the main roles for the CF are the defence of Canada and 
sovereignty protection. During the Cold War, the defence role was relatively 
easy to articulate, given that the enemy or main threat was readily identifiable 
as the Soviet Union and its allies, the Warsaw Pact nations. Thus, defining the 
role of DND in this threat environment was equally straight -forward; if the 
threat posted to Canada was a state actor, it was a defence responsibility to 
counter the threat. Acts of violence or intimidation perpetrated by non-state 
actors were considered as criminal acts, and were dealt with by Canadian law 
enforcement agencies. Moreover, these types of threats tended to be focussed 
on Canadian soil, whereas defence tasks tended to be offshore or 
expeditionary in nature.
Notwithstanding the distinction between state and non-state threats to 
security, the Canadian Forces were, and continue to be used to support civil 
authorities in areas of Canadian jurisdiction. These are known within the 
military and legal communities as “domestic operations.”
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The National Defence Act codifies the principles for control of the armed 
forces, as well as providing the legal basis for the provision of military support 
to provinces for maintaining public order.189 Pursuant to the National Defence 
Act, military “service” can be furnished “in any case in which a riot or 
disturbance of the peace, beyond the powers of civil authorities to suppress, 
prevent or deal with and requiring that service.”190 The Chief of the Defence 
Staff is accorded the discretion to determine the scope and nature of military 
“service” in these situations.
What is a domestic operation? It is a term used to denote “. . . any CF 
activities which provide assistance in response to requests for support from 
Canadian civil authorities, or from the Canadian public.”191 In truth, the Minister 
of National Defence or the Governor-in-Council may authorize the armed forces 
to “perform any duty involving public service,” including the “provision of 
assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter.”192
Provision of assistance to law enforcement agencies follows a formal 
procedure, and is only agreed to when the Minister of Public Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness makes the request.193 In addition, the assistance 
must be deemed to be in the national interest and, as well, the matter cannot 
be effectively dealt with except with the assistance of the armed forces. Minor 
assistance that is limited only to logistical, technical or administrative support 
does not have to follow this sequence.
The Canadian Forces classifies domestic operations into five categories:
a. Category 1 -  Routine support to community activities. This is, by far, 
the most frequent type of domestic operation undertaken by the 
Canadian Forces and pertains to non-crisis provision of services;
189 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.
190 Ibid.
191 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 3301-0 (DCDS) 
NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98: Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations. 10 July 
1998, p. 1.
192 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 273.6.
193 Formerly the Solicitor General of Canada.
189
b. Category 2 -  Humanitarian assistance. This includes ground search 
and rescue, civil disasters such as floods and fires, environmental 
emergencies, and other humanitarian situations such as missing 
persons and mercy flights;
c. Category 3 -  Assistance to law enforcement agencies (ALEA). This 
category is further sub-divided into four classes of assistance that run 
the spectrum from the benign, such as provision of ranges or training 
areas for police personnel, to situations in which a disturbance of the 
peace is occurring or about to occur and armed forces personnel or 
equipment may be needed for support;
d. Category 4 -  Assistance to other federal government departments’ 
law enforcement. This category pertains to such activities as 
assistance to federal penitentiaries for assisting in the suppression of 
prison disturbances. The four classes of assistance mentioned above 
can also be used in this category. As well, Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) with the RCMP, DFO, and EC fall into this 
category; and
e. Category 5 -  Aid of the Civil Power. Pursuant to the National Defence 
Act, the Canadian Forces may be called out in aid of the civil power in 
any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond the 
powers of the civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and 
requiring that service, occurs or is, in the opinion of an attorney 
general, considered as likely to occur."194 Under aid of the civil power, 
armed forces members possess the powers and duties of 
“constables” but remain under military command and control.
Under normal circumstances, the Canadian Forces do not use resources 
for a purpose not directly in support of national defence objectives. However,
194 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 275
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there are occasions when it is consistent with the intent of government policy to 
provide a service in response to a request from a non-defence agency, even 
though the service is outside the immediate scope of the national defence 
mandate. As such, the Government of Canada or Governor-in-Council, other 
federal government departments, provincial governments, municipal 
governments, other non-defence agencies, and individuals may request 
assistance or Canadian Forces support on a routine or emergency basis.
Depending on the nature and scope of the support requested, i.e., the 
category, a request for support is first discussed at the local level between 
departments, but must be processed through the requestor’s staffing chain to 
the ministerial level. The Minister in need of the support makes the official 
request directly to the Minister of National Defence, who directs the request 
downward through the chain of command until support can be provided 
appropriately.
While this may appear to be an overly-bureaucratic and convoluted 
process, in practice authority for the provision of support can be obtained very 
rapidly, i.e., under an hour, in times of crisis. From time to time in domestic 
operations, Canadian Forces members are afforded peace officer status. This 
status depends on the circumstances of each situation and exists only for as 
long as it is required for duty. Peace officer status provides both legal status 
and legal protection to service members while carrying their legal duties. 
Notwithstanding this status, armed forces members remain under military 
command at all times.
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Figure 5-10. Process for Requesting Military Support -  Atlantic Canada
TABLE 5-9
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS THAT SHAPE MILITARY DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Type Instrument
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Federal Statute 
Governor-in-Council Order 
Governor-in-Council Order 
Governor-in-Council Order 
Governor-in-Council Order
Ministerial Order
Ministerial Order 
Memo of Understanding 
Memo of Understanding 
Memo of Understanding
National Defence Act
Emergencies Act
Emergency Preparedness Act
Security Offences Act
Security of Information Act
Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act
Fisheries Act and Coastal Fisheries Protection Act
Criminal Code of Canada
1975 Penitentiary Assistance Order
1976 Olympic Games Security Order
1993 Canadian Forces Armed Assistance Directions 
1996 Canadian Forces Assistance to Provincial Police 
Forces Directions and Principles for Federal 
(Military) Assistance to Provincial Policing 
Nov 1996 - Approval authority for classes of 
assistance to provincial and territorial law 
enforcement 
Nov 1997 - provision of services to non-defence 
agencies
Counter Drugs MOU between MND and Solicitor 
General of Canada 
Fisheries MOU between MND and Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans 
Environmental Emergency MOU between MND and 
Minister of Environment
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Table 5-9 above lists the key federal statutes, Orders-in-Council, and 
Memoranda of Understanding that affect Canadian Forces domestic 
operations.
5.4.3 Regional Joint Task Force Structure
In 2005, the Chief of the Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces instituted 
a major structural change to the Canadian Forces in order for the military to 
better meet emerging threats in the new security environment. The Canadian 
Forces “Transformation” resulted in the establishment of two new operational- 
level command headquarters in Ottawa. The purpose of this initiative was to 
facilitate command and control of domestic and international operations from 
separate headquarters, rather than from one central headquarters that 
frequently found itself distracted by policy staffing and corporate governance in 
addition to command of operations. Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command 
(CEFCOM) was stood up to mount international operations, and the new 
headquarters that had the whole of Canada as a theatre of operations for 
domestic issues was established as Canada Command (CANCOM).
In addition to Canada Command, the transformation agenda resulted in 
the creation of six regional joint task forces spread across the country. These 
new structures are Joint Task Force Pacific (JTFP) in Esquimalt, Joint Task 
Force Western (JTFW) in Edmonton, Joint Task Force Central (JTFC) in 
Toronto, Joint Task Force East (JTFE) in Montreal, and Joint Task Force 
Atlantic in Halifax. A regional joint task force commander in any of the regions 
is responsible for command and control of all of the forces, that is, naval, air 
and land forces in the affected region, for the domestic operations described in 
earlier sections of this chapter. The establishment of Canada Command with 
the regional joint task forces provides the Government of Canada with a unified 
and integrated chain of command for the execution of the full spectrum of 
domestic operations, from natural disasters to terrorist threats. Figure 5-11 
depicts the regional joint task force area of responsibility.
The introduction of the regional joint task force structure complicates the 
study of the Navy’s role in domestic maritime enforcement because many of
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the tasks previously assigned through pure naval channels are now the 
responsibility of Canada Command, a non-Service affiliated command. Two 
examples of such operations are search and rescue operations and fisheries 
patrols. It should be borne in mind though, the Commander Maritime Forces 
Atlantic is also “dual-hatted” as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic, and is 
responsible for the force generation and force employment of naval forces on 
domestic operations
60°W 50°W
60 “W  50°W
Figure 5-11. Regional Joint Task Force Atlantic (limited to study area)
missions in the Atlantic region. As well, naval staffs at the Joint Task Force 
Atlantic headquarters conduct the planning, command, control, and execution 
of these operations. Moreover, there is limited naval expertise at Canada 
Command headquarters, and when the need arises for advice on naval 
operations, the Canada Command invariably turns to Maritime Forces Atlantic 
(or Pacific) for this input. Hence, for purposes of this study, Canada Command 
missions that involve naval vessel and air assets will continue to be referred to 
as naval missions for the purposes of examining the naval contribution to 
maritime security and enforcement.
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5.6 Summary
There are a many departments and agencies, as well as non­
governmental organizations implicated in oceans management in the Atlantic 
region. Of these bodies, federal departments play the greatest role in 
governance, and its with these departments that the Navy has the greatest 
influence and interaction. The principal tasks that these regulatory and advisory 
bodies undertake are surveillance and monitoring activities related to exercising 
national sovereignty, developing situational awareness of the maritime domain, 
and control of the sea approaches to ensure territorial security. The spectrum 
of the various joint, federal, and provincial agencies and departments that have 
interests in ocean affairs in Canada are summarised at Tables 5-1 and 5-2 at 
the beginning of the chapter.
The threat of increased terrorist activity in the post-9/11 security 
environment has had an impact on the responsibilities and structure of 
Canadian federal departments. As a result, departments such as the Canada 
Customs and Revenue Agency, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the 
Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness have 
undergone complete restructuring, or been replaced by new departments or 
agencies such as the Canadian Border Security Agency as well as Public 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Canada. As of 2001, Transport 
Canada assumed responsibility for marine security in Canada.
The frequency of departmental restructuring should be cause for 
concern. For example, in the seven years since January 2001, as it morphed 
into the department at present known as Public Safety Canada, the department 
underwent four name changes as it added or discarded various responsibilities 
and legacy organisations. This flux in organisation structure is indicative of the 
difficulty that government faces in dealing with the complex post 9/11 security 
environment.195
195 In January 2001 Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) was a stand alone federal 
department. In February 2001 it became the Office of Critical Infrastructure and Emergency 
Preparedness (OCIPEP). In 2004, OCIPEP morphed into Public Safety and Emergency
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The number of Canadian federal statutes that govern ocean 
management is large, and many contain provisions that result in areas of 
mutual interest and responsibility between departments. Accordingly, 
departments draw up Memoranda of Understanding to provide support to each 
other in cases where one department lacks sufficient resources. Notably, 
despite the number of agencies and departments that have legitimate need to 
be “on the water,” only DND, DFO, CCG and the RCMP maintain fleets of 
vessels, and only DND and DFO have any significant capability for deep-water 
intervention.
In the context of maritime enforcement, the key Memoranda of 
Understanding that have an impact on the Navy are those agreed upon with 
DFO for fisheries enforcement, the RCMP for counter-narcotic enforcement, 
and Environment Canada for environmental emergency incidents. The most 
visible manifestation for the Navy of these routine domestic operations is the 
provision of vessels and aircraft for OGD enforcement efforts.
Domestic operations is a term used to describe the use of military 
personnel and equipment to support civil authority at all levels of government. 
Domestic operations are strictly regulated, and fall into five categories. These 
categories span a spectrum of activities from the relatively benign provision of 
services to non-crisis community activities to armed aid to the civil power where 
military force is used to return order resulting from a disturbance beyond the 
ability of local law enforcement to contain.
Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic is responsible through the naval 
chain of command for the generation of maritime forces for defence missions 
around the globe and, wearing the hat of Commander Joint Task Force 
Atlantic, is responsible to the Canada Command chain of command for 
domestic operations in the Atlantic region. For the purposes of this thesis, all
Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). The title of this department was shortened in 2007 to Public 
Safety Canada.
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support generated by naval vessels and aircraft in the Atlantic region will be 
deemed part of the Navy’s contribution to maritime security and enforcement.
This chapter completes the examination of the second key theme of 
inquiry, the policy and regulatory framework for maritime enforcement in 
Canada. As well, the chapter ends the first main part of the overall 
investigation. Part One described the use of the sea in Atlantic Canada as well 
as its political regulatory framework. In essence, Part One is the theory portion 
of this study. The following chapters will describe how the theory is 
“operationalized,” or in other words, how it is put into practice, both in terms of 
working relationships with other departments and, through a geographic lens, 
what the Navy contributes to maritime enforcement in the Atlantic region.
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Chapter Six
INTERACTION BETWEEN AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS
6.1 Introduction
The first half of this thesis has provided the theoretical framework upon 
which is anchored the maritime enforcement component of oceans 
management in Canada. Part One described the marine geography of Atlantic 
Canada, the various ocean sectors, the evolution of relevant policy in Canada, 
and the key federal departments and agencies with enforcement mandates. 
The aim of the second half of this study is to measure in qualitative and 
quantitative terms how the Navy contributes to domestic maritime enforcement 
in Canada.
Having been introduced in Chapter Five to the key constituents in the 
enforcement regime, the aim of Chapter Six is to examine how these 
departments interact and co-operate. This chapter opens with a discussion of 
how maritime security is treated by government in Canada, and is followed by a 
review of the mechanisms for co-operation at the national level. Considerable 
attention is paid to the key national-level interdepartmental committee that laid 
the groundwork upon which much of the regional level interaction is based. 
The main strategic level federal committees and working groups with security 
thrusts are discussed as are the national level emergency response systems.
The strategic level examination is followed by a detailed review of 
interdepartmental co-operation in the Atlantic region. Acknowledging that there 
are multitudes of interdepartmental working groups, only those that have 
maritime security or enforcement mandates are examined. The chapter ends 
with a discussion of the flow of processes used when reacting to marine 
security incidents occur. The chapter notes how linkages established through 
intelligence networks as well as relationships built through participation in 
working groups and committees enable federal departments to respond to 
emergent marine enforcement incidents.
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6.2 Security -  Law Enforcement or Defence?
To understand how government departments interact with one another 
in an enforcement context it is important to observe that maritime security is 
viewed by all levels of Canadian government first and foremost as a law 
enforcement responsibility rather than a defence issue, even in the case of 
terrorism.196
This significant point is lost on many analysts. Moreover, it seems not to 
have been completely understood by the Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence (SCONSAD) in their investigation of the need for a 
national security policy. In their 2003 report Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest 
Under-Defended Borders in the World, the Committee waxes nostalgically 
about the Royal Canadian Navy’s success in coastal protection when the 
country was on a war- time footing during the 1940s. The Committee further 
suggests that the Canadian Navy of present has abandoned patrols of its home 
coasts.197
While that is clearly not the case, the fact remains that in the present 
governance structure the Navy, as part of the Canadian Forces, has no legal 
mandate for law enforcement except in very specific circumstances. As outlined 
in Chapter Four, the Navy fulfils its constabulary role by supporting those 
departments that do, the key ones being the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Environment Canada. This is done 
primarily through the provision of naval ships and aircraft as transport for peace 
officers or conservation and protection officers; other military capabilities are 
used for surveillance and monitoring of the Canadian ocean areas. Prior to 
2004, short of a direct attack on Canada or some threat so overwhelming that 
the responsible departments simply couldn’t cope, the Navy would not have 
become the lead agency for most maritime security scenarios in the extant 
federal construct. However, with the promulgation of the National Security
196 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police. National Counter-Terrorism Plan. Annex L.
197 Canada, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Canada’s 
Coastlines: The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World. October, 2003, 17.
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Policy, the Navy has been assigned the “co-ordination of on-water response to 
a marine threat or a developing crisis in our Exclusive Economic Zone and 
along our coasts.”198 This does not imply lead agency status for routine 
security tasks, ergo marine enforcement. However, it sets the stage for the 
Navy to play an important role when the scale or complexity of a security (or 
enforcement) scenario warrants harnessing the co-ordination, command and 
control capacity that the Navy can bring to bear on a problem.
Prior to 9/11, the threat of foreign terrorist attack on Canadian soil 
seemed remote in the minds of the public and government alike. Even more 
remote was the likelihood that this attack could come from or be supported by 
sea. As a consequence, the few departments that did monitor the threats 
tended to conduct their analyses from an isolated law enforcement perspective 
rather than a broader security perspective.
In a governance structure in which threats to security by non-state actors 
are viewed largely as criminal acts to be dealt with by the appropriate law 
enforcement agency, it should come as no surprise that government 
departments have become accustomed to viewing problems solely in the 
context of their narrow legal mandates. This approach has led to the conduct 
of government operations in what is termed a “stove-pipe” or “silo” fashion. In 
this manner departments and agencies address security activities without 
consideration of the relevance to another department’s mandate, and thus fail 
to capitalise on opportunities to collaborate for mutual benefit. This was the 
normal way of doing business for government departments post-Second World 
War, until a government study spawned a renaissance of co-operation on 
maritime issues at the strategic level that had an effect at the regional level as 
well.199
Since 9/11, government bodies have adopted a more holistic view of 
security, and departments that had formerly paid only lip service to their marine
198 Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society, 38.
199 The 1990 Treasury Board study led by Senator Gordon Osbaldeston is discussed in detail 
later in this chapter (Article 5.4.2.2.)
200
security responsibilities now acknowledge them, even if somewhat reluctantly. 
This reticence is due largely to the fact that many departments now may have 
“marine security” implied in their mandates but, as described in Chapter Five, 
they have no physical capability to either monitor or respond to security threats. 
However, what is important is that the concept of “contributing to marine 
security” appears to be a catalyst for greater co-operation among the 
departments.200
6.3 Nature of Multi-agency Relationships
Interdepartmental co-operation exists in Canada in an environment of 
complex, multi-agency relationships that, as a simple rule of thumb, span three 
levels of interaction. The first of these levels is the strategic. Issues at the 
strategic level are those that are pan-national in nature, usually concerning 
policy, and are addressed by national headquarters in Ottawa. The next level 
is the regional level.201 Issues at the regional level are those that are province- 
wide or cover multiple provinces and large areas of the Atlantic approaches. 
The last level is the tactical or local level. Tactical level issues tend to be more 
narrowly focussed, often pertaining to specific incidents or operations that do 
not employ region-wide resources.
In addition to the levels of interaction, interdepartmental relationships at 
all levels can be categorised as being either formal or informal in nature as well 
being either proactive or reactive in their approach. In addition, some 
relationships are based on sharing of common intelligence, as opposed to 
some relationships that are a reflection of the need for agencies to mount a co­
ordinated operational response to a set of stimuli. The next segment of this 
chapter will address the nature of inter-agency relationships at the strategic and 
regional levels.
200 Personal observation based on experience from 2001 -  2007 as Chairman of Eastern 
Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee, and as Chief of Staff, Maritime 
Forces Atlantic.
201 In military planning terms the regional level would be referred to as the “operational” level 
because in scope it equates to a theatre-wide level of planning for operations.
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Figure 6-1. Nature and Levels of Multi-agency Relationships
6.4 The National Setting (Strategic Level)
The nation’s capital, Ottawa, is where the power of government in 
Canada is centralised. It is in this city that Parliament resides, assisted by 
central agencies, and the strategic headquarters of the various federal 
departments and agencies. The term “strategic” is used in this context to 
suggest both the pan-national nature of the departmental headquarters, as well 
as the executive oversight elements of an organisation’s “head office.”
Central agencies are authoritative organisations that are not federal 
departments per se, but fulfil an important role in maintaining an enabling 
framework for departments and agencies, as well as providing advice and 
reports to the Prime Minister and Parliament. Central agencies seldom have 
direct responsibility for any particular policy; rather they influence and co­
ordinate the policy initiatives of federal departments. The main central agencies 
in Ottawa are the Treasury Board Secretariat, the Public Service Commission, 
the Department of Finance, the Office of the Auditor General, and the Privy
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Council Office. Of these, the Privy Council Office is the only central agency 
likely to be engaged in operational issues of marine security and enforcement.
The Privy Council Office is the secretariat of the federal cabinet and is, 
in essence, the Prime Minister’s “department.” The PCO’s function is to provide 
the Prime Minister with non-partisan advice on a wide spectrum of government 
matters. Its main focus is the routine co-ordination of issues within 
government, and managing the federal cabinet’s decision-making apparatus, 
i.e., preparation and administration of legal instruments and departmental 
policy proposals. PCO is one of the most influential bodies in the federal 
construct, so it was a significant breakthrough for the enforcement community 
when a senior member of PCO was appointed as the nation’s first National 
Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in 2005. By this appointment, the 
government finally acknowledged the that security could no longer be relegated 
“to the back burner” as it had been in the past.202
Although each federal department or agency will differ in its approach to 
decentralisation, each has its national headquarters in Ottawa. Each 
department or agency reports to an elected member of Parliament who is 
appointed by the Prime Minister as “the Minister” for the specific line 
department. With the exception of a Minister’s personal staff, the department or 
agency is made up of bureaucrats who execute the department’s specific 
mandates.
Each department is headed up by a career civil servant known as the 
Deputy Minister, who reports directly to the Minister. The role of the Deputy 
Minister is to provide sound public service advice to the Minister on policy 
development and implementation of policy within the individual Minister’s 
portfolio and the government’s overall policy and legislative agenda.
202 The National Security Advisor’s purpose is to co-ordinate integrated threat assessments, 
help strengthen interagency co-operation, and assist in the development of an integrated policy 
framework for national security and emergencies.
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Deputy Ministers are responsible for the maintenance of effective 
management frameworks within their departments, and for providing the 
strategic direction necessary to achieve the government's priorities. Deputy 
Ministers use their national headquarters for establishing national departmental 
objectives, policies, procedures and standards. Departmental headquarters in 
Ottawa also administer certain national programs and they monitor 
departmental activities across the country to ensure the quality and consistency 
of service delivery. Within a department’s national headquarters, individual 
directorates at the national headquarters are managed by high-ranking civil 
servants known as Assistant Deputy Ministers (ADM). It is at this level, within 
DND and the RCMP, that uniformed senior officers find themselves from time 
to time appointed as ADMs alongside their civilian counterparts. It is also at this 
level that the line between the political and bureaucratic realms first begins to 
blur.
Almost all federal departments and agencies execute their programs 
throughout the rest of Canada in a “regional” construct. The number of regions 
varies depending upon the individual department. Each region is headed by a 
senior civil servant known as a Regional Director General. Like Assistant 
Deputy Ministers in Ottawa, Regional Directors General report directly to the 
Deputy Minister of the individual department. Within the national headquarters 
construct, Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers and Regional Directors 
General are expected to work closely together in manage a department’s 
operations. However, what should be apparent in this discussion of 
headquarters structure is that a department’s national headquarters focus will 
be on national policy development and feeding of the political machine through 
the department’s Minister, whereas a department’s operations tend to be 
relegated to its respective regions.
This brief synopsis illustrates the political and bureaucratic environment 
at the national level of government in Canada. The next few pages will discuss 
the nature of interdepartmental relationships at the strategic level.
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6.4.1 Informal and Formal Relationships
Informal liaison occurs across the broad spectrum of government affairs. 
This liaison may be simply a matter of staff sounding out their counterparts at 
the same level in another department about a routine issue or pending 
initiative. At a national headquarters, it could be various staffs chatting 
unofficially about upcoming policy deliberations or changes to programmes. 
Informal co-operation is highly dependent upon individual personality and 
networking skills. Usually the liaison concerns a particular issue for which one 
or more departments have an interest or a line responsibility.
By contrast, formal co-operation is that which is established through 
official appointments, secondments, and memberships in various committees 
or working groups, ad hoc or otherwise. In many cases, the official nature of 
this liaison is captured in an incumbent’s job description or terms of reference. 
For example, the Canadian Forces have a Liaison Officer permanently 
assigned to RCMP national headquarters to provide advice on the use of 
military resources for counter-narcotics operations. As well, military officers 
are assigned to supplement the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre operated 
by CSIS. Canadian naval officers have been seconded in the past to Transport 
Canada’s national headquarters to assist in the formulation of marine security 
policy. The Canadian Forces also appoint an admiral-level officer to the staff of 
the Privy Council Office to provide high-level advice to the federal cabinet. As 
well, the Navy has seconded another senior naval officer to PCO who can 
advise the National Security Advisor on marine security issues.
6.4.2 Proactive Engagement
Government authorities deal with the management of their departmental 
mandates and emergent crises through both proactive and reactive means. In 
general, proactive measures reflect the interdepartmental working group and 
committee structure that convenes periodically to resolve issues spanning 
departmental mandates, as well as existing Memoranda of Understanding 
between selected departments.
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Proactive co-operation takes many forms and occurs as part of normal 
daily activities. Longstanding relationships have ensured that lines of 
communication remain open so that contact leading to action can be made 
easily when the need arises. These relationships have been created and 
maintained through day-to-day liaison, through participation in official working 
groups and committees and, in some instances, national or bi-lateral strategic 
exercises.
6.4.2.1 Day-to-day Liaison
Day-to-day liaison at the strategic level in federal government 
departments is directed for the most part at the development of pan-national 
government policy. However, given a headquarters’ notional proximity to 
Parliament Hill, Deputy Ministers are called upon continually to feed the political 
“beast;” thus, headquarters staffs expend considerable time, effort and 
resources supporting their Ministers for briefing and responding to the House of 
Commons.
It is important to acknowledge the significant difference between the way 
the military and other government departments function at the strategic level. 
While policy development and staffing in support of the MND also are core 
activities at National Defence Headquarters, the military also directs domestic 
and international operations from Ottawa. Certain aspects are delegated to 
military commanders in the various regions throughout Canada, but overall 
command and control is retained centrally. No other department directs routine 
operations from the strategic level.
There is a heavy emphasis in the civilian bureaucracy on gaining 
consensus before committing to a plan of action whereas the concept of 
hierarchical command and control is central to military operations. Indeed, 
military personnel are comfortable with shifting command and control functions; 
this is more difficult for civilians to accept. Even the term “command and 
control” has a negative connotation for many bureaucrats. One senior public 
servant observed that the term implies that the military seeks to control all 
aspects of a situation without input from other stakeholders. She also added
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that the term invokes the image of a person controlling a toy aircraft or car 
using a radio controlled remote.203 From the mission-oriented military officer’s 
perspective, the civil servant is more concerned about consensus building 
rather than actually getting the job done. Thus, the differences in public 
service and military cultures manifest themselves in the day-to-day interchange 
and liaison.
The cultural difference between the civil service and military manifests 
itself in two ways. It is often difficult to progress operational issues because 
strategic-level OGD staffers are far removed from operations, and are less 
inclined to understand the pressing nature of some situations. Second, in some 
cases from DND perspective, there is no opposite number at the strategic level 
in a given department -  the day-to-day contact that the military staff needs to 
connect with may be at a lower level out in one of the regions.
6.4.2.2 Inter-agency Committees and Working Groups
While day-to-day liaison between various departmental staffs may be 
sporadic and unstructured, that is less the case for inter-agency committees 
and working groups. However, attempting to outline a formal working group 
structure at the strategic level can be tricky. Normally, an ADM-level committee 
is stood up for most memoranda going to federal Cabinet, the purpose of which 
is to support the memorandum’s progress. The committees might exist for a 
single meeting or perhaps weeks. In many instances these committee meetings 
may last years, and sometimes are never articulated publicly. Usually, 
committees are disbanded after the issue makes it to Cabinet but sometimes 
morph into regular working groups at lower staff levels.204
Notwithstanding the apparent ephemeral nature of some of the national 
level committees, there indeed are a significant number of these formal bodies 
that cover a host of governance issues across the broad spectrum of public 
sector policy. With respect to the marine sector, the Navy has a clear interest in
203 Diane Giffin-Boudreau, Regional Director General Atlantic, Canada Border Services 
Agency, interview by author, 22 June 2007.
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oceans policy development and is represented by the Director of Maritime 
Strategy at national committees that deal with these issues. Working groups 
that benefit from naval participation include the Interdepartmental Marine 
Protected Areas Working Group, the Interdepartmental Working Group for 
Canada's Oceans Strategy and multiple Interdepartmental Offshore Oil & Gas 
Working Groups.205 However, for the purposes of this thesis, only the 
committees and working groups that have relevance to either marine security 
or maritime enforcement will be discussed further.
In order to understand better how government committees and working 
groups contribute to the overall security framework, it is worth stepping back a 
decade and a half to review a significant government study that set the wheels 
in motion for greater co-operation in the marine sector. What is important to 
note is the broad spectrum of issues that required addressing by the federal 
departments that operated ships and boats on the government’s behalf, as 
evidenced by the number of sub-committees that were spawned from the 
study’s final report. The large range of issues is indicative of the lack of sharing 
of information and resources at the time, resulting in a “stove-piped” approach 
to government maritime operations and fleet management.
6.4.2.2.1 The Osbaldeston Report: “All the Ships that Sail”
Although interdepartmental co-operation appears to have become 
topical in the context of national and maritime security only since 11 September 
2001, co-operation has existed to varying degrees since the since 
Confederation in 1867. However, it was the watershed 1990 Treasury Board 
study led by Senator Gordon Osbaldeston that provided the major impetus for 
change. The Senator undertook a major review (referred to as the 
Osbaldeston Report) to identify opportunities for enhancing the efficiency and 
improving delivery of federal marine fleets programs.206
204 Shauna Grant, Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National Defence, interview 
by author, 23 June 2003.
2C*  Ibid.
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Participating departments and agencies in the study included Transport 
Canada, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans (DFO), the Solicitor General of Canada and the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.207 A unique aspect of this study was the primary emphasis it 
placed on compiling a comprehensive inventory database of the federal fleet. 
The data accumulated were used to identify the capacity of federal fleets to 
respond to present and future demand as well as a means for improving their 
utilisation.208
In the Osbaldeston study full consolidation of all maritime vessels under 
DND was not considered a viable option. However, it was recommended that 
DND increase its support for other government departments in the areas of 
sovereignty, fisheries, search and rescue and the environment.209 
Consolidation of the two civilian federal fleets (at the time DFO and CCG) was 
considered but this was rejected in light of the considerable financial and 
human resource costs that would be accrued.210 However, from the 
perspective of determining more effective and efficient ways of utilising all 
federal government marine resources, the study’s recommendation to create 
an interdepartmental steering committee was groundbreaking for the time.
6.4.2.2.2 Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review 
Committee
The Osbaldeston Report recommended that an Interdepartmental 
Program Co-ordination and Review Committee (IPCRC), consisting of 
representatives of the (then) three major federal fleet operating departments 
(DND, DFO and CCG), be established on a two-year trial basis. The trial was 
to determine if the three departments could find effective ways to operate and
206 Canada, Treasury Board of Canada. All the Ships That Sail: A Study of Canada’s Fleets, by 
G.F. Osbaldeston. Report of the Study on the Utilization of the Federal Government’s Marine 
Fleets. Ottawa, 15 October 1990, p. 66.
207 In 1990, the Canadian Coast Guard’s parent department was Transport Canada.
208 Treasury Board of Canada. All the Ships That Sail,. 88.
209 Ibid., 58.
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interact. In the event that they were unsuccessful, the study recommended 
examining the potential consolidation of the two civilian fleets.211
IPCRC held its first meeting in June 1991 met every year until 2001. 
IPCRC acted as a forum for identifying government program requirements for 
ship support and for coordinating the tasking of the government’s fleets of sea­
going vessels to promote their efficient utilization. However, it had no role with 
respect to fleet management. To the extent that the departments cooperated, 
existing bilateral Memoranda of Understanding were the prime method of 
meeting “supplier-demander arrangements”.212
IPCRC reports were tabled formally with the Treasury Board. In terms of 
rank, IPCRC members were ostensibly at the Assistant Deputy Minister level. 
They were expected to ensure that the common database recommended and 
established after the Osbaldeston Report was maintained and updated 
regularly by the primary fleet operator and that the costing and utilization data 
was updated annually.213
IPCRC established a Working Group chaired by a representative (at the 
Director General/Director level) of the same department as the IPCRC chair. 
This Working Group met more frequently than IPCRC, and initially established 
two operationally-related activities, namely the Interdepartmental Co-ordination 
of Vessel Utilization Subgroup (ICVU) and the Concept of Operations Sub­
committee (COSC). The Working Group provided direction to, reviewed and 
approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for its various sub-committees to 
ensure that they remained true to the intent of the original Osbaldeston 
recommendations.214
211 Ibid., 59-60.
212 Ibid., 59.
213 Art Silverman, Chairman, “Record of Decision -  Meeting of the Organizing Committee for 
the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee 24 May 1991” (Ottawa: 
10 June 1991).
214 Ibid.; Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1735-5 
(CMDO) Delegation of Duties and Responsibilities Associated with the Interdepartmental 
Program Co-ordination and Review Committee, 23 March 1992.
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At the national level, the Interdepartmental Co-ordination of Vessel 
Utilization Subgroup was composed of representatives from the departments 
that owned fleets and from those departments who wanted to use them. It 
sought to establish and coordinate an annual matching process of ship 
requirements versus ship availability on an interdepartmental basis. It focused 
on maximizing the efficiency of vessel utilization. To that end, regional 
committees were established (Pacific, Atlantic and Central/Arctic) to coordinate 
vessel availability with both identified and unforeseen demands for vessel 
support, to compile a three-year plan for multi-tasking of ships to meet 
demands and to provide feedback to ensure the right ship for the task. This 
three-year plan was developed in parallel to the Multi-Year Operations Planning 
(MYOP) process employed by DND. The committee also maintained an 
historical record of utilisation.
The other body, the Concept of Operations Sub-committee, was charged 
to develop the Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (ICMO) 
working document. This publication detailed the concept of operations 
necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring the involvement of 
more than one government department. ICMO captured the protocols of 
existing interdepartmental MOUs and outlined the procedures to successfully 
accomplish the mission or task. The concept of ICMO was that any operational 
protocol could be extracted from it and used as a stand-alone document to suit 
the training and operational needs of individual departments.215
The IPCRC Working Group acknowledged the need for other sub­
committees. A Communications Sub-committee (CSC) was set up to identify 
communication requirements to support interdepartmental operations and to 
make recommendations to IPCRC for equipment and procedures to meet those 
requirements.216 In addition, a surveillance Sub-committee (SSC) was created 
to improve the efficiency of surveillance of the Canadian maritime approaches. 
Its objectives were to establish jointly manned surveillance co-ordination and
215 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1735-5 (CMDO)
Delegation of Duties and Responsibilities Associated with the Interdepartmental Program Co­
ordination and Review Committee, 23 March 1992.
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operations centres on both the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts of Canada. 
However, other than DND, participating federal government departments did 
not wish to finance jointly-manned operations centres. As a consequence, the 
objectives of the Surveillance Subcommittee were amended to simply 
establishing a means for concerned departments to have access to existing 
operations centres when necessary, and to develop a method to disseminate a 
Recognized Maritime Picture (RMP) to automated data processing equipment 
in individual departments.217 Interestingly, in 2004 the National Security Policy 
directed the creation of Marine Security Operations Centres (MSOC) east, west 
and on the Great Lakes. These MSOCs will fulfill the needs that the IPCRC 
Working Group sub-committees had identified a decade and half earlier.
Other sub-committees to the IPCRC Working Group included a 
Hydrographic Operations Sub-committee (HOSC) that was established to co­
ordinate the acquisition of hydrographic and bathymetric data, to develop the 
use of new technology, and to ensure a co-ordinated plan to meet pan­
government requirements for hydrographic products and services.218 The 
IPCRC Working Group also set up a Vessel Design Requirements Sub­
committee to review new designs and modernization plans for increasing 
federal fleet interoperability. This sub-committee also considered issues such 
as sharing other infrastructure such as bases among government 
departments.219
Two years after IPCRC’s inaugural meeting, its membership was 
expanded to include Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Environment 
Canada, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development. The membership was later expanded to include Natural 
Resources Canada (NRCAN), the National Research Council of Canada 
(NRCC), and Public Works (PW).
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In early 1994, a two-year assessment recommended by the Osbaldeston 
study was carried out to validate the effectiveness of IPCRC as a tool of 
interdepartmental governance. The assessment reviewed government 
processes with three major criteria in mind. The first criterion was that the 
participating departments were satisfied with the results of the IPCRC process. 
The second was that excess capacity, i.e., availability of resources that went 
unused, had been significantly reduced on an annual comparative basis. The 
third criterion was that unmet demand for fleet resources had been significantly 
reduced on a year-over-year basis.220 The two-year assessment 
recommended that the IPCRC organization and supporting infrastructure be 
maintained as a co-operative interdepartmental body to increase the 
effectiveness of the federal fleets and to measure their efficiencies on an 
annual basis. It was generally believed that the IPCRC process was producing 
useful results in terms of fleet effectiveness and that potential existed for further 
gains in efficiency.221
Although the two-year assessment in 1994 did not recommend 
consolidation, by 1995 it was decided to combine the two non-military federal 
fleets (DFO and CCG) under the aegis of the Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans. In light of this, IPCRC was again reviewed and it was determined that 
the IPCRC organizing committee at the Assistant Deputy Minister level should 
be stood down, and that its responsibilities be taken over by the IPCRC 
Working Group. The organizing committee was renamed simply the IPCRC 
(DG level).222
A decision was also taken to combine the Surveillance, 
Communications, Concept of Operations and Vessel Design Requirements 
Sub-committees into one national Operations Sub-committee (OSC). To 
facilitate better regional co-operation it was rationalised that the OSC should 
have three regional sub-committees. These sub-committees would be
220 Canada, Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee. All the Ships 
That Sail: Two Year Assessment. Ottawa, 18 January 1994, p. 2.
221 Ibid., 12.
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responsible for co-ordinating operational issues in the Atlantic, Pacific and 
Central/Arctic. It was decided that the Hydrographic Operations Sub-committee 
and the ICVU Subgroup would remain intact with their work being co-ordinated 
at the national level.223
From 1995 to 2001, the IPCRC Working Group and its the national-level 
Operations Sub-committee continued to function in conjunction with the three 
regional operations sub-committees. These were known as the Pacific Region 
Operations Sub-committee (PROSC), the Central and Arctic Zone Operations 
Sub-committee (CAZO) and the Atlantic Operations Sub-committee (AOSC). 
The Interdepartmental Co-ordination of Vessel Utilization Sub-group was 
subsumed by the OSC, whereas in 1998 the Hydrographic Operations Sub­
committee began reporting directly to the IPCRC Working Group. It seemed as 
though the federal partners were well on the way to cracking the code to real 
interdepartmental co-ordination and effective employment of maritime human 
and materiel resources.
What, then, happened to IPCRC?
Over the course of ten years, IPCRC fulfilled its mandate with mixed 
success. As is the nature of such things, the departure of key individuals over 
time resulted in a diminution of IPCRC’s importance in the departments that 
both maintained and needed the services of fleets. The consolidation of the 
two non-military fleets under one department reduced the flexibility possible 
within three fleets while concomitantly reducing the size of all. The absorption 
of the Canadian Coast Guard by DFO during an era of resource reduction 
diverted both departments’ energies to the detriment of IPCRC. The 1990s saw 
the stagnation of interdepartmental relationships and, over time, meetings 
ceased to be conducted. The increased number of departments associated 
with IPCRC, with the multiplicity of departmental endeavours, made difficult the 
task of educating of federal employees about IPCRC and its contribution to
222 Canada, Department of National Defence, National Defence Headquarters, 1150-110/J257-
3 (DNR4) Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee (IPCRC) - 
Reorganization, 13 December 1996.
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interdepartmental co-operation. Consequently, branches of departments 
returned to embarking in isolation on programs that would have better been 
served through the IPCRC process.224
The Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations document, 
inspired in its conception, was allowed to whither. New federal employees, 
often pressed for time and ignorant of the founding principles of IPCRC, did not 
maintain the level of staff effort required to ensure its usefulness. Staffs in the 
various departments frequently embarked on operations that involved more 
than one department without reference to this document.
By the late 1990s, there was little funding available to progress 
interdepartmental issues, and public sector managers’ priorities turned inwards 
to their own departmental needs during periods of budgetary constraint. 
Occasional spikes of activity that demanded multi-departmental responses, 
such as the Turbot Crisis in 1995 and the Swiss Air Flight 111 disaster of 1998, 
buoyed relations with other government departments. However, in general 
terms, many of the benefits set in motion by the Osbaldeston study and IPCRC 
simply stopped dead in their tracks. Sadly, IPCRC was stood down on 17 
September 2001.
The Committee’s final meeting aptly sums up the story of this genuine 
attempt at high level interdepartmental co-operation. Of the original list of 
invited OGD members (24 in total), only four individuals in addition to the two 
naval representatives were present. They were the IPCRC Co-Chair, IPCRC 
OSC Chair, CAZO Chair, and the HOSC Secretary, all of whom represented 
either DFO or CCG. The other IPCRC Co-Chair, the Director General Maritime 
Plans and Readiness represented DND, and was assisted by a naval staff
224 The acquisition of communications equipment is an example. The national OSC would have 
been the place for each department to consult prior to one of them buying equipment that might 
not be compatible with that of other government departments.
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officer. The RCMP, TC, CCRA, NRCan and Public Works chose not to attend, 
even though the fate of IPCRC was to be decided at that meeting.225
In answering the question, “Is IPCRC still needed?” the Committee felt 
that the original mandate and impetus of IPCRC had long been surpassed and 
was no longer meeting the needs of any of the participants at the national level. 
It was argued that the situation described in Osbaldeston Report represented a 
completely different maritime fleet environment, with excess surplus in 
resources in 1990. This was in stark contrast to the state of reduced numbers 
in OGD assets and the climate of budgetary constraint by 2001. Moreover, the 
members felt that IPCRC forum was not providing any useful oversight for the 
regions to effect their day-to-day operations. In taking the decision to disband 
IPCRC, the members agreed not to interfere or cancel any previous initiatives 
instituted by the regions or sub-committees. It was felt that day-to-day co­
operation in the regions would be able to continue without the need for the 
terms of reference or oversight of the national level IPCRC organisation.226
Retired Vice-Admiral Gary Garnett, one of the founding member of the 
IPCRC organising committee, downplays the effect of reduced budgets on the 
demise of IPCRC. Garnett, in a rebuttal to the researcher’s summation of the 
causes of IPCRC’s failure, argues that “the process was so dependent on the 
good will and professionalism of bureaucrats to move it forward, it leads one to 
wonder if this informal approach might not have also been a factor in this 
pause.”227 Garnett makes a valid observation, but it is obvious from the 
minutes of the IPCRC meetings leading up to the 17 September 2001 
gathering, that funding concerns weighed heavily on the minds of the 
committee members and, in particular, the Canadian Coast Guard.
225 Lieutentant-Commander Scott Godin, “IPCRC - Record of Decision 17 Sep 01," office email 
(18 September 2001).
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227 Gary Garnett, “Whither Canada?” In Continental Security and Canada-U.S. Relations: 
Maritime Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Robert H. Edwards and 
Graham Walker, Halifax: Dalhousie University, 2003, p. 187. 
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Why then, has so much space been allotted in this chapter to describing 
IPCRC and for that which it stood? The very fact that IPCRC was created 
showed that, up to that point, departments with similar mandates and 
challenges had not been learning from the experiences of other departments 
with the same problems. More importantly, IPCRC demonstrated that at the 
federal level, departments could work together to eliminate redundancies and 
make use of excess capacity, and could resolve mutual challenges. IPCRC 
showed that, with the right mindset, co-operation among disparate, complex 
bureaucratic agencies was within the realm of the possible, after all.
IPCRC also demonstrated the utility of specialized sub-committees to 
tackle unique aspects of interdepartmental co-operation. IPCRC’s sub­
committee structure was genesis of the regional operations committees, 
working bodies that have survived the demise of the national umbrella 
organisation, and remain thriving and useful organs that have sponsored true 
collaborative planning at the regional level. This is the enduring legacy of the 
Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee.
6.4.2.2.3 Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies
The Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and Emergencies is a 
follow-on committee to high-level group that was assembled shortly after the 
9/11 attacks. In late September 2001, the Prime Minister created the Ad Hoc 
Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) to co­
ordinate the strategic government response in the emergent uncertain security 
climate. The PSAT committee’s objectives were to protect Canadians from 
terrorist attacks, to keep the borders with the United States open, and to 
contribute to international efforts to combat terrorism. On the PSAT committee 
was minister-level representation from the Privy Council Office, PSC (then 
OCIPEP), CBSA, CRA, DFO, CCG, TC, DND and various police agencies.
PSAT, like many other ad hoc Cabinet committees, addressed time- 
sensitive issues that cut across the mandates of several departments. PSAT 
provided general policy direction, but it did not make policy decisions. Rather, 
issues were referred to permanent committees of Cabinet for decision. Once
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formed in 2001, PSAT provided Cabinet with advice on proposed marine 
security measures and their priority for implementation, as well as advice on 
broader security initiatives.228
The Ad Hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism 
was replaced by a different body, the Cabinet Committee on Security, Public 
Health and Emergencies, in December 2003. This occurred at the same time 
as major changes were introduced to the structure of parliamentary 
committees, departments, and agencies that created new entities such as 
CBSA and PSEPC. The Cabinet Committee on Security, Public Health and 
Emergencies has a broader mandate than PSAT, and endeavours to manage 
at a strategic level national security issues and activities and, in addition, 
government-wide responses to public health, national disasters, and security 
emergencies.229
6.4.2.2.4 Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group
As Senator Colin Kenny observed incredulously in Canada’s Coastlines: 
The Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, the IPCRC was terminated 
in 2001 only six days after the terrorist attack on North American soil. The 
disbanding of the committee occurred precisely at a time when more co­
ordination of related interdepartmental at sea activities was needed, not less. 
Thus it should have come as no surprise that within the year, the federal 
government recognised this need and constituted a new interdepartmental 
body, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group (IMSWG). The 
IMSWG’s mandate was to “coordinate federal response to marine security, 
analyze our marine systems for security gaps, and develop possible mitigation 
initiatives to address these gaps.”230 Senator Kennedy observed that the 
IMSWG was “simply the resuscitation of the Interdepartmental Program Co­
ordination and Review Committee” but this is not entirely accurate. Whereas
228 Canada, Department of Justice, Public Safety And Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) Initiative, 
Summative Evaluation, 23 July 2007 <http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/eval/reports/07/psat/sum/ 
p5.html> (21 August 2007).
29 Canada, Office of the Auditor General Canada, “Federal Response to September 11, 2001,” 
Exhibit 2.1 to 2005 Report o f the Auditor General of Canada, 5 April 2005 <http://www.oag- 
bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ 20050402xe01.html> (21 August 2007).
230 SCONSAD, Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders, *\ 10-113.
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IPCRC was established to rationalise and manage fleet resources, the co­
ordination of operational issues evolved as a logical progression from that. On 
the other hand, the IMSWG was created with an operational security mandate 
at the outset, and its participants included many who were not party to IPCRC.
From its inception, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working 
Group (IMSWG), was designed to be a working body that furnished the Ad Hoc 
Cabinet Committee on Public Security and Anti-Terrorism with fully staffed 
conclusions and policy recommendations on maritime security issues.231 The 
IMSWG’s function was to identify federal government actions in support of a 
national marine security plan and Canada’s international marine security 
obligations. The IMSWG was given licence to facilitate co-operation and co­
ordination among IMSWG member departments and agencies and “to promote 
the breaking-down of barriers to information exchange and the improvement of 
interoperability among the departments.” Its main functions though, were to 
develop national policy recommendations for presentation to Cabinet and to 
provide integrated and interdepartmental recommendations on the prioritisation 
of marine security enhancements. These recommendations included the 
resource requirements of the federal government Marine Security Co-ordination 
Fund established in 2001. Lastly, IMSWG was charged with facilitating 
communication with federal departments and agencies, other levels of 
government and the private sector, and regional-based committees with 
interest in or responsibilities for marine security.
The IMSWG is chaired by Transport Canada, and has as members 
representatives from 14 departments and agencies. These are PSC, DND, 
RCMP, CSIS, DFO, CBS A, CRA, DFAIT, DOJ, and the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency. Ex-officio members include the Privy Council Office, the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, and Finance Canada. Representation to the 
working group is at the Director General level from federal departments and 
agencies with policy, regulatory and/or enforcement mandates dealing with 
marine security. In addition, subject matter experts of those organisations
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having a broad mandate touching on aspects to marine security (such as 
Agriculture Canada, Health Canada and Environment Canada) may be 
requested to attend IMSWG or its subordinate committee meetings.
As in the case of IPCRC, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security 
Working Group created several sub-committees to enable it to carry out its 
mandate. The first of these, the Information Sharing Sub-Committee, is chaired 
by DND and is responsible for identifying interdepartmental marine security 
information synergies and roadblocks to the effective sharing of that information 
between departments. The RCMP chairs another group, the Armed Ship 
Boarding Protocol Sub-Committee that has been developing a national protocol 
concerning the armed boarding of ships for national security purposes.
Given that there is a significant amount of seaborne commerce that uses 
the St Lawrence River and Great Lakes waterways, a third sub-committee has 
been stood up. Chaired by Transport Canada, the Canada-U.S. Seaway 
Vessel Security Screening Sub-Committee is establishing a co-ordinated 
approach for security-related information sharing and procedures to address 
ships using the Canada/U.S. St. Lawrence Seaway system.
At present, the IMSWG provides advice to the National Security Advisor 
and Cabinet committees on the four pillars of marine security: domain 
awareness, responsiveness, safeguarding and collaboration. Through the 
IMSWG, Transport Canada administers the Marine Security Co-ordination 
Fund,. This fund provides money for one-time or limited-period federal projects 
that improve the co-ordination of marine security efforts across the federal 
government and with other jurisdictions. In 2001, for example, the federal 
government allocated 60 million dollars for marine security initiatives over a six- 
year period. This commitment was increased to 172 million dollars in 2003 in 
order to fund 13 different but related marine security initiatives. These projects 
included the purchase of increased hours for DFO-contracted surveillance 
aircraft, an Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Long Range Vessel
231 Peter Avis, “Surveillance and Canadian Maritime Domestic Security,” Canadian Military
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Identification and Tracking project, a High Frequency Surface Wave Radar 
(HFSWR) project, increased resources to support police Emergency Response 
Teams (ERT), and the acquisition of static and portable explosive, nuclear, 
chemical and biological scanning equipment for shipborne containers. The 
funds are dispersed to whichever department has the lead for a particular 
project. For example, in 2006, the IMSWG approved funding for 
interdepartmental projects proposed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, Health Canada, and the 
Canadian Space Agency.232
6.4.2.2.5 Integrated Threat Assessment Centre
In the American public’s collective mind, the attack on the World Trade 
Center by Muslim extremists in 2001 was the direst manifestation of a failure of 
intelligence. In the post-attack analysis a number of open source reports cite 
prior knowledge by a small number of US government authorities of extremists’ 
intentions to target New York. However, the sharing of this information by 
government agencies and the ability to synthesise that intelligence was 
insufficient to thwart the attacks. North of the border, the ability of Canadian 
authorities to meet the same challenge has attracted greater scrutiny by the 
public and government alike. As one senior police official put it in this wry 
understatement, “the open and proactive sharing of law enforcement 
information was inconsistent and not as well co-ordinated as it could have 
been.”233 In this climate, it was assessed that Canadian departments and 
agencies with security mandates continued to operate in “stovepipes,” and 
would be more effective if a multi-agency intelligence assessment group were
Journal 4, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 9-14.
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established to integrate all-source intelligence analyses and disseminate them 
to the government authorities charged with responding to them.
In 2004 the National Security Policy articulated the need for such an
organisation, calling for the establishment of the Integrated Threat Assessment
Centre (ITAC). The function of ITAC is the collation and analysis of intelligence
feeds from multiple agencies, and the generation of comprehensive threat
assessments. These threat assessments are disseminated in a timely and
effective manner so that risks to public safety can be either prevented or
mitigated in some fashion.234 John MacLaughlin, the Director of ITAC,
describes the role of Centre in this manner:
“You could think of ITAC as a mixing bowl that provides the 
environment for integration. Integration, in this context, has three 
dimensions: integration of access to information; integration of 
departmental or agency analytical cultures; and integration of the 
assessments themselves.”235
CSIS provides the framework for ITAC but it is not staffed exclusively by 
CSIS personnel. Additional staff members from other security and enforcement 
agencies are seconded to ITAC, normally for a two-year period. There are 
roughly a dozen agencies represented at ITAC at the time of this writing. 
These include CSIS, PSC, CBSA, DND, TC, RCMP as well as the Privy 
Council Office, the Communications Security Establishment, Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade, the Correctional Service of Canada, and the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. Also included are the 
provincial police forces of the two provinces in which the RCMP does not have 
contracted provincial policing duties. These services are the Ontario Provincial 
Police and La Surete du Quebec. The core members of ITAC bring expertise 
of their respective organisations to the table, and furnish a pipeline through 
which intelligence and information can be pulled from the various agencies. 
ITAC is also the formal link to international threat assessment centres in the 
United States, UK, Australia, and New Zealand.
234 Canada, Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, The Integrated Threat Assessment 
Centre, 13 April 2007 <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/ 
backgrounder13.asp> (20 August 2007).
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6.4.2.2.6 Arctic Security Working Group
This body was established by the Canadian Forces in 1999 as the Arctic 
Security Interdepartmental Working Group, and brought together 
representatives from 15 federal departments and territorial government 
representatives. Having dropped “interdepartmental” from its title in recognition 
of the increased membership by NGOs and academics, the Arctic Security 
Working Group meets semi-annually to provide a forum to share information 
and intelligence and to generate synergy among departments and 
organisations in the North. Sub-committees to the working group have been 
established recently for Arctic sovereignty, security, interoperability and the 
environment.236
While the group discusses a broad range of issues ranging from science 
and research to delivering the mail, recent discussions have highlighted 
concerns increased air traffic in the North that is forcing a rewrite of the 
Canadian Forces major air disaster plan.237 The Arctic Security Working Group 
has championed several joint operations in the Arctic such as a 2005 simulated 
terrorist attack on the Mackenzie Delta gas industry.
While there has been little linkage between this working group and 
broader marine security and enforcement initiatives to date, one can expect this 
body to take on a greater role as activities in the Arctic increase. At present 
there continues to be renewed interest in scientific exploration in the Arctic with 
the aim of bolstering claims by other nations of extensions to their continental 
shelves, such as by Denmark in the vicinity of Hans Island, and by the 
Russians in regard to the Lomonosov ridge.238
235 Chris Thatcher, “Integrating Terrorism Intelligence Resources,” Vanguard (February 2006) 
<http://www.vanguardcanada.com/lntegratinglntelligenceThatcher> (20 August 2007).
236 Colonel Norris Pettis, Chairman, “Minutes of Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working 
Group Meeting 18-19 November 2002” (Yellowknife, N.W.T.: December, 2002).
237 There at least 315 flights per day that overfly Canada’s Arctic, according to MARLANT 
intelligence sources.
238 “Russia plants flag under N Pole,” BBC News, 2 August 2007 <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/ 
europe/6927395.stm> (22 August 2007).
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6.4.3 Reactive Engagement
Up to this point, the discussion has treated proactive interdepartmental 
activities at the national level through the lens of working groups and 
committees. However, from time to time, situations develop that require 
strategic level government response. These scenarios would be those that are 
too large in scope or too politically sensitive for the Regional Directors General 
to manage alone. When these types of situations arise, the set of protocols 
that form the Federal and National Emergency Response Systems are 
expected to resolve them.
6.4.3.1 Federal Emergency Response System
In the Canadian system of government, the Prime Minister retains 
overall responsibility for national security and the safety of its citizens. Until 
relatively recently, there was no other minister below the Prime Minister who 
had sole responsibility for national security. Rather, federal organisations with 
security mandates reported directly to their respective ministers, who were 
accountable for activities within departmental silos. With the creation in 2003 of 
what is now known as Public Safety Canada, a single minister became 
responsible to support Prime Minister in matters of public safety and 
emergency preparedness. In addition, the National Security Advisor supports 
the Prime Minister for issues of national security.
In conjunction with the appointment of the National Security Advisor and 
the stand-up of the new department, there was recognition that in order to 
provide leadership in emergencies of national significance, a formalized set of 
procedures needed to be established for strategic federal response. Moreover, 
there was a need for a system to ensure that alert and warning systems across 
government could respond effectively to threats, and that the system could 
provide 24/7 co-ordination and support to government officials and key national 
stakeholders in the event of national emergency. To meet this challenge, 
Public Safety Canada proposed the Federal Emergency Response System 
(FERS). It should be borne in mind that the premise of FERS was for relief 
from natural disaster or pandemic, and this remains the mindset of many of the
224
architects of the FERS and, in particular, PSC. However, the FERS structure 
lends itself equally well to human-induced threats to security.
The overall aim of the Federal Emergency Response System is to 
provide effective leadership ensuring a “whole of government” federal response 
to any emerging, imminent or occurring incident that affects the national 
interest. This includes all manners of incident, not just those that are 
enforcement or security related. As such, the FERS has three major 
objectives. The first is to ensure early detection of any incident that may 
require a federal response. The second is to provide information and briefs to 
facilitate ministerial policy direction and decision-making as required. The third 
objective is to develop and implement incident specific strategic “whole of 
government” national security and public safety response plans that are 
harmonized among federal departments and agencies.
Figure 6-2. Security Response Process Flow
The FERS aligns federal co-ordination structures, capabilities, and 
resources into a unified all-hazards response to major events of national 
interest or significance that affect national security and public safety. The term 
“all hazards” implies an approach that integrates the security incident and 
disaster emergency responses into a seamless response flow that can deal 
with both national security, including enforcement, and the consequence 
management aspects of a potential or actual event.
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Activities that are undertaken under the FERS construct occur mainly 
within the Government Operations Centre (GOC). Housed in PSC facilities in 
Ottawa, this Centre provides strategic coordination and direction to federal 
departments and agencies and, as required, interfaces with provincial, territorial 
and international agencies. The GOC has a mandate for both domestic and 
international incidents. In developing the concept of the GOC, it was 
determined that the Centre should be action biased, conducting both pre­
emptive as well as reactive strategic operations, and that the Centre needed to 
fuse both crisis and consequence management. The GOC should be the 
single point of contact for international events affecting the national interest, 
and be capable of round-the-clock operations with immediate access to expert 
knowledge in areas of national security, consequence management, cyber and 
public communications. Moreover, the GOC required full time connectivity with 
federal and provincial operations centres in the regions.
The GOC supports the decision-making process of the federal Cabinet 
Operations Committee and appropriate Assistant Deputy Minister level 
committees by providing a series of incident-related information and decision­
making products. Of note, when the FERS is activated, PCO and the National 
Security Advisor are represented in the Government Operations Centre as well.
The majority of security and enforcement situations that arise on a 
routine basis fall within the mandate of a single department or agency, or can 
be dealt with by federal authorities alone. For example, CBSA often boards 
commercial vessels inbound for Halifax Harbour when the agency suspects 
that there may be a security concern aboard a particular ship. CBSA embarks 
its personnel through the use of the pilot boats of the Atlantic Pilotage 
Authority. The RCMP and CBSA frequently collaborate to investigate 
suspicious containers in the Port of Halifax facilities. However, from time to 
time, these types of operations may be driven by information gleaned at the 
strategic level, or they may ordered by higher authority. Figure 6-3 depicts the 
relationships that exist in a single mandate scenario as described above.
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Noting that policy development, not operations, tends to be the focus at 
strategic level OGD headquarters, individual federal departments and agencies 
differ considerably regarding the amount of involvement that their Ottawa 
offices have in any given event. For most OGDs, if Ministerial involvement is 
necessary, the Minister might deal directly with the appropriate Regional 
Director General rather than engage the national level departmental 
headquarters in the operation. This concept is foreign to military officers, and 
adds yet another dimension to interdepartmental co-operation.
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Figure 6-3. Single Mandate Scenario -  National / Regional Relationships
Within the FERS, there are three activation levels. The first level is an 
initial risk assessment and incident monitoring. If warranted, the incident 
controller may choose to go to the next level, which involves contingency 
planning and a limited government response. The third level is the full 
Government of Canada response.
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6.4.3.2 National Emergency Response System
To have a truly strategic system, the federal component of the 
emergency response system has to effectively complement and interact with 
the various existing provincial and territorial response systems to ensure timely 
and effective federal support in time of crisis or emergency. In situations in 
which a combined federal/provincial response to an event is warranted, the 
National Emergency Response System (NERS) is activated. The NERS 
addresses the interface between the federal/regional organisations and 
associated FERS process mechanisms, and those of the provinces and 
territories, i.e. a different level of government with similar but separate 
departments and processes.
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Figure 6-4. Multiple Mandate Scenario -  Federal / Provincial Relationships
The NERS adheres to an almost identical sequence of procedures and 
protocols as the FERS but they are amended as appropriate for the provincial 
or territorial legal framework. Figure 6-4 shows the linkages between national 
policy direction, strategic co-ordination and regional level co-ordination in a 
multi-agency federal/provincial scenario.
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PSC has produced a draft Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) 
that is intended to become the nation’s “all-hazard, whole of government co­
ordination plan for responding to single and/or multiple mandate events or 
emergencies involving one or more federal departments and agencies.”239 The 
purpose of the FERP is to provide guidance to managing the grey area 
between events for which a single department or agency has a mandate to 
address and those that require multiple agencies and are national in scope.”240
6.5 The Regional Setting (Operational Level)
Although the main study area for this thesis is the Atlantic region, up to 
this point the discussion has treated federal government interdepartmental 
relationships at the national level. This was necessary in order to comprehend 
the strategic framework with which the regional authorities must interact so that 
linkages between various operations centres, committees and working groups 
can be better understood.
Outside of the nation’s capitol, federal departments are headed by a 
Regional Director General in a regional headquarters. However, because 
OGDs at the strategic level concern themselves largely with policy, and 
operational decision-making and authority for resource expenditure are 
delegated to the regions, the RDGs are the true powerbrokers in terms of inter­
agency co-operation.241
As mentioned in Chapter Four, not all departments organise their 
respective regions in the same manner. In the Atlantic study area, some 
departments combine all four provinces to create one large region and have 
only one RDG to manage the four provinces. Other departments use provincial 
boundaries for delimitation and employ four RDGs in four separate regions in
239 Canada, Public Safety Canada, Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) Volume 1 - 8  
November 2006 (Draft 6) (Ottawa: Department of Public Safety Emergency Management and 
National Security Branch, Government Operations Centre Directorate, 8 November 2006), 23.
240 Ibid., 22-23.
241 Most federal departments employ the title Regional Director General. The are some 
exceptions: the senior CCG officer in the region is called an Assistant Commissioner, the senior 
regional RCMP officer is called the Deputy Commissioner, and each province has its own 
Commanding Officer.
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the Atlantic area. Yet other departments use non-political geographic criteria 
upon which to establish their regions, resulting in three regions with three 
RDGs to administer the same area as other departments with one or four 
RDGs. The significance of these organisational differences means that 
interagency co-operation will be inherently more complicated on a regional 
basis because a greater number RDGs and their bureaucracies must be 
engaged than would be required at the strategic level.
The remainder of this chapter will address interaction between 
government agencies and departments in the Atlantic study area.
6.5.1 Informal and Formal Relationships
Just as at the national level, informal liaison occurs in the region across 
the full spectrum of government affairs. The nature of the liaison is less 
politically or policy driven, and focussed more on delivery of a federal 
government service or program. In the regions, informal liaison often drops to 
the tactical level. As well, informal co-operation at the regional level is just as 
dependent upon individual personality and networking, acknowledging that 
different skill sets will be needed in an operational environment as opposed to a 
policy-oriented atmosphere.
Similar to the Ottawa construct, formal co-operation at the regional level 
is that which is established through official appointments, secondments, 
memberships in various committees and working groups. However, the 
emphasis of the co-operation favours “hands on” resolution of issues. Further, 
in the regions, there are a greater number of OGD representatives in each 
others operations centres than there are at the strategic level. Moreover, there 
is a greater likelihood that operations centres in the regions will be joint 
ventures, such as the Joint Regional Co-ordination Centre in which DND and 
CCG co-manage search and rescue cases in the Atlantic and Arctic areas. 
Another example is the Marine Security Operations Centre, which is hosted 
and run by DND, but has representation from five other federal partners.
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6.5.2 Proactive Engagement
As at the strategic level, government authorities in the Atlantic provinces 
deal with the management of their departmental mandates and emergent crises 
through an interdepartmental working group and committee structure. From a 
maritime enforcement perspective, the regional interdepartmental bodies that 
concern themselves with oceans management as well as marine security and 
maritime operations are of prime interest to the Navy. This proactive 
framework, especially since 9/11, has become the foundation upon which 
departments manage their individual and joint responses to reactive operations.
The Atlantic region is also where the operational elements of 
Memoranda of Understanding between selected departments are put into 
practice. It is at the regional level where federal departments and agencies 
have a vested interest in delivering the programs and activities to the 
taxpayers. The impetus for resolving problems is not the same in the rarefied 
atmosphere of national headquarters, as it is looking eye-to-eye with the 
citizens of the regions.
6.5.2.1 Day-to-day Liaison
At the regional level, there is considerably less emphasis on policy 
development and greater focus on operational execution of departmental 
mandates. There are countless ways in which a department may carry out 
day-to-day liaison in a marine security or maritime enforcement context. Using 
the case of Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) as a single department 
having relationships with many others, the following are examples of proactive 
day-to-day liaisons being undertaken on a year-round basis:
a. Liaison with the Conservation and Protection staffs of DFO to co­
ordinate naval support to fishery patrols in accordance with DND/DFO
MOU;
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b. Liaison with the Oceans Management Branch of DFO to provide 
surveillance information to assist with the scientific study, management, 
and potential enforcement of the Sable Gully Marine Protected Area;
c. Liaison with Environment Canada (EC) for assistance in detecting 
and investigating pollution incidents. Naval vessels have also carried 
Canadian Wildlife Service scientists during fishery patrols to assist with 
ongoing pelagic bird surveys;
d. Liaison with the RCMP to provide support for counter-narcotics 
operations in accordance with DND/RCMP MOU. MARLANT also 
provides logistical support in the form of transportation to assist the 
RCMP with its Coastal Watch program;242
e. Liaison with Health Canada to co-ordinate support of the Navy’s 
Nuclear Emergency Response Team during visits to Halifax by nuclear- 
powered vessels;
f. Liaison with various agencies for intelligence sharing and monitoring 
of designated Vessels of Interest, as well as joint security efforts such as 
the G7 Finance Ministers’ Conference;
g. Liaison with United States Navy commands such as the Commander- 
in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, Commander Second Fleet, and the Office of 
Naval Intelligence (ONI) on naval matters of Homeland Defence; and
h. Liaison with the United States Coast Guard First District (Boston) on 
matters of safety, security, and Homeland Security.
It can be seen then, that there are a broad spectrum of operational issues that 
generate considerable day-to-day liaison among the federal departments that 
have security and enforcement mandates.
242 Refer to Chapter Five for greater detail on the RCMP Coastal Watch programme.
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6.5.2.2 Interdepartmental Committee and Working Group Structure
In the Atlantic region, there are a number of committees and working 
groups that contribute to governance across a variety of public sector domains. 
As is the case at the strategic level, the Navy has a clear interest in oceans 
management and security concerns and is represented regionally by the 
Maritime Forces Atlantic surface operations staff on committees and working 
groups that address these issues. While the intent of this chapter is to examine 
only those committees and working groups that are either operationally or 
security oriented, there are others that are worth noting due to their 
participants.
6.5.2.2.1 Oceans Management Committees and Working Groups
Three interdepartmental or non-government bodies are worthy of 
mention in this section. The groups concern themselves with the broader 
scheme of oceans management rather than the more focussed topic of 
maritime security. These are the Eastern Scotian Shelf Integrated 
Management group (ESSIM), the Atlantic Coastal Zone Information Steering 
Committee (ACZISC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO). 
There is little direct relevance to this discussion except that many of their 
participants are the same representatives that regional OGDs send to the 
various security working groups and, as such, use the opportunities afforded by 
oceans management venues to further foster longstanding relationships. The 
downside of this approach, in which a department essentially designates a 
single representative for all manner of interdepartmental meetings, is that the 
participants can over-extend themselves and not be available for meetings that 
may be of a higher priority than others. Moreover, employing only one or two 
departmental representatives usually results in participation at meetings in a 
note-taking capacity, rather than in a decision-taking capacity. Thus, the 
decision-makers in a department are far less likely to be engaged, than had 
they participated in the meetings themselves.
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6.5.2.2.2 Integrated Border Enforcement Teams / Integrated National 
Security Enforcement Teams I National Port Enforcement Teams
Originally conceived in British Columbia in 1996 to address cross-border 
crime, Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) have been established in 
15 locations across the country, including the Atlantic region. These teams 
comprise representatives from the RCMP, CBSA and other police agencies in 
Canada, and their American counterparts in the US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE), US Customs Protection/Border Patrol (CBP/BP), and the 
US Coast Guard. The focus of IBET is on potential threats of terrorism, 
impeding the smuggling of drugs, humans, contraband cigarettes, or other 
illegal substances.243
CBSA is working to set up Joint In-Transit Targeting Teams (JITT) with 
other agencies and American officials in Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, Newark, 
and Seattle to monitor and intervene suspicious sea and air cargos and 
containers both in Canada and at international points of departure.
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams have been established 
to increase the capacity for the collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence 
among the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, and other police agencies regarding 
individuals or groups that are deemed threats to national security. As well, as 
part of the RCMP’s National Port Strategy, there have been four National Port 
Enforcement Teams (NPET) established in the ports of Halifax, Montreal, 
Hamilton and Vancouver. These teams are comprised of individuals from 
federal, provincial and municipal law-enforcement agencies whose aim is to 
target organized crime and other threats to national security that might be 
present at or passing through major ports.
At present, there is little direct interaction between DND and the IBETs, 
INSETs and NPETs; rather, the Navy’s link is an indirect one through the 
intelligence channels that these organisations feed. That said, the naval
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intelligence personnel assisted in concept of operation development when the 
I BETS was established in the Atlantic region several years ago.
6.5.2.2.3 Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Maritime Operations 
Committee
At the operational level in Atlantic Canada, there are two key bodies that 
have the greatest influence on how enforcement and maritime security are 
managed within the region. The first is the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental 
Maritime Operations Committee (ECIMOC).244 This committee is comprised of 
federal departments that either conduct, or have an interest in, operations in 
the maritime environment. Principal members include Maritime Forces Atlantic, 
DFO including representatives from the CCG Maritimes and Newfoundland and 
Labrador Regions, CBSA, CRA, TC, EC, and PSC. Health Canada as well has 
participated since their major involvement in the merchant vessel Wadi Alarab 
anthrax incident of 2003.245
EClMOC’s aim is to identify and develop the most practical means of 
applying operational resources to facilitate joint and effective employment. It is 
through ECIMOC that a link to the strategic-level IMSWG has been established 
through the distribution of each group’s records of discussion. Examples of 
items for discussion at ECIMOC are departmental operations briefs, 
departmental training requirements, opportunities for interdepartmental training 
and exercises, communications and information sharing requirements, and 
reports from ECIMOC sub-committees.
6.5.2.2.4 Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Sub-Committee
The other significant organ is the Nova Scotia Federal Council’s Security 
Committee. This committee, comprised of Regional Directors General of
243 Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canada /  U.S. Integrated Border Enforcement 
Teams, 21 November 2003 <http://www.rcmp.ca/security/ibets_e.htm> (15 December 2003).
244 ECIMOC is what was formerly known as Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee prior to 
IPCRC’s demise in 2001.
245 Testimony of author before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and 
Defence, Issue 20 -  Evidence 16 June 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/ 
senate/Com-e/defe-e/20ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76> (30 October 
2003).
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federal departments with enforcement or security mandates, meets every two 
months to discuss a broad range of security-related issues. In the aftermath of 
the September 11th attacks in New York City, it was this committee that 
recognised that the federal departments in the Atlantic region needed to 
improve their ability to work together in order to respond to future security 
incidents. This committee initiated a series of table top and command-post 
exercises, designed to stimulate and, if necessary, to force interaction between 
departments through the resolution of complex scenarios containing both 
terrestrial and marine elements.
6.5.2.2.2 Atlantic Region Security Committee
In 2006 another interdepartmental security committee was established in 
the Atlantic Region. Known as the Atlantic Region Security Committee, it 
meets to address issues of national and provincial security with implications for 
Atlantic Canada as a whole, linking closely to provincial and national activities. 
Clearly, it is similar to the NSFC Security Committee in that it is comprised of 
federal officials representing departments with security, intelligence, and law 
enforcement roles. However, what is different about this committee is that 
provincial departments have seats at the table. Commander MARLANT, in his 
capacity as Commander Joint Task Force Atlantic is a member of this 
committee as are the Deputy Ministers of the New Brunswick Department of 
Public Safety, Nova Scotia Attorney-General, Newfoundland Attorney-General, 
Prince Edward Island Attorney-General, as well as the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police Atlantic Region. Additionally, the Regional Directors General 
for CSIS, CBSA, TC, PSC, Health Canada, and Justice Canada are 
represented, as are the Assistant Commissioners of the Newfoundland and 
Maritimes regions of the Canadian Coast Guard. The objectives of the Atlantic 
Region Security Committee are to align inter-agency policy and priorities, 
progress intergovernmental communication protocols, carry out strategic co­
ordination of joint exercises and, most importantly, to develop a common 
understanding of the security threat environment.
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6.5.2.3 Inter-agency Exercises and Simulations
There have been several interagency exercises held in the Atlantic 
region since 11 September 2001. The first of these was held in May, 2002. 
This two-day exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD was championed by the members 
of Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Committee, sponsored by OCIPEP 
(pre-PSEPC) and hosted by DND’s Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA). 
ATLANTIC GUARD challenged 13 federal and three provincial agencies with 
three different scenarios that presented security, health and environmental 
disaster problems. The ATLANTIC GUARD Final Report, prepared by an 
independent assessor from outside of government, highlighted the requirement 
to regularly exercise interdepartmental co-operation in order to standardise 
such things as telecommunications, public affairs and command and control.246
A similar exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD II was conducted 28-31 October, 
2003. This command-post exercise met the basic interoperability objectives, 
but reiterated the need for continued effort in resolving joint command and 
control issues among many departments. Since 2003, at least one ATLANTIC 
GUARD type of exercise has been conducted in the maritime provinces per 
year.
Another multi-agency exercise undertaken in the Atlantic region post- 
9/11 was a CCRA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Table Top 
Exercise on 24 September 2002. This exercise was one in a series of table top 
exercises held across the country by CCRA. The scenario presented was that 
of a “dirty bomb” entering Halifax by container ship.
Several interagency exercises followed CCRA’s CBRN exercise in 2002. 
The first of these, Exercise ATLANTIC SPEAR, was held from 18 to 22 
November, 2002. Hosted by LFAA, the scenario was a G8 meeting to be 
convened at very short notice at Campobello Island, NB. While primarily an 
LFAA initiative to train its headquarters staff, it included participation from
246 Jim Bruce, Exercise Atlantic Guard Final Report (Halifax: Science Applications International 
Corporation Canada, Emergency and Safety Services Division, 2002).
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several federal government departments such as DFAIT, RCMP, CIC, and 
Health Canada. Maritime Forces Atlantic staff provided a maritime component.
Exercise ATLANTIC SHIELD followed on 12 May 2003. Hosted by the 
Halifax Port Authority, this exercise was designed to test the response to a 
bomb threat against a visiting cruise ship. The exercise served two purposes. 
First, it satisfied the Port Authority’s need to demonstrate a specified level of 
security to the cruise industry in order to secure continuing visits to Halifax. 
Second, it presented an opportunity to determine the level of response required 
from the Halifax Regional Municipality, the province and from federal 
departments.
A number of similar interdepartmental exercises have been carried out in 
the region over the few years, but only recently have they taken on an 
international flavour. Recently, from 24 to 27 June 2007, Exercise Frontier 
Sentinel 07-02 was conducted to examine the command and control 
relationships between Canada and the United States in the context of a marine 
security event. Exercise Frontier Sentinel was a co-ordinated joint inter-agency 
multi-national and private (JIMP) exercise that attempted to employ a “whole- 
of-government” approach to resolving a marine security incident.
In Exercise Frontier Sentinel 07-02, a vessel of interest was monitored 
by US authorities when it was believed to have become a significant maritime 
security threat due to an established link and proximity with a cruise ship that 
had been high-jacked in international waters. The vessel of interest’s next 
intended port of call was to be on the Eastern Seaboard of the United States, 
and the cruise liner’s next port was to have been at Halifax. The exercise was 
designed to require collaborate planning between military and law enforcement 
agencies to facilitate the execution of a bi-lateral Canada-US response. 
Exercise participants included US Coast Guard, US Navy, US Custom Border 
Patrol, and Canadian naval and air assets. In addition, Public Safety Canada, 
the RCMP, Transport Canada, CBSA, CSIS, DFO, CCG, and the Department 
of Justice Canada had active roles in the exercise.
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6.5.2.4 Regional Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations
Under the aegis of ECIMOC, a sub-committee is drafting the procedures 
necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring inter-departmental 
co-operation in one umbrella document called the Regional Interdepartmental 
Concept of Maritime Operations (RICMO). These guidelines include, but are 
not limited to counter-terrorism operations, environmental responses, illegal 
migrants, counter-drug operations, preventative patrols, and surveillance 
operations. As well, RICMO will contain regional interdepartmental 
communications and points of contact, inventories of air, sea and shore-based 
assets, an inventory of Memoranda of Understanding among departments, and 
legislative or regulatory mandates, and statutory authorities, including the use 
of force.
6.5.2.5 Summary of Key Regional Proactive Relationships
The relationships among Canadian interdepartmental committees and 
working groups with marine security and enforcement mandates at the regional 
level as well as the strategic and national levels are depicted at Figure 6-5. 
Shown in this figure at the national level are the Cabinet Committee on 
Security, Public Health and Emergencies (CCSPHE), the Arctic Security 
Working Group (ASWG) and the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working 
Group (IMSWG). At the regional level, the oceans management bodies are 
depicted with dotted lines to indicate indirect linkages to the main security and 
enforcement committees. While each individual department has its own 
internal reporting chain, the dotted arrow between the IMSWG and the Eastern 
Canada Interdepartmental Marine Operations Committee (ECIMOC) represents 
the exchange of meeting minutes between these two bodies that provides 
awareness of each others main issues.
In Figure 6-5, the Atlantic Regional Security Committee (ARSC) symbol 
is positioned over the provincial Federal Council Security Committees (Prov FC 
SC) to symbolise the guidance function that this committee provides. The 
interdepartmental exercise program is shown linked by an arrow to the 
provincial Federal Council Security Committees; in practice there is a sub­
committee that develops the agreed-upon exercise regional exercise schedule.
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Arrows link the ARSC and the provincial Federal Council Security Committees 
to the marine security and departmental operations centres (MSOC and 
OpCen). These arrows represent the capacity to deal with unforeseen or 
emergent crises through the experience, insight, and contacts gained in multi­
agency problem-solving in a proactive programme of scenario-based exercises. 
In addition, in Figure 6-5, an arrow represents the procedural foundation that 
the Regional Interdepartmental Concept of Maritime Operations (RICMO) 
contributes the operational response to an emergent crisis. In the future, with 
the continued refinement of the FERP, RICMO may cease to be of any further 
utility.
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Fig. 6-5. Interdepartmental Working Group Contribution to Operational Response.
6.5.3 Reactive Engagement
Reactive engagement by departments at the regional level was captured 
in the overall discussion of the FERS and NERS earlier in the chapter. 
However, that discussion focussed more on vertical processes between the 
different levels of government as opposed to the collaborative processes that
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occur more or less horizontally within the levels. The next few paragraphs will 
elaborate on the evolving protocols for operations at the regional level.
Figure 6-6 depicts the elements that are in place to enable authorities to 
respond to an emergent situation based on information garnered through the 
various intelligence networks. The diagram shows departmental intelligence 
sections represented at all three levels, linked with each other, and with 
international intelligence agencies at the strategic and operational levels. The 
main departments contributing to this community within Canada are CSIS, 
RCMP, CBSA, DND, the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). As 
well, there is a linkage among the departments through the Integrated Threat 
Assessment Centre. Allied connections in the United States include ONI, the 
Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), the US Coast Guard Intelligence Co­
ordination Center, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South. 
Information is shared with departments depending upon the recipient’s need to 
know and, in most cases, departments can respond effectively within individual 
department mandates.
6.5.3.1 Threat Assessment Group / Federal Co-ordination Group
The intelligence networks uncover large numbers of items requiring 
investigation and determination of credibility, level of threat, and so on. The 
ability to “filter” this information varies among departments, as does each 
department’s understanding of what is of significance to another. In the fall of 
2002, a vessel with a suspect container arrived in Halifax. Four departments or 
agencies were aware of this container, but the information about the container 
and potential responses to it were interpreted differently by each department. 
This lack co-ordination pointed to a need to formalise a process to transition 
from compiling information, to determining whether a operational response is 
required, to mounting the actual operation.
As a direct result of this particular incident, the RCMP sponsored the 
development of a body in the Atlantic region known as the Threat Assessment 
Group (TAG). A TAG meeting became the genesis of a co-ordinated 
interdepartmental operational response to an emergent issue that transcended
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the mandate of any one department. The TAG also assisted with the 
determination of a lead agency. TAG members belonged to four principal 
departments: CSIS , RCMP, CBSA, and DND. Other departments were called 
if the issue was obviously relevant to a particular department. TAG members 
included both intelligence analysts and operators, and the aim of the TAG was 
to ensure that a common understanding of a potential event was reached, so 
that each agency could then plan and co-ordinate its response.247
By September 2007, the development of the draft FERP and the 
discussions pertaining to marine security among the Atlantic Regional Directors 
General had matured to the point that it was agreed that the functions of the 
TAG could be carried out by the regional Federal Co-ordination Group (FSG). 
Federal Co-ordination Groups are bodies of designated federal officials who 
regularly come together to discuss safety and security issues in the regions. 
While they were originally conceived to advise and co-ordinate the allocation of 
resources during emergencies as part of the NERS process, it has become 
apparent that they can be employed in the role that the TAG fulfilled during 
safety and security response scenarios. As such, it has been agreed among 
the Atlantic RDGs that the FCG will convene as required to carry out the 
functions of the TAG, and the TAG will no operate in the Atlantic region.248
6.5.4 Maritime Domain Awareness
There is an inherent need to develop and maintain an understanding of 
what activities are happening in Canada’s coastal zones and its approaches. 
This situational awareness is required by multiple government departments 
with overlapping mandates and interests in our maritime security environment. 
The Navy uses a specific tool to acquire this domain awareness, and shares it 
with other government departments. It is known as the “recognized maritime 
picture.” The term “recognized” is used to indicate that the picture has been
247 Testimony of Chief Superintendent Ian Atkins, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, before the 
Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 22 -  Evidence 22 
September 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/ parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb- 
e.htm?Language=E&Parl= 37&Ses= 2&comm_id=76> (30 October 2003).
248 Announced at a meeting of the Atlantic Regional Directors General of PSC, CBSA, 
DFO/CCG, CSIS, RCMP, and DND that was hosted by Commander Maritime Forces Atlantic,
13 August 2007. The author was a participant at the meeting.
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evaluated prior to its dissemination. In other words, rather than having stations 
simply pass data between themselves, there is a central authority to whom data 
is forwarded for compilation, evaluation and dissemination as a recognized 
picture -  a analyst’s evaluation of what is happening in a given area. 
Generation of the RMP is worthy of discussion here due to its inherent 
relationship to intelligence, and as a good example of inter-agency co­
operation.
The RMP compiled by the Navy is produced for an ocean area that 
encompasses Atlantic waters well past the 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zone, extending north to the Pole and west to the end of the Great 
Lakes and encompassing the entire St. Lawrence Seaway, following the 
Canada-U.S. border where appropriate. This area has been adopted for 
picture management purposes, not to suggest a legislated mandate for control 
within that area. Although this arbitrary area of responsibility is assigned for 
management purposes, the various databases supporting the picture actually 
contain data for the entire globe.
At present, sufficient resources would not available for comprehensive 
surveillance of the large area of responsibility were only military assets to be 
used. Accordingly, the RMP is compiled in co-operation with many other 
agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The benefits of this are clear 
-  a wider collective awareness and links through which to share information, 
plus a growing ability to reduce duplication of effort and use resources 
efficiently. As such, the picture combines data from a variety of government 
and non-government sources. The development of the RMP will be discussed 
in greater detail in Chapter Seven; it is sufficient at this juncture to understand 
that its compilation requires active engagement by a host of national and 
international agencies and technical systems.
6.4.4.1 Marine Security Operations Centres
The requirement to maintain maritime domain awareness has always 
been a defence task undertaken by the Canadian Navy, only relatively recently 
has there been broad recognition across government that this is a national
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security requirement, not just a defence mission. The National Security Policy 
of 2004 articulated the need for multi-agency Maritime Security Operations 
Centres (MSOC) to meet both marine and national security challenges of the 
post 9/11 security environment.
The origins of the MSOCs lie within the Navy’s own Maritime Operations 
Centres in Esquimalt and Halifax. These operations centres, in conjunction 
with the naval intelligence commands on each coast, attempted to produce 
actionable intelligence and a recognized maritime picture that provided the 
Maritime Commanders with the appropriate situational awareness needed for 
defence purposes. In 2002, the Navy began work on a project called MOSIC 
(Maritime Operations Surveillance and Information Centre) intended to upgrade 
the capabilities of the joint ocean surveillance and information centres on both 
coasts. When the National Security Policy was tabled post 9/11, it was decided 
to leverage the efforts already underway with the MOSIC project and to 
channel them into the creation of an interdepartmental capability on both 
coasts, and along the St. Lawrence Seaway.
The Maritime Security Operations Centres are secure physical locations 
where regional representatives of select federal departments can collect, fuse 
and analyse departmental "need-to-share" information to enhance the 
government of Canada's situational awareness of the ships, cargoes and 
people who use Canada's marine environment and marine infrastructure. 
Personnel at the MSOCs continue to work for their respective Departments but 
use the collaborative work environment of the MSOC to enhance their 
information-sharing and analysis capability. MSOCs have been established at 
the existing operations centres at Halifax and Esquimalt. Operational oversight 
and infrastructure support are provided by the Navy at these two sites. As well, 
an interim MSOC has been established for the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence 
Seaway. Situated at Niagara-on-the-Lake, the interim MSOC is led by the 
RCMP with some DND personnel assigned to assist.
The core membership of the MSOCs are employees of Canadian Border 
Services Agency, Canadian Coast Guard, Department of National Defence,
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Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Transport Canada. Other Departments 
that are involved in marine security operations or may be key contributors 
during contingency operations may participate on an as required basis. The 
MSOC Concept of Operations does not usurp extant departmental authorities 
or responsibilities, nor does it change the nature of lead agency or support 
departments for operations and incidents.
The goal of the MSOC is to create data collection, fusion and analysis 
centres where the sum of all departmental input and analysis will be greater 
than the analysis that can be generated by a single department. The core 
functions of the MSOCs are routine operations and contingency operations. For 
routine operations the MSOCs must produce actionable intelligence and must 
disseminate it appropriately so that departments have adequate warning to 
coordinate and respond to a marine security incident before it affects Canada 
or its allies. In the event of the requirement for a proactive or reactive response 
to a marine incident, the MSOCs may facilitate the planning, co-ordination and 
execution of contingency operations in support of the lead agency.
In order to be able to fulfil the MSOC mandate, the centres must be 
robustly networked with the national level Government Operations Centre, the 
Integrated Threat Assessment Centre, the CCG’s Marine Communications and 
Traffic Services (MCTS), CCG’s Regional Operational Centres (ROC) and the 
CCG’s National Co-ordination Centre; DND coastal maritime operations 
centres, and United States government American Government marine security 
operations and intelligence organisations.
In Figure 6-6, the intelligence network is symbolised by grey boxes 
linked with arrows. A circular symbol represents the Recognized Maritime 
Picture, and is linked by arrows to the regional level intelligence operators at 
DND. Figure 6-6 shows the process flow of a relatively low-level activity that 
can be handled through the resources or interdepartmental connections at the 
Marine Security Operations Centre or another departmental operations centre 
(OpCen).
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Figure 6-7. Relationship of Intelligence to Operational Response -  Multiple Agencies.
Figure 6-7 depicts the process flow of a response to an emergent 
situation based on actionable intelligence, but of a greater magnitude. In other
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words, multiple agencies might be involved, or the nature of the potential 
situation is such that that a response requires the intervention of the Federal 
Co-ordination Group to determine the scope of the response and the lead 
agency.
Figure 6-8 depicts the process flow required when intelligence calls for 
an operational response to an emergent situation that is truly national in scope, 
and may require a national contingency operation to be entertained.
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6.6 Summary
Inter-agency co-operation is a functioning reality that spans three levels 
of interaction: strategic, regional, and tactical. What differentiates the character 
of interaction at the strategic versus the regional levels is the focus at national 
headquarters in tending to the political and policy aspects of a given issue, 
whereas at the regional level the emphasis is effect “on the ground.”
The strategic-level Osbaldeston Study of 1990 provided the impetus for 
greater inter-agency co-operation in the conduct of maritime operations among 
federal departments. This study spawned the Interdepartmental Program Co­
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ordination and Review Committee, from which regional operations sub­
committees were established, and continue to this day notwithstanding the 
demise of the parent strategic-level committee.
At the regional level, there are multiple federal working groups and 
committees that form a framework for inter-agency co-operation in oceans 
management and marine security and enforcement. However, the 
interdepartmental co-operation described in this chapter exists despite a 
previous lack of Government of Canada strategic security and surveillance 
policies. This policy vacuum set in motion the evolution of the ad hoc structure. 
It works adequately due in large part to the professionalism and influence of a 
small number of individuals in key departments, and their genuine desire to do 
what is right for Atlantic Canadians despite limitations imposed by various 
bureaucracies.
Frequent multi-agency exercises have been conducted in the Atlantic 
region for the past several years that contribute to the long-term education 
process of staffs at all levels. Although initially premised on emergent disaster 
relief situations, the relationships cultivated through informal and formal 
initiatives have enabled departments to deal with maritime security issues with 
greater confidence and ability. Greater clarity is likely to be achieved as the 
Public Safety Canada-led Federal Emergency Response System matures, and 
a subordinate Marine Security Response System is agreed-upon by federal 
partners.
Maritime security continues to be viewed by all levels of Canadian 
government as a law enforcement responsibility rather than a defence issue. 
This posture shapes government security response systems, with the result 
that the Canadian Navy functions in a support role to those departments and 
agencies with enforcement mandates. The National Security Policy assigns 
the Navy the task of co-ordinating the on-water response to a marine threat in 
the Canadian maritime zones. Moreover, the Navy is required to establish 
Marine Security Operations Centres to facilitate co-ordination among 
government departments. This allows the Navy to influence the marine security
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response system as it evolves so that the significant collaborative planning, co­
ordination, command and control capabilities that are resident within the Navy 
can be used to full effect.
Chapter Six has identified how government agencies and departments 
with maritime security and enforcement responsibilities are able to interact 
through working group structures and reactive processes, spanning national 
and regional levels, to carry out their general mandates. The next chapter will 
narrow the focus to just the Canadian Navy. Chapter Seven will quantify 
exactly what the Navy contributes to maritime enforcement in Atlantic Canada, 
and what benefits the Navy derives from this contribution.
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Chapter Seven
NAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 
7.1 Introduction
The intent of this next section is to shift the discussion of previous 
chapters from the political, legal, and interdepartmental frameworks for 
interaction to a narrower focus on the operational capabilities that the Navy 
brings to maritime security and enforcement in Canada. The aim of this chapter 
is to examine the first of the remaining three key themes of inquiry, the naval 
contribution to maritime domain awareness.
The chapter opens with an explanation of the roles that navies fulfil in 
modern coastal states, and is followed by a review of the threats to maritime 
security in Canada. Leading on from this background, the constituent elements 
of domain awareness and the data sources will be reviewed. The analysis will 
further ascertain the level of government “presence” derived through aerial 
surveillance in Canada’s maritime zones, as well as determine the 
concentrations of marine activity in these zones. An assessment will be 
rendered of the appropriateness of the government presence in relation to 
marine activity. The chapter closes with a review of non-surveillance 
contributions that the Navy makes for maritime domain awareness.
7.2 Naval Use of the Sea
7.2.1 Roles of Navies
The broad roles of the Canadian Forces were examined in Chapter Four 
in the context of evolving defence policy. However, the capabilities that navies 
can deliver to their governments were not discussed. Thus, the next few 
paragraphs will review the role that navies, as opposed to the other military 
services, play in domestic and international affairs.
Any review of the roles of modern navies invariably makes reference to 
Ken Booth's Navies and Foreign Policy. In this 1979 work, Booth argues the use
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of the sea is the unifying principle that underpins a navy’s three main roles: a 
military role, a diplomatic role, and a policing role. Within each of these roles, 
Booth asserts that navies can serve a large variety of subordinate functions.249
Figure 7-1. Canadian Naval Roles and Functions fo r the 21st Century
Source: Canada. Department of National Defence. Securing Canada’s Ocean
Frontiers: Charting the Course from Lead mark (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime
Strategy, 2005), 18.
The military role is a navy's foundation; the ability to apply force coupled 
with a navy's military character is what lends it credibility in the other two roles. 
The exercising of foreign policy short of the use of force is what characterizes 
the diplomatic role of the navy. The policing or constabulary role is broken down 
into two broad categories: coastguard responsibilities and nation-building. In 
general terms, coastguard responsibilities are those of exercising sovereignty in 
the nation’s own maritime zones and approaches, resource utilization, and 
maintenance of good order. Booth argues that the military and diplomatic roles 
are well established, but the policing role is becoming of increasing importance 
to coastal states.250
Some observers suggest that an additional dimension be added to
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Booth’s Triangle. This fourth side would represent the economic driver that 
navies provide to a nation’s industrial base through shipbuilding and ship repair. 
This effect is even more pronounced in countries that lack a national shipbuilding 
strategy, such as Canada. Here, the shipbuilding industry struggles for survival 
through boom and bust cycles but is kept solvent during the “busts” by contract 
awards for work on government fleets. The emerging argument for converting 
the triangle of roles into four-sided shape has yet to gather traction among 
scholars so, for the present, naval use of the sea will be discussed in the context 
of the triad of military, diplomatic, and constabulary roles.
While the military and diplomatic roles are worthy of separate treatment in 
their own right and could easily form the basis of a separate thesis, the central 
theme of this research is maritime enforcement. Accordingly, the focus will be 
on the constabulary role.
7.2.2 Constabulary Role of Navies
Naval analyst Eric Grove observes that while navies are established 
primarily for war, they find their main utility in peace.251 Current Canadian 
defence policy requires that its Navy be capable of mounting effective responses 
to emerging situations in Canadian areas of jurisdiction. To do so, the Navy must 
demonstrate regularly the capability to monitor and control activity within 
maritime zones and approaches. Moreover, the Navy’s key strategic document, 
Leadmark, identifies six functions that the Canadian Navy should expect to 
execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role:
a. Sovereignty patrols. These are a “specific form of presence 
undertaken within a state's area of maritime jurisdiction, in support of 
nation-building, to reinforce claims in contested waters, or otherwise 
"to show the flag" in a domestic context;252
250 Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy,16.
251 Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Power (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 187.
252 Canada. Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy,
252
b. Aid of the Civil Power. Naval personnel may be called out in a 
Category 4 or 5 domestic operation in any case in which a riot or 
disturbance of the peace is beyond the powers of the civil authorities 
to suppress;253
c. Assistance to Other Government Departments. These are both routine 
and extraordinary operations in which the Navy supports and assists 
other government departments in such areas as counter-narcotics, 
fisheries enforcement, prevention of illegal immigration and 
environmental protection;
d. Search and rescue. In conjunction with the Canadian Coast Guard, 
the Armed Forces are mandated to maintain a national search and 
rescue capability;
e. Disaster relief. The Navy is expected to be able to contribute to 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief within 24 hours, and 
sustain this effort for as long as necessary;254
f. Oceans management. This function implies a wide spectrum of inter­
departmental and inter-agency measures conducted to facilitate the 
regulation of activities on, under and above the sea. Oceans 
management is both a domestic and international function.255
So far throughout this thesis the terms maritime security and maritime 
enforcement have been used virtually interchangeably. However, maritime 
enforcement is a sub-set of maritime security, and relates to particular activities 
undertaken to support enforcement efforts that form part of the nation’s overall
2001), 40.
253 See Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2 for a discussion of the five categories of domestic operations 
carried out by the Canadian Forces.
254 Canada. Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 (Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy,
2001), p. 41.
253
255 Ibid
maritime security requirements. In a post-911 international security 
environment, the practical definition of maritime security is no longer constrained 
to historic threats of a naval or military nature. A state’s requirements for 
maritime security, sovereignty, and oceans management are increasingly 
interconnected. Thus a navy’s contribution to maritime security is equally a 
contribution to maritime enforcement.
7.2.3 Spectrum of Conflict
In practice, navies seldom function exclusively in a military, diplomatic or 
constabulary role alone. In many cases there is considerable crossover between 
roles. For example, during the 1995 “Turbot Crisis” between Canada and Spain, 
existing maritime forces (the military role’s fleet-in-being) used the sea for the 
diplomatic purpose of presence, and the constabulary functions of supporting 
another government department (DFO) to enforce fishery law. As well, the use 
of force is not solely confined to the military role. The likelihood and magnitude 
of force to be employed in the various naval functions is referred to the Spectrum 
of Conflict, and is depicted in Figure 7-2.
Even sovereignty enforcement, the quintessential constabulary role, could 
theoretically involve combat operations. Consider the apprehension in Canadian 
waters of a merchant vessel that has been seized by terrorists who possess a 
portable nuclear device. More than likely the terrorists would be non-compliant 
with law enforcement agencies, and the use of military force at sea might be the 
only means to prevent the ship from getting too close to coastal population 
centres. What the Navy brings to the table that is unique among government 
departments is the capacity to apply significant coercive force in emergent 
crises.
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Figure 7-2. Spectrum o f Conflict in the Maritime Context
Source: Kelly Williams, “Canada’s Maritime Strategy: A Naval Perspective,” in Continental 
Security and Canada-U.S. Relations: Maritime Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities, ed. 
Robert H. Edwards and Graham Walker <http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/ 
spc03williams.pdf> (11 March 2005).
7.2.4 Maritime Threats and Maritime Domain Awareness
Joanne Lostracco posits that the interests of a coastal state’s security 
forces fall into four general categories: protection of fishing rights, prevention of 
illegal activity at sea, such as piracy or smuggling of contraband or human cargo; 
counter-terrorism, and protection of the environment.256 A more complete list of 
threats or activities of interest in Canada’s maritime zones would be search and 
rescue situations, illegal fishing, drug smuggling, pollution incidents, illegal 
immigration, unauthorized at-sea research, petroleum and natural gas industry 
monitoring, whale and seabird protection, eco-tourism, sightings of unusual 
activities in the Arctic, foreign intelligence collection, and extremist activity.257
256 Joanne Lostracco, “What Force for Canada: A Theoretical and Practical Study of the 
Canadian Navy in the 1990s” (M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1998), 21-23.
257 Maritime Forces Atlantic, in its de facto role as surveillance coordinator for federal 
departments on Canada’s east coast, routinely monitors all of these activities.
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These threats and vulnerabilities always have been of concern to the 
Navy and the other government departments with enforcement mandates, pre- 
and post-9/11. Organized crime and trans-state actors are a greater threat than 
before. Canada has had relatively recent experience on the west coast with 
smuggling rings and arrest of fishing trawlers with illegal Chinese immigrants. 
The experience on the east coast is slightly different; illegal migrants tend to be 
landed by large merchant ships, or stowaway in containers. However, the 
reasons that compel individuals to flee their homelands and to enter Canadian 
waters in search of safety or a better future are not forecast to decrease.
The objective in maritime security is to know what is happening, where, 
and why in the maritime zones, with progressively better positional accuracy and 
information credibility as shipping and other activity nears the coast. The choice 
of security measures depends on the context and urgency of the challenge being 
addressed. Choices include safeguarding, collaboration, marine domain 
awareness, and reaction. Safeguarding refers to activities such as personnel 
screening, physical security, e.g. fencing and cameras, searching of containers 
and so on. All federal departments have interests in aspects of safeguarding, 
but it is largely other government departments and port authorities that have 
responsibility for these types of measures. Collaboration, in the maritime 
security context, refers to the sharing of database information and analysis for 
intelligence and data fusion purposes, as well as development of collaborative 
procedures. This aspect was treated in depth in the last chapter.
The term “maritime domain awareness” was introduced in Chapter Six in 
the discussion about the importance of interdepartmental interaction. It is a 
relatively recent term; in security circles the term “recognised maritime picture” 
was used to describe the snapshot of activities in the maritime zones and 
approaches obtained through surveillance and monitoring efforts. However, the 
“snapshot” provided only part of the required situational awareness. When 
appropriate intelligence from a variety of civil and military sources is applied to 
the “snapshot” of the security problem, the result is full maritime domain 
awareness. The Navy, in exercising its military and constabulary roles, develops
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maritime domain awareness in order to respond to a variety of threats to 
maritime security.
7.3 Naval Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness
With a coastline of 243,00 kilometres and an area of responsibility over 
eight million square kilometres, Canada has a formidable challenge in 
addressing maritime security. There are 25 deep-water and 650 smaller ports in 
Canada and, on a typical day, there are some 1,700 reported ships in the 
Canadian maritime zones, with many more not self-reporting, being further out 
from the major ports and beyond the coverage of vessel traffic management 
systems. Against this backdrop are the challenges of generating maritime 
domain awareness from multiple government departments with overlapping 
mandates and interests in the maritime security environment, and limited ships, 
aircraft, radar stations and other collection assets needed to conduct effective 
surveillance or confirm self-reported positions.258
The development of awareness of what is happening in the Canadian
maritime approaches has been a long-standing challenge, and from a “whole of
government” approach has been deficient:
“The process of integrating or fusing intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance information, data and products to generate 
situational awareness in the maritime realm in near real time is 
non-existent to a large extent due to technical and/or format 
incompatibility, personnel and procedural impediments, policy 
constraints and lack of fusion tools.”259
The Navy has been the sole government body that has taken on the challenge, 
and has become the de facto lead agent for development of marine domain 
awareness in Canada. The stems from the assignment of a standing military task 
in the Defence White Paper of 1994 under the “Protection of Canada” mission. 
Essentially, the mission has two components: monitor activity for sovereignty
258 Laurence M. Hickey, Testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security 
and Defence, Issue 18 -  Evidence 16 June 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/ 
senate/Com-e/defe-e/witn-e/hickey2-e.htm> (3 April 2008).
259 Canada, Government of Canada, MSOC -  Maritime Security Operations Centre, Project 
Scope Statement, 17 October 2007 < http://msoc-cosm.gc.ca/document/background/scope/ 
over_e.asp > (3 April 2008).
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purposes and assist other government departments, i.e., those with enforcement 
mandates, to achieve their goals. Building a plot of maritime activity is one of 
several activities that contribute to the Protection of Canada mission.
7.3.1 The Recognized Maritime Picture
In the current global security environment, there are a bewildering variety 
of terms, definitions and acronyms referring to various types of picture building 
efforts. However, the fundamental goal does not change, that is to support 
maritime domain awareness through building a recognized picture. For 
simplicity, the acronym RMP or the term “maritime picture” will be used in the 
remainder of this chapter to refer to the recognised maritime picture developed 
by the Navy in the Atlantic region.
The maritime picture is built from all data sources that can be accessed 
concerning maritime traffic in the area of interest. The collection of data can 
undertaken by satellite, aircraft, surface ship, submarine, land-based radar or by 
towed and fixed sonar arrays. Normally, a data source will provide geographic 
position and identity information pertaining to a given vessel and, increasingly, 
amplifying data such as the vessel’s owner, cargo and other background 
information is included. Assembled into the RMP, all of this data provide an 
awareness of the volume, location and nature of shipping activity and provides a 
background for deeper analysis of trends and vulnerabilities. Data sources are 
identified through actively seeking them out and then collecting and assembling 
the data in a format suitable for exchange between numerous partners.260
7.3.1.1 Data Collection for the Recognised Maritime Picture
At present, there are insufficient military resources alone for 
comprehensive surveillance of the large area of interest and responsibility in the 
Atlantic region. Thus, the RMP is compiled in co-operation with many other 
agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The benefits of this are clear -
260 Sam Bateman, “Maritime Surveillance and Information Exchange”, in Sam Bateman & 
Stephen Bates (eds), Calming the Waters: Initiatives fir Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation, 
Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 114, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, p. 69.
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a wider collective awareness and links through which to share information, plus a 
growing ability to reduce duplication of effort and use resources efficiently. As 
such, the maritime picture combines a plethora data described in the following 
paragraphs.
Canadian naval ships operating on the East Coast are required to report 
their own positions and the details of contacts around them into the RMP at one- 
hour intervals. Military aircraft fly a number of hours each week for dedicated 
surveillance and conduct surveillance as a secondary task even when on training 
missions. Naval ships are also under standing orders to hail merchant vessels, 
and these communications result in further information being generated on each 
vessel. In turn, naval ships also use the RMP for cueing information for the area 
beyond the range of their own sensors. For the most part, data forwarded by 
ships can be received by the Regional Joint Operations Centre for inclusion into 
the maritime picture within minutes. Military aircraft, however, are currently less 
capable in this regard and often the results of their surveillance cannot be 
included in the RMP until a few hours after the end of their patrols.
Reports are also received from aircraft contracted by Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada. The contractor, Provincial Airlines, flies these patrols with a 
well-equipped air platform that provides radar, infrared and photographic data. A 
key aspect of these flights is that the data can be forwarded in flight for 
integration in the RMP (except the photo data), resulting in the data’s 
appearance into the maritime picture within 15-20 minutes. This makes the 
fisheries patrol aircraft one of the most capable surveillance assets on the east 
coast of Canada. Although normally focused on fisheries surveillance, these 
flights report pollution incidents and, at times, merchant shipping as well. In 
2007, an initiative allowed National Defence to purchase 565 hours of PAL 
surveillance time that equated to 112 sorties. This permitted the Navy to task 
these flights for broad maritime surveillance, rather than that focused narrowly 
on one departmental mandate.261
261 Commander Ted Parkinson, “RMP and PAL Questions,” 14 April 2008, email to author.
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The recognised maritime picture also incorporates reports from the 
Canadian Coast Guard, including mandatory reports required from commercial 
vessels at 96 and 24 hrs before reaching a Canadian port. This data is hosted in 
the Canadian Coast Guard’s servers and is accessed by a direct link between 
the Navy and Coast Guard systems. Data in the Coast Guard system, known as 
the Automated Information System for Marine Navigation (INNAV), is 
comprehensive and its timeliness increases with a vessel’s proximity to Canada. 
INNAV has become a fundamental cornerstone of maritime picture building in 
Canada; it contains the reports mandated by Canadian legislation, and is the 
data path for the transponder beacon data of the IMO-mandated Automated 
Identification System. Transponder beacons are important sources as they 
provide geographic position and identity automatically by radio signal, without 
the need for a surveillance asset to detect and physically identify the vessel.
Transponder beacons also figure in reports received from certain fishing 
vessels. Automated radio signal reports from fishing vessels, with their positions 
and identities are received by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. This department 
receives these reports for European Union fisherman when those vessels are 
operating in specified areas near Canada’s EEZ, and the reports are forwarded 
to the Navy to be included into the RMP. Additionally, some Canadian vessels 
fishing in domestic areas began carrying these beacons in the summer of 2003, 
and their data are forwarded to the Navy for inclusion in the maritime picture as 
well.
The recognised maritime picture incorporates reports on a global scale 
based on positions provided through merchant vessel voluntary weather 
reporting. Merchant ships at sea report weather in their local area, typically at 4- 
6 hour intervals. This data is pooled by weather bureaus worldwide and 
Environment Canada receives the sum of all the data. Since these reports 
contain the call signs and positions of the vessels, they are of value to the 
maritime picture. These reports are forwarded to the Navy via Internet and 
converted to the format necessary for inclusion in the RMP. An additional 
database has also been developed to match ship names with the call signs
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provided in the reports.
Reports from various NATO sites also find their way into the Canadian 
RMP. The two main NATO centres each produce a maritime picture for their 
international region and share the picture with among themselves and other 
NATO allies.262 Although they do not report ships off Canada’s east coast, the 
data are included in the RMP for long-range cueing and to support naval ships 
when deployed. Although in the past NATO had not typically been a large 
reporting source for merchant vessels, the focus in this regard is changing for 
the better.
Reports are also received from various centres in the US Navy. The US 
connection is a significant feed to the Canadian RMP. The data forwarded from 
the US contain locator messages for merchant vessel traffic on a global scale. 
As well, the US Navy shares its list of high interest vessels with Canada, and the 
names of these vessels are placed on an alert list. When a report on any of the 
vessels is received in the Canadian RMP, the information is passed on to the 
appropriate US agency.
The recognised maritime picture also draws upon commercial sources. 
Many shipping companies maintain their own plots of where their ships are 
operating and often the data are posted to company sites on the Internet. These 
data are not routinely included in the RMP, but can be used to investigate 
vessels of interest, and will likely become a growth area for inclusion in the RMP 
in the future.
The final category of report that is used to develop the RMP is that of 
national technical sensors, such as those that are space-based. The data from
262 At present, there are only two NATO RMP Managers: MCC Northwood (for the Atlantic and 
Baltic), and MCC Naples (for the Mediterranean, and nominally the rest of the world). When the 
researcher commenced this study, there were four RMP managers: SACLANT,
CINCEASTLANT, Baltic and Mediterranean. With the re-organisation of the Alliance in 1999 to 
2000, the number of NATO headquarters and RMP Managers were reduced. Of course, like 
Canada, many NATO nations maintain a national RMP, and these feed to some degree into 
Northwood and Naples.
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these sources are sensitive, and are not released to non-military agencies. 
Incorporation of this sensitive data is what creates complication in information- 
sharing among government departments, and requires the generation of both 
classified and unclassifed versions of the recognised maritime picture.
To review, maritime domain awareness is derived through several 
components, but the two essential inputs are relevant intelligence and an 
accurate recognised maritime picture. The intelligence piece is co-ordinated 
through the Navy’s Joint Ocean Surveillance and Information Centres, known as 
Trinity in Maritime Forces Atlantic.263 The Centre integrates information from 
sensors, sources and organisations into a composite picture, and uses modern 
computer technology and information management techniques to process and 
disseminate this information. This process involves data warehousing, analysis, 
and fusion. The quality of data varies between each of the sources.
A key concept in fusing and analyzing this data is that the data are almost 
always time late. The maritime picture is not a real-time picture; in other words 
each contact in the RMP only represents the last report received on the vessel, 
not necessarily its most up-to-date position. The overall time late of the RMP 
averages eight to twelve hours. This figure is decreasing, but timely data 
sources that provide high quality data with identity and full background 
information, are still scare in the overall surveillance effort.
7.3.1.2 High Frequency Surface Wave Radar (HFSWR)
For the two decades, as part of DND’s Technology Demonstration 
Program, the Department has funded a project that evaluated high frequency 
surface wave radar as a means of providing wide area, over-the-horizon coastal 
surveillance from shore sites. Work on the demonstration project commenced in 
1996 with the construction of two full-scale high frequency surface wave radars 
installed at Bona Vista and Cape Race, Newfoundland. The project was a 
collaborative venture between DND and Canadian industry. Figure 7-3 depicts 
the two east coast sites.
263 The Pacific region’s counterpart is called Athena.
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Early research postulated that HFSWR would be able to detect large 
targets such as icebergs or large vessels in excess of 500 kilometres, small 
ships at a range of 370 kilometres and small low flying aircraft at 200 kilometres. 
DND assessed that such a capability would satisfy the national requirement for 
the continuous surveillance of the Canadian EEZs in support of national 
sovereignty, search and rescue, domestic naval and maritime enforcement 
operations and resource protection. The Senate Committee on National Security 
and Defence recommended in one of its studies that eight or more HFSWR sites 
be built to provide an all-weather, highly autonomous 24-hour, 7-day per week 
surveillance capability that would have the potential to facilitate the cueing of 
patrol vessels and aircraft to effect monitoring and control of Canada's maritime 
approaches.
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Figure 7-3. High Frequency Surface Wave Radar Coverage
Source: Raytheon. Shaded areas show notional coverage of radar currently in 
operation. Other arcs indicate coverage of proposed sites.
Figure 7-3 also depicts the locations of other potential sites that, if 
constructed and set into operation, would provide seamless HFSWR coverage of
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the Atlantic maritime approaches.264
The radar picture generated from Bona Vista and Cape Race was 
displayed in the operations centre at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters 
starting in October 1998, and was used as input to the recognised maritime 
picture. In the following years, the utility of the surveillance data was evaluated 
by end users at the surveillance centres in collaboration with DND research 
scientists and members of the Navy’s Maritime Operational Research Team. 
Unfortunately, the technology did not live up to expectations. The HFSWR 
system did not perform well unless weather and atmospheric conditions co­
operated. The evaluators noted that the detection ranges of HFSWR fell short of 
those specified in the Technical Statement of Requirements, and that the data 
fusion function was a time-consuming, onerous task. The evaluators observed 
that when HFSWR was combined with another sensor, there appeared to be a 
synergistic effect that improved the completeness of the RMP. However, the 
death knell for HFSWR on Canada’s east coast was sounded when Industry 
Canada received a complaint of frequency interference from the International 
Telecommunications Union. A decision was taken in 2007 to turn the HFSWR 
sites to the Assistant Deputy Minister for Science and Technology for research 
and development, but that they would no longer be used for operational 
purposes.265
7.3.2 Contribution of Surveillance to Marine Domain Awareness
Thus far in this chapter, the discussion has centred upon the components 
of the recognised maritime picture and how these components are collated to 
develop marine domain awareness. The next part of the investigation will 
examine the level of effort and spatial context of the government’s maritime 
surveillance operations conducted in the Atlantic region. The first element of the 
analysis will be a determination of the presence of military and other government 
department patrol assets in Canada’s maritime zones.
264 Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. 
Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders in the World. October, 2003, p. 57.
265 Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. 
Canadian Security Guide Book -  2007 Edition - Coasts. March, 2007, pp. 19-20.
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To recap from earlier chapters, the main contributors to government 
presence are military patrol aircraft, DFO/CCG patrol aircraft, naval vessels, and 
DFO/CCG vessels. In a perfect world, all naval, Coast Guard and RCMP vessel 
tracks, as well as all aircraft flight tracks would have been reconstructed to 
provide a composite picture of federal government presence in the study area for 
a specified period. However, this research concentrated on reconstruction of 
surveillance aircraft patrols only. Two separate issues drove this decision. First, 
aircraft have a tremendous advantage over ships as surveillance platforms by 
virtue of their speed. The speed advantage enables aircraft to cover much more 
area than ships during the same time period. In addition, an aircraft can ascend 
in altitude, effectively increasing radar antenna height with a proportionate 
extension in radar range thereby increasing detection capability. Thus, the 
magnitude of contribution to the RMP by aircraft is considerably greater than that 
of ships limited, in relative terms, by their lower speed and fixed radar antenna 
heights.
The second issue that affected the decision to concentrate the analysis on 
aircraft presence was a more practical one. Quite simply, access to full 
geographic positional information on all naval vessels at sea could not be 
obtained. This was a surprise, since the positions of all naval vessels are 
transmitted on a frequent and automatic basis to a contact history database at 
the Maritime Operations Centre in Halifax, and are shared via the Global 
Command and Control System with Canadian and allied warships and military 
aircraft. However, it was discovered that when the contact history database had 
been set up a decade earlier, it had been configured incorrectly. No one other 
than the researcher had requested unique “pulls’ from the database, so it was 
not until specific data was requested that it was determined that much of the 
vessel track data had been permanently lost, was corrupted, or was not 
retrievable. As for ship track data from the Coast Guard and RCMP, these 
departments simply would not provide the requested data.
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In light of these circumstances, the determination of government presence 
in Canada’s maritime zones was undertaken by assessing the surveillance effort 
of military and DFO maritime patrol aircraft.
7.3.2.1 CP-140 Aurora Presence (DND)
As indicated in Chapter Two, the method I used to determine the 
cumulative presence of the patrol aircraft was to record the predefined sector in 
which the CP-140 Aurora aircraft flew, then determine the number of times 
aircraft flew missions in a given sector. The totals for each sector provided an 
indication of the relative presence of the CP-140 Aurora aircraft for the year 
2002. This method was chosen once it had been determined that the CP-140 
aircrew’s estimates of sector coverage were sufficiently accurate for the 
purposes of this research.
In 2002, Canadian CP-140 maritime patrol aircraft flew 382 sorties in the 
study area. Not all of these sorties were mission-specific surveillance flights. 
However, when surveillance was not assigned as the primary mission, it was 
tasked as a secondary mission objective, and all vessels detected were recorded 
and provided as input to the recognised maritime picture.266 Table 7-1 
summarizes the number of patrols flown in each area in 2002.
It should be noted that the military tasking authority employed 
multiple co-ordinate grid systems to assign patrol sectors.267 The lack of a 
common grid for sector assignment made creation of the map that depicts CP- 
140 aircraft presence more difficult to achieve. In order to create this map, the 
GIS technician had to identify overlaps common to multiple sectors in the 
different grid systems and weight them accordingly. This was accomplished 
using the Polygon Split, Union Features, and Intersect Features tools in ArcGIS 
to create new polygons from the area that is shared between the selected 
overlapping patrol sectors (polygons).
266 The dates and missions for each flight are found in Table G-1 at Appendix G.
267 Maps of the standing patrol grids are found in Figures 3-7 and 3-8 of Chapter Three.
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TABLE 7-1
DND CP-140 AIRCRAFT PATROLS BY AREA - 2002
Areas Grid Used for Patrol No. of Patrols
Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 92
2H NAFO Area 27
0B NAFO Area 24
A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 24
3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO Area 22
95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Area 22
A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 21
2G NAFO Area 20
A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 20
94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Area 18
A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 18
1F NAFO Area 17
G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOA Area 12
2J NAFO Area 11
92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Area 7
H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOA Area 4
0A NAFO Area 4
93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Area 4
98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Area 3
A, B, D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOA Area 2
1E NAFO Area 2
91/NS Inner CP-140 Patrol Area 2
A-10, A-11, Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zone 2
E2, E3 MARLOA Area 1
1D, 3P, 3S NAFO Area 1
96/Grand Banks CP-140 Patrol Area 1
97/NFLD East CP-140 Patrol Area 1
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.
Figure 7-4 depicts CP-140 Aurora patrol aircraft presence in 2002. In the 
figure, the areas of darkest shading received the greatest number of CP-140 
Aurora flights. As such, the presence of the patrol aircraft was deemed to be 
greatest in these areas.
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Figure 7-4. DND CP-140 A ircraft Patrols By Area - 2002
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.
In 2003, a GIS technician, Sgt Richard Mayne, was transferred from 
Ottawa on a short-term assignment to the Maritime Operations Centre (MOC) in 
Halifax. During the period of his assignment, I gained the co-operation of the 
Wing Commander at the Greenwood airbase, and established the procedure for 
extracting flight track data from CP-140 surveillance flights. Figure 7-5 was 
drawn from data recorded by fourteen CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft 
that conducted airborne operations from 15 Dec 2003 to 15 January 2004. 
Geographic positions of the aircraft were extracted from the onboard tactical 
computers and forwarded as ASCII files to the MOC at Maritime Forces Atlantic 
Headquarters where the co-ordinates were entered into the GIS to recreate the 
aircraft tracks. A nominal buffer of 75 nautical miles was applied to the tracks to 
approximate the radar coverage during a normal flight profile at different 
altitudes.
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Sgt Richard Mayne manipulated the raw data and rendered the draft 
version of the choropleth map. However, 13 different shades were represented 
on the first images. I chose to decrease the numbers of orders of magnitude to 
make interpretation of the map easier. A polarizing filter was applied to the draft 
image and reduced the number of shades from thirteen to five.
The shades on map at Figure 7-5 represent the cumulative radar 
coverage and the level of presence by CP-140 Auroras during a 30-day period. 
The lightest greyscale represents areas that were in the radar coverage of one 
or two Aurora aircraft during the period. The next darker shade represents radar 
coverage of between three to six flights. The next darker shade represents 
coverage by seven to nine flights, and so on. Readers are cautioned that this 
map does not represent the tracks of Arcturus variant of the CP-140 aircraft that 
may have flown during the same time period because the avionics package of 
the Arcturus aircraft did not facilitate downloading of track data.
Presence
50° 45°
Figure 7-5. DND CP-140 A ircra ft Patrols 15 Dec 2003 -  15 Jan 2004
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2004. 
Derived from data from 14 flights.
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Figure 7-6 was created from data recorded by eighteen CP-140 Aurora 
maritime patrol aircraft that conducted airborne operations from 15 January to 15 
February 2004. The map was rendered by the GIS technician in an identical 
fashion to Figure 7-5. However, seventeen different shades were represented on 
the first images. A polarizing filter was applied to the draft image and reduced 
the number of shades from seventeen to five. The lightest greyscale represents 
areas that were in the radar coverage of one to three Aurora aircraft during the 
period. The next darker shade represents radar coverage of between four to 
seven flights. The next darker shade after that represents coverage by eight to 
eleven flights, and so on.
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Figure 7-6. DND CP-140 A ircra ft Patrols 15 Jan -  15 Feb 2004
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2004. 
Derived from data from 18 flights.
Figures 7-5 and 7-6 demonstrate several things. The first is how
surveillance presence can be depicted when the actual flight tracks are used and
the creation of the map not constrained by use of defined sector boundaries.
The second significant point to note is how the pattern of surveillance presence
changes in the space of just 30 days. This change is reflective of predicted
marine activity, such as fishery openings and closings, bad weather, pack ice,
and aircraft availability and serviceability.
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It is noteworthy that in both Figures 7-5 and 7-6, the darkest shades 
correspond to the littorals within 100 nautical miles of the airbase in Greenwood, 
NS. This makes perfect sense since this area would be overflown by each 
aircraft for every take off and landing. What is significant though, is that this 
pattern does not appear in Figure 7-4. Indeed the same littorals are depicted in 
relatively light greyscale. The reason for this is that Figure 7-4 was created from 
a summary of the areas patrolled by military aircraft once they arrived in their 
assigned sectors. What was not indicated in the post-mission reports (Forms 
Purple) were the areas covered during the aircraft’s transit from the point of take 
off to arrival at the assigned sector, nor the route taken to return to base. Thus, 
while Figure 7-4 paints a relatively accurate picture of CP-140 Aurora maritime 
patrol aircraft presence once on patrol, its method of compilation does not allow 
a completely accurate depiction of presence for the entire time the CP-140s 
were in the air. The method employed in the creation of Figures 7-5 and 7-6 
provide a true depiction of military long range patrol aircraft presence.
Regrettably, Sgt Mayne’s assignment came to an end before a full year’s 
worth of 30-day maps could be produced. As such, it was not possible to 
compare the patterns of CP-140 presence in 2002 derived by sector assignment 
with the 2004 patterns that could have been derived using the more accurate 
method based on flight track rather than sector assignment.
7.3.2.2 Contracted PAL Aircraft Presence (DFO)
As was the case for CP-140 aircraft, prior to 2003, there was no means by 
which the researcher could obtain track data on PAL flights, either by electronic 
data capture, or by manual recording of positional information by aircrew, such 
that data could be entered easily into a GIS system. Consequently, the method 
employed by the researcher was essentially the same one used for military 
surveillance aircraft. Based on the PAL post-flight report, a tally was compiled of 
the areas that the aircraft was tasked to patrol. Since the PAL aircraft were 
tasked by DFO using the NAFO grid for surveillance planning and reporting, the 
totals for flights flown in each NAFO area were recorded manually by staff at the
271
Maritime Operations Centre.
In 2002, there were a total of 481 flights flown on behalf of the 
Newfoundland Region of DFO, 256 sorties on behalf of the Maritime Region (at 
the time known as Scotia-Fundy), as well as 63 flights for the Gulf Region. That 
year, Quebec Region accounted for 65 flights, the Canadian Coast Guard flew 
80 anti-pollution patrol flights that were recorded and included in the totals for 
DFO. Table 7-2 summarizes the 945 PAL patrols flown in each NAFO sub­
division in 2002. A single patrol may have entered into more than one sub­
division during the flight.
Figure 7-7 reflects the presence of PAL aircraft on patrol in the Atlantic 
region in 2002. As in the case of previous maps, the darkest shades indicate the 
areas in which PAL aircraft flew the most frequently and thus represent the areas 
of greatest presence by Fisheries and Oceans Canada.
N E W F O U N D L A N D
NE W <  
I R U N S W I C
4VSt>
4VSe
Figure 7-7. DFO PAL Aircraft Patrols By NAFO Area - 2002 
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.
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TABLE 7-2
DFO PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS BY NAFO SUB-AREA - 2002
Area Fits Area Fits Area Fits
3Lj 481 4Tn 34 3PN 13
4Wk 324 3PSf 33 3Ke 13
3Lg 355 4Xn 31 3Lf 11
4TI 235 4Tg 30 3Ka 11
3PSc 215 3Nc 26 3PSe 10
4Tf 131 5ZEj 25 3Kh 10
3Lf 115 4VSb 25 3PSa 9
4VN 110 3PSh 24 3PSd 9
4Xr 106 3Ne 24 3Ld 9
4Sz 105 4Xs 23 5Yf 8
4Xm 103 3Mb 23 2Hd 8
3Kd 99 3Nd 22 3Md 6
4Tj 93 4Wh 21 2Ji 6
3Lh 89 4Sy 21 2Jd 6
3 Li 76 4Rb 21 5Yb 5
4Sw 75 3 La 21 4Xx 4
3Ls 66 3PSg 20 4Tm 4
4Rc 65 4VSc 19 30c 4
3Le 65 4WI 18 3Kk 4
4Xo 56 30a 18 2Je 4
3Ma 54 30d 18 4Xi 4
3Ki 54 2Jm 18 4Wg 3
3Lq 50 4Wj 17 4Wf 3
3Lb 50 3Nf 17 4Tp 3
3Lt 50 4Tk 16 4Sx 3
4Xq 47 4Ss 16 4Sv 3
30b 45 4Rd 16 2Jb 3
4Xp 40 5ZEm 15 4Si 2
4To 40 3Mc 15 3Kg 2
4Ra 40 3Kb 15 2Ja 2
30e 40 3PSb 14 3Kc 1
3Lr 40 3Nb 14 2Jn 1
3Lc 40 4We 13 2Jf 1
3Na 35 4Wd 13 2Ha 1
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2002.
As was observed in Figures 7-5 and 7-6, there are dark areas depicted in 
the littorals close to the airfields at which the PAL patrol aircraft are based. In 
this case, the airfields are located at St John’s NL, and in Nova Scotia, at the 
Halifax International Airport rather than at Greenwood. Thus the data indicate as 
shift in greater presence east along the coast. This also highlights the difference 
between CP-140 and PAL post-mission reporting; in the case of PAL, the report 
indicates all areas in which the aircraft flew, not just the assigned sector.
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The areas of high PAL presence to the north and east of Cape Breton 
Island are surprising, given that the Gulf Region of DFO had only 63 flights 
assigned to it in 2002. The obvious conclusion is that a large number of the 256 
flights allocated to the Maritimes (Scotia-Fundy) Region also overflew areas of 
the Gulf Region. A random inspection of Scotia Fundy mission printouts for 
2002 confirmed this supposition.
7.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Marine Traffic
Having determined where the government has placed its aerial 
surveillance effort in Section 7.3.2.2, the second element of the analysis is a 
determination of the concentration of marine traffic and activity in Canada’s 
maritime zones.
As articulated in Chapter Two, the security classification associated with 
the source and nature of the some of the fixed, mobile and space-based sensors 
constrained what I could use to establish patterns of maritime activity. In light of 
this, I assessed that PAL aircraft under contract by DFO provided the best level 
of detailed contact data in an unclassifed format.
For consistency of comparison, what will be presented are PAL 
surveillance data for the year 2002. The specific data collected were the mission 
designator, date, time, geographic co-ordinates, vessel name, nationality, and 
type of vessel. The staff of the Maritime Operations Centre extracted this 
information from post-mission reports posted to DFO’s Surveillance Information 
System server in St. John’s, NL. The next series of figures are both point plots 
and surface model maps for the year 2002, for the four seasons, and for each 
month in 2002.
Figure 7-8 is a point plot of all radar contacts detected by PAL lights 
during the year 2002. The 2002 database from which the figures were drawn 
contains 20,153 contacts.268 Contacts that were identified by the PAL aircrews
268 This figure is not the actual number of contacts that were present in the region in 2002. Many 
of these contacts would have been detected and recorded by flights on sequential days. What is 
important is the spatial relationship between these contacts and others recorded on the same
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as icebergs, bergy bits, and other non-vessel contacts are not reflected in this or 
subsequent figures. However, where aircrew were unable to visually identify the 
contact, or the contact was not exhibiting the characteristics of a vessel, i.e., the 
radar contact was not showing a course and speed made through the water, the 
contact was recorded as an “unknown” and is reflected in Figure 7-8, as well as 
subsequent figures.
Figure 7-8. Cumulative Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - 2002
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.
Figure 7-8 clearly depicts concentrations of marine activity in the offshore 
fishery, especially on the Nose and the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as the 
Flemish Cap. The inshore fishery is reflected within 100 nautical miles to the 
southeast of Newfoundland, and the substantial lobster fishery to the south and 
southwest of Nova Scotia is readily apparent. Another area of concentration 
shows the inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the east of New 
Brunswick and north of PEI. Surprisingly, the merchant vessel traffic lanes 
through the Gulf of St. Lawrence to the St. Lawrence Seaway are not well 
defined, although there is a faint pattern of a fine trail of contacts leading 
southeast of Anticosti Island.
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Figure 7-9 depicts the same data, but as a surface model rather than a 
point map. In this case, the surface models are representations of the densities 
of individual point data. Density plots are useful for showing where point 
features are concentrated, particularly in cases where a large number of points 
are clustered in the same location such that the points blend into one another. 
Surface models were chosen because they allow changes in patterns due to 
seasons to be seen more readily.
The ArcGIS software allowed two choices for density calculation: simple 
and kernel. In the case of a simple density calculation, the software sums all of 
the points that fall within a search area grid cell, then divides the total by the 
search area size by to arrive at a density value for each cell. The kernel density 
calculation works the same way except that the points found at the centre of the 
grid cells are weighted more heavily than those found towards the edges of the 
cells. Kernel density calculations normally provide smoother distribution plots269 
The GIS technician and I experimented with both methods, and settled on the 
kernel method. We also spent considerable time experimenting with the ArcGIS 
software and the criteria that generated the graduations, or “classes” in 
greyscale. The aim was to assign criteria that would generate no more than six 
scales of shading, yet show discernable pattern changes. The reason for this 
choice was that humans find it difficult to differentiate between more than five or 
six shades of grey on thematic maps.270
The GIS technician and I also experimented with the features that would 
create the classes of values that would equate to shades of grey. In the end, the 
natural breaks algorithm was selected, and the criteria adjusted to best display 
the changes in patterns.
269 A. Stewart Fotheringham, Chris Brunsdon, and Martin Charlton, Quantitative Geography 
(London: Sage Publications, 2000), 45-46;Trevor C. Bailey and Anthony C. Gatrell, Interactive 
Spatial Analysis (Essex: Prentice Hall, 1995), 84-88.
David J. Cuff and Mark T. Mattson, Thematic Maps: Their Design and Production (New York: 
Methuen, 1982), 36-37.
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Figure 7-9. Cumulative Vessel Detections by DFO Aircraft - 2002 Surface Model
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.
Figures 7-10 and 7-11 are two from a series of maps that break down 
vessel concentrations by month and by season for the year 2002. The complete 
series are found at Appendix D. The maps in the series are presented as both 
point plots and surface models. A comparison of the figures will demonstrate 
how the patterns of vessel concentration change throughout the year. Figures 7- 
10 and 7-11 were selected because they depict distinct changes in marine 
activity during the passage of only two months.
Figure 7-10 shows an active inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. Lawrence 
during April, yet by the end of June this fishery has closed and the only vessel 
activity of note is the merchant traffic enroute to the St. Lawrence Seaway. The 
magnitude of activity on the Grand Banks in April is high, but diminishes 
significantly by June. However the inshore fishery of southwest Nova Scotia 
remains relatively constant.
277
60°W
N EW F O U N D IA N O *
NEW ' 
BRUNSWtCl
NOVA 
►CO Ti  A
Figure 7-10. Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - April 2002 Surface Model
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.
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Figure 7-11. Vessel Detections by DFO A ircraft - June 2002 Surface Model
Source: Maritime Operations Centre Staff, 2003.
7.3.3 Comparison of Marine Activity and Government Presence
Having established the federal government’s aerial surveillance presence 
in 2002 as well as where the concentrations of marine activity were located 
during that time frame, the third element of the analysis will be to determine
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whether the government’s presence targeted the appropriate areas in Canada’s 
maritime zones. The method to do so will be a visual map comparison with a 
view to identify patterns of marine activity by month and season against the 
backdrop of patrol effort for the entire year.
To recap, concentrations of vessel activity occur in the offshore 
fishery on the Nose and the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as the Flemish Cap. 
Inshore fisheries concentrate vessels on the southeast coast of Newfoundland, 
and to the south and southwest of Nova Scotia, and on the west side of the Gulf 
of St. Lawrence. The merchant vessel traffic lanes through the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence to the St. Lawrence Seaway are less distinct.
The PAL presence map, Figure 7-7, shows that DFO spends much of its 
effort in patrolling the entire Grand Banks and the Flemish Cap. PAL also has a 
moderate presence in the fishery of southwestern Nova Scotia. Figure 7-7 also 
suggests a focus of effort to patrol the inshore fishery in the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, which has the added benefit of conducting surveillance on merchant 
traffic as it passes through the choke point between the tip of Cape Breton Island 
ant the southwestern tip of Newfoundland. It appears from Figure 7-7 that few, if 
any, PAL flights are tasked with patrols beyond 100 nautical miles southeast of 
Nova Scotia.
All three of the military aerial presence maps (Figures 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6) 
depict a greater presence to the immediate south of Nova Scotia. The vessel 
detection maps depict no substantive concentration of traffic in this area. Why 
would this increased presence be indicated? In fact, it is entirely logical because 
it is in the naval exercise areas, the MARLOAs, to the south where the Navy 
conducts its main training exercises that integrate naval surface and sub-surface 
forces with naval aviation and long-range maritime patrol. As such, to support 
these exercises, CP-140 Aurora aircraft would be expected to fly in these 
MARLOAs frequently.
Figures 7-4, 7-5, and 7-6 also show a moderate level of military presence
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south and southeast of Cape Breton Island in the approaches to Cabot Strait. 
This is the result of collaborative surveillance planning between DND and DFO 
staff. DFO PAL flights tend to focus on areas where fishing activity is located, 
and tend to overfly the approaches to Cabot Strait less frequently. DND 
surveillance planners recognise this, and task CP-140 flights to patrol the areas 
in which merchant vessels are converging to enter the gateway to the St. 
Lawrence Seaway. The three figures also depict military aerial presence along 
the entire southeastern coast of Nova Scotia.
The comparison of concentration of vessels to patrol presence suggests 
that, on the whole, the two main departments with surveillance mandates are 
tasking their assets to monitor the areas that demand the most attention. 
However, acknowledging the fact that the vessel concentration maps are based 
on data collected from actual missions flown, it is possible that there are 
concentrations of activity in areas over which no PAL aircraft were tasked to fly. 
The area of concern is directly south and southwest of Sable Island. Indeed, 
military surveillance aircraft did fly in this overall area; there is no standing or 
seasonal fishery in this area, and CP-140 aircraft reported widely dispersed 
merchant traffic and infrequent sword-fishing vessels that tend to follow linear 
depth contours rather than congregate in specific areas. This contact data could 
not be parsed efficiently from the classified RMP for the purposes of this thesis.
As further confirmation of the relatively light amount of traffic south of 
Sable Island, one can review a study commissioned by DFO in 2002 to 
determine merchant vessel activity, patterns and trends in Canada’s Atlantic 
region. The study produced vessel movement transect and density maps for 
1990, 1995, and 2000 that were based on RMP data compiled by Maritime 
Forces Atlantic from a variety of public sources. Figure 7-12 is representative of 
the inbound and outbound transect maps that show that the majority of the 
merchant traffic is dispersed beyond 100 nautical miles of the Nova Scotia coast 
(and beyond Sable Island). The figure shows that the traffic tends to follow the 
coastline as it converges to round Cape Breton Island to enter the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence. This area is well patrolled by CP-140 Auroras, and to a lesser extent,
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by PAL aircraft.
Kilometers
1995 Ecareg Inbouna Tanker 
Ship Tracks (486) 
v S ! Std Artsr Course - Caps Race 
'  ]  18 M ay-30 Nov.
Figure 7-12. Merchant Traffic Inbound to  A tlantic Canada -  1995 Filtered
Source: Bernard Kelly, Marine Commercial Vessel Traffic Activity in Canada’s Atlantic 
Region, Geocentric Mapping Consulting, June 2002.
7.3.4 Other Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness
7.3.4.1 Canadian Maritime Network
The Canadian Maritime Network (CANMARNET) is an unclassified but 
restricted, Canadian government interdepartmental computer system for sharing 
maritime operational information. Its genesis was the 1990 Osbaldeston Report 
that recommended that a means to facilitate greater information sharing between 
departments be established. The CANMARNET system was developed as a 
prototype in 1994, and originally linked Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters, 
Fisheries and Oceans regional office in St John’s NL, and the Coast Guard 
offices in Dartmouth, NS. The system was configured to link several different 
departments through dial-up connections employing Internet web technology. At 
present, the CANMARNET is hosted on the Government Enterprise Network 
(GNet) and is protected by firewalls and password controls. Dial-up access 
remains for users without access to the GNet. The network consists of a 
collection of E-mail, Web/HTML, databases, and file servers hosted by DND at 
Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters. Although CANMARNET was conceived 
for the benefit of all government departments, it was and remains the Navy that
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provides the funding and human resources to allow the system to continue to 
operate.
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Figure 7-13. CANMARNET Home Page in August 2001
The CANMARNET system has evolved to include well over 100 users, 
representing all departments in the Atlantic region with maritime interests, as 
well as selected offices in the nation’s capital and elsewhere in Canada. At 
present, the network hosts information and databases from several government 
departments such as DFO’s Fishing Vessel and Small Craft Harbours 
databases, Transport Canada's Ship Registry, and MARLANT’s Merchant Ship 
Database. As well, concerned OGDs can submit via CANMARNET email reports 
of ship movements. These reports are captured and displayed on the Enhanced 
Link Virtual Information System (ELVIS). This provides an unclassified portion of 
the RMP that is releasable to all government departments that are connected to 
CANMARNET.
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Figure 7-14. ELVIS Unclassified RMP Page -  2001
CANMARNET has proven its worth as an effective, low cost information- 
sharing tool through repeated use in inter-departmental enforcement and SAR 
operations. However, security challenges and low data rates continue to be seen 
as limitations to the system.
7.3.4.2 Route Survey
Marine domain awareness is three-dimensional requiring analysis of the 
aerospace, sea surface, and undersea environments. So far the discussion has 
revolved around the surveillance patrol effort, and collection and sharing of data 
at the surface of the water and, to some degree, in the super-adjacent airspace. 
What is left for discussion is the underwater dimension.
Some defence analysts have been critical of the Canadian Navy’s
decision to maintain an anti-submarine warfare capability, with its inherent
requirement for sophisticated patrol aircraft, ships, submarines and ship-borne
helicopters. However, it is precisely this capability that enables, with the
assistance and support of allies, the Navy to monitor and control the sub-surface
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portion of Canada’s maritime zones. In Canada, only the military has this 
mandate, and only the military has capability to execute it. While anti-submarine 
warfare is clearly a defence rather than security task, there is another aspect of 
underwater situational awareness that implications for maritime enforcement. 
The Navy exercises seabed monitoring and control through its route survey and 
seabed intervention capabilities. These capabilities are derived from the Navy’s 
mandate to maintain a limited but credible mine counter measures capability.
Route survey enables the Navy to produce highly-detailed seabed maps. 
These map are produced in stages. Detailed bathymetric data are gathered 
initially on a specific area, usually by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, then an 
image of the seabed is produced using multiple sweeps of a high-resolution side 
scan sonar system towed astern of a minor war vessel or locally contracted 
small craft. Seabed objects of interest can then be investigated in detail using 
the Navy’s remotely-operated vehicles (ROV) or clearance divers. The 
information gathered during these stages is fused together to produce the map. 
This process is repeated periodically for the area, the frequency of repetition 
determined by threat level, so that changes to the seabed can be detected. 
Although the Navy is interested primarily in monitoring the seabed for mine 
warfare purposes, the route survey capability can contribute to marine domain 
awareness in other ways. Unclassified seabed data is shared with other 
government departments and route survey and ROVs have been used for 
disaster response, such as the search for the downed Swiss Air Flight 111, as 
well as support to law enforcement.
Route survey has attained greater visibility since the asymmetric terrorist 
attacks of 9/11. The maritime security concern is that of naval mines. Almost 
any vessel can lay these explosive devices, and it only takes the threat of one 
mine to tie up vast mine clearance resources to ensure safe passage of marine 
traffic Even if terrorists can not obtain sophisticated naval mines, crude mines 
are easily fabricated. Mining can cause loss of life and economic disruption far 
out of proportion to the resources invested in the mines. Consider economic and 
public confidence impact of a cruise ship in the St. Lawrence Seaway that strikes
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a mine. Due to Canadian and American co-dependence on certain coastal and 
inshore seaways, Canada and the United States since 9/11 have embarked on a 
co-operative route survey effort for shared and adjacent waters. Segments of 
the St Lawrence Seaway system, which traditionally had been considered safe, 
have recently been surveyed as part of this effort.
7.4 Summary
Modern navies fulfill three main roles is support of government objectives. 
These are the military, diplomatic, and policing roles. The military role is a navy's 
raison d’etre; the ability to apply coercive force in concert with a navy's military 
character is what enables it to achieve the other two roles. Moreover, it is the 
capacity to bring force to bear that is what differentiates the Navy from other 
departments with enforcement mandates. As more and more maritime claims 
are extended throughout the world, the policing role for navies is becoming of 
increasing importance to coastal states.
Canadian naval policy identifies six functions that its Navy should expect 
to execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role. These functions are 
sovereignty patrols, Aid of the Civil Power, assistance to other government 
departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans management. The 
Canadian Navy’s operations fulfill all of these mandates; this chapter highlighted 
the Navy’s contribution to maritime domain awareness. Domain awareness, 
which incorporates the presence element of sovereignty, also demands co­
operation and assistance to other government departments through sharing of 
data and intelligence. The Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement is also a 
contribution to oceans management.
The Canadian Navy was engaged in developing maritime domain 
awareness long before the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the promulgation of the 
National Security Policy in 2004. Canadian defence policy required that the 
Navy be capable of monitoring activity in Canada’s maritime zones for the 
purposes of national defence. In order to meet this obligation, the Navy 
established coastal surveillance centres, and became the de facto lead for
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development of maritime domain awareness. This occurred because other 
government departments with maritime surveillance interests carried out their 
monitoring efforts in isolation from each other. Only the Navy attempted to 
integrate the data, information, and intelligence from all sources. The 
operational and technical contribution to the recognised maritime picture by the 
Navy is significant. The Navy facilitates co-ordination of all of government 
maritime surveillance planning through the Marine Security Operations Centres, 
and provides the backbone for electronic information sharing systems such as 
the Canadian Maritime Network.
The two key departments with surveillance mandates, DND and DFO, 
expend considerable resources to achieve aerial presence in the Canadian 
maritime zones and approaches. When the presence of military and DFO 
maritime patrol aircraft is estimated and presented in a spatial context, and then 
compared against the concentrations of marine vessel activity, one concludes 
that the government surveillance effort is directed to the areas of greatest 
interest for maritime enforcement and sovereignty protection.
The next chapter will examine the patrol and response aspect of the 
constabulary role, with emphasis on assessing the Navy’s role in maritime 
search and rescue and assistance to other government departments in the form 
of fisheries patrols.
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Chapter Eight
NAVAL CONTRIBUTION TO PATROL AND RESPONSE 
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified the Navy’s role in both contributing to the 
recognised maritime picture as well as being a crucial enabler of whole of 
government maritime domain awareness. The purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement in the context of 
patrol and response activities.
The chapter opens with a discussion of the structure of the search and 
rescue system in Canada, with reference to the resources assigned to the 
Atlantic region. This is followed by an examination of the spatial distribution of 
SAR incidents, an analysis of SAR operations in the year 2002, and how the 
Department of National Defence contributed to that SAR mission.
Next, the Navy’s support to fisheries enforcement through patrol 
activities is examined. An analysis of patrol patterns is offered, as well as 
spatial analyses of at-sea inspection data. The chapter closes with a synopsis 
of the naval enforcement patrol effort.
8.2 Contribution to Search and Rescue
In all locations on the globe, the activities of work and recreation often 
produce situations in which individuals find themselves in distress. In urban 
areas, this assistance is normally provided by municipal emergency services. 
However, beyond the populated areas, it normally the remit of government 
agencies to perform these search and rescue activities, the objective of which 
is to prevent loss of life and injury. Incidents that generate the need for rescue 
occur on land, on the water, or in the air. In broad terms, search and rescue is 
broken into these three categories, each referring to the medium in which the 
incident is initiated: ground SAR, marine SAR, and aeronautical SAR. In many 
cases there will be an obvious overlap; for example, an aeronautical incident 
will eventually become either a marine ground SAR incident depending upon 
the geographic location of an aircraft when the effects of gravity are fully
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realized.
8.2.1 Search and Rescue Structure in Canada
Coverage for SAR in Canada includes the nation’s landmass, and 
extends approximately 1,000 nautical miles into the Atlantic, 800 nautical miles 
into the Pacific, and north to the North Pole. Under Canada's constitutional 
arrangements, coastal and ocean search and rescue has been assumed by the 
federal government, and inland ground and water searches are the 
responsibility of provincial and territorial governments.
There are six federal departments or agencies involved in SAR 
response. These are the Department of National Defence, Environment 
Canada (Meteorological Service of Canada), Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
(Canadian Coast Guard), Parks Canada Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police, and Transport Canada.
Ground SAR is treated differently the other two categories of SAR, and 
is the responsibility of individual provinces and territories. Operational authority 
for ground SAR is delegated to the RCMP everywhere except Ontario, Quebec, 
and parts of Newfoundland and Labrador. In those provinces, the provincial 
police forces have operational authority, and the operational response is 
normally delegated to the police service of the jurisdiction in which the ground 
SAR incident has occurred. The Canadian Navy plays no real role in ground 
SAR; accordingly, only marine and aeronautical SAR will be examined further.
In Canada, the federal government is the authority for marine and 
aeronautical SAR. This responsibility was conferred first upon the Royal 
Canadian Air Force in 1947. Later, in 1976, the Minister of National Defence 
was designated as the Lead Minister for SAR (LM-SAR). Cabinet reconfirmed 
this appointment in 1982 and again in 1986.271 In 1986, the federal government 
established the National SAR Program to co-ordinate, promote, and review the 
activities of departments and agencies that deliver SAR services, with the
271 Canada, Department of National Defence/Fisheries and Oceans Canada,B-GA-209-001/FP- 
001 DFO 5449, National Search and Rescue Manual (Ottawa, May 2000), Ch. 1, p. 4.
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overall aim of improving SAR prevention and response. The focus of the 
National SAR Program is on research, provision of information, application of 
technology, and saving of lives through prevention of SAR incidents.272
There are two independent bodies that provide advice to the Lead 
Minister for SAR. The first of these is the Interdepartmental Committee on SAR 
(ICSAR), made up of senior officials representing departments and central 
agencies that execute the National SAR Program. The Committee facilitates 
interdepartmental co-ordination, and is the primary forum for development of 
advice to the LM-SAR in the areas of SAR policy and planning.273
The second is an independent body outside of the departmental line 
authorities for SAR delivery. This body is the National SAR Secretariat (NSS), 
and it serves to co-ordinate, promote and review the National Search and 
Rescue Program among federal authorities, and to develop and standardize 
provincial and territorial SAR service.274
Under the federal SAR structure, DND is required to provide the aircraft 
and aeronautical services for SAR. Although DND has overall responsibility for 
marine and aeronautical SAR, the Canadian Coast Guard component of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada is responsible under the Oceans Act to co­
ordinate maritime search and rescue with DND, and is responsible for the 
provision of the maritime component of the federal SAR program. Moreover, 
within the joint rescue co-ordination centres (RCC), military and CCG personnel 
operate together as a team to co-ordinate and control marine and aeronautical 
SAR responses.
The Commander of a Search and Rescue Region (SRR) is appointed to 
co-ordinate, control and conduct SAR operations within his SRR. These SRRs
272 Canada, National Search and Rescue Secretariat, Who We Are: National Search and 
Rescue Secretariat, 9 September 2007 <http://www.nss.gc.ca/site/whoWeAre/nssorg_e.asp> 
(27 December 2007).
Canada, National Search and Rescue Secretariat Who We Are: International Committee on 
Search and Rescue, 6 July 2007 <http://www.nss.gc.ca/site/whoWeAre/icsar_e.asp> (27 
December 2007).
274 National SAR Secretariat, Who We Are: National Search and Rescue Secretariat, 9
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are established in accordance with the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO) and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) agreements. In 
Canada, there are three SRRs: Victoria, Trenton, and Halifax. The SRR 
Commander may appoint a Senior Military Officer to oversee on his behalf the 
Officer-in-Charge of the Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre.275
Smaller maritime rescue sub-centres (MRSC) have been established in 
the Halifax SRR to reduce the JRCC’s workload and to maximize local 
knowledge and resources for SAR response.276 MRSC St. John's is 
responsible for an area 200 nautical miles adjacent to Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and MRSC Quebec is responsible for an area that includes the St 
Lawrence River and the northern Gulf of St. Lawrence. These two centres 
report to Halifax and Trenton respectively.
Within DND, responsibility for the execution of SAR rests with the 
Commander, Canada Command. The Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) is 
responsible for providing search and rescue aircraft to the Commander, 
Canada Command to whom all of the SRR Commanders report. The CAS also 
is responsible for strategic SAR policy within DND, liaison with the National 
SAR Secretariat, providing a DND representative to ISCAR, and liaison with 
other national and international SAR departments. A simplified organization 
chart depicts these relationships at Figure 8-1.
September 2007.
275 The researcher exercised the duties of Senior Military Officer for the Halifax SRR from July 
2001 to August 2003.
276 Figures 3-9 and 3-10 in Chapter Three depict the SRRs and MRSCs in the Atlantic region.
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Figure 8-1. Search and Rescue Structure w ithin DND
8.2.2 Search and Rescue Resources
For maritime SAR, both air and marine resources are designated as 
primary and secondary SAR assets. In the case of air resources in the Halifax 
SRR, primary resources are one helicopter each at the two SAR squadrons in 
the Atlantic region, holding at 30-minute response times during normal working 
hours, and two hours notice during quiet hours. Secondary air assets are all 
federal government aircraft available for tasking, such as military CP-140 
Aurora long range patrol aircraft and ship-borne Sea King helicopters, as well 
as CCG, RCMP, DFO, and TC aircraft, in addition to the resources of the Civil 
Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA).
The primary fixed wing SAR aircraft is the CC-130 Hercules transport 
plane. Based in Greenwood, NS, and Trenton, Ontario, a Hercules can 
cruise at 300 knots out to 3,600 nautical miles and stay in the air for 12 
hours. This aircraft is used for localization of persons in distress in a large 
area, and can parachute drop lifesaving equipment such as rafts, other 
supplies, and SAR personnel. The Hercules has no capability to rescue 
persons who have been located. The Hercules' SAR crew consists of two
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pilots, a navigator, a flight engineer, a load master and two SAR 
technicians.
The primary rotary wing SAR aircraft, CH-149 Cormorant helicopters, 
are based in Greenwood, NS and Gander, NL. A Cormorant can cruise at 130 
knots out to 200 nautical miles and stay on station for one hour. The helicopter 
can in the air for 6 hours, landing with a 30-minute reserve. Refueling at the 
Hibernia oil platform on the Grand Banks extends the helicopter’s range even 
farther. Cormorant helicopters are capable of dropping lifesaving equipment 
and supplies, and can hoist persons in distress for evacuation to safety. The 
Cormorant's crew consists of two pilots, one flight engineer and two SAR 
technicians.
The CH-146 Griffon helicopters based in Gander, NL are also an often 
used SAR resource. The Griffon’s main missions are to support the Army as 
tactical troop transports, and as SAR support to the Air Force’s F-18 fighter 
squadrons. Griffons are tasked routinely to respond to any SAR incident. In its 
SAR configuration, a Griffon's crew consists of two pilots, one flight engineer 
and one SAR technician.
Although not designated as primary SAR assets, CP-140 Aurora 
maritime patrol aircraft respond to SAR incidents, and are capable of dropping 
life-saving equipment, marking the location of a persons in distress, and co­
ordinating the arrival of other SAR assets to the scene.
On the water, primary marine SAR resources are CCG lifeboats and 
CCG ships multi-tasked to SAR duties that are on a 30-minute standby posture. 
Secondary marine assets include all vessels of the federal government that are 
not specifically dedicated to SAR, but which may be tasked to aid in the 
resolution of a SAR incident. Usually these are naval and DFO/CCG vessels, 
and boats of the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary.
The primary marine SAR vessels in the Halifax SRR are five large CCG
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cutters (over 180 feet), nine 16-metre Arun lifeboats, eight 14-metre lifeboats, 
and nine 8-metre inshore rescue boats. The disposition of the cutters is 
normally one in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, one to the east and one to the south 
of Nova Scotia, and two to the east of Newfoundland. The lifeboats are based 
in various locations around the region to provide minimal gaps in SAR 
coverage as depicted in Figure 8-2. The inshore rescue boats are based in 
the Newfoundland communities of Notre Dame Bay, Conception Bay, 
Bonavista Bay, and the Nova Scotian communities of Pictou, Mahone Bay, 
Halifax. There are also inshore rescue boats in Saint John and Shediac New 
Brunswick, and Charlottetown, PEI. The circles in Figure 8-2 represent the 
approximate range of the vessels from their home bases.
Figure 8.2. Coast Guard Lifeboat Locations -  Atlantic Region
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre Halifax, 2007.
8.2.3 Search and Rescue Activity Results
Having reviewed the SAR structure and resources allocated to the 
Halifax SRR, the next several paragraphs will examine the region’s SAR 
incidents in a spatial context.
8.2.3.1 Spatial Aspect of Search and Rescue Support
Figure 8-3 is a point plot that shows the distribution of all categories of
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SAR incidents in Atlantic Canada in during the period 1999-2002. Visually 
inspecting the map, one sees that the majority of the incidents appear to be 
very close to the coasts of all of the Maritime provinces, and the incidents 
disperse farther away from the coastline.
Figure 8-3. SAR Incidents in Atlantic Canada -  1999 to 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
In addition, SAR incidents are in clusters that correspond to coastal 
communities. In particular, there is a large concentration off southwest Nova 
Scotia in the vicinity of Yarmouth and Cape Sable Island. This dense cluster 
corresponds to the major lobster fishery in southwest Nova Scotia. Other 
concentrations appear along the NS, PEI and eastern NB coastlines and the 
Magdelene Islands. Again, these clusters are associated with fishing 
communities. There are small concentrations of SAR incidents on the east 
coast of Newfoundland that correspond with the inshore fishery there but, 
surprisingly, there are very few incidents in comparison to Nova Scotia. In the 
waters off of Newfoundland, there are relatively few incidents that appear 
beyond the Canadian EEZ and, in particular, the Grand Banks. This is 
intriguing because there was considerable fishing activity on the Grand Banks, 
but it has not caused a corresponding number of SAR incidents. The most 
likely explanation is that the fishing vessels that ply the Grand Banks tend to be
60 °W 50°W
§
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larger ocean-going trawlers from foreign nations rather than the much smaller 
Canadian inshore fishery vessels. The smaller vessels that fish inside of the 
Canadian EEZ are more susceptible to the effects of the rough sea states 
common in the continental shelf waters of the North Atlantic.
Figure 8-4 depicts the same data, but as a surface model rather than a 
point plot. This figure and provides a much clearer picture of the “hot spots” 
where the concentrations of SAR incidents have occurred over the period. The 
concentrations correlate to the general coastline of NS, NB and in particular 
Yarmouth and Cape Sable Island. Also more apparent in this figure than in the 
point plot are concentrations of incidents in St. Margaret’s Bay, Mahone Bay 
and Halifax, as well as Sydney, Louisbourg and Canso on Cape Breton Island. 
There is also concentrations in the Northumberland Strait on both the NS and 
southern PEI coastline. In New Brunswick, the Saint John River is the source of 
a number of incidents, and there are clusters in the Bay de Chaleur and 
Magdalene Islands. With the exception of the Saint John River that is a popular 
waterway for recreational boating, the concentrations of SAR incidents 
correspond mainly with coastal inshore fishing communities.
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Figure 8-4. SAR Incidents -  1999 to 2002 Surface Model
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Maps containing point data for each individual year 1999, 2000, 2001, 
and 2002 were examined to determine whether there are changes in incident 
pattern by year. Visual inspection shows essentially the same pattern of 
clusters year after year, and there don’t appear to be any major differences 
based upon a specific year. SAR incidents broken down by year are found at 
Appendix E, Figures E-3, E-4, E-5, and E-6.
The corresponding surface models for each year are found at Figures E- 
7, E-8, E-9, and E-6-10. The surface models do not reveal any discernable 
change in pattern on yearly basis.
Figures 8-5 and 8-6 are point data maps that show search and rescue 
incidents by season. For the purpose of this study, summer is defined as the 
months of June, July, and August. The months of September, October and 
November constitute the fall season. December, January and February are 
winter. The spring season is made up of the remaining months of March, April 
and May.
Figure 8-5 shows all of the SAR incidents that took place from 1999 to 
2002 that occurred in the summer months, and Figure 8-6 depicts those that 
occurred during the winter months of the same period. These two figures 
effectively demonstrate differences in SAR incident patterns based on season. 
Clearly, by the simple measure of the number of incidents, Figure 8-5 shows 
that the summer months are when the vast majority of SAR incidents occur. 
This is fairly obvious by looking at the point data. It also makes sense if one 
considers that it is during the summer months when the majority of the fishing 
seasons are open in Atlantic Canada, and is also the period when most 
recreational boaters, kayakers, and canoe enthusiasts are active. To some 
degree as well, there is more commercial activity undertaken on the water 
during the summer months when the weather normally is better.
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Figure 8-5. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Summer Months
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Figure 8-6. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  W inter Months
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
The point data concentration in Figure 8-6 shows that during the winter 
months there are far fewer incidents, and there appears to be only one major
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concentration, that being the Yarmouth area with minor clusters of incidents 
occurring off of Halifax. The surface models in Figures 8-7 and 8-8 
corroborates these findings.
60°W 50 °W
Figure 8-7. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Summer Months Surface Model
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
N E W F O U N D I A
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Figure 8-8. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Winter Months Surface Model
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Figures 8-9, 8-10, and 8-11 depict the search and rescue incidents for 
1999 to 2002 broken down by category of air, marine and humanitarian 
incident. Of the three categories, it can be seen that there are far fewer 
humanitarian incidents; the clear majority of SAR incidents are of a marine 
origin. In terms of air incident concentrations, Figure 8-9 reveals a generally 
random pattern with clusters at the St. John’s, and Gander Airports in 
Newfoundland, and the Sydney Halifax Airports in Nova Scotia.
In terms of marine incidents, the pattern in Figure 8-10 corresponds to 
the overall pattern depicted in Figure 8-3. Indeed, the patterns are virtually 
identical. This correlation makes sense because 84 percent of the total SAR 
incidents are marine in origin.
With respect to humanitarian SAR incidents, Figure 8-11 shows that 
there are fewer at sea, and the majority of these are clustered in the Halifax 
and St. John’s areas, the Magdalene Islands, and the entrance of the Saint 
John River in New Brunswick.
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Figure 8-9. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Air
S ou rce : Jo in t R e s c u e  C o -o rd in a tio n  C e n tre , H a lifa x , 2 0 0 2 .
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Figure 8-10. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Marine
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Figure 8-11. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Humanitarian
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
Additional maps of SAR point data and surface models can be found at 
Appendix E.
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8.2.3.2 Search and Rescue Output
Having examined the SAR structure and resources, and the spatial 
aspect of SAR incident distribution, the discussion will turn to the operational 
execution of the SAR task in 2002, and the military’s contribution to it.
As was seen at Figure 3-9, in terms of overall area, the Halifax SRR is 
the second largest of the three Canadian search and rescue regions, but 
generally has slightly fewer incidents due to the region’s lower population 
density. In 2002, the Halifax SRR responded to 2,328 SAR cases. As can be 
seen at Figure 8-12, this was a normal caseload, one that followed the normal 
distribution for SAR incidents handled by JRCC Halifax and the Maritime 
Rescue Sub-Centres at St. John’s and Quebec City.
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Figure 8-12. Monthly SAR Caseload in Halifax SRR -  2000 to 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
For statistical purposes SAR cases are recorded in numerous 
categories. The first series of categories deals with the urgency of the 
situation. Category 1 incidents are distress cases in which there is clear and 
present risk for loss of life. Category 2 cases are emergencies in which there is 
strong potential for loss of life. Category 3 incidents are less serious situations 
such as vessel breakdowns. Category 4 covers false alarms and hoaxes. 
Figure 8-13 depicts the Halifax SRR incidents by category. The percentages 
for each category during that period are consistent with the other SRRs in the 
country and imply no trends or irregularities. Category 3 cases, the less serious
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incidents, form the majority of cases in the Halifax SRR, again consistent with 
Trenton and Victoria SRRs.
■  Category 1
■ Category 2
□ Category 3
□  Category 4
Figure 8-13. SAR Incidents by Urgency -  Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
SAR incidents are also categorised for statistical purposes based on 
whether they originate as air or marine SAR cases. In cases of medical 
evacuation, the event is recorded as a humanitarian SAR case. In some 
cases, the category of the incident cannot be ascertained before it is resolved 
and is recorded as “unknown.” For example, an emergency position indicating 
radio beacon (EPIRB) may be inadvertently activated in a garage, hangar, or at 
dockside and the signal is detected. SAR resources may be brought to bear to 
search for the transponder, but the EPIRB may be switched off before SAR 
assets launch. Figure 8-14 breaks down the 2002 SAR incidents in the Halifax 
SRR by type. For comparison, Figure 8-15 does the same for the period 1997 
to 2002.
■  Air
□  Marine
■  Humanitarian
□  Unknown
Figure 8-14. SAR Incidents by Type -  Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Figure 8-15. SAR Incidents by Type -  Halifax SRR 1997 to 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
The number of SAR incidents in 2002 was fewer by two percent from the 
year previous and even fewer than the years 1999 and 2000. However, a five- 
year trend suggests that 2002 was an “average” year; thus, the total number of 
SAR incidents in 2002 represent normal fluctuations in marine activity.
Figure 8-16 depicts the type of vessel associated with marine SAR 
cases in 2002. Fishing activity continues to be the source of the majority of 
cases in the Halifax SRR, which is not surprising given the fishing industry’s 
significance to the economy of the Atlantic region. The relationship between 
fishing vessel SAR cases and other user categories in the Halifax SRR has 
remained relatively constant in recent years.
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Figure 8-16. SAR Incidents by User Type -  Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
Interestingly, the predominance of fishing vessel SAR cases is not 
replicated on Canada’s West Coast. There the relatively sheltered inside 
passages and more temperate climate encourage a greater number of 
recreational boaters. Accordingly, the majority of SAR incidents in the Victoria 
SRR are caused by power-driven pleasure craft. Fishing vessels account for 
only 14 percent of the cases on the West Coast.277
The JRCC also compiles statistics pertaining to the source of the 
indidents to which they respond. Figure 8-17 shows that mechanical and 
equipment breakdowns are the root cause of the majority of marine SAR cases 
in the Halifax SRR.
277 _ —Power-driven pleasure craft account for 53 percent of all SAR cases in the Victoria SRR. 
See Appendix R for the breakdown by user group.
304
Human Error 
9%
Mechanical
67%
Weather
7%
Unknown
17%
Figure 8-17. SAR Incidents by Root Cause -  Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
Most marine SAR activity is concentrated in the Nova Scotia area of the 
SRR, and since marine cases comprise the majority of total incidents, Nova 
Scotia records the majority of total incidents. Table 8-1 shows that Nova Scotia 
and Prince Edward Island dominate the marine cases while Quebec is the 
leader in air incidents. Nova Scotia and Newfoundland record the greatest 
number humanitarian incidents, most of which require aerial medical 
evacuations in NL.
TABLE 8 -  1
DISTRIBUTION OF SAR CASES -  HALIFAX SRR 2002
Province Marine Air Humanitarian Other
QC 7 38 10 11
NL 54 23 27 17
NS 707 40 28 44
NB 0 11 3 12
PEI 529 4 10 20
Offshore 93 10 2 4
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
The summer months of July and August generate the largest number of 
SAR incidents. This is to be expected, given the larger number of people 
participating in recreational activities such as pleasure boating, kayaking, sail 
boarding, and private aircraft operation. Figure 8-18 shows that January, 
February and March of 2002 recorded the fewest incidents largely due to the 
severe winter weather that normally reduces marine activity levels. Indeed, the
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SAR incidents that occur during the winter months tend to be serious ones 
because of the bad weather in which both the distressed vessel and responder 
find themselves. Figures 8-18 depicts the monthly SAR caseload and Appendix 
R shows the same for a four-year period from 2002 to 2005. This monthly 
pattern is a known phenomenon and seldom changes significantly from year to 
year.
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Figure 8-18. Monthly SAR Cases in Halifax SRR -  2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
Table 8-2 lists the type of vessel that responded in support of SAR 
incidents in the Halifax SRR. The table and Figure 8-19 below it clearly show 
that Canadian Coast Guard assets responded to the majority of incidents in 
2002.278 The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary was the next most active 
organisation in terms of both SAR taskings and hours engaged in SAR 
activities. The 2002 statistics are consistent with data recorded for the years 
prior to and after 2002.
278 The two CCG Marine categories includes light station keepers, the Inshore Rescue Boat 
program, and all vessels belonging to DFO/CCG.
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TABLE 8 - 2
MARINE RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002
Halifax SRR Marine Resources Taskings Hours
CCG Marine (SAR) 947 3,418
CCG Marine (non-SAR) 164 855
CCG Auxiliary 146 397
Federal Vessel (Other) 1 1
Provincial Vessel 1 1
Police Vessel 10 9
Commercial Vessel 16 266
Fishing Vessel 90 278
Other 163 446
Pleasure Craft (Private) 9 24
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002
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Figure 8-19. Marine Responders in SAR Cases - Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
Table 8-2 and Figure 8-19 were compiled from records obtained from 
the Canadian Coast Guard national headquarters, and reflect the SAR 
incidents as reported by JRCC Halifax staff. There is one statistic in Table 8-2 
that implies that only one federal vessel other than those of the CCG or CCG 
Auxiliary was tasked for SAR support, and it was on task only for one hour in 
the entire year. This statistic was considered suspect. Accordingly, the 2002 
Halifax JRCC daily SAR message summaries were retrieved from the National 
Library and Archives office and a review of the 365 daily summaries revealed 
that naval vessels were tasked to respond to several SAR incidents in 2002. 
This naval support to SAR is reflected in Table 8-3. These revised statistics
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would increase in Figure 8-19 the percentage that naval vessels responded to 
SAR incidents from zero percent to one percent based on hours on task. The 
whole number figure of total number of taskings would be unchanged. 
Although these figures are more accurate, they do not alter the weight of the 
relative participation of Canadian naval vessels in SAR incidents in the Atlantic.
TABLE 8 - 3  
NAVAL RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002
Date Warship Type Nature of Response Hours
27-May-02 Toronto FFH Medical evacuation from fishing vessel 25.3
25-Jun-02 Kingston MCDV Tow of pleasure craft 1.8
25-Jun-02 Summerside MCDV Tow of pleasure craft 1.8
28-Sep-02 Moncton MCDV Search for overdue fishing vessel 4.8
29-Oct-02 Toronto FFH Investigate "ball of fire" on water 1.1
8-Dec-02 Halifax FFH Assist disabled fishing vessel 16.0
Total 50.8
Source: Halifax JRCC Daily SAR Summary Message Logs for 2002.
The anomaly in statistics was brought to the attention of the Officer-in- 
Charge of JRCC Halifax. He explained that the method of recording is neither 
consistent among JRCC staff in Halifax, nor among rescue co-ordination 
centres across the country. This is a long-standing problem that requires the 
Coast Guard and DND to agree to a common set of standards for interpretation 
of incidents to be employed nation-wide.279
As it can be seen in the table, naval vessels played a very minor role in 
SAR response in 2002. However, naval ships frequently respond to SAR 
incidents even though they are not specifically tasked by the JRCC for a 
particular case. Usually, this entails a warship suspending whatever activity it 
is undertaking at the time, and altering course and closing the SAR scene at 
best speed. Normally a tasked SAR aircraft will arrive at the scene long before 
the warship; as such, the warship will return to its previous activities, and the 
diversion will not be recorded by the JRCC as a statistic for tasking or hours.
279 Major John Van Oosten, QIC JRCC Halifax, interview by author, 7 December 2007.
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The 2002 statistics for warship responses to SAR incidents are slightly 
higher in the Pacific than in the Atlantic. In the Victoria SRR, naval vessels 
were tasked with 33 incidents and participated for 48 hours in SAR events as 
compared to six taskings for 50.8 hour in the Atlantic. However, in terms of the 
overall percentages, naval vessels on both coasts made up less than one 
percent of the SAR taskings.280
Table 8-4 lists by category the type of air asset that responded in 
support of SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR. Primary SAR air units provided 
response to the majority of incidents, garnering support from other secondary 
aircraft from time to time. CH-124 Sea King helicopters from Shearwater, NS 
and CP-140 Aurora maritime patrol aircraft based at Greenwood, NS provided 
SAR contribution when primary SAR aircraft were unavailable.
Table 8-4 and Figure 8-20 below it clearly show that in 2002 Canadian 
Forces aircraft responded to the majority of SAR incidents in the Halifax SRR. 
The Civil Air SAR Association (CASARA) was the second largest contributor 
with respect to hours flown. The 2002 statistics are consistent with data 
recorded for the years prior to and after 2002.
TABLE 8 - 4
AIRCRAFT RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002
Halifax SRR Air Resources Taskings Hours
Canadian Forces (SAR) 281 933
Canadian Forces (non-SAR) 36 101
CASARA 14 23
Chartered Aircraft 21 3
Commercial Aircraft 2 9
Federal Aircraft 2 3
United States Coast Guard (Air) 1 1
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002
280 In the Halifax SRR, naval vessels were tasked 6 times out of 1553 taskings (0.04 percent) 
and in the Victoria SRR naval vessels were tasked 33 times out of 3726 taskings (0.9 percent).
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Figure 8-20. Aircraft Responders in SAR Cases -  Halifax SRR 2002
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
The spatial distribution of SAR incidents throughout the region, as well 
as the operational responses recorded for the year 2002, lead to the conclusion 
that SAR resources are geographically positioned appropriately to respond to 
public need. Indeed, if Figure 8-2 is overlaid onto Figure 8-3, it is apparent that 
CCG lifeboats are stationed to provide full coverage of the coastline. The 
exception is the northeast coast of Newfoundland, but two large CCG cutters 
cover this area.
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Figure 8-21. SAR Asset Location in Relation to SAR Incidents - 2002
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The preceding material has shown that the Navy plays an important role 
in search and rescue in the region. The Armed Forces assign aircraft and ships 
to respond to SAR incidents; military aircraft are used in almost 90 percent of 
search and rescue operations, whereas naval vessels respond to less than one 
percent. However, the Navy’s key contribution to search and rescue is through 
the provision of the leadership, infrastructure, and joint (CCG) command and 
control apparatus to respond effectively to all SAR events.
8.3 Contribution to Fisheries Enforcement
The first half of this chapter has concentrated on the significant effort 
that the Department of National Defence expends in providing oversight, co­
ordination, and resources to search and rescue in Canada. The remaining 
pages of the chapter will focus on the Navy’s other main contribution to 
maritime enforcement.
The objective of this part of the study is to examine the naval 
contribution to fisheries enforcement through spatial analysis and determination 
of level of effort of naval fisheries in Chapter Seven, the research will look at 
three aspects of enforcement support in Canada’s maritime zones and 
approaches. These are the patterns of naval vessel presence and level of 
effort in enforcement support, the patterns and level of effort in the inspection of 
fishing vessels, and the relative contribution of naval vessels to the inspection 
effort.
This aspect of the analysis spans over two decades. In order to conduct 
an inquiry that covers such a lengthy timeframe, two periods were examined. 
The first period was from 1980 to 1997, and drew heavily on archival data 
extracted from naval ships’ logs. From this data individual tracks of warships 
on fisheries patrols were reconstructed and primary data on inspections of 
vessels, SAR responses, and helicopter operations during naval fisheries 
patrols were gathered. The second period was 1999 to 2003. This period 
reflected recent fisheries patrols and allowed me to acquire a greater variety of 
data for analysis than would have been recorded in the ships’ logs only.
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The data from these two periods allowed maps to be created that 
depicted the individual tracks of naval ships over a 23-year period, as well as 
showed the cumulative tracks of naval ships during the periods 1980 to 1996 
and 1999 to 2002. From these maps the patterns indicated the relative 
enforcement presence of naval vessels on fisheries support operations.
In order to show the locations of inspections conducted by both DND 
and DFO vessels over an extended period, a data “pull” from the Canadian 
Fisheries Information Network System (CFINS) was achieved for the years 
1990 to 2002, This allowed an analysis of cumulative inspections over a 12- 
year period and facilitated the analysis of the spatial relationship between the 
fisheries inspections and the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, as 
well as the relationship between inspections and the bases for patrol aircraft 
and ships.
8.3.1 Enforcement Contribution to Maritime Domain Awareness
There is a symbiotic relationship between maritime surveillance for 
fisheries enforcement and that conducted for overall maritime domain 
awareness. The Navy’s significant aerial surveillance contribution and provision 
of the architecture to support whole of government MDA was discussed at 
length in Chapter Seven, and will be given no further treatment. Naval vessels 
at sea also feed information about marine traffic encountered to the Maritime 
Operations Centre, and thereby advance the recognised maritime picture. 
Thus, any naval vessel at sea in support of fisheries enforcement contributes to 
maritime domain awareness, but that contribution was not examined in this 
project because of the likelihood that any marine traffic detected by naval 
vessels would have already been reported by the aerial surveillance effort.
8.3.2 Naval Fisheries Patrols
In addition to the surveillance and maritime domain awareness aspects, 
there is another component of support to fisheries enforcement that warrants a 
detailed examination. This element is the support to fisheries patrols, a 
longstanding and traditional commitment that the Canadian Navy has 
undertaken since its inception.
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8.3.2.1 Historical Context
In the examination of the naval contribution to maritime enforcement it is 
worthwhile to review, from a historical perspective, the relationship between the 
Navy and Fisheries and Oceans Canada, the lead federal department 
responsible for the management of Canada’s fisheries resources. Indeed, it 
was the need for fisheries protection from American interests in the waters of 
the Dominion of Canada that was a major driving factor in the creation in 1910 
of a home-grown naval service.281
The establishment of a Canadian marine fleet came about with the 
rejuvenation of the Fisheries Protection Service in 1885, and it continued to 
expand under the aegis of the Department of Marine and Fisheries, originally 
instituted in 1868. By 1904, this department had become the largest in the 
Canadian government, and operated eight armed cruisers and over two dozen 
other large vessels.282 Of note, when the Naval Service Act of 1910 officially 
established the Royal Canadian Navy, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries was 
appointed to a concomitant post as Canada's first Minister of Naval Services. 
Moreover, with the ratification of the Act, the new Navy assumed responsibility 
for fisheries enforcement, tidal survey and hydrography, although in the 
ensuing ninety-two years since, these responsibilities have vacillated among 
the Navy and various departments.283 The lengthy sequence of administrative 
changes among departments is listed at Table 8-5.
281 Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 
8 .
282 Nigel D. Brodeur, "L.P. Brodeur and the Origins of the Royal Canadian Navy" in The RCN in 
Retrospect, 1910-1968, ed. James A. Boutilier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1982), 15.
283 Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, The Ships of Canada's Marine Services (St. 
Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 15.
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TABLE 8 - 5
CHRONOLOGY OF CHANGES TO DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY
Date_________________________________ Event___________________________
1868 Department of Marine and Fisheries established.
1884 Marine and Fisheries split into separate Departments.
1892 Marine and Fisheries amalgamated. Assigned responsibility for
hydrography and tidal surveys.
1904 Canadian Hydrographic Survey established.
1910 Department of Naval Service established. Fisheries patrol, lifeboat
service, hydrography, tidal survey, and wireless telegraphy 
transferred to Royal Canadian Navy.
1920 Fisheries patrol and lifeboat service returned to Marine and
Fisheries.
1922 Hydrography, tidal survey, and wireless telegraphy returned to
Marine and Fisheries.
1927 Marine and Fisheries become separate branches.
1930 Marine and Fisheries split into separate Departments.
1936 Department of Transport is established. Takes over Department of
Marine fleet, except Hydrographic Service vessels that go to 
Department of Mines and Resources.
1939 Majority of fisheries patrol vessels taken over by the Navy for use as
patrol craft.
1946 Requisitioned vessels returned to original departments.
1962 Department of Transport's Canadian Marine Service fleet becomes
Canadian Coast Guard.
1971 Department of Environment takes over fisheries responsibilities. In
1976 renamed Department of Fisheries and the Environment.
1979 Department of Fisheries and the Environment splits into separate
Departments.
1995 Canadian Coast Guard subsumed by Department of Fisheries and
_________Oceans._____________________________________________________
Source: Charles D. Maginley and Bernard Collin, The Ships of Canada's
Marine Services (St. Catherines: Vanwell Publishing, 2001), 15, 119.
As articulated in Chapter Five, at present the level of naval support to 
DFO is formalized in a Memorandum of Understanding. Every year for the past 
few decades, the MOU is re-negotiated to plan the number of ship-days and 
flying-hours allocated to fisheries enforcement by DND. However, the actual 
execution of this MOU differs between the east and west coasts.
In the Atlantic, the Navy provides the agreed-upon number of sea days 
to DFO for either frigates or the smaller maritime coastal defence vessels 
(MCDV) in which Conservation and Protection officers embark for enforcement 
duties that constitute dedicated fisheries patrols. In the Pacific, an alternate 
arrangement exists. The waters of Canada's West Coast are divided into three 
zones for the administration of search and rescue. The Canadian Coast Guard
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maintains a vessel as SAR standby in each of those zones. Rather than 
provide ships for fisheries patrols, Maritime Forces Pacific fulfils its traditional 
obligation of thirty sea days to DFO by scheduling coverage by an MCDV of the 
three SAR zones at mutually-agreeable times with the Coast Guard. This 
permits the Coast Guard to re-task some of their ships during that period, 
providing that department with better flexibility for other maritime tasks.284
8.3.2.2 Level of Effort in Support of Fisheries Enforcement
Over the past decade on the Atlantic coast, Canadian naval vessels 
spent between 1500 to 2500 days at sea per year, many of them on overseas 
deployments, but the majority of them within the Exclusive Economic Zone. 
While many of the sea days were devoted to training and exercises, they 
provided many “eyes on the water” and constituted a distinct federal presence 
in Canada’s maritime approaches. In recent years, the trend for naval vessel 
days at sea has been a decreasing one due to a reduction in the size of the 
naval fleet, and annual budgetary constraints. Table 8-6 shows the downward 
trend in naval sea days in general.
TABLE 8 - 6
NAVAL VESSEL TOTAL DAYS AT SEA - ATLANTIC
Vessel Type 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Destroyer 659 512 367 284 157 254 166 178 115 205 128
Frigate 794 827 753 718 718 552 620 839 824 636 735
Submarine 264 275 242 228 169 85 58 25 0 88 76
Minor Warship 664 531 562 521 741 592 611 600 608 634 607
Other types 133 110 118 103 100 57 117 168 90 16 0
Totals 2514 2255 2042 1854 1885 1540 1572 1810 1637 1579 1546
Source: Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff, 2004.
Note: Destroyer totals include Annapolis-class and Improved Restigouche-c\ass destroyers prior 
to 1999. Minor warship totals include Kingston-class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV) 
and, prior to the year 2000, HMC Ships Anticosti, Cormorant, and Moresby, as well as Gate 
vessels used for naval reserve training.
Table 8-7 shows the annual number of sea days allocated to DFO 
support. These totals are based on the MOU targets of 125 sea days and 
between 500 to 720 aircraft hours. Note the reduction of fishery patrol days by
284 Captain(N) Richard Harrison, Plans and Operations Officer - MARPAC, interview by author,
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major warships in 2002 and 2003, the years that Canadian major warships 
were deployed to the Arabian Sea on Operation APOLLO. Notwithstanding this 
requirement for expeditionary operations, from 1990 to 2004 the Navy delivered 
99 percent of planned ship days to DFO; the Armed Forces provided DFO with 
seven percent more aircraft hours than the MOU required.
TABLE 8 - 7
DND FISHERIES PATROL ASSET ALLOCATION - ATLANTIC
Fiscal
Year
A
Ship Days 
(Planned)
B
Ship Days 
(Actual)
C
Aircraft Hours 
(Planned)
D
Aircraft Hours 
(Actual)
1990 65 78 420 406
1991 65 83 420 691
1992 125 138 720 806
1993 125 145 720 733
1994 125 115 700 822
1995 125 141 700 745
1996 125 150 700 731
1997 125 124 700 630
1998 125 108 700 733
1999 125 121 539 549
2000 125 125 539 540
2001 125 101 539 539
2002 125 97 400 398
2003 125 99 400 403
2004 125 110 539 539
Totals 1755 1735 8736 9265
Sources: Column A - Canada. Department of National Defence. 1990- 
91 Estimates, Part III: Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1990. Followed by
each annual report thereafter. Column B - Annual totals kept by 
Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff for all ship classes. 
Columns C and D - Annual totals kept by Maritime Air Component 
(Atlantic) Operations staff for Aurora maritime patrol aircraft.
Note: In Column A, from 1994 to 1997, HMCS Cormorant and her 
submersibles supported fisheries research for DFO.
The distribution of sea days between major and minor warships in 
support of DFO varies year to year depending upon the demand for major 
warships in defence tasks. The breakdown in the number of days allocated is 
shown at Figure 8-22. Note the increased percentage of minor warship days in 
support of DFO in the post-911 timeframe, when the Canadian Navy directed 
its major warships into the Persian Gulf.
13 March 2001.
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Figure 8-22. Naval Fisheries Patrol Sea Days - Atlantic
Source: Maritime Forces Atlantic Sea Operations staff, 2005.
8.3.2.3 Spatial Aspect of Fisheries Patrol Effort
The next few paragraphs will examine the spatial context of the naval 
support to fisheries enforcement in the Atlantic region. The first element will be 
a discussion of the patterns of typical patrols for minor and major warships. 
This will be followed by an analysis of the presence of these patrol vessels for 
fisheries enforcement.
8.3.2.3.1 Typical Warship Fisheries Patrol
In the Atlantic region, most fisheries patrols are of two weeks duration.285 
In the case of frigate fisheries patrols, the DFO Conservation and Protection 
officers embark aboard the warship in Halifax, and sail directly for DFO’s 
designated area of interest on the Grand Banks. Typically, the frigate patrols a 
specific area of the Grand Banks, then proceeds to St. John’s to allow the 
Conservation and Protection officers to return to home port for the weekend. 
The ship normally sails early Monday morning, and either returns to the area 
previously patrolled, or a new area of interest designated by the Conservation 
and Protection officers. Figure 8-23 is the track of a typical frigate fisheries 
patrol that took place in May 2000. HMCS Toronto sailed from Halifax, passed 
north of Sable Island, and proceeded directly to the Tail of the Grand Banks.
285 Table J-3 at Appendix J contains the length of days for each patrol studied for this project.
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After inspecting several fishing vessels on the Tail, the ship steamed for St. 
John’s for the weekend. On departure from port, Toronto went directly to the 
Flemish Cap, and then patrolled the Nose of the Grand Banks, working its way 
towards the Tail again. At patrol’s end, the ship proceeded directly to Halifax 
where the Conservation and Protection officers disembarked. Of note, the 
Conservation and Protection officers were from the DFO Newfoundland region, 
and expressed no interest in any fishing vessel once Toronto was inside the 
DFO Maritime region administrative jurisdiction, notwithstanding the presence 
of several fishing vessels that could have been inspected.
Figure 8-23. Typical Frigate Fisheries Patrol -  1999 to 2002
Sources: Derived from data collected on 16 frigate fisheries patrols.
The 15 nautical mile buffer shown in Figure 8-23 depicts the average 
range at which a small fishing vessel will be detected by a frigate’s navigation 
radar. The 15 nautical mile figure is based on records kept by 16 frigates that 
conducted fisheries patrols during the period 1999 to 2002. Interestingly, the 
data show that ships tended to overestimate their ability to detect fishing 
vessels by as much as an additional 15 nautical miles. The 15-mile figure also 
reflects all atmospheric conditions and technical states of radar; in many cases 
fishing vessels were detected at 20 to 30 nautical miles.
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Figure 8-24 depicts a typical MCDV fisheries patrol. Normally the vessel 
departs Halifax and proceeds to a small port in Newfoundland where the 
Conservation and Protection officers are embarked. The minor warships then 
conduct a patrol of the inshore fishery. From time to time, MCDVs are tasked 
for patrols on the Grand Banks, but they are not as well suited for the offshore 
patrols due to lesser ability for sea keeping, and they do not have the speed 
advantage that the frigates possess. In addition, DFO Conservation and 
Protection officers prefer frigates for the offshore for reasons of connectivity 
with shore authorities and personal comfort.
Figure 8-24. Typical MCDV Fisheries Patrol -  1999 to 2002
Sources: Derived from data collected on 9 MCDV fisheries patrols.
The 10 nautical mile buffer in Figure 8-24 reflects the average detection 
range of an MCDV’s navigation radar against a small inshore fishing vessel. It 
is based on data collected during nine MCDV fisheries patrols during the period 
1999 to 2002. The 10-mile figure also reflects all atmospheric conditions and 
technical states of the MCDV’s radar; in many cases fishing vessels were 
detected at much greater ranges than 10 nautical miles.
8.3.2.3.2 Naval Fisheries Patrol Patterns
Historically, the Navy has focussed its fisheries patrol effort on the 
Grand Banks of Newfoundland, although periodically patrols are conducted
319
along the Hague Line on Georges Bank. Figure 8-25 is a reconstruction of the 
raw tracks of all classes of naval vessels that conducted 119 fisheries patrols 
between 1980 to 2003. Clear patterns emerge in Figure 8-25; there is obvious 
attention paid to the Tail of the Grand Banks, as well as to some parts of the 
Nose and the Flemish Cap. The departure and return transits from and to 
Halifax appear as well worn paths passing to the north and south of Sable 
Island, and there appears to be a focus on St. John’s as well. Figure 8-25 also 
shows individual ship tracks straying from the main concentration of tracks; 
these are fisheries patrols that were interrupted by search and rescue events 
that required the ships to leave their normal patrol sectors.
While Figure 8-25 provides a graphic illustration of the basic pattern, it 
suffers from the same shortcomings as did the point plots of surveillance effort 
and SAR point plots earlier. Note that the area on the Tail is almost black with 
lines and it is impossible to tell how many tracks have contributed to that 
concentration. To better appreciate the patrol presence, Figures 8-26 and 8-27 
are presented as surface models. Each covers a different period that is based 
on the source from which the patrols were reconstructed.
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Figure 8-25. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to 2003
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada and shipboard data (119 
tracks).
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Figure 8-26, covering the years from 1980 to 1997, shows a 
concentration of patrol effort on the Tail of the Grand Banks, with increased 
presence on the routes to and from Halifax and St. John’s. The focus on the 
Tail was due in large measure to the plethora of foreign vessels attracted to this 
particularly abundant fishing ground, and then later in the 1990s to the 
requirement to enforce the moratorium imposed on the Tail as a result of 
plummeting groundfish stocks.
Figure 8-26 was drawn from data recorded by 87 warships that 
conducted fishery patrols during the period from 1980 to 1997. Geographic 
positions of the warships were extracted manually from the ships’ logs. These 
co-ordinates were imported into the ArcView 3.2 geographic information system 
software, and the Spatial Analyst module was used to measure the relative 
densities of the positions of the warship tracks, and a choropleth map was 
rendered that depicted track density in five orders of magnitude. The shades 
on this map represent the amount of enforcement presence by naval vessels 
over a 17-year period.
s
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Figure 8-26. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1980 to1997
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (87 tracks).
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Figure 8-27. Naval Ships on Fisheries Patrol: 1999 to 2003
Source: Ship track logs (33 tracks).
Figure 8-27 map was drawn from data recorded by 33 warships that 
conducted fishery patrols in support of the Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
during the period from 1999 to 2002. Geographic positions of the warships 
were recorded at sea once per hour into electronic logs in MS Access and then 
processed by the ArcView software in the same manner. The shades on this 
map represent the amount of enforcement presence by naval vessels over a 
15-month period. Figure 8-27 captures the shift in concentration away from the 
Tail where, by 1999, there was only a small total allowable catch allocated by 
the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization. The shift was towards the Flemish 
Cap where other species such as shrimp and crab were and still are 
commercially viable.
8.3.2.3.3 Hague Line Fisheries Patrols
There are many anecdotes that suggest that the Canadian Navy 
maintained a considerable presence along the international maritime boundary 
to the southwest of Nova Scotia. Surprisingly, from official records there were 
very few naval fisheries patrols that deployed from Halifax and proceeded 
along the Hague Line that delimits George’s Bank. Figure 8-28 contains all of 
the naval fisheries patrols that spent a segment of patrol time in the vicinity of
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Georges Bank, to which I was able to locate an official reference and which I 
was able to reconstruct. There are a few tracks along the south coast of 
Newfoundland that represent minor warships that undertook patrols in the 
inshore fishery. As well, there are one or two patrols that went along the 
southwest coast of Newfoundland, noting one that passed north and then west 
of Anticosti Island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. Figure 8-28, in conjunction with 
earlier figures, demonstrates clearly that the concentration of enforcement 
effort by the Navy has been on the Grand Banks, in particular the Tail.
Figure 8-28. Hague Line Fisheries Patrols: 1980 to 1997
Source: National Archives of Canada (7 tracks).
8.3.2.3.4 Naval Enforcement Presence
The analysis of the reconstructed tracks shows that over twenty years 
there was little or no naval enforcement presence that was not in a direct path 
from Halifax to the Tail of the Grand Banks, or from St. John’s to the Nose or 
the Tail of the Grand Banks. There was no naval enforcement presence in the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence, and limited presence to the northeast of Newfoundland. 
As well, there was virtually no naval enforcement presence in the EEZ directly 
south of mainland Nova Scotia. However, that is not to say that naval vessels 
were not present at all. Far from it, in fact. As depicted in Figure 3-6, the main 
naval exercise and operations areas lie directly south of Halifax and are used 
extensively by naval vessels and aircraft. So while there may have been few
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warships on fisheries support operations in this area, there was a strong naval 
presence in this section of the Canadian EEZ.
8.3.2.4 Boardings / Inspections
Fisheries and Oceans Canada undertakes several measures to control 
and regulate fishing activity in the Canadian maritime zones. To ensure 
compliance, DFO’s key tools are its aerial surveillance, dockside monitoring, at- 
sea observers, and at-sea inspection programs.
The relevant aspects of the aerial surveillance were discussed in the 
previous chapter. In the case of dockside monitoring, Conservation and 
Protection officer carry out random and directed dockside inspections to 
confirm that all licences are correct, and that catches being unloaded comply 
with extant regulations. The at-sea observers embark aboard fishing vessels to 
monitor fishing practices, and to educate vessel crews on the regulations for 
sustainable fishing. The Canadian Navy has no connection with the dockside 
monitoring or at-sea observer programs.
The at-sea inspection program is the link between DFO and the Navy. It 
is through this program that the patrol and response capabilities of the Navy 
are brought to bear for fisheries enforcement. DFO uses naval vessels as 
platforms from which its Conservation and Protection officers can mount 
boardings and inspections of a wide range of fishing vessels.286
Table 8-8 contains the total number of at sea fisheries inspections that 
were carried out by Conservation and Protection officers in the 
Maritimes/Scotia-Fundy and Newfoundland regions by all government agencies 
during the period 1990 to 2002. The CFINS extract obtained through DFO 
records 7,193 inspections during that period.
286 The Navy uses the term “boardings” whereas DFO employs the term “inspections”
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TABLE 8-8
FISHING VESSEL INSPECTIONS BY DEPARTMENT -  1990 TO 2002
Platform 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
DFO NF Ships 347 546 464 396 461 280 341 249 309 254 127 240 204
DFO SF Ships 204 470 274 487 327 356 214 - - - - - -
DND Ships 10 62 23 58 29 64 53 57 25 60 53 68 18
Charter Service - 17 36 -
RCMP Ships - - 2 -
NAFO Patrol 4 - - - - - . _ 1 - . -
Other - - 1 2
Total 565 1095 798 943 817 700 608 306 334 315 180 310 222
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
Notes: In the table above, Newfoundland Region is abbreviated to NF, Scotia-Fundy is abbreviated 
to SF. The vessel engaged in DFO Charter Service was the Casaco. The RCMP vessel that 
conducted the inspections was the Simmonds. The NAFO patrol vessel Commandante Blaison 
conducted 4 of the 5 inspections; the Commander Amalie conducted the fifth.
Of the total number, Conservation and Protection officers conducted 
3,883 at-sea inspections under Canadian jurisdiction (54 percent), another 
2,264 under NAFO jurisdiction (31 percent), and the records did not indicate 
the authority under which the remaining 996 were carried out. Table 8-9 shows 
the breakdown by country of registration of fishing vessels subjected to the 
inspections. Over the 12-year period examined, the country of registration of 
most likely to be inspected by Canadian authorities in the study is Canada (50 
percent).
TABLE 8-9
FISHING VESSEL INSPECTIONS BY NATIONALITY -  1990 TO 2002
Country Number Country Number Country Number
Canada 3,568 Latvia 64 Belize 13
Spain 1,552 U.S.S.R. 45 Poland 5
Portugal 567 United States 44 Vanuatu 5
Russia 279 SIL 43 Caymans 2
Faroes 167 Panama 41 Italy 2
Estonia 151 Greece 26 New Zealand 2
Norway 148 Honduras 23 Antigua 1
Cuba 115 France 21 Morocco 1
Lithuania 93 Korea 20 Ireland 1
Iceland 92 Germany 19 Unknown 4
Japan 79 Total 7,193
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
Over the past several years DFO has begun to rely increasingly on the 
Navy for support, notably since DFO reduced its offshore enforcement fleet.
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Figure 8-29 shows the number inspections carried out each year by 
Conservation and Protection officers using naval vessels as the transport 
medium. Of the 7,193 inspections carried out during this period, Canadian 
naval vessels were used in 580 at-sea inspections (8 percent). Of the 580 in 
total, major warships were used in 364 inspections (63 percent), minor 
warships took part in 184 inspections (32 percent), and naval auxiliary vessels 
were employed for 32 inspections (5 percent).
Figure 8-30 depicts the slight upward trend in the overall percentage of 
inspections that are carried out by naval vessels. While the number of 
inspections carried by DFO officers embarked aboard naval vessels remains 
relatively constant, the overall percentage of inspections instigated by fisheries 
officers embarked in naval vessels is increasing. Fisheries and Oceans 
Canada is facing a major challenge in dealing with the “rust out” of the 
DFO/CCG fleet and acquiring replacement vessels, so it is reasonable to 
expect that Fisheries and Oceans Canada will continue to rely heavily on naval 
vessels to support its inspection goals.
Table 8-10 shows the number of inspections attributed to each warship 
during the 1990 to 2002 timeframe. With the exception of HMCS Anticosti, all 
of the naval vessels that carried out 30 or more boardings were major 
warships, i.e., frigates or destroyers. Regrettably, the DFO statistics for 2003 
onwards were unavailable; they would show an increased percentage of 
boardings carried out by minor war vessels as the larger combatants deployed 
abroad to the Persian Gulf.
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Figure 8-29. Boardings by Fisheries Officers aboard Naval Ships -1990 to 2002
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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Figure 8-30. Navy’s Percentage of Total DFO Boardings for Nfld Region
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
327
TABLE 8 - 1 0
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL BOARDINGS BY SHIP -  1990 TO 2002
Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Anticosti - - 1 1 1 6 3  4 1 6
Athabaskan - ..........................................................................................................5 - -
Chartottetown - - _ - . _ - . 1 5 5 - - .
Cormorant 7 1 0  - - - 8 ............................................................................
Fredericton - ........................................................................ 2 - 9 - - 7
Gatineau - 5 - 13 13 20 ...................................................................
Glace Bay - ............................................................... 22 - - 1 - 2
Goose Bay - ......................................................................................................... 13 1 0 -
Halifax - . . . .  12 - - 2 - - - 3
Kingston  6 2 8 - - 2
Margaree - 3 . . . ...............................................................................
Moncton - ...............................................................................................2 1 - -
Montr6al - .........................................................................6 - 1 5 8 9 -
Moresby - - - 7 - 9 4 .........................................................
Nipigon - 6 1 0 5  - 1 2 ...........................................................................
Ottawa - 9 .................................................................................................................
Riverton - 3 8 .....................................................................................................
Skeena - 5 5 22 ...........................................................................................
St. Charles - 2 1 ................................................................................................................
St. John's - ..............................................................................................11 4
Summerside - ...........................................................................................................25 4
Terra Nova 3 - - - - - 15 1 4 ..............................................
Toronto - - - - - 30 - - - 18 -
Ville de Quebec - - - - - - - 6 - 1 0 3  24 -
Totals____________10 62 23 58 29 64 53 57 25 60 53 68 18
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
8.3.2.4.1 Spatial Aspect of Inspections I Boardings
Figure 8-31 maps the locations of all government inspections of fishing 
vessels at sea that took place in the Maritimes (Scotia-Fundy) and 
Newfoundland DFO administrative regions over the 12-year period. The map 
clearly demonstrates that the heaviest concentration of inspections took place 
on the Flemish Cap and on the Nose of the Grand Banks, with some 
concentration on the Tail. DFO enforcement effort also was undertaken to the 
southwest of Nova Scotia. These inspections correspond to the lobster fishery 
discussed earlier. The concentration of boardings to the east and southeast of 
Newfoundland correspond to the ground fish, shrimp and crab fisheries beyond 
the EEZ. There are some inspections that take place in the inshore fishery off 
of eastern Newfoundland, but the number of these is not of the same 
magnitude as those inspections that are undertaken beyond the EEZ. Figures
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8-33 and 8-34 are surface models of the same data, and depict the same 
concentrations.
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Figure 8-31. Cumulative Boardings by Government Vessels -  1990 to 2002
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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Figure 8-32. Cumulative Boardings by Naval Vessels -  1990 to 2002
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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Figure 8-32 shows concentration of inspections that were undertaken 
from naval vessels only. In comparing Figures 8-31 and 8-32, there are 
differences in the number and location of inspections. Naval vessels 
conducted virtually no boardings during the 12-year period in the Gulf of St. 
Lawrence, nor on George’s Bank. All of the inspection effort was expended on 
the Grand Banks with a lesser effort to the south of the Burin Peninsula, and to 
the east of Saint-Pierre et Miquelon. Specifically, the main concentration of 
inspections by naval vessels has been on the Tail of the Grand Banks and the 
western part of the Nose, with some effort on the Flemish Cap. These maps 
confirm that the southwest area of the Canadian EEZ is being enforced almost 
exclusively by Fisheries and Oceans Canada. The figures also show that the 
thrust of the Navy’s support to enforcement is directed at the NAFO fishery 
beyond the 200 nautical mile limit, rather than the national fishery inside the 
EEZ.
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Figure 8-33. Boardings by Government Vessels -  1990 to 2002
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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Figure 8-34. Boardings by Naval Vessels -  1990 to 2002
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
8.3.2.4.2 Proximity Analysis of Boardings
Two proximity analyses were conducted with the objective of 
determining whether there was a correlation between where fishing vessels are 
boarded and inspected, and their proximity to the bases of government patrol 
assets, as well as the major maritime political boundary that defines the outer 
Canadian maritime zone. A proximity analysis was performed on the inspection 
data sets using the Nearest Feature Extension of ArcGIS. This tool was used to 
calculate the distance in kilometres from each fisheries inspection to DND and 
DFO airfields and vessel home ports. A similar proximity analysis was 
performed using the Nearest Feature Function that calculated the distance from 
each fisheries inspection to the Canadian EEZ, both inside and outside the line 
of demarcation.
8.3.2.4.2.1 Distances from Patrol Bases to Boardings
On land, few people become victims of armed robberies on the steps of 
the village police station. The likelihood of being robbed increases with distance 
from the base of the local constabulary. Can the same be said in a maritime 
context? The proximity analysis tested the supposition that the probability of a 
boarding / inspection increases the farther that a fishing vessel is from the
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home airfield or homeport of known government patrol assets.
Figure 8-35 shows the locations of the “police stations” from which 
surveillance aircraft and enforcement vessels would deploy for patrol activities. 
One military airfield is not shown; Goose Bay, Labrador lies just beyond the 
northern neatline of Figure 8-35, but is incorporated in the next map.
'Gander*
New x  
8 * U N S W C I
‘Sydney
S W ^S nea  rwater *  ^  HalifaxGi?
Dartmouth
90 W
ecrw so w
Figure 8-35. Locations of Patrol Asset Airfields and Home Ports
Figure 8-36 depicts the software’s calculation of the straight-line 
distance from the position of each inspection to the various bases of DND and 
DFO patrol assets. Inspections carried out by all federal departments were 
included in this calculation. A total of 2,972 inspections were used in this 
analysis that covered the period 1995 to 2002.
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Figure 8-36. Distances from Inspections to Patrol Asset Bases
Figures 8-37 through to 8-41 are graphs of the distances between the 
2,972 at-sea inspections and the various airfields and home ports of DND, DFO 
and CCG patrol assets. Visual inspection of the results show that in all cases, 
there is no consistent trend for increased likelihood of inspection by 
enforcement authorities the farther away one fishes from a patrol base. The 
exception, one could argue, is the airfield in Goose Bay, Labrador at Figure 8- 
40. However, the number of inspections is more or less the same from Goose 
Bay until roughly 650 nautical miles, and then there is an exponential increase.
By contrast, all of the graphs are punctuated by spikes that correspond 
to the distances from patrol bases to the inner and outer limits of the Tail of the 
Grand Banks, and the inner and outer dimensions of the Flemish Cap.
The distances from inspections to the PAL facility at the Halifax 
International Airport and the naval base in Halifax Harbour are portrayed in 
Figure 8-37. The two graphs are similar because the distance to from the sea 
bases to the airport is only 17 nautical miles. In Figure 8-37, the first spike at 
approximately 200 nautical miles corresponds to the distance to the Hague 
Line scallop fishery on Georges Bank and the lobster fishery off southwest
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Nova Scotia. The next spike occurs at 550 to 600 nautical miles, the distance 
from Halifax to the Tail of the Grand Banks, and also the same distance to the 
inshore fishery off of the northeast coast of Newfoundland. The large number of 
inspections occurring 780 to 880 miles from Halifax corresponds to the inner 
and outer reaches of the Flemish Cap.
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Figure 8-37. Distance from Inspections to Halifax Patrol Bases
Figure 8-38 contains the graphs of distances from the Coast Guard base 
in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, and from the military airfield in Gander, NL. The 
Dartmouth graph appears identical to the Halifax graphs in Figure 8-37 
because the Coast Guard base and the naval dockyard are within two miles of 
each other in Halifax harbour. As such, my observations on Figure 8-37 are 
applicable to the Dartmouth graph. With respect to the Gander graph, the 
inshore fishery to the northeast of Newfoundland is reflected by the frequency 
of inspections between 50 to 200 nautical miles. The large concentration 50 to 
75 miles either side of the 400 nautical mile mark reflects the inspections 
carried out on both the Flemish Cap and the Tail of the Grand Banks. The 
spike at 650 miles from Gander is the fishery on Georges Bank.
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Figure 8-38. Distance from Inspections to Dartmouth and Gander Patrol Bases
Figure 8-39 depicts the distances from sites in Nova Scotia: the military 
air base in Shearwater, and the Coast Guard ship base in Sydney. Shearwater 
is only 4 nautical miles from the bases in Dartmouth and Halifax, ergo the 
resemblance to these two. Thus, Shearwater graph will be affected by the 
same influences. The Sydney results are interesting. What the graph shows is 
the concentration of inspections that start on the Tail at approximate 350 
nautical miles and continue through to about 475 miles, then at 520 nautical 
miles the inner part of the Flemish Cap becomes apparent right out to 750 
miles. The spike at 360 miles is the where the concentration on Georges Bank 
and southwest Nova Scotia coincide with the large concentration of inspections 
on the Tail.
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Figure 8-39. Distance from Inspections to Shearwater and Sydney Patrol Bases
Figure 8-40 contains the graphs of distances from the military air bases 
in Goose Bay, NL and Greenwood, Nova Scotia. The Goose Bay graph is 
interesting because the Georges Bank, and the inner and outer reaches of the 
Tail and Flemish Cap are all roughly the same distance from the military 
airfield. That is the cause of the concentration on the graph at 680 to 780 
nautical miles. The spike at approximately 750 miles occurs because it is at 
that distance that the concentration of inspections along the EEZ on the Tail 
coincide with heavy enforcement activity on the inner part of the Flemish Cap.
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Figure 8-40. Distance from Inspections to Goose Bay and Greenwood Patrol Bases
The distances from inspections to the PAL facility at the St. John’s 
Airport and the Coast Guard base in St. John’s Harbour are portrayed in Figure 
8-41. The two facilities are only 3.5 nautical miles apart, so the graphs should 
appear almost identical as was the case with Halifax. From St. John’s the 
inner edge of the Tail is approximately 220 nautical miles and concentration of 
inspections on the Flemish Cap is roughly the same distance. This coincidence 
explains the large number of boardings that appear on the graph from 240 to 
350 nautical miles. The spike at 700 miles corresponds to the distance from St. 
John’s to Georges Bank.
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Figure 8-41. Distance from Inspections to St. John’s Patrol Bases
The shortcomings of this type of proximity analysis must be borne in 
mind when analysing these results. In the case of airfields, straight line 
distances would have included some portion over land, meaning that an at-sea 
inspection would not have been possible for this segment of the line. However, 
had the overland segments been subtracted from the overall distances, the 
result would have been the same. The graphs would not have portrayed a 
scaled increase in boardings over distance. This is because, as visual 
inspection of the maps at Figures 8-31 and 8-32 demonstrated earlier, at-sea 
boardings occur in well-defined clusters anchored around specific geographic 
features. There appears to be no correlation between the location of a patrol 
base and where Conservation and Protection officers choose to conduct 
inspections.
8.3.2.4.2.2 Distances from EEZ to Boardings
Since the 1977 declaration of Canada’s 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Fishing Zone that later became the Exclusive Economic Zone, distant water 
fleets have fished in close proximity of this maritime boundary on the Nose and
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the Tail of the Grand Banks. In the mid-1990s, a moratorium was placed on 
harvesting ground fish on these two geographic features. An exception to the 
moratorium permitted certain vessels a NAFO-set quota to fish particular 
species on the Nose and Tail outside of the Canadian EEZ, but Canada did not 
allow ground fish to be taken inside of the EEZ. Soon, foreign fishing vessels 
were taking ground fish right up to the EEZ, but could not legally cross that 
political boundary and continue to fish.
Fish do not respect political boundaries. A fishing vessel within ten 
nautical miles of the EEZ could easily cross to the other side of the maritime 
boundary, even with its trawls in the water, and be back into legal waters 
quickly. Fisheries and Oceans Canada stepped up monitoring and 
enforcement efforts on the Grand Banks, and were concerned that foreign 
fishing vessels were not respecting the Canadian EEZ. Some extraordinary 
measures were undertaken to patrol the EEZ, including the use of naval 
submarines to determine whether unscrupulous fishing boat captains were 
using the cover of darkness or fog and reduced visibility to slip across the line 
to fish illegally.287 This leads to the supposition that since the mid-1990s, DFO 
and naval patrol assets focussed greater effort on boarding fishing vessels to 
the area immediately adjacent to the Canadian EEZ.
The proximity analysis tested the supposition that there is a correlation 
between the location of an at-sea inspection and its distance from the EEZ. As 
in the previous section, this analysis used 2,972 inspections carried out by all 
federal departments between 1995 to 2002. Figure 8-42 is a map that depicts 
the GIS software’s calculation of the straight line distance from the geographic 
position of each inspection to the closest point along the Exclusive Economic 
Zone. Figures 8-43 through to 8-45 are graphs of the distribution of distances 
between the at-sea inspections and the EEZ.
287 In 1994,1 commanded the submarine HMCS Okanagan during fisheries patrol of the Grand 
Banks. See Laurence M. Hickey “The Submarine as a Tool of Maritime Enforcement,” 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management 1 (Spring 2000): 117-122.
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Figure 8-42. Distances from Boardings to Exclusive Economic Zone
Figure 8-43 shows the distribution of distances between inspections and 
the 200 nautical mile limit, both inside and beyond that maritime boundary. 
While it appears that the frequency of inspections increases towards the EEZ 
on the outside of the maritime boundary, there are three features on that part of 
the graph that warrant explanation. The first is the concentration of boardings 
that occur between 5 to 35 miles from the EEZ. These distances correspond to 
the to the majority of inspections that were conducted on the Tail of the Grand 
Banks. The Flemish Cap is also discernable on the graph, with the spikes at 
50 through 65 nautical miles. Those distances correspond to the inner edge of 
the Flemish Cap and the outer edge is distinguishable at 120 nautical miles.
Referring to the inside the EEZ part of Figure 8-43, there is a marked 
spike of over 200 inspections at 60 nautical miles from the EEZ. This 
corresponds to the distance from the Hague Line to the inshore lobster fishery 
close to the southwest coast of Nova Scotia.
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Figure 8-43. Distances from Boardings to Canadian EEZ -  1995 to 2002
Figure 8-44 shows the distribution of distances based on region in order 
to separate the Georges Bank and southwest Nova Scotia fisheries from those 
of the Grand Banks. There are very few inspections that are conducted by 
Scotia-Fundy region beyond the Hague Line that separates the maritime zones 
of Canada and the United is less than 200 nautical miles from coast the 
Canadian coast. Thus, what is displayed on the Scotia-Fundy graph at Figure 
8-44 are those inspections undertaken inside of the EEZ. The spike at 60 
nautical miles discussed earlier is evident in this figure.
The other graph in Figure 8-44 depicts the inspections that occurred in 
the Newfoundland administrative region. In this region, DFO Conservation and 
Protection officers carry out inspections under the authority of Canadian law 
inside the EEZ. Beyond the 200 nautical mile limit, the same fisheries officers 
take down their national flag, hoist the NAFO pennant, and conduct inspections 
on behalf of the North Atlantic Fisheries Organisation. Depicted in Figure 8-44 
are the inspections carried out under national jurisdiction, inside the EEZ. The 
graph shows two main features. The first is a large concentration at roughly
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100 nautical miles inside of the EEZ that corresponds to the inshore fishery to 
the northeast of Newfoundland. There also is a number of boardings within 15 
miles of the EEZ. These do not correspond with any particular cluster, and are 
simply inspections that have occurred close to the EEZ over the 12-year period.
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Figure 8-44. Distances from Boardings to Canadian EEZ -  By Region
The distribution of distances beyond the EEZ is found at Figure 8-45. 
The upper graph depicting national jurisdiction boardings shows that the 
inspections were spread out from 5 to 275 nautical miles. The median distance 
is 158 nautical miles. The spikes in the graph at 125 and 175 nautical miles 
correspond to the cluster in the middle of the Flemish Cap and the Cap’s outer 
edge.
The lower graph in Figure 8-45 paints a different picture, with a large 
number of boardings carried out relatively near to the EEZ, decreasing in 
number farther afield. The median distance in this case is 50 nautical miles. 
This graph suggests that when Conservation and Protection officers conduct 
inspections on behalf of NAFO, they do indeed conduct more boardings closer
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to the EEZ.
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Figure 8-45. Distances from Boardings to 200 nm Limit from Beyond EEZ
As with the previous analysis of the distance to patrol bases, there are 
shortcomings to this type of proximity analysis that must be considered. 
Distances were calculated along the entire length of the EEZ contained within 
the study area. There are areas in which relatively little commercial fishing 
activity occurs such as the near Arctic, yet the few inspections recorded in 
these areas were included in the overall calculation. It could be argued that it 
would have been better to divide the EEZ into sections in the vicinity of 
inspection clusters, carry out the calculations, and then compare the sections. 
This process would have likely yielded results that could be considered more 
accurate. This approach was not pursued because the greater degree of 
granularity would have offered little more insight into the results than had been 
already obtained.
From the perspective of allocation of naval resources, an understanding 
of where inspections are likely to occur assists in the planning of enforcement 
support, particularly with regard to minor war vessels less capable of sustained 
operations on the edge of the continental shelf. The analyses in this chapter
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demonstrated that proximity to patrol bases had no impact on where fishing 
vessels are boarded. Proximity to a maritime boundary had a limited influence 
on the location of inspections, but only when DFO functioned on behalf of 
NAFO. A review of Figure 8-31 reveals that inspections are carried out in 
geographic clusters, and while depth of water is an indicator, the main factor is 
whether or not there is a legal fishery, i.e., an area that is “open” for fishing. An 
open season attracts commercial fishing vessels that, in turn, require 
monitoring and enforcement presence. The best way to plan enforcement 
support is to use historic data that depict the inspection clusters in conjunction 
with a knowledge of what areas will be open for which seasons. While 
developing an ability to predict where best to position military surveillance and 
enforcement assets, in the final analysis, the Navy remains in a support role, 
essentially providing a “taxi service” for Conservation and Protection officers. 
While the Navy may influence the location of the enforcement effort, ultimately 
the final decision for execution rests with the lead department, Fisheries and 
Oceans Canada.
8.3.2.5 Naval Fisheries Patrols Statistics
So far, in this section of the thesis, the Navy’s contribution to fisheries 
enforcement has been presented in the geographic context of naval vessel 
patrol presence and the disposition of at-sea inspections. A study of patrol and 
response would not be complete without having some measure of the 
outcomes of fisheries patrols by which achievement of mission goals might be 
assessed. Tables 8-11 and 8-12 contain statistics compiled in the 
reconstruction of the fisheries patrols for this project.
Table 8-11 contains the averages of patrol statistics taken from 87 
individual ship’s logs held in the National Library and Archives. The length of 
the each patrol was determined by reviewing the start and stop days of the 
each patrol, and subtracting the number of days mid-patrol that a vessel spent 
on a port call. Distance of each patrol was calculated by summing the distance 
run recorded on each page of the ship’s log. Number of helicopter hours flown 
was determined by noting in the narrative of the ship’s log the time at which a 
helicopter was launched and later recovered. The number of boardings carried
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out was determined by noting in the narrative of the log when a ship’s boat was 
launched and recovered, with an accompanying annotation that the boat was 
being used for transporting DFO officers to a fishing vessel. The number of 
arrests was determined by review of the narrative of the log and noting entries 
that indicated that an arrest had been carried out. The number of search and 
rescue missions undertaken on fisheries patrol was determined by review of 
the narrative of the log. Time spent on SAR activities was subtracted from the 
figure for patrol length. Statistics for each patrol can be found in Tables J-3 
and J-4 at Appendix J.
TABLE 8 - 1 1
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL AVERAGES -  1980 TO 1997
Major
Warship
Minor
Warship
Patrol Length (days) 15.0 22.4
Days in port 1.7 2.2
Distance (nm) 3,112 3,517
Helicopter Hours 20.1 0
Boardings / Inspections 6.1 9.2
Arrests .07 < .01
Search and Rescue Events .35 < .01
Note: An arrest is an event in which a fishing vessel was 
diverted under escort to a Canadian port for further judicial 
processing.
TABLE 8 - 12
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL AVERAGES - 1999 TO 2002
Major
Warship
Minor
Warship
Area Covered (krn^) 218,022 73,327
Contacts Detected 115 24
Boardings / Inspections 7.1 5.5
Violations Detected 1.1 1.0
Fuel ($) 104,991 17,090
Coverage per dollar (km ) 2.1 4.3
Cost per Detection ($) 913 712
Cost per Violation ($) 91,855 17,090
Cost per Arrest ($) 771,587 N/A
Note: Costs for fuel based on price paid by Navy at time of 
patrol. Violations are offences for which, at minimum, a 
warning or citation was issued by fisheries officers.
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The patrol averages in Table 8-12 are drawn from the data collected 
aboard 11 frigates and 8 minor war vessels on fisheries patrol from 1999 to 
2002. Electronic templates were provided to warship Commanding Officers for 
the collection of positional information, fuel consumption, detection ranges of 
vessels, location of inspections and other related information. The templates for 
this data collection are found at Appendix L.
One of the objectives in collecting data from naval vessels conducting 
current patrols was to develop an appreciation for the amount of ocean area 
that major and minor warships were actually monitoring in comparison to the 
theoretical. One naval analyst had postulated that Canadian frigates could 
monitor 32,000 km2 (12,335 square miles) for eight to ten days without 
refueling.288 In discussion with this analyst, I learned that he arrived at that 
figure by calculating the distance that a frigate would travel in a straight line 
over 10 days at a medium cruising speed. He used that distance as length of a 
rectangle, and double the ship’s estimated radar range as the width, then 
employed the basic mathematical formula for determining the area of the 
rectangle.
Naval vessels never patrol in a straight line. Normally they favour one 
part of an area, passing several times over the same ground. I believed that a 
more realistic assessment would be obtained by averaging the observed 
coverage of several patrols over a multi-year period. Thus, the area coverage 
of naval fisheries patrols at Table 8-12 was obtained by using the GIS to 
reconstruct the ship’s tracks at using hourly positions supplied by the ships, 
then connecting the positions with a straight line. The GIS was employed to 
create a “buffer” corresponding to the measured radar detection range on either 
side of the track, then the software carried out an area calculation. A buffer of 
30 miles was used initially to test the method. This figure was based on the 
frigates’ estimation of the maximum detection range of a small fishing boat by 
navigation radar at the frigates’ antenna height. The buffer was changed once 
the actual detection range for each patrol was ascertained based on analysis of
288 peter T. Haydon, “Canadian Naval Policy: Still Stalled, Still Contentious, and Still Political,” 
Canadian Defence Quarterly 26 (Summer 1997): 6-13.
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the researcher’s contact log maintained by the operations staff aboard the 
ships. While almost every frigate estimated an ability to detect a fishing vessel 
at 30 nautical miles, the actual detection ranges varied from 6.5 to 18.8 nautical 
miles, with a mean of 14.7 nautical miles. These results showed that frigates 
were over-estimating their ability to detect fishing vessels. In fact, they were 
detecting the contacts at only half the range that they’d anticipated.
Minor warships also over-estimated their ability to detect fishing vessels. 
Most MCDVs reported that they expected to gain contact by radar at 15 
nautical miles. The contact logs revealed that actual detection ranges varied 
from 6.7 to 14.2 nautical miles, with a mean of 10.4 nautical miles.
The mean figure for area coverage of the 1999 to 2002 frigate fisheries 
patrols was 218,465 km2. To put this in perspective, it could be said that on a 
fisheries patrol, a Canadian frigate monitors an area the size of the country of 
larger than Syria, but slightly smaller than Uganda. For minor warships, the 
mean figure for area coverage was 73,327 km2, an area larger than Ireland but 
smaller than Panama. Area coverage by individual patrols is found at Table J-7 
in Appendix J.
The cost metrics contained at Table 8-12 are not those used for 
performance measurement of operational activity. However, they are useful to 
demonstrate how expensive it is for a government to maintain a serious 
monitoring and enforcement regime. The figures also show the benefits and 
disadvantages of employing major combatants for constabulary operations, as 
opposed to smaller coastal patrol vessels. In the conduct of fisheries patrols, 
minor warships are roughly six times less expensive to operate yet they cover 
about one third of the territory as a frigate. However, they detect about one fifth 
of the number of contacts, bearing in mind that they tend to patrol the inshore 
fishery rather than the offshore fishery that is the realm of the frigates. The 
costs per violation detected and per arrest were calculated by summing the fuel 
costs for all of the patrols studied during 1999 and 2002, and dividing by the 
number of violations and arrests made. Arrests by Conservation and 
Protection officers embarked aboard naval vessels are rare and, as such, drive
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the cost per arrest to approximately three-quarters of a million dollars in 2002 
currency.
Although not reflected in the 2002 search and rescue statistics, it is 
interesting to note that, based on data spanning a 20-year period, a major 
warship on a fisheries patrol has a 35 percent chance of being dispatched on a 
SAR mission at some time during the patrol. While the positioning of a major 
combatant for the purposes of SAR alone is not a cost -effective proposal for 
maritime planners, the statistic nevertheless underscores the how the conduct 
of one type of enforcement activity has tertiary benefit to another.
8.4 Summary
This chapter examined the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement 
in the context of patrol and response. Within the framework of maritime 
enforcement, search and rescue is considered a response activity, and the 
provision of vessels for the embarkation of fisheries officers to sea clearly 
constitutes a patrol activity.
The federal government is the authority for marine and aeronautical 
SAR. Under the federal SAR structure, the Department of National Defence 
provides aircraft and aeronautical services for SAR. Although DND has overall 
responsibility for marine and aeronautical SAR, the Canadian Coast Guard is 
responsible co-ordinate maritime search and rescue with DND, and is 
responsible for the provision of the maritime component of the federal SAR 
program. Joint rescue co-ordination centres bring together military and CCG 
personnel operate as a team to co-ordinate marine and aeronautical SAR 
responses. SAR fixed and rotary wing aircraft are based at two locations in the 
Atlantic provinces, and several lifeboats are stationed strategically in ports 
throughout the region. Five large Coast Guard cutters augment the SAR 
coverage of these lifeboats.
The majority of SAR incidents originate on the water, and tend to be 
clustered around small inshore fishing communities throughout the region. 
Most marine search and rescue incidents occur while local fishing seasons are
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open, and the majority of calls for assistance take place in the summer months 
when fishing, recreational, and other commercial activities are at their peak. 
The geographic distribution of SAR incidents varies from season to season, but 
is consistent from year to year.
The Navy contributes to SAR in four ways: command and control, 
infrastructure, provision of SAR aircraft, and provision of naval vessels. The 
Canadian official responsible for SAR in the Atlantic region is a senior naval 
officer. The Navy provides an operations centre and communications capability 
for the command and control of all SAR operations. Military aircraft are tasked 
with the lion’s share of SAR responses, and participate in almost 90 percent of 
all SAR incidents. This is not the case in the utilization of ship resources. 
Canadian Coast Guard vessels respond to just under three quarters of marine 
SAR cases, whereas naval vessels participate in less than one percent of these 
incidents. Analysis indicated that marine SAR resources are distributed 
effectively around the region.
Commercial ocean fishing activity is concentrated in six main locations in 
the study area. There are a string of inshore fisheries that extend from the 
coast to approximately the outer limit of the contiguous zone, most notably 
along the northeast coast of Newfoundland, and in the Northumberland Strait 
area of Nova Scotia and PEI. The other significant area of inshore fishing is to 
the southwest of Nova Scotia extending from the coast to the Hague Line. In 
the offshore fishery, there are three areas of concentrated activity. These 
areas lie on the continental shelf beyond the Canadian Exclusive Economic 
Zone, and are referred to as the Nose and Tail of the Grand Banks, and the 
Flemish Cap.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada is the lead federal department for 
fisheries management in Canada, but is assisted by DND for support to 
fisheries enforcement. In addition to aerial surveillance, the Navy provides 
major and minor warships for fisheries patrols, from which DFO Conservation 
and Protection officers board and conduct inspections of fishing vessels in 
Canada’s maritime zones and the waters enforced by the North Atlantic
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Fisheries Organization.
A geographic analysis of DFO/DND enforcement practices shows that 
the government effort has been characterized by clusters of at-sea inspections 
in southwest Nova Scotia, as well as the Grand Banks, and the Flemish Cap. A 
multi-year review of fisheries patrol data demonstrates that the Navy has 
concentrated its resources in the offshore fishery on the Grand Banks and 
Flemish Cap, and analysis of reconstructed ship tracks show that limited or no 
naval enforcement presence was demonstrated away from these geographic 
features. Analysis also shows that the proximity to the EEZ or to patrol bases 
have little influence on where government at-sea inspections are conducted.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada is becoming increasingly reliant on the 
Navy to assist with enforcement tasks. Over a 12-year period, the Navy 
conducted eight percent of at-sea inspections throughout the Atlantic 
provinces, and as much as 29 percent of the inspections for the Newfoundland 
region of DFO.
Analysis of data collected from warships during the 1999-2000 
timeframe demonstrate that over a two-week fisheries patrol, a frigate typically 
maintains surveillance over an area of nearly 200,000 square kilometres, and a 
minor warships averages roughly half of that. Major combatants are six times 
more costly than minor warships to employ in a fisheries support role, but or 
more effective due to their speed advantage, better sea-keeping ability, and 
superior detection and communications capabilities.
Thus far, the Navy’s commitment to developing maritime domain 
awareness for the whole of government, maintaining a robust search and 
rescue posture, and provision of support to fisheries enforcement have been 
explored in detail. The next chapter will examine what benefit the Navy 
accrues from its involvement in domestic maritime enforcement, and whether 
the status quo is a forgone conclusion.
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Chapter Nine
NAVAL BENEFIT FOR SUPPORT TO MARITIME ENFORCEMENT 
9.1 Introduction
Up to this point in the study, the research has examined how the Navy 
contributes to domestic maritime enforcement operations as part of the 
grander scheme of marine security in Canada. Put another way, the 
emphasis so far has been on what the Navy puts in to the equation, and not 
what it gets in return. This chapter will explore that aspect; what benefit does 
the Navy derive from its support to maritime enforcement?
This issue will be examined through two exploratory studies that 
address the perceived deterrent value of naval support to fisheries 
enforcement, and public opinion as it pertains to naval support to constabulary 
operations. In addition, the effect that fisheries support has on the combat 
readiness of warships, i.e. the ability of ships to complete combat readiness 
training on patrol will be examined to determine whether the Navy obtains any 
training benefit from this type of employment.
9.2 Estimation of Deterrent Effect of Naval Forces in Enforcement
A recurring theme throughout this project is the Navy’s key role in the 
maintenance of Canadian sovereignty through its maritime enforcement 
activities. The previous chapter identified the level of effort expended in 
support of fisheries enforcement by a variety of measures, including the 
allocation of a number of days at sea, and the relative expense per fisheries 
patrol. However, Canadian frigates and destroyers were built with sea 
combat as the primary design factor. Speed and firepower are important 
characteristics in the design of successful warships, but the achievement of 
these attributes in greater magnitude usually demands higher fuel 
consumption, or greater initial cost at build. Thus, from an accountant’s 
perspective, the employment of frigates and destroyers for relatively benign 
patrol duties is not a cost effective means of contributing to maritime 
enforcement, unless the overall effect of their patrols outweighs the cost of 
this type of employment.
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How can the effect of patrols be measured? A simple tally of the 
number of citations issued or violators arrested provides some indication, but 
caution must be exercised in interpreting these numbers. Canadian naval 
vessels do not act independently during fisheries patrols; they respond to the 
direction of embarked DFO Conservation and Protection officers. Thus, 
violations or arrests attributed to naval vessels are a sub-set of the overall 
DFO effort, and do not constitute a true picture of the independent effect of 
naval vessels to the enforcement effort.
Earlier in this thesis, the policy framework and departmental 
responsibilities were discussed, as well as legal limitations for law 
enforcement by the Armed Forces. The naval enforcement presence and 
surveillance effort were covered in Chapters Seven and Eight. What is not 
readily apparent, though, is the impact of this naval presence, both ships and 
aircraft, on those who would challenge national sovereignty by violating 
Canadian law. In essence, the question is, “Are military aircraft or naval 
vessels a deterrent to law-breaking?” If the deterrent effect is minimal, then it 
can be argued that a review of the employment of naval assets for this type of 
sovereignty operation is overdue.
9.2.1 Prior Studies on Deterrence in Canadian Fisheries
As explained in the methods chapter, to address the issue of the 
deterrent effect, views were sought of those individuals who spend 
considerable time on the water in the Canadian maritime zones. These 
persons could comment upon the perceived presence of maritime patrol ships 
and aircraft, as well as the observed effect of this presence on those who 
would be inclined break the law. For the reasons identified in Chapter Two, 
the individuals chosen to provide the data for this aspect of the research were 
commercial fisherman.
There is a limited amount in the literature pertaining to deterrence of
fisheries violations by commercial fishermen in the Canadian context. In the
mid-80s, Fisheries and Oceans Canada conducted evaluations of fisheries
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enforcement programs in on the east and west coasts of Canada to determine 
the extent to which the programs deterred non-compliance. One such study 
found that non-compliance was a real problem in fisheries management, one 
that had the potential for depletion offish stocks through over-fishing, reduced 
long-term yields, and long-term economic losses for the region.289 In 1985, 
DFO-sponsored researchers consulted with the RCMP and other government 
departments that had enforcement responsibilities and learned that, until then, 
no government department had attempted to measure deterrence in the 
fisheries.290
The DFO studies defined deterrence as a “non-event,” or the amount of 
illegal activity that does not take place because of the threat of sanctions. 
Edwin Blewett notes that in the case of the fisheries, fishermen find 
themselves with opportunities to violate the law but, on weighing all the 
alternatives, decide that breaking the law is simply not worth it. He suggests 
that the commission of any offence presents a set of perceived gains and 
losses to the offender. There is always the possibility of being caught and 
prosecuted, so a violator’s attitude towards risk is an important factor in the 
decision to commit an offence.291
Most law enforcement agencies use probability of arrest as a 
performance measure where the output of law enforcement is interpreted as 
the number of crimes not committed because of the threat of punishment. 
Blewett states that this cannot be done in the fisheries because the number of 
offences is not known as they would be in the case of an offence such as 
homicide. In the fisheries, the number of offences not committed is 
unobservable since the majority of them occur at sea, there are seldom 
witnesses and, as Blewett remarks, “fish don’t squeal.”292 He adds that the 
extent of non-compliance with fisheries regulations cannot be directly
289 Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Optimization and Implementation Plan for 
Offshore Fisheries Surveillance, by Donald J. Clough, Ottawa, 9 June 1980, p. P-2.
290 Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Program Evaluation Branch. Canada’s 
Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect o f Fisheries Law Enforcement, by Edwin 
Blewett, William Furlong, and Peter Toews, Ottawa, 1985, 2.
291 Ibid., 3.
292 Ibid., 4.
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measured, but rather must be estimated.293
Federal enforcement activities attempt to provide a credible deterrent 
through three main methods: aerial surveillance, sea patrols, and observers 
aboard fishing vessels. Each method has its own attributes. Aerial patrols 
provide photographic and eye-witness evidence of violations as well as acting 
as a visible deterrent due to the requirement to decrease altitude in order to 
read the vessel name off the hull.294 The deterrent effect of aerial patrols 
depends on the potential violator’s perception of the potential gain from 
committing the offence, the likely penalties if the offence is detected, and the 
chance that the fisherman will be detected breaking the law. One DFO study 
suggests that aerial surveillance can prevent short-term violations such as 
crossing a political boundary to fish illegally, then return quickly to legal 
waters.295
Both vessel and aerial patrols demonstrate national presence on and 
above fishing grounds. Earlier studies indicate that vessel patrols provide a 
different deterrent than aerial patrols. Rather than commit an offence such as 
temporarily fishing in a restricted area close to a boundary for a short time, a 
fisherman might decide to increase revenue by using illegal gear over longer 
period, perhaps a couple of weeks. Vessel patrols exercise the capability to 
intercept suspected violators at sea and board them with fisheries officers. At 
sea inspections discourage such practices such as prolonged use of illegal 
gear.296
In order to gauge the deterrent effect of DFO’s enforcement programs, 
Blewett conducted personal interview surveys with fishermen in the Atlantic, 
Pacific, and Quebec regions. The Pacific study was conducted first. Blewett 
found that the sample size was too small, and he had no way of correlating 
enforcement effort with deterrent effect on anything but a local basis. When
294 While the Automatic Identification System (AIS) makes identification of vessels easier, to 
successful prosecute a violator, the positive identity of the vessel must be established. Visual 
identification remains the best method.
295 Clough, Optimization and Implementation Plan for Offshore Fisheries Surveillance, P-2.
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the study team conducted the Atlantic study, they chose to focus on several 
fisheries, and sample those intensively, rather than sampling a wide 
population but with little depth. Blewett interviewed 150 lobster fishermen out 
of a population of 8,000 lobster licences in the region. He found that 
expectation of apprehension was very low, only three percent across the 
Atlantic DFO regions.297
TABLE 9 - 1
FISHERIES VIOLATIONS -  EXPECTATIONS OF CONSEQUENCE
Region Perceived Probability of 
Apprehension and Punishment
Perceived Probability of 
Licence Suspension
1st Offence 2na Offence
Scotia-Fundy 2.9 % 40 % 100 %
Gulf 2.1 % 91 % 100%
Newfoundland 4.0 % 75% 98%
Source: Edwin Blewett et al. Measuring the Deterrent Effect, p. 13.
In Blewett’s survey, fishermen were asked questions about the 
probability of being caught by a fisheries officer and, if caught, what was the 
likelihood of being prosecuted and convicted. Blewett’s research was very 
much concerned with the economic consequences of an offence, and he 
summarized the study by offering strong support for the economic model of 
criminal behaviour, with the underlying assumption that lawbreakers weigh the 
costs against benefits.298
9.2.2 Deterrence Survey for this Research Project
To ascertain the deterrent effect of naval patrol assets, as opposed to 
those of other government departments, it would be necessary to determine 
whether the visual or radar presence of a maritime patrol vessel or aircraft in 
the immediate area would deter a person from committing a serious violation. 
The perception of presence was not an element of the either the Blewett or 
Clough studies, in which legal and illegal revenue from fishing were weighed 
against the probability of loss of income from detection or prosecution, 
irrespective of which department’s enforcement resource had made the
296 Ibid., P-3.
297 Edwin Blewett, et al, Measuring the Deterrent Effect, 13.
298 Ibid., 30.
355
apprehension.
In deciding on the best manner to approach the research question, a 
number of methods were considered. Personal interviews such as Blewett 
had used were one approach. The benefit of personal interviews is the face- 
to-face contact that provides an ability to probe for clarification or expansion, 
and thus is a versatile and flexible method.299 The disadvantage of this 
research technique is that respondents are not anonymous to the researcher, 
and they may be reluctant to provide sensitive information to another 
person.300 Telephone interviewing was not considered an option for this 
project. The type of questions required for this survey would not be as non­
threatening as would be for a researcher who might ask for which candidate 
the respondent intended to vote in the next election. Rather, the subject 
matter of the interviews would be about potential law breaking. In addition, 
since the human and fiscal resources that Blewett had at his disposal were 
not available for this project, it was decided that another method would be 
employed to attempt to gauge the deterrent value.
William Zikmund identifies the self-administered mail questionnaire as 
a potential method for gathering this type data. The two advantages of this 
research method are that mail questionnaires can reach a geographically 
dispersed sample simultaneously, and at relatively low cost. Respondents in 
isolated or difficult areas to reach can easily be contacted by mail, such as the 
case of coastal fishing communities, particularly in out ports in Newfoundland. 
Mail questionnaires can be filled out at the respondents’ convenience, 
whenever they have the time. Moreover, he suggests that there is a better 
chance that respondents will put more thought into their replies than they
Ofl1
would in a personal or telephone interview.
Zikmund asserts that a mail survey is the best medium for gathering 
extremely sensitive information because it is anonymous. The main
299 William G. Zikmund, Business Research Methods (Orlando: Dryden Press, 1997), 232.
300 Ibid., 235.
301 Ibid., 244-245.
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disadvantage of this survey method is that higher non-response rates are 
experienced with mail surveys than personal or telephone interviews.302 
Accordingly, for the reasons above, as well as financial resource constraints, 
it was decided to employ a mail questionnaire to collect the data. The 
process for developing the questionnaire was outlined in Chapter Two.
9.2.3 Purpose of Key Questions in Deterrence Questionnaire
A copy of the questionnaire used for the deterrence survey is found at 
Appendix P. The next few paragraphs will explain the intent behind the most 
important questions of the questionnaire.
Questions 1 through 8 solicited background information on the 
respondent, and were structured to put the respondent at ease, as well as 
determine two things. First, did the respondent spend a lot of time on the 
water in pursuit of his or her livelihood? If so, the credibility of the 
respondent’s observations in the questionnaire would be greater since he or 
she would have been more likely to have seen patrol assets while fishing than 
a person with little cumulative experience, or one who spent little time on the 
sea. Second, did the respondent fish in the inshore or offshore fishery? This 
was important information since most of the DND surveillance and 
enforcement effort is dedicated to the offshore fishery. If the majority of the 
respondents worked the inshore fishing grounds only, the results would be 
less conclusive since the respondents would be less likely to see the patrol 
assets, and thereby formulate opinions about enforcement presence.
Question 9 was designed to determine the presence of patrol assets 
from the respondent’s perspective. This question presented the respondent 
with ten photographs of naval and other government department ships and 
aircraft, then asked the respondent how many times per week each type of 
patrol asset was visually observed. Having determined in Chapter Seven what 
the actual military presence had been, it would be possible to compare the 
respondents’ perspectives of the type of patrol asset they observed most
302 Ibid., 205.
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often, and how often DND patrol assets in particular had been observed?
Central to the issue of deterrence, Question 11 was structured to 
determine relative deterrent value of patrol assets from the fishermen’s 
perspective. In Question 11, the respondent was presented with the same ten 
photographs of naval and other government department ships and aircraft, 
then asked in each case whether the visual or radar presence of the vessel 
depicted in the photo would deter someone from committing a serious 
offence. From the answers to this question it would be possible to determine 
what type of patrol asset respondents considered the best deterrent. The 
responses would also indicate to what degree fishermen perceived DND 
patrol assets as being a deterrent.
Questions 12a through 12h were designed to determine from the 
fishermen’s perspective the adequacy of monitoring and enforcement efforts. 
Respondents were asked to either agree or disagree that various government 
departments were conducting the “right number” of patrols in their fishing 
areas. If respondents answered that they disagreed, they could elaborate 
further by choosing “more” or “fewer” patrols. From these questions it would 
be possible to know whether the respondents believed the government is 
doing enough surveillance and patrol activity, and whether the respondents 
felt that the Navy, in particular, should be doing more or less of these 
activities.
Question 13 was core to the issue of deterrence, and was probably the 
most important question in the questionnaire. The intent of this question was 
to determine whether or not respondents believed that law enforcement 
personnel were carried aboard naval vessels frequently. If so, it could be 
inferred that naval vessels are a legitimate deterrent. However, if 
respondents believed that enforcement officers are seldom aboard, then it 
could be argued that the ships have no deterrent value.
This question asked the respondents what percentage of time they
believed that DFO Fisheries Protection officers were embarked aboard naval
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vessels for enforcement purposes. The respondent was presented with 
percentages in five-degree increments from 0 to 100 percent, and was asked 
to circle the number closest to the respondent’s estimate of the percentage. 
The respondent was then presented with a second set of percentage choices 
and asked to repeat the process with RCMP officers in mind. Question 14 was 
identical to Question 13, except it requested respondents’ estimates of the 
amount of time that DFO and RCMP officers were embarked in Air Force 
aircraft for enforcement purposes.
Question 15 was another core question to the issue of deterrence. In 
this question, respondents were asked directly which department they 
considered to be the most effective at deterring illegal activities. Five choices 
were presented: Canadian Coast Guard, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
Department of National Defence, Environment Canada, and the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police.
Questions 16, 17 and 18 were of no real significance to the matter of 
deterrence, and were included to allow the respondents to express their 
opinions on broader issues of conservation and protection, in case the 
respondents had become uneasy with the thrust of the questionnaire up to 
that point. It was felt that this would increase the likelihood of questionnaire 
completion and subsequent return by post.
Question 19 asked respondents to list all of the NAFO sub-areas and 
Canadian regional districts that they fished. This question was necessary for 
a couple of reasons. First, the survey was expressly designed to be 
anonymous; therefore it would be impossible to infer in which geographic 
areas the respondents had fished on an individual basis. While the mailing 
addresses of the fisheries associations gave some indication regarding the 
geographic distribution of the survey, many respondents fished in vessels that 
had the capability to travel far beyond their local fishing areas.303 Thus,
303 Most respondents fished from boats less than 45 feet in length (82.4 percent). However 
9.8 percent fished in boats 45 to 65 feet in length, and 7.8 percent fished from boats greater 
than 100 feet.
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determining the actual areas fished would indicate whether the survey was 
representative of the entire Atlantic region in both inshore and offshore 
fisheries. The NAFO sub-area and Canadian regional district data would show 
whether the sample population was clustered in areas that received no DND 
patrol presence, which potentially might correlate to a low number of sightings 
in Question 9.
9.2.4 Response to Questionnaire
Fisheries associations are organizations of individuals from various 
fisheries groups that are concerned with the development, conservation, and 
management of commercial fisheries, and the economic prosperity of their 
members. There are 88 fisheries associations in the Atlantic region: 54 in 
Nova Scotia, 12 in New Brunswick, just 7 in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 
only 2 in Prince Edward Island. Since some fisheries associations in New 
Brunswick are in French-speaking areas, the initial letter soliciting 
participation in the study was provided in both English and French. These 88 
fisheries associations represent 10,671 core licence holders in the Atlantic 
region. Table N-2 at Appendix N provides a breakdown of licences by 
province.
In response to the letter solicitation, 14 fisheries associations agreed to 
participate in the survey. This number comprised 11 associations in Nova 
Scotia, none in New Brunswick, only 1 in Newfoundland and Labrador, and 2 
in Prince Edward Island. The participation rate of Atlantic region fisheries 
associations overall was 15.9 percent. A list of fisheries associations and 
those that participated is found at Appendix N, Table N-1.
Based on the return cards posted back to the researcher, 144 
questionnaires were distributed to the 14 fisheries associations. Of this 
number, 51 completed questionnaires were received back, for a fisheries 
association questionnaire response rate of 35.4 percent. However, in terms of 
the 10,671 core licence holders, questionnaires were sent to 1.3 percent of 
the total number of licence holders rendering only a 0.5 percent response rate 
in terms of total licences.
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In the literature, it is stated that a mail survey is not considered reliable 
unless it has a minimum of 50 percent response, or unless it demonstrates 
with some form of verification that the non-respondents are a similar 
population to those did respond. Zikmund adds that the problem with mail 
surveys is that it is never really known whether non-respondents have refused 
to participate or are just indifferent to the subject matter.304 Thus, the low 
response rate in terms of overall licences means that there is little inference 
that can be drawn from the deterrence data because the sample size is small.
It is also worth commenting on the geographic distribution of the 
respondents. By soliciting over 85 percent of all the fisheries associations in 
the maritime provinces, it was hoped to attract responses by those who fished 
throughout the entire Atlantic region, so that conclusions could be drawn 
about the region rather than just certain geographic sectors. Indeed, if one 
inspects Figure 9-1, one will note that respondents fished in virtually every 
NAFO sub-area, except those in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. However, the 
Canadian fishing districts fished by respondents are depicted in Figure 9-2 
and this figure paints a different picture. The majority of respondents fished 
primarily around the island of Cape Breton on the northern part of Nova 
Scotia.
304 Paul L. Erdos, Professional Mail Surveys (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), 144; Zikmund, 
Business Research Methods, 205.
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Figure 9-2. Areas Fished by Survey Respondents -  Canadian Districts
Note: Grey shading indicates area was fished by at least one respondent.
District 27 is adjacent to the east of District 30, and not where labeled.
Table 9-2 shows that although almost all NAFO sub-areas were 
reported as being fished in 2003, only five respondents identified the offshore 
as being their principle fishing destination. The majority of the respondents, 
over 70 percent of them, reported being inshore fishermen. Almost 18 percent
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of the respondents claimed to fish the inshore zones, but recorded NAFO sub- 
areas that are in the offshore fishery. The most probable interpretation is that 
they fish the inshore primarily but ventured out to 4X and 4W  for flounder (33 
percent) based on species licences reported in the questionnaire.
TABLE 9 - 2 
AREAS FISHED BY RESPONDENTS
Respondents Areas Fished Percent
5 Offshore (2J,3K,3M,3N,30,4Vs) 9.8
37 Inshore (4T,4Vn,3Ps) 72.5
9 Both 17.7
51
A comparison of where the majority of respondents fished in Figure 9-2 
and the presence of aerial surveillance aircraft presence at Figures 7-4 and 7- 
7 shows that military aircraft had relatively little presence in the Cape Breton 
area, whereas PAL aircraft patrolled frequently. In terms of naval vessel 
presence around Cape Breton, Figure 8-26 reveals that there was very little. 
One could expect that a low perception of military enforcement presence 
would be registered in the questionnaire, and that might have an effect on 
perceptions of the deterrent value of military assets.
9.2.5 Validity of the Survey
Aside from the small sample size, another issue that prevents 
statistically supportable conclusions from being drawn from the survey is that 
it is not a true random sample of all fishermen in the region. This is because 
of the self-selection bias inherent in the manner in which the mail survey was 
administered. In the first instance, fisheries associations self-selected 
themselves for participation. In the second instance, individual respondents 
belonging to the fisheries associations self-selected themselves for 
participation. Zikmund points out that self-selection will bias a survey because 
it allows extreme positions to be over-represented while those who are 
indifferent are under-represented.305
A true random sample allows statistical theories to hold. In this
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deterrence survey, the sample size is 51 of a population of 10,671 core 
licences. If the sample were truly random, at a 95 percent confidence level 
the results would be +/- 14 percent. However, because this is not a true 
random sample of all fishermen, standard confidence levels that would 
normally be used cannot be applied in this case.
In view of the small sample size that lends little statistical significance 
to this data, and the relatively light presence of military patrol assets in the 
geographic areas fished by the majority of the respondents, this deterrence 
study should be interpreted as an exploratory study only.
9.2.6 Results of Exploratory Deterrence Survey
As shown in Table 9-3, the majority of respondents had fished for 21 
years or more (80.4 percent). Few respondents (2 percent) had 15 or fewer 
years of fishing experience. Since the majority of the respondents were 
experienced fishermen, one can deduce that the respondents would be able 
to recognize and identify the patrol assets if observed.
TABLE 9 - 3 
FISHING EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS
Fishing experience Percent
More than 25 years 49.0
21 to 25 years 31.4
16 to 20 years 17.6
11 to 15 years 2.0
Table 9-4 shows that the majority of respondents had fished between 
17 and 32 weeks of the year (62.8 percent). This equates to 4 to 6 months of 
working on the water, and would have provided ample opportunity for the 
respondent to observe the activities of government ship and aircraft patrols.
305 Zikmund, Business Research Methods, p. 205.
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TABLE 9 - 4
TIME SPENT FISHING PER YEAR
Weeks fishing per year Percent
17 to 24 weeks 47.1
8 to 16 weeks 21.6
25 to 32 weeks 15.7
33 to 40 weeks 15.7
Table 9-5 shows that the majority of respondents were lobster 
fishermen (86.3 percent). This result correlates with those who identified 
themselves as inshore fisherman, as well as with the geographic areas 
identified as being fished. Not all respondents reported a secondary licence; 
the percentages in Table 9-5 are calculated from the total of 51 responses, 
not the percentage of just those who reported a second licence.
TABLE 9 - 5
LICENCES HELD BY RESPONDENTS
Licence Primary
(%)
Secondary
(%)
Lobster 86.3
Groundfish 7.8 3.9
Clam 3.9 -
Tuna 2.0 11.8
Crab - 41.2
Oyster - 3.9
Scallop - 3.9
Turbot - 3.9
Table 9-6 lists the areas that the respondents fished by NAFO sub- 
area or Canadian district. The greatest number of respondents frequented 
NAFO sub-areas 4Vn and 4T, as well as Canadian District 27. When Figures 
9-1 and 9-2 are cross-referenced, it can be seen that these three areas are 
immediately adjacent to Cape Breton Island.
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TABLE 9 - 6 
AREAS FISHED BY SUB-AREA OR DISTRICT
NAFO No. District No.
4Vn 28 27 22
4T 15 24 8
4W 4 22 4
4Vs 3 26A 3
3N 2 26B 2
3M 2 19 1
30 2 23 1
3PS 2 25 1
2J 1 30 1
3K 1 29 0
3L 1
4V 1
4WD 1
All 51 respondents answered Questions 1 through 8 of the 
questionnaire. However, once finished the general background questions, at 
Question 9 the number of responses dropped from 51 to between 41 to 44 
responses. It is possible that at this point in the questionnaire some 
respondents became uncomfortable with the thrust of the questions and opted 
to skip the sensitive questions that focussed on deterrence. Only one of the 
51 respondents quit the questionnaire entirely at Question 9.
Table 9-7 lists by type of patrol asset the number of sightings per week 
that respondents reported observing the ships and aircraft. The numbers in 
the columns are the raw counts from the questionnaire. The most significant 
observation from the table is that the majority of respondents reported having 
never sighted any of the patrol assets of all types. The patrol asset sighted by 
the greatest number of respondents (27 percent) was the PAL aircraft in the 
DFO paint scheme, followed by the DFO inshore multi-task patrol vessel (18 
percent). The military patrol asset sighted most often by respondents was the 
DND CP-140 aircraft (16 percent). In all of these cases, respondents reported 
sighting the ships and aircraft only once or twice per week. Three respondents 
reported sighting the DFO offshore multi-task patrol cutter five times or more
per week. These three were respondents who self-identified as offshore 
fishermen who fished out to a maximum of 100 nautical miles from shore.
TABLE 9 - 7
NUMBER OF SIGHTINGS PER WEEK OF PATROL ASSETS
Patrol Asset 0 1 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 6 >7
CCG PAL Aircraft 44 0 0 0 0
DFO PAL Aircraft 32 12 0 0 0
DND CP-140 Aircraft 38 7 0 0 0
DND Sea King Helicopter 41 0 0 0 0
RCMP Patrol Boat 40 2 0 0 0
DFO Offshore Cutter 36 4 0 1 2
DND Naval Frigate 39 3 0 0 0
DFO Small Patrol Cutter 35 7 0 0 0
DND Naval Minor Vessel 41 1 0 0 0
DFO Inshore Vessel 34 8 2 0 0
Table 9-8 lists by type of patrol asset the perceived deterrent value for 
each on a 7-point scale, with zero representing no deterrent value, and six 
representing the maximum deterrent value. Forty-three percent of the 
respondents rated the DFO inshore multi-task patrol vessel as having the 
greatest deterrent effect, with 69.2 percent of respondents rating the deterrent 
value of this vessel at 4 or higher. The RCMP patrol boat also fared well, with 
76.2 percent of respondents rating the deterrent value of the RCMP craft at 4 
or higher. However, only 28.6 percent of respondents rated this platform as 
having the greatest deterrent effect. The patrol asset judged to have the least 
deterrent value was the DND Sea King helicopter (43.9 percent), followed 
naval frigates and minor warships (33.3 percent).
The percentage of time that respondents perceived enforcement 
officers to be aboard naval vessels or military aircraft is presented at Table 9- 
9. Between 40 to 49 percent of respondents believed that enforcement 
officers were never embarked aboard military patrol assets. For these 
respondents, military ships and aircraft are clearly not a deterrent to law 
breaking.
367
TABLE 9 - 8
PERCEIVED DETERRENT VALUE OF PATROL ASSETS
Patrol Asset Least (Values in % ) Most
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
CCG PAL Aircraft 12.2 26.8 19.5 12.2 26.8 2.4 -
DFO PAL Aircraft 11.9 14.3 11.9 11.9 14.3 23.8 11.9
DND CP-140 Aircraft 21.4 19.0 23.8 7.1 9.5 14.3 4.8
DND Sea King Helicopter 43.9 17.1 12.2 14.6 4.9 2.4 4.9
RCMP Patrol Boat 2.4 - 4.8 16.7 28.6 19.0 28.6
DFO Offshore Cutter 19.5 24.4 4.9 19.5 - 14.6 17.1
DND Naval Frigate 33.3 17.9 15.4 12.8 5.1 10.3 5.1
DFO Small Patrol Cutter 14.6 24.4 4.9 4.9 14.6 9.8 26.8
DND Naval Minor Vessel 33.3 16.7 19.4 5.6 11.1 8.3 5.6
DFO Inshore Vessel 5.1 5.1 5.1 15.4 5.1 20.5 43.6
As indicted in the previous chapter at Table 8-7, for the past several 
years, the naval operations schedules assign 125 sea days to DFO each year 
for fisheries support. From Table 8-6, it can be observed that the total 
number of sea days of Maritime Forces Atlantic ships varies between 1600 to 
1800 days for all types of operations. Thus, the actual amount of time that 
enforcement officers are aboard naval ships is between 7 to 8 percent of the 
total operations schedule. In 2003, the year that the deterrence survey was 
carried out, actual sea days devoted to DFO were lower than normal. Only 99 
of the planned 125 DFO sea days were executed, set against the total 
operations schedule of 1,579 sea days in total. Thus, in 2003, fisheries 
officers were embarked at sea in warships 6.2 percent of the time.
From Table 9-9  it can be seen that 39.8 percent of respondents
believed that DFO enforcement officers might have been aboard naval
warships 10 percent of the time or more. Almost a quarter of all respondents
believed that naval vessels could have been on enforcement missions 25
percent of the time or more. In the case of aerial surveillance, 37.6 percent of
respondents believed that DFO enforcement officers might have been aboard
CP-140 aircraft 10 percent of the time or more. Twenty-eight percent of all
respondents believed that military maritime patrol aircraft could have been on
enforcement missions 25 percent of the time or more. It is clear from Table 9-
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9 that respondents believed that RCMP officers seldom embarked aboard 
military patrol assets.
TABLE 9 - 9
ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS EMBARKED ON MILITARY PATROL ASSETS
Dept / Platform Perceived Percentage of Time Enforcement Officers Embarked
_______________ 0 5 10 to 20 25 to 50 55 to 70 70 to 95 100
DFO on Warship 41.9 18.6 16.3 18.8 - - 4.7
DFO on Mil Aircraft 37.2 25.6 9.4 9.4 9.4 - 9.3
RCMP on Warship 48.8 31.7 4.9 14.7 - - -
RCMP on Mil Aircraft 48.8 26.8 9.8 9.8 4.9 - -
From Table 9-9, it is clear that 60 percent of respondents believed that 
enforcement officers were aboard warships and military aircraft five percent of 
the time or less. Since the actual figure in any given year is between six to 
eight percent, the majority of respondents believed military patrol assets were 
engaged in enforcement activity less than the actual time devoted for this 
support. Even among the 25 to 30 percent of respondents who believed that 
Conservation and Protection officers were embarked more than 10 percent of 
the time, the majority felt that the fisheries officers were aboard no more than 
50 percent of the time.
In Question 15, when asked to choose among federal departments,
55.3 percent of respondents replied that Fisheries and Oceans Canada was 
considered the most effective at deterring illegal activities in the Canadian 
coastal zones. DFO was followed by the RCMP at 31.9 percent, DND by 8.5 
percent, and the Canadian Coast Guard at 4.3 percent. Although 
Environment Canada was listed as a choice, not a single respondent 
indicated that department being perceived as effective at deterring 
contraventions to Canadian law.
Based on the data presented at Tables 9-8 and 9-9, as well as the 
results of Question 15, it is reasonable to suggest that, at least to the 44 
lobster fishermen who responded to the questionnaire, Canadian military
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patrol assets have little deterrent effect on law-breaking in the inshore fishery 
around Cape Breton Island. However, this suggestion does not have the 
statistical robustness upon which to draw a firm conclusion, and it cannot be 
extrapolated across the Atlantic region for the reasons cited earlier.
9.3 Public Opinion Value
From the exploratory study in the previous section, it was suggested 
that employment of naval assets in support of fisheries enforcement produces 
only a limited deterrent effect. The purpose of the next section is to explore 
whether support to government departments, including fisheries patrols, 
provides inherent value to the Navy from the perspective of enhancing 
positive public opinion. Anecdotally, federal departments receive “good 
press” for their efforts to control the illegal flow of drugs, and to control foreign 
fishing activities, especially in parts of Canada that have depressed 
economies tied to the fishing industry.
A media content analysis was employed to answer the question, "How 
is the Canadian Navy portrayed in its support of other government department 
operations, in particular, fisheries enforcement?” The rationale and design of 
this method were covered in Chapter Two; what will be presented here are 
the results.
9.3.1 Media Content Analysis Results
From 1 Jan to 31 December 2002 the DND Director General Public 
Affairs website was accessed by a research assistant who read the articles 
that had been automatically “tagged” by DGPA’s software and list of naval key 
words as having naval subject matter (Appendix Q). The research assistant 
determined in which of 10 themes the article belonged and, if the subject 
matter related to naval support of other government departments, the 
research assistant then categorized the article into one of six types, as listed 
in Table 9-10. The decision to categorize an article into a specific theme was 
based on whether the majority of the text or the emphasis was on a particular 
theme, although other themes might have been present in a minor capacity.
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TABLE 9 -  10
MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS -  THEMES AND TYPES
Article Theme OGD Article Type
1 OGD Support 1 Search and rescue
2 Naval operations 2 Environment/pollution
3 Naval exercises 3 Fisheries support
4 Capital projects 4 Counter-narcotics
5 Defence spending 5 Illegal immigration
6 Quality of life 6 Arctic sovereignty
7 Misconduct
8 People stories
9 Op APOLLO
0 Miscellaneous
The research assistant categorized each article based on how the print 
media had portrayed the Canadian Navy in its support of other government 
department operations, and recorded the article as having a positive, 
negative, or neutral bias towards the Canadian Navy.
During 2002, the media content analysis reviewed 852 new stories that 
contained a naval thread. Of these, 377 had a positive bias (44.2 percent), 
171 had a negative bias (20.1 percent), and 304 were neutral (35.7 percent).
Of the 852 articles, there were far fewer about naval support to other 
government department than had been anticipated. Only 73 articles touched 
upon any of the six OGD sub-themes (8.6 percent). Table 9-11 lists the 
number of articles by theme and bias, and Figure 9-3 shows the percentages 
in graphic form.
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TABLE 9- 11
MEDIA CONTENT BY THEME - 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2002
Story Theme Percent Total Neutral Positive Negative
Support to other govt depts 8.6 73 32 35 6
Naval operations - general 10.4 89 35 20 34
Naval exercises 2.7 23 6 17 -
Capital projects 10.0 85 40 8 37
Defence spending 11.4 97 87 4 6
Quality of life issues 6.5 55 7 9 39
Misconduct / harassment 2.0 17 2 2 13
People stories 15.1 129 17 111 1
Operation APOLLO 18.4 157 18 135 4
Miscellaneous 14.9 127 60 36 31
TOTAL 100.0 852 304 377 171
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Figure 9-3. Media Content By Theme -1 January to 31 December 2002
Of the 73 OGD-related articles, search and rescue accounted for 38 
articles (52.1 percent), and there were 13 environmental or pollution new 
stories that pertained to naval operations (17.8 percent). The next most 
common of the sub-themes were articles about military counter-narcotics 
operations of which there were 10 (13.7 percent). Support to fisheries
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enforcement registered only two new stories (2.7 percent). Table 9-12 lists 
the number of OGD-related articles by type and bias, and Figure 9-4 shows 
the percentages in graphic form.
TABLE 9 -  12
M EDIA C O N TE N T - SUPPO R T TO OGD - 1 JANUARY TO 31 DECEMBER 2002
Story Theme Percent Total Neutral Positive Negative
Search and rescue 52.1 38 10 28 -
Environment / pollution 17.8 13 3 4 6
Fisheries 2.7 2 1 1 -
Counter-narcotics /  terrorism 13.7 10 9 1 -
Illegal immigration 2.7 2 2 - -
Arctic sovereignty issues 11.0 8 7 1 -
TOTAL 100.0 73 32 35 6
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Figure 9-4. Media Content -  Support to OGD -1  January to 31 December 2002
Figure 9-5 shows that three-quarters of the new stories about search 
and rescue activities had a positive bias to them. This was expected, since 
search and rescue normally involves saving people in distress, and the 
rescuers are generally viewed positively. Occasionally, when there is loss of 
life, new stories can question decisions made during the search and rescue 
operation, portraying SAR personnel or processes negatively. The research 
assistant logged no negative stories about SAR in 2002.
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Figure 9-5. Naval Search and Rescue New stories
Figure 9-6 depicts a large percentage of negative stories pertaining to 
the Navy and environmental or pollution matters (46.1 percent). The amount 
of negative coverage in this category in 2002 was atypical, and reflects a 
series of new stories instigated by a single individual who generated 
significant publicity about unexploded ordnance and ocean dumping of 
mustard gas after the Second World War.
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46%
Figure 9-6. Naval Environmental/Pollution Newstories
Figure 9-7 shows that the overwhelming majority of new stories about 
naval support to counter-narcotics efforts were neither positive nor negative.
Positive
31%
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Figure 9-7. Naval Counter-Narcotics New stories
As in the case for counter-narcotics operations, Figure 9-8 shows that 
the overwhelming majority of new stories about naval linkages to Arctic 
sovereignty were neither positive nor negative.
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Figure 9-8. Naval Arctic Sovereignty New stories
Figure 9-9 shows that there were no negative new stories relating to 
naval support to the fisheries, and that the stories were evenly split between 
positive and neutral articles. However, there were only two new stories in this 
category for an entire year; no inference can be made regarding positive or 
negative bias on such a small sample.
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Figure 9 -9 . Naval Fisheries Support New stories
The results of this year-long media content analysis counters the 
supposition that support to fisheries enforcement is of significance to the Navy 
for public relations value. Only 8.6 percent of the total number of stories 
concerned support to other government departments, and of this small 
percentage only 2.7 percent pertained to support to fisheries. Put another 
way, fisheries patrols accounted for 0.002 percent of all new stories carried by 
the print media in 2002. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of 
naval fisheries patrols on public opinion in 2002 was insignificant.
In relation to other OGD-naval linkages, with the exception of the 
environment /pollution category, the majority of new stories were neutral in 
their portrayal of the Navy and thus likely did not diminish public opinion about 
the Navy, but neither is it likely that opinions were improved. However, it is 
clear that search and rescue articles undoubtedly created a positive 
impression of the military in the public mind.
The overall assessment is that support to other government 
departments by the Navy does not enhance to any great extent public opinion 
of the Navy.
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9.4 Benefit of Fisheries Patrols on Warship Crew Readiness
So far in this chapter, the potential benefits of support to enforcement 
operations has been discussed in the broad context of deterrent value and the 
effect on public opinion to the entire Navy. The next section will narrow the 
focus to the individual ship level, and examine the value of fisheries support in 
terms of the opportunity for training and maintaining an assigned state of 
readiness for operations.
There are many metrics used by the Navy to track training progress. 
Some rest with the individual sailor and pertain to the level of training required 
to perform specific functions at a particular level in a specific trade within the 
organization. They may be training requirements that are prerequisites for 
individuals to attend advanced career courses. However, for the purposes of 
this research, it is not the readiness of individual sailors that will be examined, 
but rather the readiness of the ship as a single entity that will discussed, and 
what is the value of employment on a fisheries patrol on this readiness.
The basic supposition is that employment of a warship on a fisheries 
patrol will improve the level of combat readiness of the ship. The rationale for 
this is that the pace of activity during fisheries patrols is slower than that of 
military exercises, and should allow the ship to focus more effort on 
completing the individual and small team CRRs that are frequently difficult to 
achieve in a normally schedule of exercises and operations.
9.4.1 Combat Readiness Requirement Analysis
The Canadian Navy maintains a system of measurable training 
objectives called Combat Readiness Requirements (CRRs) for all classes of 
warships. These CRRs are reported every month to the Operational 
Readiness staff at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters. The CRRs are 
reported as percentage completed during a particular month. For example, if 
there are 15 seamanship CRRs, and the ship has satisfied the criteria for only 
11, the ship would report that it is 73 percent up-to-date in seamanship 
readiness.
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The nature of these CRRs is tailored to the roles and capabilities of 
each class of ship. Moreover, there are three levels of CRR. The lowest level 
are periodic lectures and training activities to keep specific skill-sets of 
individual sailors and small teams refreshed at a periodic interval, skills that 
are needed for fighting of shipboard fires, small arms training, first aid training, 
etc. Depending upon the class of vessel, there might be over 250 CRRs that 
are tracked on a monthly basis.
Combat Readiness Requirements also vary depending upon the ships 
readiness status as assigned by the Commanding Admiral. Understanding 
that it could no longer afford to train, maintain, and sustain every ship in the 
Fleet to a high readiness standard due to diminished budgets, several years 
ago the Navy adopted a tiered-readiness program. Accordingly, the majority 
of ships are assigned “standard” readiness status, meaning that they need 
only achieve roughly 75 percent of CRRs. The ships that form the national 
and contingency task groups are assigned high readiness status, and are 
expected to achieve the highest level of CRRs possible. Thus, the overall 
CRR status of a warship will vary depending upon where the ship is in its 
tiered-readiness cycle.
Table 9-13 lists some of the lower level CRRs for surface vessels. The 
intermediate level CRRs are aimed at maintaining a whole ship capability for a 
particular task on a generic mission. Examples of these are displayed at 
Table 9-14. The advanced level CRRs are aimed at integrating the ship into a 
task group, demonstrating the vessels capability for multi-ship combat 
operations. Examples of advanced CRRs are listed at Table 9-15.
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TABLE 9 -  13
EXAMPLE INDIVIDUAL AND SMALL TEAM CRRS
Combat Readiness Requirement Validity Period 
(days)
Standard First Aid Training 1095
NBC Team Training 730
Contamination Control Organisation 365
Naval Fire Fighting 730
Flood Control Refresher 730
Rules of the Road for Officers-of-the-Watch 90
Bridgemanship Exam 180
Non-Ionising Radiation Hazards Lecture 365
Fuel/Oil Spill Response Lecture 365
Anchoring Procedures 180
Hazardous Materials Lecture 365
Source: CFCD 102(H).
TABLE 9 - 1 4  
EXAMPLE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL CRRS
Combat Readiness Requirement Validity Period 
(days)
Lost Diver Search 90
Cleansing Station Procedures (Nuclear) 365
Search and Rescue Simulation 120
Bomb Threat 180
Nuclear Defence 365
Refugee Assistance 730
Intelligence Collection 365
Blind Pilotage (Navigation by Radar) 60
Evidence Gathering Team 180
Maritime Interdiction Operations - Hailing 120
Source: CFCD 102(H).
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TABLE 9 - 15 
EXAMPLE ADVANCED LEVEL CRRS
Combat Readiness Requirement Validity Period 
(days)
Sea Sparrow MissileFiring 365
Sea-Skimming Target Acquisition & Tracking 180
Intermediate Multi-Ship Air Defence Exercise 120
Target Acquisition Missile Scenario 180
Intermediate Surface Firing Exercise 120
Advanced Surface Firing Exercise 180
Encounterex 120
Mk 46 Torpedo Firing 365
Combined Anti-Submarine Warfare Exercise 180
ASW Detection & Tracking 90
Source: CFCD 102(H).
In order to determine what effect the employment of warships on 
fisheries patrols had on combat readiness, the Operational Readiness staff 
was contacted to provide combat readiness statistics on warships that had 
participated in naval fisheries patrols. Specifically, the staff was asked for 
CRRs percentages achieved during the patrols, and for one month prior to the 
patrols, as well as one and two months after the patrols. In addition, the staff 
was requested to provide the same information on ships that had taken part in 
the two major national maritime exercises in 2001. These were Canadian 
Fleet Operations Exercise 2/01 (CFO 2/01) and Canadian Fleet Operations 
Exercise 3/01 (CFO 3/01). Both CFOs were multi-ship exercises involving 
Canadian and Allied ships, submarines, and fixed and rotary wing aircraft. 
The CRR status of the ships that participated in the multi-ship exercises 
provided a useful comparison set against single ship naval fisheries patrols.
The Operational Readiness staff at Maritime Forces Atlantic 
Headquarters compiled CRR data on 29 warships that had conducted 
fisheries patrols during the years 1999 to 2001. These data were arranged in 
9 categories based upon the definition of the CRR in the Navy’s ordering 
directive, CFCD 102(H). The categories were Combat (CBT), 
Communications (COMMS), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Surface Warfare 
(SURF), Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Command/Control/Communications/
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Computers (C4), Combat Systems Engineering (CSE), Marine Systems 
Engineering (MSE), Seamanship (SEA), and Air Department (AIR). Minor 
warships also have an additional category, Coastal (COAST).
Table 9-16 contains the summary of CRR data provided by 
headquarters staff, minus the AIR and COAST categories. There are three 
activities represented in this table. The first section lists the CRR averages 
for all 29 ships that had conducted fisheries patrols. The second section 
provides the CRR averages for the three ships that participated in CFO 2/01, 
and the third section contains the data (CRR averages) for the three ships 
that took part in CFO 3/01. The numbers in the table are the percentages of 
CRRs that were reported by ships as having been completed either the month 
before the patrol or CFO, the month of the patrol or CFO, one month and two 
months after the patrol or CFO.306
From Table 9-16 it can be seen that, for the average ship in 1999 to 
2001, one month before a fisheries patrol 55.8 percent of all CRRs were 
reported as complete. During the month of the fisheries patrol the figure 
increased to 59.5 percent, then dropped to 56.7 percent complete one month 
after the patrol. Two months after the fisheries patrol, the number of CRRs 
complete had risen to over 60 percent. This was a reflection of the ships’ 
programmes providing opportunities to complete CRRs that were not possible 
during the fisheries patrols.
306 Ships that participated in CFO 2/01 were Iroquois, Ville de Quebec, and Preserver. The 
CFO 3/01 ships were Halifax, Toronto, and Preserver.
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TABLE 9 -  16
COMBAT READINESS REQUIREMENT COMPLETION PERCENTAGES -  1999 TO 2001
A V G ALL
S H IP
C B T C O M M A A W S U R F A S W C4 C S E M SE SEA
Fisheries Patrol Ships
1 month before 5 5 .8 5 5 .9 65.4 74.2 4 0 .5 31.5 46.1 0.0 65.2 70.3 58.2
Month of patrol 5 9 .5 5 9 .0 6 8 .2 74.1 4 4 .2 37.4 4 9 .0 0.0 69.0 80.8 58.1
1 m onth after 5 6 .7 5 8 .0 6 5 .4 71.0 4 0 .6 39.4 4 4 .4 0.0 68.0 78.0 56.9
2 m onths after 6 1 .2 6 3 .6 81.4 87.0 4 7 .4 49.0 4 9 .8 75.0 82.1 81.9 65.4
3 m onths after 6 2 .2 6 0 .5 76.4 83.7 4 2 .3 4 2 .8 4 4 .9 62.3 73.1 80.1 63.5
CFO 2/01 Ships
1 month before 6 2 .0 6 0 .3 77.7 8 0 .0 4 4 .0 57.7 48.7 22.3 75.7 79.3 70.7
Month o f C F O 6 5 .7 6 4 .3 8 4.7 8 7.0 6 6 .7 50.0 4 6 .3 55.0 73.7 79.3 73.0
1 month after 7 2 .0 6 5 .7 93.3 8 7.3 83.3 6 9.3 4 6 .3 36.7 83.0 74.3 78.0
2 m onths after 7 2 .7 6 5 .0 87.7 8 5.3 81.0 6 9.3 39.0 68.3 88.7 75.3 71.0
3 m onths after 7 1 .7 6 6 .7 84.3 76.7 73.7 77.0 32.0 68.3 86.3 87.0 69.0
CFO 3/01 Ships
1 month before 6 7 .0 6 9 .5 8 0.0 80.1 59.3 64.3 55.5 51.0 90.8 87.5 78.5
Month of C F O 7 0 .0 6 7 .5 8 4.5 9 0.8 64.3 55.3 64.8 46.3 87.3 77.5 73.3
1 month after 7 1 .0 7 1 .0 8 9.8 8 9.8 62.3 47.3 65.3 52.0 88.5 91.3 69.3
2 months after 6 5 .0 6 4 .5 85.8 6 7 .5 56.8 4 6 .3 44.8 45.8 89.0 86.5 63.8
Source: Maritime Forces Atlantic Operational Readiness staff, 2001.
Figure 9-10 depicts the same information in graph form for the average 
of all CRR categories. The axis along the bottom of the graph indicates the 
months before and during the patrol, as well as one, two and three months 
after the patrol. The graph shows that on average a ship goes from 55 percent 
CRRs complete to 60 percent complete during a fisheries patrol, an increase 
of only five percent. Figure 9-10 also shows the average of all CRR 
categories for the high readiness ships that participated in the two major CFO 
exercises. Note that in the months prior to the exercises, the six ships already 
had higher rates of CRR completion (62 and 67 percent) due to their assigned 
high readiness posture. Note also that the CFO ships did not suffer an 
immediate drop in CRR status immediately following the two exercises, 
although the CFO 3/01 ships experienced a 6.5 percent decline two months 
after CFO 3/01.
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Figure 9-10. Combat Readiness Requirements -  Average of All Categories
If one examines the CRR completion status by individual category, the 
curves are even more dramatic. Figure 9-11 depicts the Combat CRRs. One 
can see a drop of roughly three percent post-fisheries patrol, then two months 
after the patrol an increase by 16 percent in CRR completion. This same 
effect is not registered with the CFO ships that experienced no decline in 
Combat CRRs the month after the exercise. Their decline commenced two 
months after the exercise. This again was a reflection of ships’ programmes 
providing opportunities to complete CRRs that were not possible during the 
fisheries patrols.
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Figure 9-11. Combat Readiness Requirements -  Combat
The curves representing Anti-Air Warfare CRRs in Figure 9-12 show 
how little this warfare discipline can be practised during a fisheries patrol. 
This is in marked contrast to the ships that participated in CFO 2/01. These 
ships were, on average, only 3.5 percent ahead of the average fisheries patrol 
ship the month before the exercise, yet achieved 66.7 percent during the 
exercise and peaked at 83.3 percent one month afterwards. Of interest, 
although one month before the two CFO exercises the Anti-Air Warfare 
readiness status of the six ships varied by 15 percent, both groups of ships in 
the major exercises achieved roughly 65 percent CRR completion during the 
months of each exercise. The CFO 2/01 ships went on to conduct live missile 
firings after the major exercise, and the CFO 3/01 ships did not.
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Figure 9-12. Combat Readiness Requirements -  Anti-Air Warfare
Figure 9-13 depicts a category in which fisheries patrol employment is 
not disadvantageous to CRR completion, whereas multi-ship exercises and 
operations might be a hindrance. The curves for Marine Systems Engineering 
are shown in Figure 9-13. MSE CRRs involve practising emergency 
propulsion and power generation scenarios that have a ship-wide impact, and 
are not suited for scheduling at the same time as warfare scenarios. In Figure 
9-13, it can be seen that fisheries patrols allow ships to increase their MSE 
CRRs by 10 percent, and remain relatively constant in the months after. On 
the other hand, the intense nature of the multi-ship exercises may impede the 
ability of ships to improve in this category of CRR, as seen in the curve for 
CFO 3/01.
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Figure 9-13. Combat Readiness Requirements -  Marine Systems Engineering
9.4.2 Additional Training Value
In addition to Combat Readiness Requirements completed, the 
fisheries patrol allows ships to complete a number of miscellaneous training 
requirements. These include on-job training packages that required sea time, 
Officer-of-the-Watch bridge watch keeping by day and night for junior officers 
pursuing bridge watch keeping certificates, Engineering Officer-of-the-Watch 
certification endorsements, several marine systems engineering Head-of- 
Department and naval officer Certificate of Competency pre-boards, junior 
officer shiphandling practice, Captain’s Rounds, unit disciplinary training and 
radiation safety lectures. These are in addition to the normal non-CRR 
recurring training such as casualty clearing training, boarding stations, gun 
functioning, and so on.307
The training value of a fisheries patrol is highly dependent on its timing. 
Often it is the focussed training during a fisheries patrol that allows the ship to 
complete a great deal of individual training and some team training, preparing 
the crew to take full advantage an upcoming multi-ship exercise. Fisheries
307 Captain(N) Drew Roberston, Commanding Officer HMCS Athabaskan, interview by author, 
1 December 2000.
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patrols are a useful opportunity that is integral to the ship’s combat readiness. 
Almost any ship can benefit from one quiet period in a year to enhance 
training.308
9.4.3 Assessment of Enforcement Support on Combat Readiness
Table 9-16 and Figures 9-10 through 9-13 show consistently that, on 
average during fisheries patrols, Combat Readiness Requirements can be 
increased by about 5 to 10 percent depending upon category, but there is a 
corresponding decline in the month immediately following the patrol. In 
addition, on average, Combat Readiness Requirements can be increased if 
the ship trains with other warships and aircraft present. This is because most 
of the advanced Combat Readiness Requirements require multiple ship 
interaction to satisfy the criteria for sign off. Few advanced CRRs can be 
achieved on single ship operations, and at least 30 percent of CRRs are in the 
advanced category. So unless a ship is able to orchestrate the participation 
of other maritime forces in the vicinity of a fisheries patrol, the best that a 
fisheries patrol ship can hope to achieve is an average of 70 percent 
completion of CRRs.
While gains might be made in individual categories of CRRs during 
fisheries patrols, an across-the-board improvement of only five percent for all 
departments is insignificant, and the consistent decline in readiness 
immediately following the patrols suggest that there is no inherent benefit to 
combat readiness derived from support to fisheries enforcement by warships.
9.5 Summary
There have been a limited number of previous studies pertaining to 
fisheries enforcement and the possible deterrent effect of government patrol 
assets. The prior research has tended to emphasize the economic model of 
criminal behaviour; the concept of patrol presence was not an element of 
these studies. In terms of contribution to knowledge, the deterrence survey 
presented in this thesis should be interpreted as an exploratory study only.
308 Ibid.
387
This is due to its small sample size that renders the data statistically 
insignificant. Since there was limited presence of military patrol assets in the 
geographic areas fished by the majority of the respondents, the reliability of 
observations pertaining to patrol frequency is called into question. With those 
cautions in place, the deterrence survey conducted for this thesis suggests 
that, at least to some inshore fishermen, Canadian military patrol assets have 
little deterrent effect on law breaking.
A media content analysis undertaken for the year 2002 found that less 
than 10 percent of new stories pertained to naval support to other government 
departments. Naval support to fisheries enforcement accounted for only 0.002 
percent of all new stories carried by the print media in that year. The majority 
of new stories that had naval linkages were neutral in their portrayal of the 
Navy. In view of these three elements, it is likely that new stories about naval 
support to other government departments had little impact on public opinion of 
the Navy.
One of the key measures of the status of training of a naval vessel as a 
whole is the Combat Readiness Requirement. Warships that are assigned 
fisheries patrol duties have the opportunity for focused training without the 
distraction of other ships in company. Data reported on CRRs from 1999 to 
2001 indicate that readiness for combat can be increased by only about 5 to 
10 percent during fisheries patrols, but immediately after the patrol ends there 
is a loss of readiness. Thus, employment by warships on fisheries patrols 
offers no substantial value to naval commanders in terms of an increased 
readiness posture for their naval vessels.
The ephemeral increase in combat readiness during the fisheries 
patrols, the apparent lack of a deterrent effect, and the insignificant effect on 
public opinion suggest that there is no inherent benefit derived to the Navy 
from the employment of warships on fisheries patrols.
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Chapter Ten
ANALYSIS OF THE NAVAL ROLE IN MARITIME ENFORCEMENT 
10.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an analysis that suggests that the Canadian Navy 
could take on a greater role in domestic enforcement, but that there are many 
impediments and a lack of will that prevent it from doing so. The chapter 
describes how the Navy’s role in maritime security and enforcement continues 
to evolve, and how the Navy is charting the course for a whole-of-government 
approach in this domain. This discussion includes the potential for enhanced 
legal powers, the Navy’s key function in the Marine Security Response System, 
and improvement in surveillance planning. The chapter closes with a short 
recap of naval contributions to oceans management that are related to, but 
separate from its maritime enforcement support efforts.
10.2 Threats and Security
When any government has insufficient resources with which to fulfill its 
multiple mandates, prioritization must occur, and choices must be made as to 
what receives attention and what does not. These choices are made by either 
by commission or omission; failure to take a decision is a decision in and of 
itself. Over the past half century, the area that the Canadian government has 
chosen to place little emphasis has been precisely where oceans, security, and 
defence policies trisect.
The question is will this trisection continue to be a gap in government 
attention and, by extension, the necessary resources to maintain sovereignty 
and national security?
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Figure 10-1. Trisection of Federal Policies
The threats and activities of interest in Canada’s maritime zones will 
continue to be search and rescue, illegal fishing, drug smuggling, pollution 
incidents, illegal immigration, unauthorized at-sea research, petroleum and 
natural gas industry monitoring, whale and seabird protection, eco-tourism, 
foreign intelligence collection, and extremist activity. An emerging challenge for 
Canada though, is the implication from global warming and its effect on Arctic 
sovereignty. W armer temperatures will likely result in the Northwest Passage 
becoming more navigable, with an inherent increase in marine traffic, and the 
increased likelihood of enforcement issues in the north.289
Jeff Tasseron and George Lindsey observe ironically that the greatest 
threat to Canadian sovereignty could well be the superpower to the south, and 
caution that Canada alone is responsible for defending its sovereignty.290 
Indeed, the November 2005 transit to the North Pole by USS Charlotte, an 
American nuclear submarine, became an election issue for the sitting 
government in 2006 because it was suggested that the vessel had entered
289 Rob Huebert, “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest Passage,”
Isuma 2 No. 4 (Winter 2001): 86-94.
290 Tasseron, “Facts and Invariants,” 20; Lindsey, et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” 9.
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Canadian territorial waters during its submerged passage without informing 
Canadian authorities.291
The security climate changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall. It is unlikely 
that North America will face a conventional military threat as had been the case 
during the Cold War. However, globally non-state actors have threatened 
larger powers with asymmetric capabilities.292 It is reasonable to assume that 
terrorist groups are prepared to use merchant vessels to transport their 
personnel and weapons. Any number of scenarios can be imagined here, 
including attacks upon cruise liners. Intelligence sources indicate a large 
number of merchant vessels controlled by Al-Qaeda; unclassified sources 
place the number at just over a dozen.293 To combat these vulnerabilities, many 
security analysts agree on the need for greater surveillance of Canadian 
territory, maritime and aerial approaches.294
Dr. James Boutilier, testifying before the Standing Senate Committee on 
National Security and Defence, identified the lack of sufficient resources to 
execute the maritime security piece, in particular the weaknesses inherent in 
the existing federal government structure:
At the national level, virtually all of the organizations involved 
directly or indirectly in maritime security appear to have 
significant capacity problems. The escalator phenomenon 
prevailed during the 1990s fewer and fewer dollars chasing 
greater and greater responsibilities.”295
This concern should be serious to Canadians, in view of the dire 
condition of the Coast Guard and Fisheries and Oceans fleets given the age of 
the vessels and their state of “rust out.” It also supports the case for increased
291 Canadian Press,“Martin offers “necessary measures” in Arctic,” 19 December 2005. 
http://www.ctv. ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20051216/ELXN_arctic_051219?s_name 
=election2006&no_ads=> (26 December 2005).
292 Ralph Peters, “Constant Conflict,” Parameters (Summer 1997): 4-14.
293 David Pugliese, “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet,” Ottawa Citizen, (17 March 2004): A1-A2.
294 Lindsey, et al., “Canada’s Security Policies,” 5.; Bland and Maloney, Canada’s Defence 
Policy at the Turn of the Century, 205.
295 Testimony of Dr. James A. Boutilier, before the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence, Issue 19 -  Evidence 9 June 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2Zparlbus/ 
commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/19evb-e.htm> (7 February 2005).
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use of naval vessels for maritime sovereignty and security tasks.
10.3 Wariness for Increased Naval Role?
Peter Haydon points out that the place of navies in maritime security is 
clear, but increasingly naval forces are taking on a greater role in oceans 
management despite nations fielding coast guards for this express purpose. 
Haydon explains that the trend for many states to use their navies in this 
manner is that the capabilities needed for maintaining maritime security, 
specifically surveillance, presence and response, are precisely the same 
capabilities required for oceans management and sovereignty protection.296
Indeed, it is easy to understand what the sovereignty protection role of 
the Navy is when the triggering incident is some form of armed aggression 
towards Canada. This is clearly a defence scenario, and the Navy’s role in it is 
obvious. However, what is more difficult to divine what the Navy’s contribution 
should be in routine sovereignty tasks, in which the threat to Canada is 
contravention of Canadian law, and in which the lead agency is invariable 
another federal department. In routine sovereignty protection, the Navy is just 
one of several players.
The reality is that no single government department or agency on its 
own can assure the safety, security, or sovereignty of Canada, even in the 
post-911 environment with the greater visibility that these issues have received. 
Senator Colin Kennedy, in his 2004 Senate committee report The Longest 
Under-Defended Borders in the World, observes that the Canadian Coast 
Guard, the Canadian Navy, and by extension the RCMP, are not defending 
Canada’s coasts in “any meaningful way.297” Kenny opined that during the 37th 
Parliamentary hearings for the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence, the Committee was surprised to discover that:
296 Peter T. Haydon, “What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?” in Maritime Security in the 
Twenty-First Century: Maritime Security Occasional Paper No. 11, ed. E.L. Tummers (Halifax: 
Dalhousie University, December, 2000), 136.
297 SCONSAD, Longest Under-defended Borders in the World, 108-109. See also Kelly E. 
Williams, “The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign and Defence Policy,” in 
The Canadian Navy and the New Security Agenda: Proceedings of the Maritime Security and 
Defence Seminar, Toronto, 26-27 April 2004, ed. Ann L. Griffiths (Halifax: Dalhousie University,
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the Canadian navy is not defending Canada’s coasts -  other than 
assisting with surveillance -  and that the navy has no jurisdiction 
over interior waters, such as the Great Lakes. The Navy prefers 
to do its defending on waters far away. We learned that, despite 
its name, the Canada Coast Guard does not guard Canada’s 
coasts. Nor does it guard our interior waters.298
The committee concluded that no one department or agency in Canada was 
taking the lead in maritime security or in the protection of maritime sovereignty.
Senator Colin Kenny observes that the key federal departments with 
responsibilities for maritime security, Canadian Coast Guard, Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, and Canadian Navy are not funded adequately to fulfill their 
mandates in the offshore, inshore, and internal Canadian waters, including the 
Great Lakes and St Lawrence Seaway.299
In the post-9/11 environment, there has been considerable debate 
pertaining to the need for greater numbers of ships to patrol in Canada’s 
offshore estate. The Senate Committee on National Security and Defence 
criticized the Navy for “abandoning” coastal patrols by its ships.300 The 
misplaced emphasis on patrolling in ships also manifested itself as an element 
of the National Security Policy’s six-point plan for maritime security. A short 
think-piece at Simon Fraser University’s web-site Canadian American Strategic 
Review places emphasis on the need for many patrol vessels in the maritime 
approaches; in fact, there is even a proposal to employ the Navy’s slow-moving 
maritime coastal defence vessels under the aegis of an invigorated Coast 
Guard with constabulary powers.301
It would appear that the authors of these proposals don’t understand the 
sheer enormity of the area inside the 200 nautical mile Canadian EEZ. A lone
2004), 9.
298 Colin Kenny, “Defending Canada’s Coastal Waters: The King Canute Approach,” Toronto 
Star, 29 October 2003 <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ckenny/OPED%20Tor%20Star%200ct%2029- 
03.htm> (20 March 2004).
299 SCONSAD, Longest Under-defended Borders in the World, 14-27.
300 Ibid., 17.
301 “A Modest Proposal -  Maritime Security and Canada’s Economic Exclusion Zones: MCDV 
for an Interim Maritime Security Force?” Canadian American Strategic Review, 1 October 2004 
<http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp-ccgmcdv.htm> (28 February 2005).
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ship, even with the speed of a frigate, in such a vast featureless territory is a 
poor use of a resource if the aim is solely surveillance and detection of 
violations of Canadian law. The analogy of a police car making patrols of city 
streets and keeping the peace simply doesn’t fit in the maritime context. An 
ocean area is best covered by a combination of fixed arrays, aerial 
surveillance, and space-based assets. Patrol vessels are most efficient when 
vectored in to an area. The greatest benefit of a patrolling vessel is simply the 
demonstration of “presence,” particularly in remote areas, rather than an 
expectation that the vessel would actually detect wrongdoing. Presence is also 
useful for supporting claims of sovereignty; the Danes send ice-capable ships 
that conduct Davis Strait patrols every year to reinforce their contested claim to 
Hans Island.
The Canadian Navy maintains a significant presence in Canada’s 
maritime zones; moreover, naval vessels and supporting maritime patrol 
aircraft maintain presence in certain sections of the EEZ that other government 
departments do not. Presence also supports the argument for enhanced law 
enforcement powers, so that naval vessels could act when violations are 
encountered on routine operations.
While Canada’s Navy has always been active in the nation’s maritime 
affairs, there is a case to be made for expanding the naval role in domestic 
maritime enforcement in support of safeguarding national security and the 
exercise of Canadian sovereignty. A more comprehensive role for the Navy is 
both practical and necessary. The Navy should have all the legal tools 
required to enforce Canadian law in those areas. This is not to suggest that the 
Navy would shift its primary emphasis from preparing for combat at sea to 
coast guard duties. Rather, it is an appeal for powers that would enable the 
Navy to act upon violations detected while carrying out its fundamental military 
role. As was shown earlier, other government departments have become 
increasingly reliant on the Navy during a decade of government-wide 
retrenchment.
The Canadian Navy is fully engaged in safeguarding national security
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and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. In a period when patrol activities by 
other government departments has been waning, the Navy continues to 
maintain a not insignificant “on-the-water” presence in Canada’s maritime 
zones. The Navy’s tendency to revisit areas of high activity and traffic density 
coupled with its sophisticated modern sensor capability predisposes its vessels 
to detect breaches of domestic and international law. However, at present, 
unless a peace officer from another government department is embarked, there 
is little recourse open to a naval vessel other than to report it to the appropriate 
law enforcement authority and to wait for action to be taken by another 
department. Why then, has Canada been so reticent to take the next step, as 
have many other nations, to employ the Navy in enforcement of federal statutes 
in all Canadian maritime zones in a more primary manner than relegating it to a 
support role, as is the current situation?
10.4 Reticence to Use Armed Forces for Domestic Maritime Enforcement
The answer to the question posed above is found in a number of 
separate but related issues. The more significant of these can be summarized 
as follows:
a. public perceptions of the Army and a general unease with the 
use of the Army for law enforcement on land;
b. the question of the legitimacy of the use of the Canadian 
Forces for law enforcement;
c. the public’s inability to distinguish between the Army and the 
Navy, and
d. the concepts that constabulary duties are non-traditional, 
detract from the status of a navy, and erode its war fighting 
capability.
These will be examined in further detail and, in so doing, it will become evident
that these issues do not present such an insurmountable obstacle as may first
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be thought.
10.4.1 The Army and Law Enforcement
As instruments of national power, most Western armed forces have 
been conceived and maintained to execute state policy abroad, although they 
can be employed domestically in certain situations where their unique military 
attributes can be employed with great effectiveness. The skills and aptitudes 
derived from training for combat make armed forces highly suitable to assist 
local authorities in dealing with dangerous or violent confrontations. Equally, 
armed forces are a natural pool of disciplined, highly trained talent to assist in 
times of disaster.302
While armed forces may seem suited for the execution of domestic 
policy, in practice democratic governments constrain the internal use of their 
militaries, usually to avoid potential political fallout and to maintain the 
legitimacy of their democratic governance. Canada is no exception, and this 
tradition has its roots in British legal heritage, imported to British North America 
before Confederation.303
It is argued that the perceived unwillingness to employ the Canadian 
Army in law enforcement roles during modern times comes from long-standing 
prejudices resulting from misuse of the Army in foregone times. To better 
understand how attitudes have been shaped regarding this issue, it is useful to 
review the historic record, starting in Great Britain. Steven Haines observes 
that the British Bill of Rights of 1688 is the point of departure for an analysis of 
civil-military relations in the British Isles and, by extension, the Dominion of 
Canada. This Act rendered the Army subordinate to Parliament and restricted 
its use by the Crown.304 Haines notes also that the Bill of Rights of 1688 
makes no reference to the Royal Navy, a powerful arm of the state during that 
particular period of empire building. Clearly, it was not viewed as a threat to the
302 Steven W. Haines, “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain’s Maritime 
Domain” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1992), 210.
303 Ibid., 213.
304 E.C.S. Wade and A.W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Longman, 
1985), 406.
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domestic political structure of the era. After the Bill of Rights a series of Acts 
followed to provide statutory authority and funding for armed forces to operate 
on land.305
For well over two centuries, the army remained an important tool in the 
execution of domestic policy largely because it was the only organized body of 
men that the Crown could call upon for its coercive ends. Consequently, well 
into the nineteenth century, soldiers were employed to maintain public order, 
notwithstanding the potential risk to liberty. However, the activities of working 
class movements during the Industrial Revolution often instigated riots and 
demonstrations, and frequently necessitated the use of the Army to maintain 
public order. Over time, public figures in Great Britain began to question the 
means employed to maintain law and order and the appropriateness of the use 
of the Army for this purpose. This evaluation coincided roughly with the creation 
of Great Britain’s fledgling police forces, first in Scotland, then Ireland, and then 
in England. The Metropolitan Police Act of 1829 created an unarmed force of 
civilians that was based on the long established and generally accepted 
appointment of constable. These specific prerequisites were aimed at reducing 
public concern that a centrally controlled police force might pose the same 
threat to public liberty that had previously been the case with the Army.306
These attitudes towards the use of the army in the domestic context 
ultimately migrated to Canada, where the nation’s inaugural police force came 
into being in 1841 at Kingston, Ontario. Thereafter, across the country the 
concept of law enforcement by civilian authorities became institutionalized. 
That said, the Army was used on many occasions since the birth of the nation 
in 1867 to prior to World War Two, in order to quell disturbances, to suppress 
election disorder, and to put down uprisings such as the Riel Rebellion of 1885. 
Many of these were not, as we would say today, public affairs successes. For
305 P. Rowe, “The British Soldier and the Law,” in The Defence Equation: British Military 
Systems -  Policy, Planning, and Performance since 1945, ed. M. Edmonds (London:
Brassey’s, 1986), 175-190; quoted in Steven W  Haines, “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil 
Authorities in Britain’s Maritime Domain” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1992), 214.
306 F. Gregory, “The British Police System -  With Special Reference to Public Order Problems,” 
in Police and Public Order in Europe, J. Roach and J Thomaneck (London: Croone Helm,
1985), 37.
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example, the federal government enacted the Military Service Act of 1917 to 
permit conscription of men for service in Europe during the First World War. 
Opposed in Quebec, its passage divided the country along linguistic lines. 
When protests against conscription turned ugly in Quebec City 1 April 1918, 
troops were called in to quell the riots. Four persons were killed and 70 were 
wounded when the military forces opened fire. Some argue that the memory of 
this action remains with the population today, resulting in resentment towards 
using the Canadian Army to quell civil disorder.307
To gauge more recent public attitudes, if one looks at the most intrusive 
use of military force in the domestic context, Aid of the Civil Power, there have 
only been four instances of this type of employment by Canadian military forces 
since 1945.308 In 1969, the Army was called out during the Montreal general 
police strike. A year later in 1970, the FLQ crisis resulted in the invoking of the 
War Measures Act and the callout of the Army again to maintain order in the 
province of Quebec. The third instance was the 1976 case of a sniper in 
Alberta, and the most recent experience with Aid to the Civil Power was gained 
in 1990, again in Quebec, with the Oka crisis.
It is difficult to determine the real public sentiment towards the use of the 
Army for law enforcement purposes. In the case of both the FLQ and Oka 
crises, the armed forces were praised for the calm and disciplined manner in 
which they contained the crisis and prevented escalation.309 If there is truly 
lingering resentment towards use of Canadian Forces for law enforcement 
tasks, it is difficult to explain why visible military assistance is requested for 
major politically charged events such as the G8 ministers’ conferences in
307 Serge Durflinger, Les Purs Canayens: French Canadian Recruitment during the First World 
War, 27 September 2001 <http://www.civilisations.ca/cwm/disp/dis001_e.html> (7 February 
2005). See also Canadian Military History Gateway, Military Service A c t, 21 June 2004 
<http://www.cmhg.gc.ca/flash/ glossary/default-en.asp?organization=&t=1&osubject= 
&ss=&Ntx =mode%20matchall&resourcetype=&Ntt=military%20service%20act&Ntk= 
siResource&subjec t=&x=36&y=9&letter=M&page=3> (7 February 2005).
308 Aid to the Civil Power is a type of domestic operation in which military forces are called out 
to suppress a riot or disturbance of the peace because it is beyond the civil authorities to 
control.
309 Superintendent A. Antoniuk, Speech to RCMP officers at RCMP Training Academy, Regina 
Saskatchewan, 27 September 1990; Desmond Morton, Understanding Canadian Defence 
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Halifax (1995) and Kananaskis (2002), or the Summit of the Americas in 
Quebec City (2001).
This section has discussed possible origins of reticence for employing 
the Army in law enforcement roles, but has not addressed to the issue of naval 
enforcement. However, before that topic can be taken up, the issue of the 
legitimacy of the use of armed forces in such a role must first be explored.
10.4.2 Legitimacy of the Canadian Forces for Law Enforcement
Contrary to what many might wish to think, law enforcement is indeed a 
legitimate function of the Canadian Forces. Parliament has clearly indicated 
both its acceptance and expectation that its armed forces have a role in law 
enforcement in certain circumstances. This statutory basis can be found in the 
National Defence Act. This Act codifies the principles for control of the armed 
forces, as well as providing the legal framework for the provision of military 
support to provinces or other government departments for maintaining public 
order.310
Parliament has two major expectations vis-a-vis the armed forces and 
law enforcement. The first is that the Canadian Forces be capable of a broad 
spectrum of provision of services in both crisis and non-crisis scenarios as 
discussed in Chapter Five. Through the National Defence Act, Parliament 
empowers the Minister of National Defence or the Governor-in-Council to 
authorize the armed forces to “perform any duty involving public service,” 
including the “provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement 
matter.”311 At the low end of the spectrum, this takes the form of routine 
support to community activities. This is, by far, the most frequent type of 
domestic operation undertaken by the Canadian Forces and pertains to non­
crisis provision of services. Humanitarian assistance is also covered by this 
section of the National Defence Act.
The “provision of assistance in respect of any law enforcement matter”
310 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.
311 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. s. 273.6.
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clause in Section 273.6 of the National Defence Act also encompasses 
assistance to law enforcement agencies. Assistance rendered by the armed 
forces covers a broad spectrum of activities from provision of ranges or training 
areas for police use, to the suppression of prison disturbances.
Parliament’s second expectation vis-a-vis the armed forces and law 
enforcement is that the Canadian Forces be capable of taking responsibility for 
restoring public order when necessary, that is, be capable of coming to the aid 
of the civil power. Pursuant to the National Defence Act, military “service” can 
be furnished “in any case in which a riot or disturbance of the peace, beyond 
the powers of civil authorities to suppress, prevent or deal with and requiring 
that service.”312 The Chief of the Defence Staff is accorded the discretion to 
determine the scope and nature of military “service” in these situations. Under 
aid of the civil power, armed forces members possess the powers and duties of 
“constables” but remain under military command and control.
Aid of the civil power is a “service” that some might argue is the most 
controversial since it conjures up in the public’s eye images of soldiers with 
rifles patrolling Canadian streets and, as far as some are concerned, the idea 
of a police state with the threat of concomitant suspension of civil liberties. 
Sean Maloney asserts that employing military forces domestically is a 
’’politically provocative act, one that carries much weight regardless of the 
situation.”313 Further, argues Mathew Hammond, the use of military forces for 
law enforcement purposes obfuscates military and civilian roles, undermines 
civilian control of the armed forces, and is not an appropriate use of 
resources.314 Notwithstanding this criticism, the reality is that the concept of 
the police state has never been acceptable in Canada, and the requisitions for 
aid to the civil power are always undertaken as means of last resort. Moreover, 
as stated earlier, recent examples of armed forces employment in aid to the
3 National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.
313 Sean M. Maloney, “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach,” Parameters (Autumn, 
1997): 135-152.
314 Matthew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” 
Washington University Law Quarterly 75 (No. 2, Summer, 1997) 
<http://law.wustl.edU/WULQ/75-2/752-10.html#fn160> (6 February 2005).
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civil power met with overall approval.315 More importantly, though, Parliament 
has demonstrated through various legal instruments that it both accepts and 
expects Canada’s military to play a role in law enforcement.
Are there constitutional issues that prevent the Navy, as opposed to the 
Army, from enforcing Canadian law? Understanding that this enforcement 
would take place offshore in Canada’s maritime zones, a review of the 
Constitution Act indicates otherwise. Section 91 of the Act states that “the 
exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to . . . 
Militia, Military and Naval Service, and Defence . . . Beacons, Buoys, 
Lighthouses .. . Navigation and Shipping . . . Sea Coast and Inland Ferries.” 316 
All of these subjects are clearly related to maritime activities on or beyond the 
coasts, and the Act codifies federal responsibility for each. Section 92 of the 
Act lists the exclusive powers of the provinces. These are focused on activities 
and issues that affect provincial territory, i.e., land. For example, “in each 
Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to . . . Direct 
Taxation within the Province . . . Management and Sale of Public Lands . . 
.Establishment, Maintenance and Management of Hospitals . . . Tavern 
Licences . . . Property and Civil Rights.317 Thus, the Constitution Act clearly 
implies that Canada’s ocean zones are federal jurisdictions. As such, 
appropriate organs of the federal government may enforce Canadian law within 
these jurisdictions, provided they have the legal mandate. What would be 
required for the Navy to enforce, rather than just assist in enforcement, would 
be relatively minor amendments to various maritime-related enabling statutes.
Having established the legitimacy of the Canadian Forces and, by 
extension, the Canadian Navy for law enforcement tasks, it is time to examine 
potential biases.
10.4.3 Lack of Distinction between Army and Navy in “DomOps”
Notwithstanding the success of Kananaskis, Halifax and other fora in
315 Antoniuk, Speech at RCMP Training Academy, 27 September 1990; Morton, Understanding 
Canadian Defence, 158.
316 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91.
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which the Canadian military has been employed at domestic operations in high 
profile support of law enforcement agencies, in the public realm the perception 
is that “traditional” military law enforcement operations are those in which the 
Army is agency “of last resort.” For many there is no distinction between the 
Navy dealing with narcotics smuggling, pollution, and fisheries violations at sea, 
and the Army conducting aid to civil power operations on land. The latter are 
very visible, affect large numbers of citizens, and can be intrusive on normal life 
whereas naval enforcement operations are largely invisible to the majority of 
Canadians. Due to this lack of distinction, negative biases derived from 
perceptions of the Army’s operations are unconsciously applied to those of the 
Navy.
10.4.4 Enforcement as Non-Traditional Employment
When the question of naval law enforcement is raised, policy-makers, 
lawyers, and senior bureaucrats are reticent to concede that there might be a 
case for enhancing the Navy’s constabulary role because such activities are 
“non-traditional.” It can be argued that MOU-based counter-narcotics, fisheries, 
customs, and immigration law enforcement operations carried out by the Navy 
are not considered in the same category as the “force of last resort” missions. 
Rather, these types of operations are deemed more to fall into the realm of 
support to law enforcement agencies. That these operations are seen to be a 
“non-traditional” role for the Navy is both unfortunate and misinformed. Indeed, 
the need for fisheries protection from American interests in the waters of the 
Dominion of Canada around the turn of the century was a major factor in the 
creation of our homegrown Canadian naval service.318
Among naval analysts, the employment of navies for constabulary tasks is 
not a universally popular concept. A former head of the Navy, Vice-Admiral 
Gary Garnett stresses the importance of maintaining a distinction between the 
enforcement roles of the Canadian military and civilian authorities. He notes, 
as have many other analysts, that in Canada law enforcement traditionally has
317 Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92.
318 Marc Milner, Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 
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been a civilian function, although it is accepted that the armed forces may 
provide support to assist civilian agencies when circumstances warrant. With 
respect to naval law enforcement, there are disadvantages to employing naval 
vessels in these roles. The most apparent is that navies are designed for war- 
fighting, not constabulary tasks. In fact, during the Cod Wars with Iceland, 
Great Britain’s frigates proved to be too “over-sophisticated” for the task.319 
Garnett’s principal concern is to avoid the watering down of combat skills of 
naval personnel and his point is well taken. However, the intent would not be 
to convert the Canadian Navy into a fleet of coast guard cutters. Rather, naval 
ships would continue to train for their primary combat roles, and small teams 
would receive additional specialized training for them to become proficient at 
their secondary constabulary duties.
Peter Haydon argues that the Navy should be the key contributor to 
sovereignty and security patrols of Canada’s maritime zones, in all parts of the 
water column and super-adjacent airspace,320 because it is the sole department 
that has the capability to do them properly and efficiently, and the only 
organization that understands and can implement the concept of sea control.321 
Haydon also notes that the notion that the Navy should take on greater 
constabulary roles will always be contentious. He argues that, given the 
diminished state of the Canadian Coast Guard, consideration should be given 
to turning over northern sovereignty patrols to the Navy over time. Likewise, he 
posits that increased naval fisheries patrols make sense, with the actual 
inspections to be carried out by dedicated Conservation and Inspection Officers 
assigned to the warships.322
But Haydon also cautions against too much “constabularization” to the 
point that the nation has only a coast guard. In that scenario, he argues that 
Canada would find itself excluded from multinational naval operations. Both he 
and Garnett suggest that sending forces perceived to be of a constabulary
319 Elizabeth Young, “Policing Offshore: Civil Power or Armed Forces,” RUSI Journal 122 (No.
2, June 1977): 18-22.
320 Super-adjacent airspace is a legal term used to define the airspace immediately above the 
surface of the water in the water column in question.
321 Haydon, Canadian Naval Future, 13-14.
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law is invoked against a single vessel and not against a state, there should be 
no provocation.” Likewise, he adds, so many other countries use their navies 
for fisheries protection, it can be argued that there is a strong prima facie case 
for Canada to follow suit.325
Garnett is not the sole naval commander to express reservations about 
enhancing the Navy’s constabulary role. Why are so many Canadian flag 
officers opposed to the Navy taking on a more active domestic maritime 
enforcement posture? The idea should not be discounted that there could be 
simple deep-seated biases at play. In his book Sea Power and the Law of the 
Sea, Mark Janis described five classes of navies, with the US and Soviet 
superpowers ranked at the top of the pecking order. The navies of Great 
Britain and France formed the second tier, but remained categorized as first- 
class “blue-water navies.” The remaining classes are described as “coastal” by 
Janis due to their lack of naval power in comparison with the navies of the first 
two tiers.326 Closer to home, Canadian naval planners, drawing heavily from 
Eric Grove’s Future of Seapower, expanded the number of classes to nine in 
their 2001 naval policy document Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020. In 
this typology, the number one category, i.e., “major global force projection navy 
(complete)” is reserved for the United States. At the lowest rungs of the ladder 
are the “constabulary and token” navies. Canada ranks its navy in the third 
category far away from those navies described as being “constabulary.”327 
Measured against yet another generally accepted scale, Canada meets the 
criteria to earn the label “medium-power navy” as defined by Rear-Admiral 
Richard Hill.328
Why is this relevant? Simply put, there is generally a correlation between
325 Colin S. Gray, Canada’s Maritime Forces Wellesley Paper 1 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs, January, 1973), 46.
326 Mark W. Janis, Sea Power and the Law of the Sea (Lexington, Mass: Heath, 1976), 63-64.
327 Canada, Department of National Defence, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 
(Ottawa: Directorate of Maritime Strategy, 2001), 43-45. The nine categories in this 
classification system are: 1) major global force projection navy (complete), 2) major global force 
projection navy (partial), 3) medium global force projection navy, 4) medium regional force 
projection navy, 5) adjacent force projection navy, 6) offshore territorial defence navy,7) inshore 
territorial defence navy, 8) constabulary navy,7) token navy.
328 Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers, 20.
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ranking of a nation’s navy and the nation’s status in the international system. 
The majority of navies of developed countries occupy the upper tiers of the 
ranking system, whereas the developing countries’ navies, those of a more 
constabulary nature, are found in the lower end of the ranking spectrum.329 
While some might argue that the reluctance to take on enforcement tasks 
reflects a desire to devote the Navy’s limited resources to combat functions, it 
may well be that the senior naval leadership perceives a certain stigma if its 
fleets are associated with constabulary tasks rather than power projection or 
more war-like functions that rank them higher on the international stage. The 
Canadian Navy, given its early roots as a fisheries protection force, wished to 
shed that image and become a “real” navy. The attitudes of modern naval 
officers might well be a legacy of concern over image.
As discussed earlier, both Garnett and Haydon have cautioned against 
“non-traditional,” that is, law enforcement employment of Canada’s naval 
forces. However, they have not stated their case as categorically as did one 
witness who appeared before the Senate Committee on National Security and 
Defence. A former Commissioner of the Canadian Coast Guard, Mr. John 
Thomas, argued passionately against any increase in law enforcement powers 
for the Navy, citing cost and the need to maintain the option of a graduated 
response:
I do not think that DND should have the role of coastal security.
DND's ships, aircraft and trained personnel are very expensive, 
perhaps as much as 10 times the cost of Coast Guard 
equipment and personnel. Navy personnel are trained for war 
and navy systems are developed for war, not to fulfill a policing 
role on the coast. . .  the navy should be called upon only when 
the police force cannot do the job. . . when a situation arises 
that police officers cannot deal with, you escalate the action up 
to the next level, but you do not start at the highest level. I must 
emphasize that point. There is a need for a flexible response.
The military should be seen, from a policy perspective, as a 
force of last resort, in the same way as they are for land-based 
police operations. We do not call in the military to work with, 
say, the Toronto police unless the police are facing a significant 
situation that is beyond their capacity. The military is not called
329 Michael A. Morris, “Military Aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone,” in Ocean Yearbook 3 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), 336.
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in as a first step.330
Thomas and, to a lesser extent, Haydon and Garnett speak to a bipolar 
world of a bygone era during which Canada’s Navy was structured to counter 
symmetric threats. It is unlikely that North America will face a conventional 
military threat as had been the case during that era of the Cold War. The 
maritime security environment changed with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and its 
continuing evolution was punctuated with the terrorist attacks against the World 
Trade Center in 2001. Globally, societies are witnessing an increased 
emphasis on asymmetric capabilities by organized crime and a variety of trans­
state actors. It is reasonable to assume that terrorist groups are prepared to 
use merchant vessels to transport their personnel and weapons; any number of 
scenarios can be imagined here. Intelligence sources indicate that there are a 
large number of merchant vessels that are controlled by Al-Qaeda; unclassified 
sources place the number at just over a dozen.331
In addition to counter-terrorism, the protection of fishing rights, the 
prevention of illegal activity at sea, such as piracy or the smuggling of 
contraband or human cargo, and the protection of the environment will continue 
to require vigilance on the part of the federal government.332 The National 
Security Policy, calls for effective integrated multiple agency threat 
assessment, protection and prevention capabilities.333 However, it is no longer 
easy to understand what the sovereignty protection role of the Navy is when, as 
observed in Canada’s International Policy Statement, “the boundary between 
the domestic and international continues to blur.”334 The International Policy 
Statement Canada’s continues with the assertion that “defence and security 
policy must change.”335 Thus, while the thinking of Thomas et al may have 
been adroit at one time, the point has been reached to discard old paradigms
330 Testimony of John F. Thomas before the Senate Committee on National Security and 
Defence, Issue 19 -  Evidence 9 June 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/ 
senate/Com-e/defe-e/19eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl= 37&Ses=2&comm_id=76> (7 February
2005).
331 Pugliese, “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet,” A1-A2.
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333 Privy Council Office, Canada’s National Security Policy, 5.
334 Canada, Privy Council Office, Canada’s International Policy Statement (Ottawa: 2005), 12.
335 Ibid.
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about traditional employment for the Navy and to consider what is practical and 
relevant for the future maritime security environment. Other nations have 
already done so.
10.5 European Example of Naval Enforcement
If one looks to European nations for comparison, one notes that many 
employ their navies in limited law enforcement capacities. Fisheries protection 
has long been a traditional role for European naval and coast guard forces. The 
experience of Great Britain’s Royal Navy in this role dates back to the 16th 
century.336 At present, in the United Kingdom, law enforcement is defined as 
military aid to the civil authority, and the Royal Navy undertakes the following 
missions: quarantine enforcement; fishery protection; contraband operations; 
drug interdiction; oil and gas field patrols; anti-piracy operations; support to 
counter-insurgency operations; and maritime counter-terrorism.337 Moreover, 
the Royal Navy maintains a Fisheries Protections Squadron with eight offshore 
patrol vessels.338
In other parts of Europe the French Navy, for example, acquired patrol 
vessels several years ago for policing tasks.339 Farther north, the Norwegian 
Coast Guard forms part of the Royal Norwegian Navy, and has been given 
enforcement powers for over 25 laws through the Norwegian Coast Guard Act. 
These include fisheries, customs, immigration and safety-at-sea laws. 
Denmark has no coast guard; the Danes do not distinguish a maritime task as 
being coast guard or naval in nature. The Danish Navy exercises police 
authority for enforcement of sovereignty issues.340
European navies generally furnish law enforcement services directly to 
national authorities through MOUs. Usually what these navies provide are 
naval platforms and facilities. In some cases, such as the Danish model, the 
Navy carries out constabulary and traffic-police duties, whereas the appropriate
336 Pugh, “Policing the Seas,” 111.
337 Ibid., 109.
338 Ibid., 108.
339 Michel d’Oleon, “Policing the Seas: The Way Ahead," in The Role of European Naval Forces 
after the Cold War, edited by G. de Nooy (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 144.
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civil authority conducts the criminal investigations.341 From a European 
perspective, naval participation in law enforcement is a significant contribution 
to good governance at sea.”342
10.6 United States Experience with Posse Comitatus
It is useful to compare the Canadian position towards naval enforcement 
vis-a-vis those of our neighbour to the south where the use of the armed forces 
for domestic enforcement has, until recently, been prohibited by law. By way of 
background, the Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to prevent the US 
Army from carrying out law enforcement tasks in the United States. The 
enactment of this legislation was a reaction to the use of military forces in the 
confederate states for the maintenance of peace and good order, enforcement 
of policies for post-Civil War reconstruction, and to ensure that rebellious 
sentiments did not re-ignite. The US Congress became concerned when the 
Army stationed troops at political events and polling stations under the premise 
of ensuring civil order. As Craig Trebilcock points out, the intent of this federal 
statute was to prevent the Army from becoming “the national police force” of 
the United States. Accordingly, the Posse Comitatus Act was enacted to return 
the Army to its proper role in defence of US territory, and to make it illegal for 
US troops to be used for civilian law enforcement, except in very specific 
circumstances.343
In the era that the Posse Comitatus Act was passed, it was much easier 
to distinguish between defence tasks and civil law enforcement tasks since the 
military threat of the day was posed by standing military forces of foreign 
powers. As noted earlier, with the advent of modern technology facilitating the 
increased prominence of asymmetric threats, the distinction between these two 
subsets of national security becomes somewhat blurred.
Interesting is the fact that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 did not apply
340 Pugh, “Policing the Seas,” 105.
341 Ibid., 130.
342 Ibid., 108.
343 Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of Posse Comitatus, October 2000, 
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to the US Navy, only the US Army. It is possible that, as with Great Britain’s 
Bill of Rights of 1688 that likewise made no reference to naval forces, the US 
Navy was not viewed as a threat to the domestic political structure of the era. 
In 1956, an amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act caused the same 
restrictions to be applied to the US Air Force, but curiously made no mention of 
the US Navy. It was interpreted though that the implied purpose of the act was 
to prohibit military forces in general from conducting civilian law enforcement. 
Thus, in 1974 the US Secretary of the Navy issued a formal instruction that 
stated that although the act did not specifically apply to the Navy, its principles 
were to be upheld. That said, the instruction also gave the US Navy a 
loophole; the directive stated that the Navy could be employed for civilian law 
enforcement purposes with the express permission of the US Secretary of the 
Navy, a civilian official. Thus, the principle of civilian control over military forces 
could be maintained.344
The “get tough” anti-drug campaign of the Reagan administration in the 
early 1980s resulted in a law being passed and a Defense directive issued that 
eased the way for US Navy involvement in at-sea counter-narcotics 
enforcement by enabling the US Secretary of Defense to provide equipment 
and facilities to civilian law enforcement personnel and provided approval for 
US Navy and Marine Corps personnel to participate in maritime interdiction 
operations against ships and aircraft in violation of US law.345 In 1982, at the 
request of the US Department of Transport, the US Secretary of Defense 
approved US Navy support to the US Coast Guard for law enforcement 
purposes. Specifically, the US Navy could conduct surveillance, tow or escort 
seized vessels, transport prisoners, provide logistic support to Coast Guard 
units and embark Coast Guard personnel to conduct boardings of American 
and stateless vessels.346 In addition, according to Trebilcock, the United States 
has also developed an interesting legal procedure whereby a Navy vessel
344 Michael R. Adams, “Navy Narcs,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September, 
1984): 35.
345 See the US Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-86) and 
Department of Defense Directive 5525.5 (22 March 1982).
346 Memorandum from US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, to US Secretary of 
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becomes a Coast Guard vessel when required:
. . . the USS Kidd intercepted a drug-smuggling boat in 1983.
When the smugglers refused to yield without force, the problem 
of passive versus active law enforcement was handled by 
lowering the Navy ensign on the ship and raising the Coast 
Guard ensign. The Coast Guard asset USS Kidd then fired on 
the smugglers’ ship, rendering it immobile and leading to its 
seizure, along with 900 bales of marijuana.347
These powers and procedures mark a considerable departure from the 
outright prohibition on US naval involvement in law enforcement and indicate 
American acceptance of this role for their Navy.
Having established the legitimacy of the use of the Navy for law 
enforcement purposes, and challenged some perceptions about constabulary 
and non-traditional naval employment, what remains to be discussed is what an 
enhanced mandate for naval law enforcement would really entail.
10.7 Proposal for Naval Enforcement in Canadian Maritime Zones
At present, Canadian naval forces are relegated to a support function 
only, essentially providing a glorified taxi service for enforcement officers from 
other federal departments, except under special circumstances when coercive 
force is required, and is requested by the appropriate Minister. I believe that the 
Canadian Navy should be empowered with the legal authority to enforce 
directly selected federal statutes on a routine basis throughout the maritime 
zones of Canadian jurisdiction.
Were these legal powers granted, what would this new role entail? The 
basic premise is that the Navy’s fundamental mission would remain the 
“generation and maintenance of combat-capable, multipurpose maritime forces 
to meet Canada's defence objectives.”348 That said, were naval vessels to 
detect violations to Canadian law while conducting their defence or sovereignty 
missions, they would have the requisite legal tools to act upon those 
discoveries. However, this is not to suggest that the Navy would be obliged to
347 Trebilcock, “ The Myth of Posse Comitatus.”
348 Department of National Defence, Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020, 92.
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cease its operations to deal with violations detected. Rather, the naval 
commanding officer’s decision whether to enforce would be shaped by the 
priority of his naval operations and the circumstances of the violation detected. 
In practice, this precedent already exists; throughout Canada police officers 
have similar discretion to choose when and where to enforce laws, with due 
consideration to the severity of the offences, the risk to the public, and so on. 
As well, the Navy would not be expected to enforce all federal statutes, only 
those that apply to specific activities on the seas. These would be limited only 
to those offences that are directly linked to the protection of Canadian 
sovereignty and this should allay concerns referred to earlier about police 
power in the hands of the military.
The proposed new role would not see the Navy conducting 
investigations of violations detected at sea. Rather, naval personnel would 
carry out the preliminary work designed to contain the scene. Again, an 
analogy of normal police work is useful. Throughout Canada general duty 
police officers are normally first at the scene, then turn over difficult or serious 
cases to the general investigative services, or detectives as they are commonly 
known. The general duty officer is trained on basic policing functions i.e., 
understanding how an investigation is carried out, how not to contaminate a 
crime scene, how to maintain care and custody of evidence, and how to deal 
with suspects, etc so that the detectives can investigate the case in detail. This 
basic knowledge is necessary so that the Crown’s case is not derailed by 
procedural errors at the outset. In the model proposed in this paper, naval 
personnel would act as the general duty officers, and would turn over the case 
for investigation by Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Environment Canada, or the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police as appropriate. Moreover, the support to 
enforcement already established by interdepartmental MOU would not change. 
Thus routine patrols with fisheries or RCMP officers embark would continue, 
and reactive operations, such as counter-drug interdictions would be carried 
out with the appropriate enforcement officers embarked.
Some argue that the Navy would not be competent to undertake a more
direct enforcement role, primarily because naval personnel are not in tune with
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the requirements for the prosecution of a court case. Essentially, this is a 
question of training and shipboard organization. One solution would be to
confer peace officer status to all watch-keeping officers and a small cadre of
sailors.349 These people would train specifically for law enforcement duties, 
and become the ship’s experts at the use of force, care and custody of
evidence etc. The logical choice for these teams would be the personnel who
form the Navy’s existing naval boarding parties. At present, naval boarding 
party team training is very similar but shorter to that received by Canadian 
police officers, and would require minimal adjustment to cater to at-sea 
enforcement requirements, mainly to become familiar with the minimal number 
of federal statutes that would be enforced by the Navy, and to augment the 
team’s understanding of requirements for court.350
In my view, there is little doubt that the Navy could execute an enhanced 
enforcement role, given its considerable experience in maritime interdiction 
operations abroad. Whether it will be given that chance remains an open 
question.
10.8 Champion and Enabler for Marine Security Processes
Captain(N) Peter Avis, naval representative to the Interdepartmental 
Maritime Security Working Group from 2001 to 2003, compared the practices of 
three western nations in terms of domain awareness, safeguarding, 
responsiveness, and collaboration. His examination of the cases of Australia, 
Norway, and the Netherlands allowed him to reach conclusions about “best 
practices” for maritime security.
In his 2004 study, Avis identified a “whole-of-government approach” that 
emphasizes collaboration as the foremost best practice for maritime security. 
He found that by cultivating an expectation to collaborate across all levels of 
government, especially with regard to crafting of legislation and intelligence
349 This idea was proposed as a means of preparing the Canadian Coast Guard for 
constabulary duties. See Thomas, Testimony before SCONSAD, 9 June 2003; See also 
Canada. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. Safe, Secure, 
Sovereign: Reinventing the Canadian Coast Guard. March, 2004. p. 48.
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coordination with law enforcement, Australia achieved an integrated national 
security effort that has proven successful in dealing with a number of terrorist 
and anti-migration incidents in the recent past. Avis posits that adoption by 
Canada of a whole-of-government approach would resolve many of the 
shortcomings identified by the Senate Committee on National Security and 
Defence.351
A whole-of-government approach is prescribed in the National Security 
Policy; moreover, there is a presumption by the Canadian taxpayer that a 
whole-of-government approach is being employed already for maritime security 
and enforcement. However, the taxpayer does not recognize the self-imposed 
constraints that shape government department operations, or the “stove-piped” 
method of conducting business that continues to be the modus operandi in the 
federal apparatus. While a laudable objective, at this juncture, the “whole-of- 
government approach” remains in its infancy, and requires continual 
reinforcement by politicians and senior bureaucrats at all levels during 
operations and exercises to ensure that the concept takes root.
Avis’ study remarked on another collaborative best practice, a “common 
risk assessment methodology.” This approach calls for applying a common 
language among departments such that they can compete for resources in an 
equitable fashion acceptable to all maritime security stakeholders. The use of 
this methodology facilitates the allocation of resources based on current 
intelligence assessments, allowing the right resources to be focused in the right 
area at the right time. In Australia, the use of this approach has resulted in a 
dramatic decline in illegal maritime activities.352
Both best practices identified by Avis are at the heart of the fledgling 
federal Marine Security Response System, an initiative being developed among 
key departments and being championed by the Navy to integrate better the 
Federal Emergency Response System, National Emergency Response
350 Based on author’s experience and training as a former member of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police.
351 Avis, “Comparing National Approaches to Maritime Security,” 65-66.
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System, and Marine Security Operations Centres.
10.8.1 Marine Security Response System
Since the requirement for the Marine Security Operations Centres was 
identified in the National Security Policy, their development has been pursued 
in parallel with the establishment and evolution of Public Safety Canada, and 
the development and approval of the Federal Emergency Response Plan. As 
discussed in Chapter Six, the FERP identifies the role of Public Safety Canada 
and the Government Operations Centre, and further defines structures for the 
Federal and National Emergency Response Systems.
Lessons learned from interdepartmental exercises as well as operational 
experience within the Atlantic region over the past two years indicated that 
there was a requirement to align MSOC operations, the roles and functions of 
Public Safety Canada, and relevant elements of the Federal Emergency 
Response Plan. The creation of a single Marine Security Response System 
(MSRS) was the manifestation of this alignment effort. The Commander of 
Maritime Forces Atlantic, on behalf of the Navy, has been the chief advocate of 
the MSRS, and has facilitated a number of strategy meetings with Regional 
Directors General and their planning staffs to develop the template for this 
response system.353
Commander MARLANT, Rear-Admiral Dean McFadden, observed that 
when the National Security Policy was signed, the Navy had two tangible 
contributions to offer the federal partners. The first was a near real-time 
“picture” of the maritime environment, the Recognized Maritime Picture. The 
second was an operations centre run on a 24/7 basis, where the RMP could be 
enhanced with intelligence data then shared, and from where an on-water 
response could be coordinated.354
352 Ibid., 66.
353 Randy Wyatt and Commander Russ Stuart were the two staff officers who developed the 
MSRS template for Commander MARLANT. Figures 10-2 to 10-3 are adaptations of figures 
created by Wyatt for the members of the Federal Co-ordinating Steering Committee.
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When the MSOCs were first stood up, the view held by many in the 
federal marine security sector was that the MSOC functions were intelligence 
collation and data fusion only. In addition to being a living laboratory in 
examining technologies, intelligence, methodologies, information exchange and 
operational capabilities, McFadden believed that the MSOC’s role extended 
well beyond the development of situational awareness. He argued that the 
MSOC organizational structures and processes be optimized for integration:
It is not sufficient that we collaborate better, that we improve 
cooperation as an adjunct to individual mandates, whatever they 
may be; it is essential that collaboration be a prime driver of how 
we are structured, how we train and how we conduct our 
operations.355
In the Marine Security Response System construct proposed by the 
Navy, the MSOCs remain distinct entities within the system for providing 
maritime domain awareness, conducting threat assessment and alerting and, 
when deemed necessary, conducting collaborative operations planning for a 
whole-of-government response. Collaborative operations planning is 
conducted by a multi-departmental team appropriately selected to ensure that 
required authorities, subject matter expertise, and resource authorities can 
work together on the response, while maintaining the required level of 
operational security. This is referred to in Figures 10-2 and 10-3 as “variable 
geometry.”356
When an on-water response is necessary, a separate and distinct 
Military Operations Centre (MOC) is engaged as the means to co-ordinate the 
conduct of the operation. The appropriate military commander co-ordinates the 
on-water response. This does not imply lead agency status or overall control of 
all sea and air assets. Rather, the military commander is the enabler that 
provides the lead agency with the infrastructure and command and control 
architecture necessary for the conduct of complex maritime operations. 
However, the military commander does exercise command and control of all
354 Rear-Admiral P.D. McFadden, Speech to Dalhousie University Master of Public 
Administration Program, 19 November 2007.
355 Ibid.
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military forces, thereby requiring a secure operations centre separate from the 
MSOC.
In introducing the Marine Security Response System, the Navy has 
persuaded other government departments that the planning effort must be 
collaborative in principle and execution, rather than each department 
approaching the security or enforcement problem in isolation. In addition to 
concept development, the Navy has facilitated the conditions for collaborative 
planning through the allocation of physical space and information technology 
resources for a Marine Security Operations Centre where real collaborative 
planning can take place under one roof.
The federal emergency response systems are set up to cope with 
natural disasters, and pandemics. They were not created with human-induced 
national security issues in mind. Public Safety Canada co-ordinates with 
provincial, territorial, municipal, and private agencies to effect the broad whole- 
of-government response to the consequences of an incident in an unsecured 
environment.357 Movement from the secure to non-secure domain is very much 
risk-dependent. Understanding this, Commander MARLANT pressed hard for 
the creation of the regional Federal Coordinating Steering Committee to 
provide oversight and direction in those incidents when the security threat is 
deemed to be complex by its nature or magnitude, and could result in severe 
consequences ashore or at sea. In those scenarios, the risks of maintaining 
operational security (normally inhibiting information sharing) must be balanced 
with the risks to public safety. The Federal Coordinating Steering Committee 
assesses the overall risk, determines the variable geometry, selects members 
and provide direction to collaborative operations planning team based on the 
variable geometry; and through Public Safety Canada and the Government 
Operations Centre, maintains federal government situational awareness.
Figure 10-2 is the proposed marine security functional template
356 Term coined by Wyatt and Stuart.
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championed by the Navy to the other government departments, but in particular 
to Public Safety Canada. In the figure the two security domains are 
distinguished; the non-secure domain in which consequence management of 
natural disasters is carried out, and the secure domain in which threats of 
human origin are managed. The two operations centres are pictured, the 
military operations centre for command and control of military forces and co­
ordination of other government department assets, and the marine security 
operations centre with its intelligence and data fusion function. The dotted pink 
ellipse joining the two operations centres represents their linkage by co-location 
as well as by function, in terms of collaborative planning.
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Figure 10-2. Proposed Marine Security Functional Template
Source: Randy Wyatt, Briefing Note for Commander MARLANT
By virtue of its military character, and well-established inter-Service and 
inter-Allied operational planning process, the Navy brings discipline to the 
domestic marine security response system. The participation and leadership of
357 What is meant by “unsecured” is that the matter is not of such a grave risk to national or 
Allied security that increased security precautions must be taken to prevent disclosure. In other 
words, this is the “unclassified” realm.
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naval officers in multi-departmental consequence management influences other 
federal partners to follow agreed-upon protocols rather than adopting different 
and usually ad hoc process each time a marine security incident develops
Figure 10-3 is a graphical representation of the proposed whole-of- 
government decisions support process that spans both the regional and 
national levels. Each federal department with a security or enforcement 
mandate is shown as a column. On the right of the figure are the various 
governance bodies and committees.
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Figure 10-3. Whole-of-Government Decision Support Process -  Marine Security
Source: Randy Wyatt, Briefing Note for Commander MARLANT
Another key role in the evolution of marine security that has been taken 
on by the Navy is to act as the engine that drives other government 
departments through a series of realistic exercises forcing thorny legal 
problems to be addressed. Commander MARLANT has used a number of 
these command-post exercises, such as Frontier Sentinel 2007, to identify 
jurisdictional conflicts. In the case of Frontier Sentinel, an international
exercise that involved the simulated arrest of a vessel carrying suspected
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terrorists, lawyers representing various departments advised the senior 
leadership during the game play that certain actions could not be carried out. 
Normally when this happens, the advice is taken, and game play is adjusted so 
that the existing legal framework is respected. However, during Frontier 
Sentinel 2007, the lawyers were instructed simply to “red flag” the issue, but to 
carry on as though the proposed action had been sanctioned. This led to 
additional “red flags” being identified, but importantly, it finally achieved staff 
discussion on how to resolve the legal technicality for operational necessity 
rather than simply dismissing the action as being unachievable under the 
existing framework.
Notwithstanding considerable effort by staffs at the federal level, the 
restrictions and challenges related to information sharing between the 
departments have changed little post-911. While some progress at the regional 
level is being made, and recent table top exercises in Canada and the United 
States have been fruitful in determining exactly what is allowed to be shared by 
whom, to whom and when, this aspect of marine security remains the Achilles 
heel to an effective whole-of-government marine security response system.
10.8.2 Improved Surveillance Planning
When the work on this thesis commenced several years ago, maritime 
surveillance planning by National Defence and other government departments 
that possessed surveillance capabilities was done in isolation from one 
another. Fisheries and Oceans Canada planned and executed their fisheries 
surveillance flights without consultation with DND, Transport Canada, or 
Environment Canada. Within MARLANT, the Maritime Component 
Commander(Atlantic) scheduled CP-140 Aurora flights in consultation with a 
junior naval intelligence officer, but this consultation did not extend to DFO. 
This stove-piped method of surveillance planning is no longer the norm, and is 
the result of two specific initiatives: this thesis, and the National Security 
Policy’s direction to create marine security operations centres.
The collection of data for this thesis, and the acquisition of ArcView
software for the Maritime Operations Centre demonstrated to the operations
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and surveillance planning staffs the power and analysis capability of a modern 
GIS. This allowed the senior naval leadership to be briefed in greater detail, 
and allowed for a greater number of questions pertaining to surveillance to be 
answered. With this analysis capability came the realization that surveillance 
assets were not being employed as effectively as they could be in concert with 
other government departments.
The creation of MSOCs that required co-location of analysts from a 
number of departments also led to an understanding that each department was 
conducting its surveillance planning using its own geographic demarcation or 
grid system, and often without knowledge of another department’s patrol 
assets’ movements. This resulted in both gaps in coverage, and duplication of 
surveillance effort in some sectors of the maritime zones and approaches. This 
was not as evident on the west coast where the Exclusive Economic Zone is 
only a fraction of the size of the Atlantic EEZ. As well, there are fewer 
surveillance assets to harness. However, on the east coast, the surveillance 
effort was not orchestrated for the most effective use of available assets.
In Maritime Forces Atlantic, defence scientists from operations research 
developed a new interdepartmental surveillance grid in consultation with naval 
operations, air operations, DFO and Transport Canada staff. This new grid 
divided the MARLANT area of responsibility divided into 12 areas. Five 
comprise the outer zone that is the area beyond the EEZ to the CANLANT 
boundary. Four areas are found between the coast and the EEZ. Two areas 
are defined for the eastern arctic, and the Gulf of St Lawrence is a designated 
surveillance area on its own. The interdepartmental surveillance grid is shown 
at Figure 10-4.
In implementing the new surveillance grid in 2007 and commencing
collaborative surveillance planning among military, DFO and TC staffs,
performance measurement was based on how often government patrol assets
were able to revisit sectors of the grid. This was premised on the fact that
although many sensor systems are available to detect vessels in the maritime
zones, only surveillance aircraft can both detect and identify non-emitting
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vessels in a large area.358
Figure 10-4. New Interdepartmental Surveillance Planning Grid
Source: Joint Task Force Atlantic operations staff, 2008.
After several months of using this method of performance measurement, 
it was determined that to have a high probability of identification of a non­
emitting vessel, the surveillance effort in the inner and middle zones was 
sufficient with the resources of all of the departments, but it could not be 
achieved without co-ordination among departments. It was also determined 
that surveillance presence in the outer zones was insufficient. The CP-140s 
flew too flew sorties to provide a high probability of identification -  this was a 
function of using CP-140s for missions close to the coasts when their best 
employment was in the outer zones where the OGD aircraft didn’t have the 
endurance. The outcome of this new system and performance measures was 
that emphasis was shifted on CP-140 flights to the outer zones only, and extra 
surveillance hours were purchased from PAL for the inner zones to make up for 
the CP-140 retasking.359
358 Revisit rate is the time between successive surveillance flights in a given sector, and is 
based on the probability of identification of transiting vessel.
359 Neil Carson, Briefing to Maritime Domain Awareness Working Group, Esquimalt, British 
Columbia, 27 February 2008.
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The Navy will continue to champion collaborative surveillance planning 
as an essential element of the whole-of-government approach to marine 
security. Naval operational research scientists have demonstrated to the 
senior naval leadership that dynamic contour plots, similar to the surface model 
figures in this thesis, provide a more accurate measurement of performance 
than fixed grid planning boundaries alone, and are devising tools to enable 
these plots to be generated for routine use in the MSOCs.360
10.9 Additional Naval Contribution to Oceans Management
All of the earlier material in this thesis has emphasized the Navy’s 
support to sovereignty protection, marine security and maritime enforcement in 
terms of in maritime domain awareness, and patrol and response activities. An 
examination of the naval role would not be complete without mention of the 
naval contribution to oceans management initiatives in support of Canada’s 
Ocean Strategy.
The Navy supports the COS goal for developing an improved scientific 
knowledge base for estuarine, coastal, and marine ecosystems through the 
conduct of ongoing research into noise and marine mammals in an ongoing 
effort to minimize the impact of naval activities on the maritime environment. 
This includes research to better understand the risks posed to the environment 
and human health from ocean dumpsites of military materials, and the 
necessary mitigation to reduce these risks. The Navy also assists in the 
promotion of the development of a State of the Oceans Reporting system 
through its support of the Victoria Experimental Network Under the Sea 
(VENUS) project. VENUS is a network of instruments placed on the seabed to 
observe the seafloor waters off the West Coast. The Navy also supports 
NEPTUNE, a joint Canada/US interactive, real-time ocean observatory. In 
2004, the Navy provided a remotely operated vehicle to Dalhousie University 
for deep-sea coral research off southern Nova Scotia.
With respect to the COS goal to conserve and protect the marine
360 Neil Carson, Briefing to Commander MARLANT, Halifax, 31 March 2008.
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environment, the Navy co-ordinates with DFO to conduct surveillance and 
provide visible naval presence to help deter improper activities in the vicinity of 
Marine Protected Areas. Over the past five years, naval frigates have 
conducted at least three vessel traffic assessments of the Sable Gully MPA. As 
a concurrent activity, warships have embarked biologists from the Canadian 
Wildlife Service during fisheries patrols to support the ongoing study of sea-bird 
populations. These sea-bird counts are used as a means of identifying the 
effects of pollution on the marine environment. Naval vessels also routinely 
report whale sightings to Fisheries and Oceans Canada for sea mammal 
counting and tracking purposes.
Naval ships and aircraft have standing orders to report observations of 
oil slicks or other forms of pollution. During the past five years, the Navy 
supported an Environment Canada-sponsored trial of using RADARSAT to 
detect pollution by corroborating RADARSAT observations of potential oil 
slicks.
The North Atlantic Right Whale is a critically endangered species, most 
of which reside in the Bay of Fundy during the months of July through October, 
and share their habitat with a shipping lane and fishing activity. Over the past 
10 years, collisions with ships were found to be responsible for nearly 40 
percent of documented right whale deaths, and the occasional entanglement in 
fishing nets is an increased risk to the species.
In July 1999, the Defence Research and Development Canada (Atlantic)
collaborated with Dalhousie University and the Canadian Forces to investigate
the feasibility of acoustically locating whales based on their specific
vocalizations. A trial occurred in the Bay of Fundy during which a field of
sonobuoys were air-deployed and monitored from a CP-140 aircraft, while a
hydrophone was deployed by a ship-based team. This preliminary study
justified further vocalization investigations and the collection of oceanographic
data using naval research vessel, sonobuoys and bottom-mounted sensors.
The data gathered in these studies might lead to the design of a permanent
system of hydrophones for the Bay of Fundy for use as an early warning device
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for mariners and fishermen.
While its emphasis remains maritime security and defence, the 
examples above show that the Canadian Navy contributes where possible to 
the broader spectrum of oceans management initiatives.
10.10 Summary
Policing Canada’s maritime zones and approaches presents no shortage 
of difficulties to overcome, particularly as the federal government struggles to 
allocate finite resources to a plethora of ministries charged with maintaining 
national security. While the Navy has always had a major part to play in 
protecting Canadian sovereignty, the burden of law enforcement has fallen 
largely upon other government departments. This reality reflects a Canadian 
tradition of law enforcement by civilian agencies. However, in light of the 
evolving post-911 asymmetric security environment, there is a case to be made 
for expanding the naval role in domestic maritime enforcement. Influenced to a 
degree by land-oriented aid to civil power operations, detractors question the 
legitimacy of this use of armed forces or denounce the idea as non-traditional. 
However, none of these issues present an insurmountable obstacle to 
developing an enhanced role for Canada’s naval forces.
With federal enforcement departments becoming increasingly reliant on 
naval assets for support of their operations, the Navy’s significant presence in 
Canada’s maritime zones should be leveraged and the Navy, empowered with 
appropriate legal authority, should be granted the option to enforce Canadian 
law in those vast areas. Doing so would be yet another important step in 
realizing the goals articulated in Canada’s national security policy, specifically 
to provide maritime security for Canadians in an effective integrated manner.
425
Chapter Eleven 
CONCLUSION 
11.1 Introduction
The overall objective of this thesis was to evaluate the employment of 
the Canadian Navy in a maritime enforcement role within the Canadian 
maritime zones. The basic assumption of the thesis was that the Canadian 
Navy plays a key role in this specific aspect of the maintenance of Canadian 
sovereignty. As well, the research was intended to determine whether the 
employment of naval forces in support of enforcement operations is of value 
to the Canadian Navy itself.
11.2 Policy Framework
A credible sovereign state controls the management of renewable and 
non-renewable marine resources, the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, the maintenance of maritime sovereignty and prevention 
of illegal activity, and the maintenance of marine safety. In Canada, the 
absence of clear political guidance by a series of successive governments 
has resulted in an ad hoc approach to development of oceans, security, and 
defence policies. As a result, sovereignty, surveillance, and enforcement 
responsibilities have not been well articulated and, at times, been ambiguous.
Notwithstanding the seemingly convoluted policy development process, 
there are now several strategic policy documents that enable maritime 
enforcement operations to be conducted in the Canadian maritime zones. 
These documents are the Oceans Act, Canada’s Ocean Strategy, the 
National Security Policy, and the 2005 Defence Policy Statement. The first of 
these, the Oceans Act, provides federal departments with legal authority for 
security operations in the Canadian maritime zones. In addition, the National 
Security Policy provides the Navy with legitimacy to aggressively pursue 
marine security co-ordination initiatives with other government departments.
Maritime security is the compilation of practices that a state observes
to protect its maritime interests abroad, along its coasts, and in its maritime
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approaches. In a post-911 world, a state’s requirements for maritime security, 
sovereignty, and oceans management are increasingly interconnected, and 
there is a blurring of defence and security tasks. Maritime security continues 
to be viewed by all levels of Canadian government as a law enforcement 
responsibility rather than a defence issue. This posture shapes government 
security response systems, with the result that the Canadian Navy functions in 
a support role to those departments and agencies with enforcement 
mandates.
Maritime enforcement is a sub-set of maritime security that involves 
three basic tasks: detection, interception, and intervention of violators. In this 
construct, the Navy’s contribution to maritime enforcement is equally a 
contribution to maritime security and vice versa.
Canadian naval policy identifies six functions that its Navy should 
expect to execute in fulfillment of the constabulary role. These functions are 
sovereignty patrols, Aid of the Civil Power, assistance to other government 
departments, search and rescue, disaster relief, and oceans management.
11.3 Complexity of Enforcement Problem
The challenge to achieve effective maritime security and enforcement 
in the Atlantic region is multi-faceted. Its main feature is the sheer size of the 
Atlantic maritime zones. As well, the four provinces, amidst three levels of 
government, create a complex jurisdictional and administrative morass. A 
lack of uniformity of water and air space delimitation, multiple grid systems 
and inconsistent boundaries results in duplication of responsibility for much of 
the same area. Regulatory regimes created by international, national, and 
provincial bodies make it difficult to apply a common framework in the 
execution of maritime security and enforcement tasks.
There are a large number of departments and agencies involved in
oceans management in the Atlantic region. Federal departments play the
greatest role in governance, and with these organs the Navy has the greatest
influence and interaction. Only DND, DFO, CCG and the RCMP maintain
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fleets of vessels, and only DND and DFO have any significant capability for 
deep-water intervention. In the context of maritime enforcement, the key 
Memoranda of Understanding that have an impact on the Navy are those with 
DFO for fisheries enforcement, the RCMP for counter-narcotic enforcement, 
and Environment Canada for environmental emergency incidents.
There has been considerable churn in the organizational make-up of 
federal departments with security mandates during the past seven years. The 
frequency of departmental restructuring is cause for concern, and is indicative 
of the difficulty that government faces in dealing with the complex post 9/11 
security environment. Also adding to the complexity are federal laws that 
have not adapted to the changing asymmetric threat environment, and 
impede the timely sharing of information between departments and agencies 
charged with enforcement mandates.
11.4 Naval Contribution through Patrol and Response
Although the government framework presents challenges to be 
overcome in the interest of greater effectiveness, the Navy contributes 
significantly to the sovereignty task. DND and CCG personnel operate as a 
team to co-ordinate roughly 2,200 marine and aeronautical SAR responses 
per year in the region. The Navy contributes to SAR through its ability for 
effective command and control, infrastructure, provision of SAR aircraft, and 
provision of naval vessels.
Fisheries and Oceans Canada is the lead federal department for 
fisheries management in Canada, but is assisted by DND for support to 
fisheries enforcement. In addition to aerial surveillance, the Navy provides 
major and minor warships for fisheries patrols, from which DFO Conservation 
and Protection officers board and conduct inspections of fishing vessels in 
Canada’s maritime zones and the waters enforced by the North Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization. The Navy concentrates its support to fisheries in the 
offshore fishery on the Grand Banks and Flemish Cap, and maintains limited 
naval enforcement presence away from these geographic features.
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The physical area over which a frigate can maintain surveillance 
coverage is huge. Indeed, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is becoming 
increasingly reliant on the Navy to assist with enforcement tasks. Over a 12- 
year period, the Navy conducted eight percent of at-sea inspections 
throughout the Atlantic provinces, and as much as 29 percent of the 
inspections for the Newfoundland region of DFO. While employment in 
fisheries support may be advantageous to Fisheries and Oceans Canada, this 
research suggests that the benefits of naval fisheries patrols are far less 
tangible for the Navy than they are for DFO.
11.5 Naval Contribution through Maritime Domain Awareness
Long before the National Security Policy was released, Canadian 
defence policy required that the Navy be capable of monitoring activity in 
Canada’s maritime zones for the purposes of national defence. In order to 
meet this obligation, the Navy established coastal surveillance centres, and 
became the de facto lead for development of maritime domain awareness. 
While other departments had maritime surveillance mandates, only the Navy 
attempted to integrate the data, information, and intelligence from all sources. 
The operational and technical contribution by the Navy to whole-of- 
government maritime domain awareness is significant, and it can be argued 
that it is the most important contribution to maritime security and enforcement 
made by the Navy.
The two key departments with surveillance mandates, DND and DFO, 
expend considerable resources to achieve aerial presence in the Canadian 
maritime zones and approaches. This research has demonstrated that that 
the government surveillance effort is directed to the areas of greatest interest 
for maritime enforcement and sovereignty protection.
11.6 Naval Contribution as Champion for Co-operation
Inter-agency co-operation is a functioning reality that spans three levels 
of interaction: strategic, regional, and tactical. At all levels, there are multiple 
federal working groups and committees that form a framework for inter­
agency co-operation in oceans management and marine security and
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enforcement. The policy vacuum described earlier set in motion the evolution 
of the ad hoc structure that works adequately due in large part to the 
professionalism and influence of a small number of individuals in key 
departments. The Navy is a key “driver” in this framework through its support 
of mechanisms and bodies for oceans co-operation and collaboration, as well 
as promotion and participation in information sharing and lessons learned on 
maritime security. The Navy champions multi-agency exercises that 
contribute to the long-term education process of staffs at all levels. The 
relationships cultivated through informal and formal initiatives have enabled 
departments to deal with maritime security issues with greater confidence and 
ability.
The National Security Policy assigns the Navy the task of co-ordinating 
the on-water response to a marine threat in the Canadian maritime zones. 
Moreover, the Navy is required to establish Marine Security Operations 
Centres to facilitate co-ordination among government departments. This 
allows the Navy to influence the marine security response system as it 
evolves so that the significant collaborative planning, co-ordination, command 
and control capabilities that are resident within the Navy can be used to full 
effect.
11.7 Contribution to Knowledge
This research was undertaken to address a gap in the literature 
pertaining to the constabulary employment of the Navy in the maintenance of 
Canadian sovereignty. It adds to writings by a small number of Canadian 
scholars, but is differentiated from earlier works in that it goes beyond the 
discussion of just maritime strategy and policy to assess, in a geographic 
context, exactly what the Canadian Navy does to support domestic maritime 
enforcement efforts.
This thesis makes three main contributions to knowledge. The first is
the documentation of the Canadian Navy’s involvement in maritime domain
awareness, and the importance to marine security of this key function of
aovernment. The research shows that how the Navy, as the de facto co-
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ordinator of maritime surveillance and intelligence, has been carrying out this 
undertaking on its own for decades. The second major contribution is the 
documentation of the overall level of effort as well as the spatial aspect of 
naval fisheries patrols over two decades. The third element is the articulation 
of the key role that the Navy plays in furthering interdepartmental co­
ordination and co-operation in the marine security framework in Canada.
11.8 Future Research
Regrettably, this thesis was unable to explore the full range of domestic 
maritime enforcement activities in which the Navy plays a role. It would have 
been revealing to measure the improvement in surveillance capability that an 
embarked helicopter brings to a major warship, and what effect the reduction 
in Sea King helicopter flight hours has had on enforcement effectiveness.
This research presented one measure of presence for military and PAL 
aerial surveillance presence. Unfortunately, it was not possible to measure 
the contribution to maritime domain awareness of single warships not 
employed in fisheries support. The presence of naval vessels and aircraft on 
enforcement tasks was determined in the conduct of this research, but to 
evaluate the complete picture, the presence of CCG, DFO, and RCMP patrol 
vessels need also to be analyzed.
While the naval contribution to fisheries enforcement has been well 
documented in this thesis, the spatial element of smuggling, illegal migration, 
and environmental law-breaking remain to be analyzed, as well as the relative 
contribution of naval assets in the enforcement of these maritime threats.
The question of deterrence is worthy of further study. Lessons learned 
from the exploratory study in Chapter Nine could be incorporated into the 
research design of a future study to ensure that a larger sample of 
respondents is obtained. This would allow statistically-supportable inferences 
to be drawn about the actual deterrent value of naval patrol assets in 
enforcement employment.
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The focus of this project has been on domestic maritime enforcement. 
Over the past thirty years, the Canadian Navy has been involved in maritime 
enforcement missions abroad, such as United Nations embargoes on 
weapons and oil to questionable regimes. A geographic study similar to this 
one, with its focus on expeditionary Canadian naval enforcement operations 
would be a worthy contribution to knowledge.
11.9 Closing Thoughts
Research is a journey that takes one down many paths, some of which 
are quite unexpected. This project has shown that the Navy’s shore-based 
efforts in support of domain awareness outweigh the patrol activities that are 
regarded as “traditional” maintenance of sovereignty employment for the 
Navy. Few naval officers, the researcher included, would have suspected that 
at the outset.
432
Bibliography 
PRIMARY SOURCES
HMC Ships Logs
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13092, HMCS Nipigon 
Ship's Log, 22 - 30 April 1980.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13092, HMCS Nipigon 
Ship's Log, 1 - 9 May 1980.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13083, HMCS 
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 1 2 - 2 8  November 1980.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13082, HMCS Algonquin 
Ship's Log, 25 - 30 November 1980.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13082, HMCS Algonquin 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 2  December 1980.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13114, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 8 - 23 January 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13104, HMCS Fraser 
Ship's Log, 1 9 - 3 1  May 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13104, HMCS Fraser 
Ship's Log, 1 - 4 June 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13103, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 4 - 2 8  October 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13108, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 22 - 31 October 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 13108, HMCS Margaree 
Ship’s Log, 1 - 5  November 1981.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22172, HMCS Huron 
Ship's Log, 21 - 31 January 1982.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22172, HMCS Huron 
Ship's Log, 1 - 5 February 1982.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22207, HMCS Nipigon
Ship's Log, 1 5 - 2 8  February 1982.
433
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22207, HMCS Nipigon
Ship’s Log, 1 - 5 March 1982.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22196, HMCS 
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 1 8 - 3 1  January 1983.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22196, HMCS 
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 1 - 3 February 1983.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22208, HMCS Nipigon 
Ship's Log, 1 5 - 2 8  March 1983.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22205, HMCS Iroquois 
Ship's Log, 24 - 30 November 1983.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22205, HMCS Iroquois 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 0  December 1983.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22200, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 9 - 3 1  January 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22200, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 February 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22261, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 1 3 - 2 9  February 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22214, HMCS Saguenay 
Ship's Log, 1 2 - 2 9  March 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22197, HMCS 
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 2 - 9 May 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22200, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 28 - 31 May 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22200, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 - 2 3  June 1984.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22261, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 1 5 - 3 1  January 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22261, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 1 - 7  February 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22259, HMCS Saguenay 
Ship's Log, 26 - 28 February 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22259, HMCS Saguenay
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 5  March 1985.
434
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22221, HMCS Algonquin
Ship's Log, 7 - 2 4  May 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22224, HMCS
Athabaskan Ship's Log, 26 - 30 June 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22224, HMCS
Athabaskan Ship's Log, 1 - 2 July 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22224, HMCS
Athabaskan Ship's Log, 1 5 - 2 6  July 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22239, HMCS Iroquois 
Ship's Log, 28 - 30 June 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22239, HMCS Iroquois 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 1  July 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22261, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 29 - 31 October 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22261, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 5  November 1985.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22228, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 14 - 31 January 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22228, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 - 2 1  February 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22221, HMCS Algonquin 
Ship's Log, 1 - 5  March 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22247, HMCS Nipigon 
Ship's Log, 30 September 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22247, HMCS Nipigon 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 7  October 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22223, HMCS
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 2 8 - 3 1  October 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22223, HMCS
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 1 - 1 4  November 1986.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22245, HMCS Margaree
Ship's Log, 28 - 31 January 1987.
435
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22245, HMCS Margaree
Ship's Log, 1 - 8 February 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22260, HMCS Saguenay 
Ship's Log, 24 - 28 February 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22260, HMCS Saguenay 
Ship's Log, 1 - 4 March 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22228, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 23 - 31 March 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22228, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 -1 0  April 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22245, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 1 - 3 July 1987.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22268, HMCS Annapolis 
Ship's Log, 1 9 - 3 1  January 1988.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22268, HMCS Annapolis 
Ship's Log, 1 - 3  February 1988.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22275, HMCS Gatineau 
Ship's Log, 3 - 20 May 1988.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22224, HMCS
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 24 - 31 October 1988.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22224, HMCS
Assiniboine Ship's Log, 1 - 1 2  November 1988.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22289, HMCS Skeena
Ship's Log, 1 8 - 3 1  January 1989.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22289, HMCS Skeena 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 0  February 1989.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22273, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 7 - 3 0  November 1989.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22273, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 6  December 1989.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22275, HMCS Gatineau 
Ship's Log, 1 5 - 2 0  November 1989.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22288, HMCS Saguenay
Ship's Log, 4 - 1 8  December 1989.
436
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree
Ship's Log, 22 - 31 October 1990.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 1 - 9  November 1990.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22295, HMCS Cormorant 
Ship's Log, 3 - 1 4  December 1990.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 1 0 - 2 1  June 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 2 3 - 3 1  July 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 1 -1 6  August 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22303, HMCS Ottawa 
Ship's Log, 23 - 30 September 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22303, HMCS Ottawa 
Ship’s Log, 1 - 4 October 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 30 September 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Vol. 22301, HMCS Margaree 
Ship's Log, 1 - 1 7  October 1991.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 4, 
HMCS Nipigon Ship's Log, 1 0 - 2 8  February 1992.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 4, 
HMCS Nipigon Ship's Log, 1 7 - 31  March 1992.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 7, 
HMCS Skeena Ship's Log, 5 - 30 October 1992.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/1060, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 19 - 30 April 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 4, 
HMCS Gatineau Ship’s Log, 3 - 27 May 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 7,
HMCS Skeena Ship's Log, 25 - 31 May 1993.
437
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 7,
HMCS Skeena Ship's Log, 1 - 4 June 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/316, Box 8, 
HMCS Nipigon Ship's Log, 9 - 1 8  June 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 7, 
HMCS Skeena Ship's Log, 23 - 31 August 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/070, Box 7, 
HMCS Skeena Ship's Log, 1 - 1 7  September 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/1060, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 20 - 30 September 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/1060, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 1 - 8 October 1993.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/1060, Box 5, 
HMCS Moresby Ship's Log, 21 - 28 February 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/316, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 6 - 2 2  April 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/316, Box 3, 
HMCS Fraser Ship's Log, 10 - 21  May 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/316, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 25 - 31 July 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1995-96/316, Box 1, 
HMCS Anticosti Ship's Log, 1 - 1 4  August 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/113, HMCS 
Gatineau Ship's Log, 8 - 2 6  August 1994.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/113, HMCS 
Gatineau Ship's Log, 1 1 - 3 0  September 1995.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1996-97/113, HMCS 
Gatineau Ship's Log, 1 - 6  October 1995.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Accn. 1998-00756-1, Box 11, 
HMCS Moresby Ship's Log, 2 - 1 9  July 1996.
National Library and Archives of Canada, R.G. 24, Oct 2000, Box 5, HMCS
Glace Bay Ship's Log, 2 - 1 8  September 1997.
438
Interviews
Belliveau, Captain(N) Bruce. Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations,
Maritime Forces Atlantic. Interview by author, 2 March 2007.
Brownstein, Jeff. Maritime Fishermen’s Union -  Local 6. Interview by author, 19 
February 2003.
Giffin-Boudreau,Diane. Regional Director General Atlantic, Canada Border 
Services Agency. Interview by author, 22 June 2007.
Grant, Shauna. Directorate of Maritime Strategy, Department of National 
Defence. Interview by author, 23 June 2003.
Harrison, Captain(N) Richard. Assistant Chief of Staff Plans and Operations, 
Maritime Forces Pacific. Interview by author, 13 March 2001.
Rhynold, Pat. Guysborough County Inshore Fishermen’s Association. Interview 
by author, 19 February 2003.
Robertson, Captain(N) Drew. Commanding Officer HMCS Athabaskan. Interview 
by author, 1 December 2000.
Warman, Lieutenant(N) Colin. Fifth Maritime Operations Group. Interview by 
author, 12 March 2001.
Other Correspondence
Godin, Lieutentant-Commander Scott. “IPCRC - Record of Decision 17 Sep 01.” 
office email, 18 September 2001.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Books and Monographs
1991 Corpus Almanac & Canadian Sourcebook. Don Mills: Southam Business 
Information and Communications Group, 1991.
Abogado, Edgar L. and Yoma, Reynaldo L. “Development of a Philippine 
Maritime Surveillance Capability.” In Issues in Regional Maritime Strategy: 
Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 5, edited by David Wilson. 
Canberra: Department of Defence, 1998.
Bailet, Francois N., Fred W. Crickard and Glen J. Herbert. Integrated Maritime 
Enforcement: A Handbook. Halifax: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 
Dalhousie University, 1999.
439
Barnaby, Frank. “The Role of the Navies in the 1990s and Beyond.” In Ocean 
Yearbook 10, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.
Bateman, Sam. “Maritime Information and Data Exchange.” In The Seas Unite: 
Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region: Canberra Papers 118, 
edited by Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates. Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1996.
Bateman, Sam. “Maritime Surveillance and Information Exchange.” In Calming 
the Waters: Initiatives for Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation: Canberra 
Papers 114, edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 
1996.
Bateman, Sam. “Oceans Management Policy: Catalyst for Cooperation?” In 
Oceans Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension: Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No. 1, edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood.
Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 1995.
Bateman, Sam. “Strategic Change and Naval Roles.” In Strategic Change and 
Naval Roles: Issues for a Medium Naval Power: Canberra Papers 102, 
edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. Canberra: Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1993.
Bateman, Sam and Grove, Eric. “Maritime Enforcement in the Southern Ocean: 
Some Operational and Policy Considerations.” In Southern Ocean 
Fishing: Policy Challenges for Australia: Wollongong Paper on Maritime 
Policy No. 7, edited by Sam Bateman and Donald R. Rothwell.
Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 1998.
Beesley, J. Alan. “The Future of International Oceans Management.” In 
Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the 
Sea, edited by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1989.
Bellefontaine, Neil. “Canada’s Oceans Act and National Oceans Strategy.” In 
Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime Enforcement, edited by 
Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998.
Bergin, Anthony. “Australia.” In Regional Maritime Management and Security: 
Canberra Papers 124, edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. 
Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National 
University, 1998.
440
Bergin, Anthony. “Inter-Departmental Coordination: The Australian Experience.” 
In Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate, edited by Jack 
McCaffrie. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995.
Birnie, Patricia. “Delimitation of maritime boundaries: emergent legal principles 
and problems.” In Maritime Boundaries and Ocean Resources, edited by 
Gerald Blake. Totowa, New Jersey: Barnes and Noble, 1987.
Bland, Douglas L., ed. Canada’s National Defence: Vol 1 Defence Policy.
Kingston, Ont.: Queen’s University, 1997.
Bland, Douglas L. and Maloney, Sean M. Campaigns for International Security: 
Canada’s Defence Policy at the Turn of the Century. Kingston, ON: 
McGiJI-Queen’s University Press, 2004.
Bland, Douglas L. and Maloney, Sean M. Defence Policy for the World Order 
Era: The First Steps -  Reconstitution and Transformation. Kingston, ON: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004.
Blewett, E. “Canada's Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Fisheries 
Law Enforcement.” In Fisheries Law Enforcement: Programs, Problems 
and Evaluations, Proceedings of a Workshop on Fisheries Law 
Enforcement, edited by J.G. Sutinen and T.M Hennessey. Kingston, Rl: 
University of Rhode Island, 1985.
Bliss, Douglas. “Birds Oiled at Sea: A Case of Environmental Enforcement.” In 
Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime Enforcement, edited by 
Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998.
Booth, Ken. Navies and Foreign Policy. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979.
Briggs, Peter. “The ADF's Role in Policing the Offshore Zones.” In Policing 
Australia’s Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick 
Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University 
of Wollongong, 1997.
Burke, William T., Legatski, Richard, and Woodhead, William W. National and 
International Law Enforcement in the Ocean. Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1975.
Busha, Thomas S. “Monitoring and Surveillance: Navigation.” In Ocean
Yearbook 3, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Cairns, Peter. “On Course for the Future: Canada’s Maritime Forces in the Post- 
Cold W ar Era.” In Canada’s Navy Sailing Into the 21st Century: The 
Niobe Papers; Volume 5, edited by F. W. Crickard and J.P. Nash. St. 
Johns, Nfld: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1993.
441
Chartrand, Michelle. “The Department of Fisheries and Oceans since its 
Integration with the Canadian Coast Guard: Effects in the Laurentian 
Region.” In The St. Lawrence Seaway and Quebec: The Niobe Papers; 
Volume 8, edited by Gregory L. Witol. Nepean, Ontario: The Naval 
Officers Association of Canada, 1997.
Chircop, Aldo. "Canada and the Law of the Sea: Perspectives and Issues for 
Canadian Accession." In Oceans Law and Policy in the post-UNCED 
era: Australian and Canadian perspective, edited by Lome K. Kriwoken, 
Marcus Haward, David VanderZwaag, and Bruce Davis. London: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996.
Churchill, R.R; and Lowe, A.V. The Law of the Sea. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1985.
Clingan, Thomas A. The Law of the Sea: Ocean Law and Policy. San
Francisco: Austin and Winfield, 1994.
Copes, Parzival. “Canadian Fisheries Management Policy.” In Canadian 
Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, edited 
by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1989.
Crickard, Fred W., and Herbert, Glen. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest 
Atlantic: Applications to Maritime Enforcement.” In Maritime Security 
Working Papers Number 7/8, edited by E.L. Tummers. Halifax, N.S.: 
Dalhousie University, December, 1997.
Crickard, Fred W. and Herbert, Glen J. “An Oceans Strategy for the Northwest 
Atlantic: Applications to Maritime Enforcement.” In An Oceans 
Management Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic in the 21st Century: The 
Niobe Papers; Volume 9, edited by Peter T. Haydon and Gregory L. Witol. 
Halifax, N.S.: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1998.
Crickard, Fred W. “Inter-Departmental Coordination: The Canadian Experience.” 
In Managing and Protecting the Offshore Estate, edited by Jack 
McCaffrie. Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995.
Crickard, Fred W. “Maritime Issues in Canadian Security.” In Canada’s Navy 
Sailing Into the 21st Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 5, edited by F. 
W. Crickard and J.P. Nash. St. Johns, Nfld: The Naval Officers
Association of Canada, 1993.
Crickard, Fred W. “Oceans Policy and Maritime Strategy: The Canadian
Experience.” In Oceans Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension: 
Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 1, edited by Sam Bateman and 
Dick Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy,
University of Wollongong, 1995.
442
Crickard, Fred W. “Oceans Policy and Naval Policy 1970 to 1997: Divergent 
Courses or Making the Rendezvous? The Canadian Experience.” In 
Maritime Security Working Papers Number 7/8, edited by E.L. Tummers. 
Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, December, 1997.
Crickard, Fred W. “Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for Canada: 
Nuclear Powered Submarine and Other Canadian Military Options.” 
Peace and Security in the Arctic, Decision for Canada. Ottawa: Canadian 
Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, November 1987.
Crowley, Ronald W. and Bourgeois, Raymond C. “The Rationale and Future 
Directions of Canada’s Oceans Policy: Domestic Aspects.” In Canadian 
Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, edited 
by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1989.
D’Oleon, Michel. “Policing the Seas: The Way Ahead.” In The Role of European 
Naval Forces after the Cold War, edited by G. de Nooy. Netherlands: 
Kluwer Law International, 1996.
Ebdon, David. Statistics in Geography. Oxford: Blackwells, 1996.
Evans, Gareth and Sahnoun, Mohamed. Report of the International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect. 
Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
Garnett, Gary L. “The Navy’s Role in the Protection of National Sovereignty.” In 
An Oceans Management Strategy for the Northwest Atlantic in the 21st 
Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 9, edited by Peter T. Haydon and 
Gregory L. Witol. Halifax, N.S.: The Naval Officers Association of
Canada, 1998.
Garnett, Gary L. “Whither Canada?” In Continental Security and Canada-U.S. 
Relations: Maritime Perspectives, Challenges and Opportunities, edited 
by Robert H. Edwards and Graham Walker, Halifax: Dalhousie University, 
2003,
Gold, Edgar. “The Surveillance and Control of Navigation in the New Law of the 
Sea: A Comment.” In Ocean Yearbook 3, edited by Elisabeth Mann 
Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982.
Granatstein, J.L. Canadian Foreign Policy. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1986.
Granatstein, J.L. and Bothwell, Robert. Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian 
Foreign Policy. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990.
Gray, Colin S. Canada’s Maritime Forces. Wellesley Paper 1. Toronto: Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs, January, 1973.
443
Gray, George and Guppy, Neil. Successful Surveys: Research Methods and 
Practice. Toronto: Harcourt, 1999.
Gregory, F. “The British Police System -  With Special Reference to Public Order 
Problems.” In Police and Public Order in Europe, edited by J. Roach and 
J. Thomaneck. London: Croone Helm, 1985.
Grove, Eric. The Future of Sea Power. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1990.
Harris, Michael. Lament for an Ocean: The Collapse of the Atlantic Cod Fishery 
- A  True Crime Story. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1998.
Haydon, Peter. “Maritime Strategy and Canada.” In Issue Brief 11: Canadian 
Perspectives on Maritime Strategy, edited by Fred W. Crickard, Peter T. 
Haydon, and Douglas A. Ross. Ottawa.: Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament, 1990.
Haydon, Peter T. “What Naval Capabilities Does Canada Need?” In Maritime 
Security in the Twenty-First Century: Maritime Security Occasional Paper 
No. 11, edited by E.L. Tummers. Halifax, N.S.: Dalhousie University, 
December, 2000.
Haydon, Peter T. Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning 
Framework, IRPP Working Paper number 2004-12, November, 2004.
Hennessey, Timothy M.; and Kaiser, David. “Fisheries Law Enforcement: 
Indicators of System Performance.” In East Coast Fisheries Law and 
Policy, edited by J.L. Bubier and A. Rieser. University of Southern 
Maine, Marine Law Institute, 1987.
Herbert, Glen J. “An Integrated Approach to Maritime Enforcement: The 
Northwest Atlantic Region.” In Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for 
Maritime Enforcement, edited by Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. 
Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 
1998.
Hickey, Laurence M. “Regional and Interdepartmental Cooperation.” In 
Continental Security and Canada-U.S. Relations: Maritime Perspectives, 
Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Robert H. Edwards and Graham 
Walker. Halifax: Dalhousie University, 2003.
Hill, Rear-Admiral R.J. Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers. Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1986.
Huebert, Rob. “Integrated Maritime Enforcement: The Arctic.” In Canada’s 
Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime Enforcement, edited by Glen J. 
Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy 
Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998.
444
Janis, Mark W. Sea Power and the Law of the Sea. Lexington, Mass: heath, 
1976.
Jasani, Bhupendra. “Ocean Surveillance by Earth Satellites.” In Ocean 
Yearbook 2, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
Johnson, Phillip A. “Shooting Down Drug Traffickers.” In The Law of Armed 
Conflict: Into the Next Millenium: International Law Studies; Volume 72, 
edited by Michael N. Schmitt. Newport, Rhode Island: U.S. Naval War 
College, 1998.
Johnston, Douglas M. “Canada and the Law of the Sea Convention.” In Oceans 
Policy in the 1990s: A Pacific Perspective: The Niobe Papers; Volume 6, 
edited by Fred W. Crickard. Nepean, Ontario: The Naval Officers
Association of Canada, 1995.
Julian, Michael. “Maritime Safety.” In Policing Australia's Offshore Zones: 
Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 9, 
edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: 
Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1997.
Knight, Darren. “A Strategy for Maritime Surveillance and Information 
Management.” In Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime
Enforcement, edited by Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. Halifax, 
N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998.
Laing, Bob. “Aerial Platforms in Maritime Surveillance.” In Managing and 
Protecting the Offshore Estate, edited by Jack McCaffrie. Canberra: 
Australian Defence Studies Centre, 1995.
Lamson, Cynthia. “Oceans Policy for a Complex World.” In The Sea Has Many 
Voices: Oceans Policy for a Complex World, ed. Cynthia Lamson. 
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994.
Lamson, Cynthia. “Prospects: Towards a Three-Ocean, One-Nation Policy.” In 
The Sea Has Many Voices: Oceans Policy for a Complex World, edited 
by Cynthia Lamson. Montreal: McGill-Quens University, 1994.
Lavers, John, W., and Stewart, lain S. “Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement.” 
In Canadian Ocean Law and Policy, edited by David L. VanderZwaag. 
Markham, Ont.: Butterworths Canada, 1992.
Lee, Edward G., and Fraser, Douglas G. “The Rationale and Future Directions 
of Canada’s Oceans Policy: International Dimensions.” In Canadian
Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the Sea, edited 
by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. Vancouver: University of British 
Columbia Press, 1989.
445
Lightfoot, Chris. “Policing the United Kingdom's Offshore Zones.” In Policing 
Australia's Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick 
Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University 
of Wollongong, 1997.
Lynch, Stacy and Peer, Limor. Analyzing Newspaper Content: A How-To Guide. 
Chicago: Northwestern University, Readership Institute, 2002.
MacKinnon, Doug, and Schwerdt, Paul. “Maritime Crime.” In Policing Australia's 
Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper on Maritime 
Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. 
Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 1997.
Malone, Arnold. “Maritime Sovereignty.” In The Canadian Navy in Peace and 
War in the 1990’s: The Niobe Papers; Volume 3, edited by Fred W. 
Crickard. Halifax: The Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1991.
McArdle, A.D. International Ship Arrest: A Practical Guide. London: Lloyd's of 
London Press, 1985.
McCaffrie, Jack. “Potential Threats to Australian Maritime Security.” In Oceans 
Management Policy: The Strategic Dimension: Wollongong Paper on 
Maritime Policy No. 1, edited by Sam Bateman and Dick Sherwood. 
Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of
Wollongong, 1995.
McCulloch, Jeffrey. “Concepts of Military and Civil Surveillance.” In Policing 
Australia's Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick 
Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University 
of Wollongong, 1997.
McNab., R. Canada and Article 76 of the Law of the Sea: Defining the Limits of 
Canadian Resource Jurisdiction beyond 200 Nautical Miles in the Atlantic 
and Arctic Oceans. Dartmouth: Geological Survey of Canada, 1994.
McDorman, Ted L. "Canada's Ocean Limits and Boundaries: An Overview." In 
Oceans Law and Policy in the post-UNCED era: Australian and Canadian 
perspective, edited by Lome K. Kriwoken, Marcus Haward, David 
VanderZwaag, and Bruce Davis. London: Kluwer Law International,
1996.
McDorman, Ted. “The Pacific Component in a Canadian Integrated Maritime 
Enforcement Strategy.” In Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for
Maritime Enforcement, edited by Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. 
Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University,
1998.
446
McPhail, Ian, and Gillies, John. “Oceans Policy: Regulation and Enforcement 
Consideration.” In Policing Australia's Offshore Zones: Problems and 
Prospects: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug 
MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for
Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1997.
McFarlane, John. “The Potential for Illegal Activity.” In Managing and Protecting 
the Offshore Estate, edited by Jack McCaffrie. Canberra: Australian
Defence Studies Centre, 1995.
McLean, Doug. “Marine Fleet Management: Interdepartmental Coordination.” In 
Canada’s Three Oceans: Strategies for Maritime Enforcement, edited by 
Glen J. Herbert and Fred W. Crickard. Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign 
Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1998.
Middlemiss, Danford W. “Canadian Maritime Enforcement Policies.” In Canadian 
Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea, edited by Barbara Johnson and 
Mark W. Zacher. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977.
Milner, Marc. Canada's Navy: The First Century. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1999).
Morris, Michael A. “Military Aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone.” In Ocean 
Yearbook 3, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Moher, Mark. “Canadian Foreign Policy in the 1990s.” In Canada’s Navy Sailing 
Into the 21st Century: The Niobe Papers; Volume 5, edited by F. W. 
Crickard and J.P. Nash. St. Johns, Nfld: The Naval Officers Association 
of Canada, 1993.
Morgan, Joseph R. “Constabulary Navies in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.” In 
Ocean Yearbook 11, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton 
Ginsburg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Morton, Desmond. Understanding Canadian Defence. Toronto: Penguin, 2003).
Morris, Michael A. “Military Aspects of the Exclusive Economic Zone.” In Ocean 
Yearbook 3, edited by Elisabeth Mann Borgese and Norton Ginsburg. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
Murray, L. E., and Robinson, D.A “Maritime Enforcement: The Federal
Government’s Marine Fleets and the Navy’s Mission.” In Oceans Policy 
in the 1990’s: An Atlantic Perspective: The Niobe Papers; Volume 4, 
edited by Fred W. Crickard. St. Johns, Nfld: The Naval Officers
Association of Canada, 1992.
Naval Officers Association of Canada, A Maritime Policy for Canada. Ottawa: 
Naval Officers Association of Canada, 1990.
447
Pharand, Donat. Canada’s Arctic waters in international law. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Pratt, Martin, editor. Janes Exclusive Economic Zones. Surrey: Selwood Printing,
1999.
Prescott, J.R.V. The Political Geography of the Oceans. London: David & 
Charles, 1975.
Pugh, Michael, and Gregory, Frank. “Maritime constabulary roles for non-military 
security.” In Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for 
United Nations Operations, edited by Michael Pugh. New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1994.
Pugh, Michael. “Policing the Seas: The Challenge of Good Governance.” In 
The Role of European Naval Forces after the Cold War, edited by G. de 
Nooy. Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1996.
Purver, Ronald G. “Aspects of Sovereignty and Security in the Arctic.” In 
Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the New Law of the 
Sea, edited by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press, 1989.
Sarty, Roger. “The Naval Side of Canadian Sovereignty, 1909-1923.” In Oceans 
Policy in the 1990’s: An Atlantic Perspective: The Niobe Papers; Volume 
4, edited by Fred W. Crickard. St. Johns, Nfld: The Naval Officers
Association of Canada, 1992.
Shearer, Ivan. “The Development of International Law with Respect to the Law 
Enforcement Roles of Navies and Coast Guards in Peacetime.” In The 
Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millenium: International Law Studies; 
Volume 71, edited by Michael N. Schmitt and Leslie C Green. Newport, 
Rhode Island: U.S. Naval W ar College, 1998.
Sherwood, Dick. “Implications for Naval Roles.” In Policing Australia's Offshore 
Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper on Maritime Policy 
No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick Sherwood. Wollongong, 
Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, 1997.
Sherwood, Dick. The Navy and National Security: The Peacetime Dimension: 
Caberra Paper No. 109. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, The Australian National University, 1994.
Sjolander, Claire Turenne. Cashing in on the ‘Peace Dividend’: National Defence 
in the Post-Cold W ar World.” Gene Swimmer, ed. How Ottawa spends 
1996-97: Life under the Knife. Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995.
Smith, Hugh. “The Use of Armed Forces in Law Enforcement.” In Policing 
Australia's Offshore Zones: Problems and Prospects: Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No. 9, edited by Doug MacKinnon and Dick
448
Sherwood. Wollongong, Australia: Centre for Maritime Policy, University 
of Wollongong, 1997.
Sokolsky, Joel J. “Striking a New Balance: Seapower, Security, Sovereignty, 
and Canada.” In Canadian Oceans Policy: National Strategies and the 
New Law of the Sea, edited by Donald McRae and Gordon Munro. 
Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989.
Thordarson, Bruce. Trudeau and Foreign Policy. Don Mills: Oxford University 
Press, 1972.
Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy in the Nuclear Age. London: MacMillan, 1982.
Tummers, E.L. “The Navy’s Role in Maritime Enforcement.” In Maritime Security 
Working Papers Number 7/8, edited by E.L. Tummers. Halifax, NS: 
Dalhousie University, December, 1997.
Wade, E.C.S. and Bradley, A.W. Constitutional and Administrative Law. London: 
Longman, 1985.
Walsh, Mary. “Canadian Fisheries Enforcement.” In East Coast Fisheries Law 
and Policy, edited by J.L. Bubier and A. Rieser. : University of Southern 
Maine, Marine Law Institute, 1987.
Williams, Kelly E. “The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign 
and Defence Policy.” In The Canadian Navy and the New Security 
Agenda: Proceedings of the Maritime Security and Defence Seminar, 
Toronto, 26-27 April 2004, edited by Ann L. Griffiths. Halifax. N.S.: 
Dalhousie University, 2004.
Journal Articles
Adams, Michael R. “Navy Narcs.” United States Naval Institute Proceedings 
(September, 1984): 35-37.
Amphion, “Do W e Really Need a Navy?” Maritime Affairs (January, 1997):12.
Avis, Peter. “Surveillance and Canadian Maritime Domestic Security.” Canadian 
Military Journal 4 (Spring, No. 1, 2003): 9-14.
Barrick, Donald E. “EEZ Surveillance - The Compact HF Radar Alternative.” 
EEZ Technology 3 (Summer 1998): 125-129.
Bergin, Anthony. “Fisheries surveillance in the South Atlantic.” Ocean and 
Shoreline Management 11 (1988): 467-491.
Bergin, Anthony. “The Royal Australian Navy and the marine environment.” 
Ocean and Coastal Management 33 (Nos. 1-3, 1996): 213-227.
449
Bland, Raymond D. “Controlling the EEZ: Implications for Naval Force
Planning.” Naval War College Review 32 (July/August, 1984): 23-30.
Booth, K. “The Utilities of Navies: Concepts and Propositions.” The Naval
Review 64 (July 1976): 202-208.
Brecht, A.H.R. “Naval Implications of Coastal Surveillance: Part II.” Journal of the 
Australian Naval Institute 10 (February, 1984): 27-32.
Brookes, Ian. “The Physical Geography of the Atlantic Provinces.” in Studies in 
Canadian Geography: The Atlantic Provinces, ed. Alan G. MacPherson 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), 14-28.
Crickard, Fred. “Canada’s ocean and maritime security: A strategic forecast.” 
Marine Policy 19 (No. 4, 1995): 335-342.
Crickard, Fred W., Herbert, Glen J., and Hobson, Brent A. “Canada’s Oceans 
Strategy: Surveillance and Enforcement.” EEZ Technology 4 (Winter 
1999): 153-158.
Crickard, Fred W. “The Role of Maritime Strategy in Ocean Development and 
Management,” in Canadian Ocean Law and Policy, ed. David 
Vanderzwaag (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992), 515.
Day, Douglas. “Public Policy and Ocean Management in Canada.” Marine Policy 
19, (No. 4, 1995): 251-256.
Gilmore, William C. “Hot pursuit and constructive presence in Canadian law 
enforcement: A case note.” Marine Policy 12 (April 1988): 104-111.
Haydon, Peter T. “Canadian Naval Policy: Still Stalled, Still Contentious, and Still 
Political.” Canadian Defence Quarterly 26 (Summer 1997): 6-13.
Hickey, Laurence M. “Enhancing the Naval Mandate for Law Enforcement: Hot 
Pursuit or Hot Potato.” Canadian Military Journal 7, No. 1 (Spring 2006): 
41-48.
Hickey, Laurence M. “The Submarine as a Tool of Maritime Enforcement.” 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management 1 (Spring 2000): 117-122.
Hill, J.R. “Control of the Exclusive Economic Zone.” Naval Forces Vol VI, (No. VI, 
1985): 84-92.
Hill, J.R. “Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers.” Journal of the Australian Naval 
Institute 14 (May, 1988): 37-45.
Hill, Richard. “Canadian Maritime Thinking and Developments.” The Naval 
Review 83 (July 1995): 268-270.
450
Huebert, Robert. “Climate Change and Canadian Sovereignty in the Northwest 
Passage.” Isuma 2 No. 4 (Winter 2001): 86-94.
Koroleva, N.D. “The right of pursuit from the exclusive economic zone.” Marine 
Policy 14 (March 1990): 137-141.
Lindsey, George, et al. “Canada’s Security Policies.” Behind the Headlines, Vol 
60, No. 2 (Winter 2002/2003), 1-16.
MacNamara, W. D. and Fitz-Gerald, Ann. “A National Security Framework for 
Canada.” Policy Matters 3 (No. 10, October 2002): 1-27
Maloney, Sean M. “Domestic Operations: The Canadian Approach.” Parameters 
(Autumn, 1997): 135-152.
Marshall, C.J. “Canada’s Forces take stock in Defence Structure Review.” 
International Perspectives (January/February, 1976): 26.
Mendel, William W. “America’s Drug War: An Approach to Interagency
Coordination.” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 2 (No. 1, 
1993): 88-99.
Millar, Harvey H. “Planning annual allocation of fisheries surveillance effort.” 
Fisheries Research 23 (1995): 345-360.
Murray, L.E. “Maritime enforcement: The Canadian federal government’s marine 
fleets and the navy’s mission.” Marine Policy 18 (November 1994): 521- 
529.
Peters, Ralph. “Constant Conflict.” Parameters (Summer 1997): 4-14.
Pugh, Michael, and Gregory, Frank. “Maritime constabulary roles for non-military 
security.” In Maritime Security and Peacekeeping: A Framework for 
United Nations Operations, edited by Michael Pugh. New York: St. 
Martins Press, 1994.
Pugliese, David. “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet.” Ottawa Citizen, (17 March 2004): A1- 
A2.
Ranken, Michael. “Maritime Sovereignty, the Offshore Estate, and National 
Defence.” The Naval Review 81 (April 1993): 135-140.
Ranken, Michael. “Royal Navy Roles in Support of the Civil Power in 
Peacetime.” The Naval Review B0 (October 1992): 326-332.
Rawson, Kenneth. “Offshore Policeman.” Marine Policy 2 (January 1978): 37-45.
Robertson, Scott. “Finding a Way: National Security and Defence Policy for a 
New Liberal Leadership.” Policy Options 25, No. 1 (December 
2003/January 2004): 56-61.
451
Stairs, Denis. “Pierre Trudeau and the Politics of the Canadian Foreign Policy 
Review."Australian Outlook 26 (No. 3, 1972): 193-196.
Sutinen, J.G.; Rieser A.; and Gauvin, J.R. “Measuring and explaining non- 
compliance in federally managed fisheries.” Ocean Development and 
International Law 21 (1990): 335-372.
Tasseron, Jeff. “Facts and Invariants: The Changing Context of Canadian
Defence Policy.” Canadian Military Journal 4, No. 2 (Summer 2003): 19- 
30.
Williams, Kelly E. “The Canadian Navy: In the Vanguard of Canadian Foreign 
and Defence Policy.” In The Canadian Navy and the New Security 
Agenda: Proceedings of the Maritime Security and Defence Seminar, 
Toronto, 26-27 April 2004, ed. Ann L. Griffiths. Halifax: Dalhousie 
University, 2004, 9.
Young, Elizabeth. “Policing Offshore: Civil Power or Armed Forces.” RUSI
Journal 122 (No. 2, June, 1977): 18-22.
Reports, Papers and Proceedings
“Canada 21: Canada and common security in the twenty-first century.” Toronto: 
Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 1994.
“Integrated Maritime Enforcement for Effective Oceans Management: Final
Report of the First Workshop.” Halifax, N.S.: Centre for Foreign Policy 
Studies, Dalhousie University, July, 1994.
Allan, Jock. The Potential of a Submarine in Fishery Surveillance and 
Enforcement. Report by CFN Consultants for Department of Fisheries and 
Oceans. 14 May 1993.
Bruce, Jim. Exercise Atlantic Guard Final Report. Halifax: Science Applications 
International Corporation Canada, Emergency and Safety Services 
Division, 2002.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Annual Report 1985/86. Supply 
and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1986, 21.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Program Evaluation Branch. 
Canada’s Experience in Measuring the Deterrent Effect of Fisheries Law 
Enforcement, by Edwin Blewett, William Furlong, and Peter Toesw.. 
Ottawa, 1985.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Canada’s Oceans: An Economic 
Overview and a Guide to Federal Government Activities. Communications 
Directorate DO, Ottawa, 1987.
452
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Canada’s Oceans Strategy, Ottawa,
2002.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Performance and effectiveness 
of offshore fisheries surveiilance, 1977-1978, and options to 1985, by D. 
J. Clough. 1979.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Optimization and implementation 
plan for offshore fisheries surveillance, by D. J. Clough. 1980.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Effectiveness of enforcement and 
surveillance. Report Number 41. 1981.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Effectiveness of enforcement and 
surveillance. Report Number 41. 1984.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Role of the Provincial and 
Territorial Governments in the Oceans Sectors. DFO/5265. Ottawa,
1997.
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. The Role of the Federal 
Government in the Oceans Sectors. DFO/5512. Ottawa, 1997.
Canada. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. Canada in the 
World: Canadian Foreign Policy Review. Ottawa: 1995).
Canada. Department of National Defence. Interdepartmental Concept of 
Maritime Operations (ICMO). Ottawa, 9 November 1995.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1985-86 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1985.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1986-87 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1986.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1987-88 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1987.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1988-89 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1988.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1989-90 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1989.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1990-91 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1990.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1991-92 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1991.
453
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1992-93 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1992.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1993-94 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1994.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1994-95 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1994.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1995-96 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1995.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1996-97 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1996.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1997-98 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1997.
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1998-99 Estimates, Part III:
Expenditure Plan. Ottawa, 1998.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Challenge and Commitment -  A 
Defence Policy for Canada. Ottawa, 1987.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Defence in the 70s. Ottawa, 1971.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Leadmark: The Navy's Strategy for 
2020. Ottawa, 2001.
Canada. Department of National Defence. National Defence Headquarters, 
3301-0 (DCDS) NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98: Guidance for the Conduct 
of Domestic Operations. 10 July 1998.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Adjusting Course: A Naval Strategy 
for Canada. Ottawa, April, 1997.
Canada. Department of National Defence. HMCS OJIBWA Patrol Report: 
OPERATION AMBUSCADE. Halifax, N.S., March, 1993.
Canada. Department of National Defence. HMCS OKANAGAN Patrol Report: 
OPERATION GROUSE. Halifax, N.S., October, 1994.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Interdepartmental Concept of 
Maritime Operations (ICMO). Ottawa, 9 November 1995.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Operational Research and Analysis 
Establishment. Command and Control Within Canadian Maritime Areas of 
Interest, by D. A. Grant. ORAE Staff Note 79/6. Ottawa, June, 1979.
454
Canada. Department of National Defence. Securing Canada’s Ocean Frontiers:
Charting the Course from Leadmark. Ottawa. 2005.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Shaping the Future of Canadian 
Defence: A Strategy for 2020. Ottawa: June 1999.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Ship activity related data and 
information in the age of business planning and performance 
measurement, by LCdr P. L. Massel and Jay Adamson, Operational 
Research Division Ottawa DOR(CAM) Research Note RN 9815, 
December 1998.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Operational Research and Analysis 
Establishment. The Enforcement of Canada’s Maritime Jurisdiction, by Dr. 
N. Tracy. ORAE Report No. R44. Ottawa, February, 1975.
Canada. Department of National Defence. Operational Research Division. The 
Canadian Maritime Forces 2015 Study Phase I: Maritime Expert Survey 
Final Report, by D.W. Mason; D.M. McLean; A. Jesion; R.M.H. Burton; 
P.L. Massel; and C.R. Savage. ORD Project Report PR9805. Ottawa, 
April, 1998.
Canada. Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canad., A Role of Pride and 
Influence in the World: Defence. Ottawa. April, 2005.
Canada. House of Commons. Report of the Standing Committee on National 
Defence and Veterans Affairs: Maritime Sovereignty. November, 1990.
Canada. House of Commons. Security in a Changing World: The Report of the 
Special Joint Committee on Canada’s Defence Policy. Ottawa. 1994).
Canada. Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee. All 
the Ships That Sail: Two Year Assessment. Ottawa, 18 January 1994.
Canada. Privy Council Office. Canada’s International Policy Statement. Ottawa. 
2005.
Canada. Privy Council Office. Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National 
Security Policy. Ottawa, 2004.
Canada. Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster (Canada). 
Hearings - Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster 
(Canada). Ottawa. 1985.
Canada. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Competitiveness and Security. 
Ottawa. 1985.
Canada. Senate. Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security 
and Defence. Canada’s Coastlines: The Longest Under-defended Borders 
in the World. October, 2003.
455
Canada. Solicitor General. 1997/98 Estimates, Part HI: Expenditure Plan. 
Ottawa. 1998.
Canada. Transport Canada. Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group. 
Enhancing the Security of Canada’s Marine Transportation System. 
Ottawa, 2004.
Canada. Treasury Board. All the Ships That Sail: A Study of Canada’s Fleets, 
by G.F. Osbaldeston. Report of the Study on the Utilization of the Federal 
Government’s Marine Fleets. Ottawa, 15 October 1990.
Crickard, Fred W. and Herbert, Glen J. Canada's Oceans Strategies Project - 
The Atlantic: Final Report. Halifax, NS: Dalhousie University, Centre for 
Foreign Policy Studies, 1997.
English, Allan D., Brown, Angus, and Johnston, Paul. "Are we losing our 
memory?: Decision-making in DND." In Canadian Military History Since 
the 17th Century: Proceedings of the Canadian Military History 
Conference, Ottawa, 5-9 May 2000, ed. Yves Tremblay. Ottawa: 
Department of National Defence, 2001.
Gray, Colin S. Canada’s Maritime Forces. Wellesley Paper 1. Toronto: Canadian 
Institute of International Affairs, January, 1973.
Haydon, Peter T. Canadian Naval Future: A Necessary Long-Term Planning 
Framework. IRPP Working Paper 2004-12. Montreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, November, 2004.
Hennessy, T.M.; and Kaiser, D.W. . “Fisheries Law Enforcement: An Incentive 
Systems Perspective.” In Rethinking Fisheries Management. 
Proceedings from the Tenth Annual Conference, June 1-4, 1986. Center 
for Ocean Management Studies, University of Rhode Island, 1986. (pp 
133-144)
Pettis, Colonel Norris. “Minutes of Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working 
Group Meeting 18-19 November 2002.” Yellowknife, N.W.T., December,
2002.
Government Documents
Canada. Canada: A Portrait. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada.
Canada. Department of the Environment/Department of National Defence. 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of the 
Environment and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian 
Forces relative to a Partnership for Environmental Emergency Response 
Assistance to the Department of the Environment. Ottawa, March, 1994.
456
Canada. Department of Fisheries and Oceans. Joint Press Release. 29 July
1992.
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada/Department of National 
Defence..Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Forces respecting Surface Ship 
Patrols and Aerial Fisheries Surveillance. Ottawa, May, 1999.
Canada. Department of National Defence. National Defence Headquarters, 
1735-5 (CM DO) Delegation of Duties and Responsibilities Associated with 
the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review Committee. 23 
March 1992.
Canada. Department of National Defence. National Defence Headquarters, 
1150-110/J257-3 (DNR4) Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and 
Review Committee (IPCRC) -  Reorganization. 13 December 1996.
Canada. Department of National Defence. National Defence Headquarters. 
1150-1 (JFC3-3-3) National Surveillance Policy. 20 January 2003.
Canada. Department of National Defence. National Defence Headquarters. 
3301-0 (DCDS) NDHQ Instruction DCDS 2/98: Guidance for the Conduct 
of Domestic Operations. 10 July 1998.
Canada. Department of National Defence/Solicitor General of Canada. 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Canadian Forces and the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police concerning the Provision of Assistance 
by the Canadian Forces in Support of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
in its Drug Law Enforcement Role, 20 January 2005.
Canada. Public Safety Canada. Federal Emergency Response Plan (FERP) 
Volume 1 - 8  November 2006 (Draft 6). Ottawa. 8 November 2006.
Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. National Counter-Terrorism Plan. 
Annex L.
Silverman, Art. Chairman. “Record of Decision -  Meeting of the Organizing 
Committee for the Interdepartmental Program Co-ordination and Review 
Committee 24 May 1991.” Ottawa. 10 June 1991.
Letters and Memoranda
Memorandum from US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, to US 
Secretary of Transport, John Lehman, as quoted in Michael R. Adams, 
“Navy Narcs,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings (September, 
1984): 37.
457
Statutes and Regulations
Atlantic Canada Opportunities Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.41, s. 12.
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, S.C. 1987, 
c. 3, s. 9.
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland 
and Labrador Act, R.N.S.L. 1990, c. 2, s. 9.
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation Act, 
S.C. 1988, c. 28, s. 9.
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Resources Accord Implementation 
(Nova Scotia) Act, S.N.S. 1987, c. 3, s. 9.
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, R.S.C. 1992, c.37, as am. R.S.C. 
1994, c.46, s.4.
Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act, R.S.C. 
1989, c. 3, s. 7.
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91, 92.
Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.34, s.2
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act, R.S.C. 2005 
c.10. s 2, 5.
Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1982 (Public Law 97-86).
Department of Defense Directive 5525.5 (22 March 1982).
National Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985 c. N-4. Part XI.
Pilotage Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.P-14, s.20.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 Dec 1982).
Theses
Avis, Peter. “Comparing National Approaches to Maritime Security in the Post 
9/11 Era.” M.A. thesis, Carleton University, 2004.
Forbes, Andrew. “Protecting the National Interest: Naval Constabulary 
Operations in Australia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.” M.P.A. project, 
Queen’s University, 2001.
458
Haines, Stephen W. “The Provision of Military Aid to Civil Authorities in Britain's 
Maritime Domain.” Ph.D. dissertation, Aberdeen University, 1992.
Hobson, Brent A. “New Solutions for Old Problems? Canadian Naval Support of 
Sovereignty: 1971 -2000.” M.A. dissertation, Dalhousie University, 1992.
Lostracco, Joanne. “What Force for Canada: A Theoretical and Practical Study 
of the Canadian Navy in the 1990s.” M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 
1998).
Speeches
Address by Superintendent A. Antoniuk to RCMP officers at RCMP Training 
Academy, Regina, Saskatchewan. 27 September 1990.
Address by Rear-Admiral P.D. McFadden to Dalhousie University Master of 
Public Administration Program, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 12 September 2007.
Speech from the Throne: To Open the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth 
Parliament of Canada, October 5, 2004.
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott. “The Relationship of Defence Policy to Foreign Policy.” 
Statements and Speeches, No. 69/8, April 12, 1969.
Newspapers
“Rage greets fishery closing,” Globe and Mail (Toronto), 3 July 1992.
Pugliese, David. “Al-Qaeda’s Naval Fleet.” Ottawa Citizen, (Ottawa), 17 March
2004): A1-A2.
Toronto Sun (Toronto), 6 April 1995.
Internet Resources
“A Modest Proposal -  Maritime Security and Canada’s Economic Exclusion 
Zones: MCDV for an Interim Maritime Security Force?” Canadian 
American Strategic Review, 1 October 2004 <http://www.sfu.ca/casr/mp- 
ccgmcdv.htm> (28 February 2005).
The Port of Halifax, Annual Statistics, 2005 <http://www.portofhalifax.ca/ 
AbsPage.aspx?id=1245&siteid=1&lang=1> (12 April 2006).
“Russia plants flag under N Pole,” BBC News, 2 August 2007 <http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/ europe/6927395.stm> (22 August 2007).
Acton White and Associates, Economic Study of Canada’s Marine and Ocean 
Industries, 29 March 2001 <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/ internet/inad- 
ad.nsf/vwapj/economicstudy.pdf/$file/economicstudy.pdf> (9 August 
2006).
459
Association of Canadian Port Authorities, Industry Information -  Canadian Port 
Industry, 2005 <http://www.acpa-ports.net/industry/industry.html> (10 
August 2006).
Atkins, Chief Superintendent Ian. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Testimony 
before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 
Issue 22 -  Evidence 22 September 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/ 
parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/22evb-e.htm?Language=E&Parl= 
37&Ses= 2&comm_id=76> (30 October 2003).
Boutilier, Dr. James A. Testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on 
National Security and Defence, Issue 19 -  Evidence 9 June 2003 
<http://www.parl. gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/19evb 
-e.htm> (7 February 2005).
Canada. Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency. Welcome to ACOA. 4 
December 2003, <http://www.acoa.ca/ e/index.shtml> (15 December 
2003).
Canada. Atlantic Pilotage Authority. Atlantic Region Pilot Areas. <http://www. 
atlanticpilotage.com/main/content/charts.htrn> (14 December 2003).
Canada. Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. The Integrated Threat 
Assessment Centre. 13 April 2007 <http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/ 
newsroom/backgrounders/ backgrounder13.asp> (20 August 2007).
Canada. Department of Justice. Public Safety And Anti-Terrorism (PSAT) 
Initiative, Summative Evaluation. 23 July 2007 <http://www.justice. 
gc.ca/en/ps/eval/reports/07/psat/sum/ p5.html> (21 August 2007).
Canada. Department of National Defence. 1994 White Paper on Defence. 
“Chapter 4 - Protection of Canada.” 23 December 2002 <http://www. 
forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/ 5116_e.htm> (12 August 2006).
Canada. Department of National Defence. Canadians on Defence: Public 
Perception of the Canadian Forces. December 1999 <http://dgpa- 
dgap.mil.ca/DGPA/Polling/jan99/eng/dec_e_99.htm> (16 February 2002).
Canada. Department of National Defence. “Enhancing the Security of Canada's 
Marine Transportation Station: Canada’s Marine Transportation System.” 
Issues and Challenges, 28 September 2006 <http://www.navy.dnd.ca/ 
cms_strat/strat-issues_e.asp?id=301> (3 September 2007).
Canada. Department of National Defence. Serving Canadians -  On Guard: 
Watching for Polluters and Illegal Fishing. 28 January 2003 
<http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/athomedocs/ athodm4c_e.htm> (9 
October 2003).
460
Canada. Department of National Defence. Welcome to 5 Wing. 29 March 2006 
<http://www.airforce.forces.gc.ca/5wing/about_us/index_e.asp> (8 August
2006).
Canada. Environment Canada. Climate of the Atlantic Provinces. 23 December 
2004<http://atlantic-web1.ns.ec.gc.ca/climatecentre/default.asp?lang=En 
&n =7D7FE131-0> (8 August 2006).
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. 2004 Value of Atlantic & Pacific Coasts 
Commercial Landings, by Province. 12 May 2006 <http://www.dfo- 
mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/commercial/landings/seafisheries/s2004 
pv_e.htm> (8 August 2006).
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Canada’s Oceans Action Plan: For 
Present and Future Generations. 27 May 2005, p. 4. <http://www.dfo- 
mpo.gc.ca/canwaters-eauxcan/oap-pao/pdf/oap_e.pdf> (22 December
2005).
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Domestic Exports of Selected 
Commodities by Major Market and Country, December 2004. 6 July 2006 
<http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/trade/canadian_trade 
export_data/xmkt04_e.htm> (8 August 2006).
Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Exports by Major Producing Countries. 
2000-2004. 6 July 2006 <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/statistics/ 
trade/world_trade/export_data/ wxv0004_e.htm> (8 August 2006).
Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada. Introduction to the ESSIM Initiative. 6 
June 2007 <http://www.mar.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/e/essim/essim-intro- 
e.html> (26 January 2008).
Canada. Foreign Affairs Canada. Canada and the Oceans. 16 November 2004, 
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/sustain/Environlssu/canOcean/oceans- 
enasp> (28 January 2005).
Canada. House of Commons. Standing Committee on Fisheries and Oceans. 
Report on the Oceans Act. October, 2001.<http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 
infocomdoc/37/1 /FOPO/Studies/Reports/ fopoOl /07-intro-e. htm#
INTRODUCTION> (11 April 2005).
Canada. Natural Resources Canada. Coastline and Shoreline. 9 May 2005 
<http://atlas.gc.ca/site/english/learningresources/facts/coastline. html#c4> 
(15 April 2006).
Canada. Natural Resources Canada. Sea Islands. 10 March 2004 
<http://atlas.gc.ca/ site/english/learningresources/facts/islands.html > (15 
April 2006).
461
Canada. Office of the Auditor General Canada. “Federal Response to 
September 11, 2001.” Exhibit 2.1 to 2005 Report of the Auditor General of 
Canada, 5 April 2005 <http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/domino/reports.nsf/html/ 
20050402xe01.html> (21 August 2007).
Canada. Pacific Pilotage Authority Canada. Welcome to the Pacific Pilotage 
Authority Website. <http://www.ppa.gc.ca/english/index.html> (14 
December 2003).
Canada. Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. What We Do. 28 
July 2006 <http://www.psepc.gc.ca/abt/wwd/index-en.asp> (2 January
2007).
Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. About the RCMP. 11 October 2006 
<http://www.rcmp.ca/ about/index_e.htm> (24 December 2006).
Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Canada /  U.S. Integrated Border 
Enforcement Teams. 21 November 2003 <http://www.rcmp.ca/ 
security/ibets_e.htm> (15 December 2003).
Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Marine Services. 14 November 2006 
<http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/marine/marine_e.htm> (30 December 2006).
Canada. Royal Canadian Mounted Police. West Coast Marine Detachment. 24 
March 2003 <http://members.shaw.ca/rcmpwcmd/Photogallery.htm> (30 
December 2006).
Canada. Statistics Canada. Aboriginal Identity Population, 2001 Counts, for 
Canada, Provinces and Territories -20% Sample Data. 13 August 2004 
<http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/products/highlight/Aboriginal/ 
Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo=PR&View=1a&Table=1&StartRec=1&Sort=2&B 
1 =Counts01 &B2=Total> (16 April 2006).
Canada. Statistics Canada. Population and Dwelling Counts for Census 
Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, 2001 and 1996 
Censuses - 100% Data. 16 July 2002 <http://www12.statcan.ca 
/english/census01/products/standard/popdwell/Table-CMA- 
N.cfm?T=1 &SR=126&S= 3&0=D5> (8 August 2006).
Canada. Statistics Canada. Population by mother tongue, by province and 
territory (2001 Census). 27 January 2005 <http://www40.statcan.ca/ 
I01/cst01/demo11a.htm> (16 April 2006).
Canada. Statistics Canada. Population by year, by province and territory. 3 
March 2006 <http://www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo02.htm> (16 April 
2006).
Canada. Statistics Canada. The Daily: Port activity. 4 April 2005
<http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/ English/050404/d050404a.htm> (12 April
2006).
462
Canada. Transport Canada. “Transportation Security.” Transportation in Canada 
2006, 14 August 2007 <http://www.tc.gc.ca/pol/en/Report/anre2006/Chpt- 
4e_b.htm> (1 September 2007).
Canada. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Mandate. 18 September 2002, 
<http://www.tsb.gc.ca/en/common/mandate.asp> (18 December 2003).
Canada. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. The Role of Regional Councils. 
8 January 1999 <http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/frc-cfr/bkgrd-contexte/ 
role_e.asp> (14 December 2003).
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board. C-NOPB Overview, 9 
December 2003, <http://www.cnopb.nfnet.com/general/media/ 
mediaen.htm> (14 December 2003).
Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board. CNSOPB Overviews. 
<http://www.cnsopb.ns.ca/Generalinfo/overviews.html> (14 December 
2003).
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. About CCME. 26 November 
2003. <http://www.ccme.ca/about/whatwedo.html> (16 December 2003).
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. Statement of 
Interjurisdictional Coopereration on Environmental Matters. 26 November
2003. <http://
www.ccme.ca/assets/pdf/stmt_intrjrsdctnl_cprtn_envt_matters_e.pdf> (16 
December 2003).
Canadian Military History Gateway. Military Service Act, 21 June 2004 <http:// 
www.cmhg.gc.ca/flash/ glossary/default-en.asp?organization =&t=1 
&osubject=& ss=1&Ntx=mode%20matchall&resourcetype=&Ntt=military% 
20service%20act&Ntk =siResource&subject=&x=36&y=9&letter=M&page 
=3> (7 February 2005).
Canadian Press. “Martin offers “necessary measures” in Arctic.” 19 December 
2005. http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20051216/ 
ELXN_arctic_051219?s_name=election2006&no_ads=> (26 December 
2005).
Durflinger, Serge. Les Purs Canayens: French Canadian Recruitment during the 
First World War, 27 September 2001 <http://www.civilisations.ca/ cwm/ 
disp/dis001_e.html> (7 February 2005).
ExxonMobil, Sable Project -Operations < http://www.soep.com/cgi- 
bin/getpage?pageid=1/0/0> (9 August 2006).
463
Fantino, Julian. Commissioner of the Ontario Provincial Police. Testimony before 
the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, Issue 
17 -  Evidence 18 June 2007. <http://www.parl.gc.ca/39Z1/paribus/ 
commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/17evb-e.htm? Language=E&Parl= 39&Se 
s=1&comm_id=76> (20 August 2007).
Gouvernement du Quebec. Vivre au Quebec: La population. 11 April 2005 
<http://www.immigration-quebec.gouv.qc.ca/ vivrequebec/section9/9_1- 
fr.htm> (17 April 2006).
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. Mines and Energy. Oil and Gas 
Report -  January 2006. <http://www.nr.gov.nl. ca/mines&en/oil/ 
oil_gas_reportjan06.pdf > (9 August 2006).
Great Lakes St. Lawrence Seaway System, Tonnage Information, Seaway 
Monthly Traffic Results as of December 31, 2005 <http://www.greatlakes- 
seaway.com/en/pdf/tonnage2005_en.pdf > (9 August 2006).
Hammond, Matthew Carlton. “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of 
Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly 75 (No. 2, Summer, 
1997) <http://law.wustl.edU/WULQ/75-2/752-10.html#fn160> (6 February
2005).
Haydon, Peter, “Canadian Naval Requirements for the 21st Century,” Council for 
Canadian Security in the 21st Century, 29 April 2002, 
<http://www.ccs21.org/ ccspapers/papers/haydon-naval.htm> (2 February
2005).
Haydon, Peter. “Why Do We Need a Navy?” Naval Officers Association of 
British Columbia
<http://www.noabc.com/default~area~docread~docid~141 ,htm> (29 
March 2005).
Hickey, Captain(N) Laurence. Department of National Defence. Testimony 
before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 
Issue 20 -  Evidence 16 June 2003 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2Zparlbus/ 
commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/20ev-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses= 
2&comm_id=76> (30 October 2003).
Juillet ,Luc. A Report prepared for the Federal Regional Councils and the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, 1 October 2000, <http://www.tbs- 
sct.gc.ca/frc-cfr/bkgrd-contexte/horizontality_e.asp> (15 December 2003).
Kenny, Colin. “Defending Canada’s Coastal Waters: The King Canute
Approach,” Toronto Star, 29 October 2003 <http://sen.parl.gc.ca/ 
ckenny/OPED%20Tor %20Star%200ct%2029-03.htm> (20 March 2004).
464
Martin, Wendy. Once Upon a Mine: Story of Pre-Confederation Mines on the 
island of Newfoundland, Chapter V: Isle of Iron, Men of Steel, 
1983<http://www.heritage.nf.ca environment/mine/ch5p12.html> (14 April
2006).
Montreal Port Authority. Statistics: Cruise traffic 2001-2005. <http://www. 
portmontreal.com/site/6_0/ 6_4_11 ,jsp?lang=en> (12 April 2006).
Montreal Port Authority. Statistics: Traffic summary 1995-2005 (metric tonnes). 
<http://www.port-montreal.com/site/6_0/ 6_4_11 ,jsp?lang=en> (12 April
2006).
Rudd, David. Canada’s New Defence Policy. Canadian Institute for Strategic 
Studies <http://www.ciss.ca/Comment_Newpolicy.htm> (5 August 2006).
State v. Nelson, 298 NC 573, 260 SE 2d 629, cert den\ 446 U.S. 929, 100 S. Ct. 
1867, 64 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1980), cited by Craig T. Trebilcock, The Myth of 
Posse Comitatus, October 2000,
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/Trebilcock.htm > (6
February 2005).
Thatcher, Chris. “Integrating Terrorism Intelligence Resources.” Vanguard 
(February 2006) <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/lntegratinglntelli 
genceThatcher> (20 August 2007).
Thomas, John F. Testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National 
Security and Defence, Issue 19 -  Evidence 9 June 2003 
<http://www.parl. gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/19 
eva-e.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=2&comm_id=76> (7 February
2005).
Trebilcock, Craig T. “The Myth of Posse Comitatus,” Homeland Security 
Institute, October 2000 <http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/ 
articles/ Trebilcock.htm> (7 March 2003).
Vancouver Port Authority, 2005 Statistical Summary, 2005 <http://www. 
portvancouver.com/statistics/2005_statistical.html> (12 April 2006).
Vancouver Port Authority, Port of Vancouver Economic Impact Study, May 2005 
<http://www.portvancouver.com/the_port/docs/Economic_lmpact_Study 
.pdf> (10 August 2006).
THE CANADIAN NAVY
AND DOMESTIC MARITIME ENFORCEMENT
- Appendices -
by
Laurence M. Hickey
A thesis presented for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at Cardiff University
2008
List of Appendices
Title Page
A Canadian Oceans-Related Federal Legislation A1
B Example Marine Security Scenarios B1
C Naval Unit Capabilities for Domestic / Security Ops C1
D Maps -  Marine Traffic Vessel Patterns D1
E Maps -  Search and Rescue Activity E1
F Maps -  Naval Fisheries Patrols F1
G CP-140 Aircraft Patrols Depicted in Figure 7-4 G1
H PAL Aircraft Patrols Depicted in Figure 7-7 H1
J Naval Fisheries and Preventative Patrols 1980 - 2003 J1
K Naval Fisheries Patrols Depicted in Various Figures K1
L Naval Fisheries Patrol -  Data Recording Instructions L1
M Naval Fisheries Patrol -  Data Summary Sheet M1
N Participation of Fisheries Associations N1
P Deterrence Survey Questionnaire P1
Q Tools for Media Content Analysis Q1
R Miscellaneous Tables and Co-ordinates R1
S Published Articles S1
Appendix A
CANADIAN OCEANS-RELATED FEDERAL LEGISLATION
The tables presented at this Appendix summarise the main federal 
oceans-related legislation in Canada. Fisheries and Oceans Canada is 
designated by the Oceans Act as the lead department for oceans policy 
development; the first table reflects this precedence and, thereafter, 
departments are treated alphabetically. The tables draw heavily from DFO 
published and internal staff sources.1
TABLE A-1
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Atlantic Fisheries 
Restructuring Act 
(1980)
Canada Shipping 
A ct( 1980)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of 
Transport, Minister 
of Fisheries and 
Oceans
Same
Minister of Transport, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, 
M inister o f National 
Defence
Authorizes investment in 
and the provision of 
financial assistance to the 
Atlantic fisheries for the 
purpose of restructuring 
fishery enterprises.
Marine navigation, marine 
search and rescue,
pleasure craft safety, 
marine ship-source pollution 
prevention and response, 
lighthouses, receiver of 
wrecks, support to other 
federal departments and 
agencies.
Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act 
(1985)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Same Relates to licensing with 
respect to the entry of 
foreign vessels into 
Canadian waters for fishing 
a processing.
1 Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Role of the Federal Government in the Oceans 
Sector (Ottawa: 1997), 33-36. See also internal DFO draft oceans policy document 
Paper_D6_Fed Legislation Update_240500 17 April 2000, Skillen/Chudczak/McDougall/King.
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TABLE A-1 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Fisheries Act 
(1985)
Fisheries 
Development Act
(1978)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Minister 
of Environment (Sec. 
36-42)
Same
Conservation and 
management of fisheries 
and habitats, licensing, 
enforcement, international 
fisheries agreements.
Relates to fisheries 
enhancement and 
development, aquaculture 
and resource development 
research as well as to the 
more efficient exploitation of 
fishery resources, and the 
exploration for and 
development of new fishery 
resources and new 
fisheries.
Fisheries 
Improvement 
Loans Act (1955)
Fisheries Prices 
Support Act (1978)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Same
Chairman of the 
Fisheries Prices 
Support Board
Respects loans to assist 
fishermen engaged in a 
primary fishing enterprise.
Relates to the support of 
prices of fisheries products 
and establishes the 
Fisheries Prices Support 
Board.
Fishing and 
Recreational 
Harbours Act
(1977)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Same
Government 
Organization Act 
1979)
Prime Minister Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Relates to the 
administration and 
development of certain 
fishing and recreational 
harbours in Canada, 
including use, management, 
maintenance and 
enforcement of regulations.
Assigns responsibility for 
physical oceanography, 
chemical oceanography, 
marine ecology, and ocean 
policy development.
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TABLE A-1 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
National Energy 
Board Act (1985)
Navigable Waters 
Protection Act 
(1985)
Oceans Act (1997)
Members of the 
Queen’s Privy 
Council for Canada
Minister of Transport
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Resources and 
Technical Surveys 
A ct( 1985)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
National Energy 
Board, Minister of 
Fisheries and 
Oceans (Section 108)
Minister of Transport, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans .Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade, 
Minister of Justice
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Offshore oil and gas 
pipelines, including in 
submarine areas, internal or 
external waters, and 
territorial sea of continental 
shelf.
Protects the public right of 
navigation by providing for 
removal of obstructions and 
provides an approval 
mechanism for planned 
obstructions.
Declares Canada’s 
maritime zones in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 
provides for the 
development and 
implementation of a national 
oceans management 
strategy; and provides for 
the consolidation and 
clarification of federal 
responsibilities for the 
management of Canada’s 
oceans.
Provides for, among others, 
hydro-geological and 
oceanographic surveys 
relating to mineral 
exploration, development 
and production, and the 
preparation and publishing 
of maps and other data 
necessary to illustrate those 
Acts.
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TABLE A-2
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  ATLANTIC CANADA OPPORTUNITIES AGENCY AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities 
Agency Act (1985)
President of ACOA President of ACOA To increase opportunities 
for economic development 
in Atlantic Canada and to
enhance the growth of 
earned incomes and 
employment opportunities in 
that region.______________
TABLE A-3
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  AGRICULTURE CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Fish Inspection Act 
(1985)
Minister of 
Agriculture and Agri- 
Food
Same An Act respecting the 
inspection of fish and 
marine plants. Includes 
fees, possession, and 
restrictions. Promotes and 
supports the value, 
wholesomeness and 
marketability of fish 
products produced or sold 
in Canada.
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TABLE A-4
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  HERITAGE CANADA / PARKS CANADA AS LEAD AGENTS
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
National Parks Act 
(1998)
Minister of Canadian 
Heritage
Same Provides for the 
establishment of national 
marine parks within the 
context of the national parks 
system.
Parks Canada 
Agency Act (1998)
Canadian Heritage - 
- Parks Canada
Parks Canada 
Agency
Establishes the Parks 
Canada Agency.
Saguenay-St. 
Lawrence Marine 
Park Act (1997)
Government of 
Canada and 
Government of 
Quebec
Parks Canada Establishment of the 
Saguenay-St. Lawrence 
Marine Park to protect the 
environment, flora and
fauna and the natural 
resources of the area for 
future generations._____
TABLE A-5
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  CANADA TRANSPORTATION AGENCY AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Shipping 
Conferences 
Exemption Act 
(1987)
Commissioner of the 
Canadian 
Transportation 
Agency
Same Exempts certain shipping 
conference (association of 
ocean carriers that has the 
purpose or effect of 
regulating rates and 
conditions for the 
transportation by those 
ocean carriers of goods by 
water) practices from the 
provisions of the 
Competitive Act.
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TABLE A-6
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  INDIAN AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Arctic Waters 
Pollution 
Prevention Act 
(1985)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Canada Petroleum 
Resources Act 
(1985)
Canadian Polar 
Commission Act
(1991)
Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs
Board of Directors of 
the Commission / 
Members of the 
Queen’s Privy 
Council (GIC).
Yukon Waters Act 
(1992)
Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs
Board of Directors of 
the Commission
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs, 
Yukon Territory 
Water Board
Provisions concerning 
natural resources in areas 
of the Canadian Arctic for 
which the Minister has 
administrative responsibility. 
Regulations controlling the 
deposit of waste north of 60 
degrees latitude. Relates to 
the exploitation of natural 
resources of arctic areas, 
and the transportation of 
those resources to the 
markets of the world.
Regulates interest in 
petroleum in relation to 
frontier lands.
To establish the Canadian 
Polar Commission with the 
purpose of promoting the 
development and 
dissemination of knowledge 
in respect of the polar 
region by monitoring the 
state of knowledge and 
reporting on it, promoting 
the development of 
knowledge, providing
Relates to the use of water 
resources in the Yukon 
Territory, including diversion 
or obstruction of waters, 
any alteration of the flow of 
waters, and any alteration 
of the bed or banks of a 
river, stream, lake or other 
body of water.____________
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TABLE A-7
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Department of 
Justice Act (1985)
Minister of Justice Same Conduct of litigation 
(including international).
Oceans Act {1997) Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Minister 
of Justice
Some federal and provincial 
laws can be applied in 
some parts of the sea to 
regulate activities that fall 
under Canadian jurisdiction 
(e.g. oil and gas exploration 
and exploitation). Declares 
Canada’s maritime zones in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
TABLE A-8
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Emergencies Act 
(1985)
Minister o f 
National Defence
Same Permits temporary 
measures to  ensure 
safety and security o f 
Canadians.
National Defence 
Act (1985)
Minister o f 
National Defence
Same Establishes Canadian 
Forces in law.
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TABLE A-9
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  ENVIRONMENT CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Arctic Waters 
Pollution 
Prevention Act 
(1985)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Canada Water Act
(1985)
Minister of 
Environment
Canada Wildlife 
Act (1985)
Canadian 
Environmental 
Assessment Act 
(1992)
Minister of 
Environment, 
Minister of Indian 
and Northern Affairs
Minister of 
Environment / 
Canadian 
Environmental 
Assessment Agency
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs
Minister of
Environment, Minister 
of Indian and 
Northern Affairs 
(Northern Pipeline)
Canadian 
Environmental 
Assessment Agency
Provisions concerning 
natural resources in areas 
of the Canadian Arctic. 
Regulations controlling the 
deposit of waste north of 60 
degrees latitude. Relates to 
the exploitation of natural 
resources of arctic areas, 
and their transportation to 
the markets of the world.
Management of water 
resources, including 
research and the planning 
and implementation of 
programs relating to the 
conservation, development 
and utilization of water 
resources. Pollution and 
demands on water 
resources of Canada.
Wildlife conservation, 
research and interpretation, 
especially through 
partnerships and 
establishment of protected 
marine areas for wildlife.
Establishes a federal 
environmental assessment 
process to achieve 
sustainable development by 
conserving and enhancing 
environmental quality and 
by encouraging and 
promoting economic 
development that conserves 
and enhances 
environmental quality. 
Integrating environmental 
planning into decision­
making processes, 
preventing the degradation 
of environmental quality, 
ensuring that economic 
development is compatible 
with environmental quality.
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TABLE A-9 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  ENVIRONMENT CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Canadian 
Environmental 
Protection Act 
(1988)
Minister of 
Environment, 
Minister of Health
Minister of 
Environment
Respects the protection of 
the environment and of 
human life and health; 
declares the protection of 
the environment as 
essential to the well-being 
of Canada.
Fisheries Act 
(1985)
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Minister 
of Environment
Sections 36-42. Control of 
pollution from land-based 
sources, toxic substances, 
offshore oil and mineral 
resources development.
Government 
Organization Act 
(1979)
Prime Minister Minister of 
Environment
Assigns responsibility for 
ice services, marine 
weather and marine 
climate.
Migratory Birds 
Convention Act 
(1994)
Minister of 
Environment
Same Relates to the 
implementation of a 
Convention for the 
protection of migratory birds 
and their nests in Canada 
and the United States.
Resources and 
Technical Surveys 
A ct{ 1985)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Provides for, among others, 
hydro-geological and 
oceanographic surveys 
relating to mineral 
exploration, development 
and production, and the 
preparation and publishing 
of maps and other data 
necessary to illustrate those 
Acts.
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TABLE A-10
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Coasting Trade 
Act (1992)
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and 
International Trade
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and 
International Trade, 
Minister of Transport
Governs the granting of 
authority to foreign vessels 
wishing to conduct marine 
research within Canada’s 
Exclusive Economic Zone.
Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 
Act (1985)
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and 
International Trade
Same Maritime boundary 
disputes. United Nations 
Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS).
International 
Boundary Waters 
Treaty Act (1985)
Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and 
International Trade
Same Respects the International 
Joint Commission 
established under the treaty 
of January 11, 1909, 
relating to boundary waters 
between Canada and the 
United States of America.
Oceans Act (1997) Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Minister 
of Justice, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade 
(maritime 
boundaries)
Part I of the Oceans Act 
establishes maritime 
boundaries (territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, exclusive 
economic zone). Declares 
Canada’s maritime zones in 
accordance with the 
provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
TABLE A-11
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  HEALTH CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Food and Drugs 
Act (1985)
Minister of Health Same Ensures safe use of marine 
species for human 
consumption.
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TABLE A-12
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Merchant Seamen 
Compensation Act
Minister of HRDC Same Relates to medical and 
hospital expenses and other 
benefits, expenses or 
allowances for merchant 
seamen.
TABLE A-13
FEDERAL LEGISLATION - ■ INDUSTRY CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Government 
Organization Act, 
Atlantic Canada 
(1987)
Prime Minister Minister of Industry Regional economic 
development.
National Research 
Council Act (1985)
Minister of 
Industry
President of the NRC Established the NRC, which 
includes marine engineering 
and marine biology 
research.
Natural Sciences 
and Engineering 
Research Act (1977)
Minister of 
Industry
President of NSERC Established NSERC, which 
provides grant support to 
universities.
Telecommunications 
A ct( 1993)
Minister of 
Industry
Minister of Industry Submarine cables.
Western Economic 
Diversification Act 
1985)
Minister of 
Industry
President of WED Regional economic 
development.
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TABLE A-14
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  NATIONAL ENERGY BOARD AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
National Energy 
Board Act (1990)
Member of the 
Queen’s Privy 
Council for 
Canada
National Energy 
Board
Offshore oil and gas 
pipelines, including in 
submarine areas, internal or 
external waters, and 
territorial sea of continental 
shelf.
TABLE A-15
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
National Research 
Council Act (1985)
Minister of 
Industry
President of the NRC Established the NRC, which 
includes marine engineering 
and marine biology 
research.
TABLE A-16
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  CANADA REVENUE AGENCY AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Customs Act (1985) Minister of 
National Revenue
Deputy Minister of 
National Revenue
Includes goods transported 
in internal waters.
Special Import 
Measures Act (1985)
Minister of 
National Revenue
Deputy Minister of 
National Revenue
Applies to goods imported 
across waters.
Customs and Excise 
Offshore Application 
Act (1984)
Minister of 
National Revenue
Deputy Minister of 
National Revenue
Application of federal 
customs laws in respect of 
goods on their arrival within 
the limits of the continental 
shelf of Canada, and goods 
in respect of which all duties 
and taxes are paid under 
federal customs laws and 
that are moved directly from 
one place to another within 
the limits of the continental 
shelf of Canada.
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TABLE A-17
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Arctic Waters 
Pollution Prevention 
Act (1985)
Canada- 
Newfoundland 
Atlantic Accord 
Implementation Act
(1987)
Canada-Nova Scotia 
Offshore Petroleum 
Resources Accord 
Implementation Act
(1988)
Canada Oil and Gas 
Operations Act
(1985)
Canada Petroleum 
Resources Act
(1986)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Indian and 
Northern Affairs
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Same
Same
Hibernia
Development Project 
Act (1990)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Minister of Natural 
Resources, 
Minister of Indian 
and Northern 
Affairs
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Same
Same
Same
Provisions concerning 
natural resources in areas 
of the Canadian Arctic for 
which the Minister has 
administrative responsibility. 
Regulations controlling the 
deposit of waste north of 60 
degrees latitude. Relates to 
the exploitation of natural 
resources of arctic areas, 
and the transportation of 
those resources to the 
markets of the world.
Development of offshore 
resources in Newfoundland.
Development of offshore 
resources in Nova Scotia. 
Implements an agreement 
between the Government of 
Canada and the 
Government of Nova Scotia 
on offshore petroleum 
resource management and 
revenue sharing. Natural 
gas, petroleum, oil.
Regulation of exploration 
and exploitation of oil and 
gas.
Regulates interests in 
petroleum in relation to 
frontier lands, to amend the 
Oil and Gas Production and 
Conservation Act and to 
repeal the Canada Oil and 
Gas Act.
Respects the Hibernia 
Development Project and to 
amend certain Acts in 
relation thereto.
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TABLE A-17 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  NATURAL RESOURCES CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Resources and 
Technical Surveys 
Act (1985)
Minister of Natural 
Resources
Minister of Natural 
Resources, Minister 
of Environment, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Provides for, among others, 
hydro-geological and 
oceanographic surveys 
relating to mineral 
exploration, development 
and production, and the 
preparation and publishing 
of maps and other data 
necessary to illustrate those 
Acts.
TABLE A-18
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Canadian 
Transportation 
Accident 
Investigation and 
Safety Board Act 
(1989)
President of the 
Privy Council 
Office
Any department of 
the Government of 
Canada
Establishes the Canadian 
Transportation Accident 
Investigation and Safety 
Board.
Canadian Polar 
Commission Act 
(1991)
Any member of 
the Queen’s Privy 
Council for 
Canada
See above Establishes the Canadian 
Polar Commission, which 
promotes the development 
and dissemination of 
knowledge in respect of the 
polar regions.
Canada Ports 
Corporation Act 
(1981)
Any member of 
the Queen’s Privy 
Council for 
Canada
See above Establishes the Canadian 
Ports Corporation.
A14
Appendix A
TABLE A-19
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  PUBLIC WORKS AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Dry Docks Subsidies 
Act (1985)
Minister of Public 
Works and 
Government 
Services
Same Provides for aid to the 
construction of any dry 
dock, for naval and general 
purposes.
Department o f Public 
Works and 
Government 
Services Act (1996)
Prime Minister Minister of Public 
Works and
Government Services
Provides for acquisition 
services for goods and 
materiel, major Crown 
projects, Crown assets 
distribution and disposal, 
marine architecture and 
engineering, dredging, fleet 
services, and other real 
property services.
TABLE A-20
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Canada Marine Act Minister of
(1998) Transport
Canada Ports 
Corporation Act 
(1981)
Canada Shipping 
Act (1985)
Member of the 
Queen’s Privy 
Council (GIC)
Minister of 
Fisheries and 
Oceans, Minister 
of Transport
Canadian
Transportation
Agency
Minister of Transport
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Minister 
of Transport,
Minister of National 
Defence
Purpose to make the 
system of Canadian ports 
competitive, efficient and 
commercially oriented, to 
provide for the 
establishment of port 
authorities and to divest 
certain harbours and ports, 
for the commercializing of 
the St. Lawrence Seaway 
and ferry services and other 
matters related to maritime 
trade and transport.
To establish the Canada 
Ports Corporation.
Services for the safe, 
economical and efficient 
movement of ships in 
Canadian waters.
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TABLE A-20 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Canadian 
Transportation Act 
(1979)
Carriage o f Goods 
by Water Act (1993)
Coasting Trade Act
(1992)
Government 
Organization Act
(1979)
Harbour 
Commission Act
Marine
Transportation 
Security Act (1994)
National
Transportation Act
(1987)
Canadian
Transportation
Agency
Minister of 
Transport
Canadian
Transportation
Agency
Same
Minister of 
Transport
Same
Prime Minister
Minister of 
Transport
Minister of 
Transport
Minister of Transport
Same
Same
Minister of 
Transport
Same
Establishes the Canadian 
Transportation Agency.
Carriage of goods by ship 
from one place in Canada 
to another place in Canada. 
Relates to the United 
Nations Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea
(1978).
Reserves cabotage in 
Canadian waters to 
domestic ships and 
provides for temporary use 
of foreign ships when no 
suitable Canadian ship is 
available. Applies to 
transportation of passenger 
and cargo and activities of a 
commercial nature.
Includes control of ship- 
source discharge.
Provides for the 
establishment of harbour 
commissions and a national 
port policy.
Provides for the security of 
marine transportation, and 
applies to vessels and 
marine facilities in Canada, 
Canadian ships outside 
Canada, and marine 
installations and structures.
Review of mergers and 
acquisitions of marine 
undertakings. Licensing of 
northern marine resupply. 
Dispute resolution 
mechanisms for shippers 
and carriers in the marine 
mode.
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TABLE A-20 (continued)
FEDERAL LEGISLATION -  TRANSPORT CANADA AS LEAD AGENT
Legislation (year) Statutory Lead Administrative
Responsibility
Relationship to Oceans
Navigable Waters 
Protection Act 
(1985)
Minister of 
Transport
Minister of Transport, 
Minister of Fisheries 
and Oceans
Protects the public right of 
navigation by providing for 
removal of obstructions and 
provides an approval 
mechanism for planned 
obstructions.
Pilotage Act (1985) Minister of 
Transport
Same Marine pilotage in certain 
waters of Canada.
Canada Marine Act 
(1998)
Shipping 
Conferences 
Exemptions Act 
(1987)
Minister of 
Transport
Commissioner of 
the CTA
Same
Commissioner of the 
CTA, Minister of 
Transport
Provides for the 
management of public 
harbours and port facilities. 
Provides an exemption 
from Canadian competition 
law to national and 
international shipping lines 
to collectively set prices, 
terms and conditions for 
international marine 
transportation. Does not 
apply to domestic marine 
transportation.
St. Lawrence 
Seaway Authority 
Act (1996)
Minister of 
Transport
Same Seaway operations.
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EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Chapters Four and Five identified the large number of federal 
departments and agencies that have responsibility for marine affairs in 
Canada. The chapters also outlined the specific departmental mandates, 
jurisdictions and extant working groups and committee structures. The 
following scenarios demonstrate, in tabular form, the multitude of departments 
or agencies that may be implicated in a maritime security or enforcement 
incident in Canadian waters.
TABLE B - 1 
EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Possible Nature of Initial Federal Federal References
Incident Operational Support
____________________ Lead_________ Organisations_____________________
Scenario -  Fire on a Merchant Ship in the Great Lakes (Canadian waters)
-Search and Rescue DFO / CCG TC Canada Shipping Act
-Safety CBSA Department of Foreign Affairs and
-Environment CRA International Trade (DFAIT) Act
CIC Oceans Act
DFAIT Canadian Environmental Protection Act
DND/CF Boundary Waters Treaty
EC National Search and Rescue (SAR)
RCMP Manual
MOU between CCG and USCG 
Canada/US Joint Marine Pollution 
Contingency Plan
Scenario -  Petroleum Blow-out on Oil Platform in Hibernia (24-200 nm from Cdn coast)
-Safety DFO / CCG DFAIT Canada Shipping Act
-Search and Rescue DND/CF Canadian Offshore Gas Lands Act
-Environment EC Oceans Act
NRCan Canadian Environmental Protection Act
PSC Department of Foreign Affairs and
RCMP International Trade (DFAIT) Act
TC IMO International Convention on SAR 
Transport Publication 6472 “Standards 
Respecting Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Units”
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TABLE B -1  (continued)
EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Possible Nature of
Incident
Initial Federal
Operational
Lead
Federal
Support
Organisations
References
Scenario -  Striking workers seize control of offshore oil rig and threaten its destruction 
unless their demands are met (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).
-Law Enforcement 
(Criminal) 
-Safety 
-Environment
RCMP PSC Criminal Code of Canada
DFAIT Oceans Act
DFO/CCG Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act
DND/CF Canadian Environmental Protection Act
EC Department o f Foreign Affairs and
NRCan International Trade (DFAIT) Act
RCMP Prescribed Places of
Employment Order (P C. 1988-1520)
Scenario -  Intelligence reports that a container ship from Colombia destined for Halifax 
may contain a radiological bomb.
-Terrorism RCMP/PSC DND/CF Canada Shipping Act
co-leads CNSC Customs Act
CSE Marine Transportation Security Act
CSIS Oceans Act
DFAIT Security Offences Act
DFO/CCG Criminal Code of Canada
CRA Canadian Environmental Protection Act
EC CSIS Act
HC Department of Foreign Affairs and
TC International Trade Act
International Maritime Law and 
Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)
CF Armed Assistance Directions 
(CFAAD)
National Counter-Terrorism Plan 
National Support Plan 
Guidelines Concerning Cooperation on 
Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear (CBRN) Counter- 
Terrorism Between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of 
the United States of America
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TABLE B -1  (continued)
EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Possible Nature of Initial Federal Federal References
Incident Operational Support
____________________ Lead_________Organisations___________________________________
Scenario -  Intelligence determines that illegal immigrants may be stowed on a (foreign 
flagged) freighter 100 km offshore and moving north along the west coast of 
North America (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).
-Illegal Immigration CBSA RCMP Customs Act
CIC Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
CSIS Marine Transportation Security Act
DFAIT National Defence Act
DFO/CCG Oceans Act
HC Canada Shipping Act
PSC CSIS Act
TC Department o f Foreign Affairs and
DND/CF International Trade Act
Scenario -  A foreign trawler is reported to be fishing for cod on the Grand Banks without 
permission. (24-200 nm from Cdn coast).
-Law Enforcement 
(Fisheries) 
-Conservation 
-Sovereignty issue
DFO DFAIT Oceans Act
DND/CF Fisheries Act
RCMP National Defence Act
PSC Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (and
Regulations)
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Act
Scenario -  A re-supply ship in the Arctic reports it has hit an ice flow and is leaking oil.
-Environment DFO/CCG DFAIT Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act
-Search and Rescue DND/CF (and Regulations)
-Safety EC Canada Shipping Act
PSC Canadian Environmental Protection Act
T C Department o f Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Act
Scenario -  A freighter carrying hazardous materials in Lake Superior loses power during a 
storm (in Canadian waters in the Great Lakes).
-Search and Rescue DFO/CCG
-Safety
-Environment
DFAIT Canada Shipping Act
DND/CF Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act
EC Navigable Waters Protection Act
HC Canadian Environmental Protection Act
DOJ Department of Foreign Affairs and
PSC International Trade Act
TC Canada/US Joint Marine Pollution
Contingency Plan
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TABLE B -1  (continued)
EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Possible Nature of
Incident
Initial Federal Federal 
Operational Support
Lead_________ Organisations
References
Scenario -  Terrorists seize control of a cruise ship after it leaves Halifax and it remains in 
Canadian waters.
-Terrorism PSC/RCMP CBSA Customs Act
co-leads DND/CF Criminal Code of Canada
CNSC Marine Transportation Security Act
CSE Security Offences Act
CSIS Oceans Act
DFAIT CSIS Act
CRA Department of Foreign Affairs and
CIC International Trade Act
DFO/CCG Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
EC International Maritime Law and
HC Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)
TC CF Armed Assistance Directions
(CFAAD)
National Counter Terrorism Plan
Scenario -  Terrorists seize control of a cruise ship after it leaves Halifax and it has left 
Canadian waters and is in international waters.
-Terrorism DFAIT PSC Customs Act
RCM P Criminal Code of Canada
CBSA Marine Transportation Security Act
DND/CF Security Offences Act
CNSC Oceans Act
CSE CS/S Act
CSIS Department of Foreign Affairs and
CRA International Trade Act
Cic Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
DFO/CCG International Maritime Law and
EC Conventions (SOLAS, SUA)
HC CF Armed Assistance Directions
TC (CFAAD)
National Counter Terrorism Plan
Scenario -  A civilian passenger aircraft crashes off the coast near Machias Island in the 
Bay of Fundy (0-12nm in Canadian waters).
-Search and Rescue DFO/CCG RCMP Customs Act
TC Oceans Act
CRA Aeronautics Act
DFAIT CSIS Act
DND/CF Department o f Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Act
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TABLE B -1  (continued)
EXAMPLE MARINE SECURITY SCENARIOS
Possible Nature of
Incident
Initial Federal
Operational
Lead
Federal
Support
Organisations
References
Scenario -  A passing ship reports a suspicious rendezvous between a freighter and a 
fishing trawler at dusk just beyond 12 miles off of Canadian/US territory.
-Unknown
-Possible criminal or 
terrorist activity.
RCMP CBSA Criminal Code of Canada
CRA Environment Act
CIC Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
CSIS Excise Act
DFAIT Oceans Act
DFO/CCG Customs Act
DND/CF Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
PSC Marine Transportation Security Act
TC CSIS Act
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Act 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act 
RCMP Prescribed Places of
Employment Order (P.C. 1988-1520)
Scenario -  A passing RCMP has been informed that a ship spotted sailing in the Great 
Lakes is transporting drugs to Canada.
-Law Enforcement 
(Criminal)
RCMP CBSA Customs Act
CIC Controlled Drugs and Substances Act
DFAIT Criminal Code of Canada
DFO/CCG Oceans Act
DND/CF National Defence Act
TC Canada Shipping Act
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Act 
DND/RCMP MOU on Counter Drug 
Operations
Scenario -  Two ships collide in the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
TC ( if minor-Search and Rescue
-Safety
-Environment DFO/CCG 
( if major)
TC
EC
CBSA
CRA
DFAIT
DFO/CCG
DND/CF
Customs Act 
Canada Shipping Act 
Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade Act
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NAVAL CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT AND DOMESTIC
OPERATIONS
Table C-1 summarizes the core capabilities that Atlantic-based naval 
vessels and shore units could bring to bear for maritime enforcement or 
domestic operations. These are generic capabilities that may be lessened or 
enhanced depending on the state of readiness of a particular unit at a given 
time.
TABLE C -1
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
IROQUOIS Class Destroyers 
HMCS Athabaskan 
HMCS Iroquois
Max Speed : 29 kts plus 
Max Range : 4500nm at 10 kts 
Complement: 280
Pacific-based Destroyers 
HMCS Algonquin
Command and Control 
Platform
Area Air Defence
Search and Rescue
Seaward Security
Very good capability to 
relocate to remote locations 
and provide full suite of 
Command and Control ( C2) 
services to both military and 
civilian agencies.
Services include;
-secure/open satellite and
radio communications
-workspaces
-task group staff
-briefing facilities
-radar/communication
surveillance
-rations and quarters
-Internet/Intranet
-secure workplaces.
Large area coverage. Ability to 
detect, classify, identify and, if 
necessary, destroy airborne 
threats.
On-scene command, 
helicopter equipped.
Anti-air, anti-surface and anti­
submarine weapons and 
sensors. Trained combat 
teams.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
IROQUOIS Class Destroyers Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in 
reserve.
Container search trained 
including rappelling 
Able to provide up to 3 prize 
crews (custodial) to 
commandeered vessels.
Explosives Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD)
Casualty Clearing / Medical 
Assistance
Organic capability to dispose 
of IED immediately threatening 
the ship.
12-16 crew members crossed 
trained as casualty clearers, 
advanced First Aiders.
Maritime Interdiction
CH-124 Helicopter
Flight Deck
- detecting
- intercepting
- hailing
- questioning
- searching
- rerouting
- seizing/arresting
3 Hr PLE
125 kts (150 max)
4 aircrew
Rescue capacity 4 - 6  
(depending on A/C weight)
Able to accommodate a 
variety of rotary wing from 
both Canadian and Allied 
forces. Dependent on the 
Helairdet status of the ship as 
well as her current flight deck 
certification.
Deck cycle 12-18 hours 
depending on size of 
embarked Helairdet.
Diving 
Small Boats
12 man dive team.
2 Zodiacs
1 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB)
Facilities to tie up numerous 
craft (boats booms/ladders).
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
IROQUOIS Class Destroyers Refueling Aviation Fuel (JP5) 
Diesel/gasoline for small 
boats.
Cranage 
Work Parties
1 Stores Crane - 12001b SWL.
Dependent on the other tasks 
ongoing, up to 50 man work 
parties could be made 
available for duties ashore 
including humanitarian 
assistance and security 
functions.
Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters 
Ships company trained in 
shipboard firefighting and flood 
control.
Engineering Mechanical, electrical, 
construction journeyman 
personnel.
Workshops available.
HALIFAX Class Frigates 
(FFH)
HMCS Charlottetown 
HMCS Fredericton 
HMCS Halifax 
HMCS Montreal 
HMCS St John's 
HMCS Toronto 
HMCS Ville de Quebec
Max Speed: 30 kts +
Max Range: 7100nm at 15 kts 
Complement: 225
Command and Control 
Platform
Good capability to relocate to 
remote locations and provide 
full suite of C2 services to both 
military and civilian agencies. 
Services include;
-secure/open Satellite and
radio communications
-workspaces
-briefing facilities
-radar/communication
surveillance
-rations and quarters
-Internet/Titan/DIN
-secure site
Pacific-based Frigates 
HMCS Calgary 
HMCS Ottawa 
HMCS Regina 
HMCS Vancouver 
HMCSWinnipeg
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
HALIFAX Class Frigates Air Defence Self-defence or threat bearing 
picket only with very limited 
effectiveness against crossing 
targets. Ability to detect, 
classify, identify and if 
necessary destroy airborne 
threats within 10nm of own 
ship.
Search and Rescue On-scene command, 
Helicopter equipped.
Seaward Security Anti-air, anti-surface and anti­
submarine weapons and 
sensors. Trained combat 
team s.
Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in 
reserve.
Container search trained 
including rappelling.
Able to provide up to 3 prize 
crews (custodial) to 
commandeered vessels.
Casualty Clearing/Medical 
Assistance
1 senior Physician Assistant 
1 junior Physician Assistant 
12-16 Steward/Cooks crossed 
trained as Casualty Clearers -  
Advanced First Aiders.
Maritime interdiction - detecting
- intercepting
- hailing
- questioning
- searching
- rerouting
- seizing/arresting.
CH-124 Helicopter 3 Hr PLE
125 kts (150 max)
4 aircrew
Rescue capacity 4 - 6  
(depending on A/C weight).
Diving 12 man dive team.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
HALIFAX Class Frigates Flight Deck Able to accommodate a 
variety of rotary wing from 
both Canadian and Allied 
forces. Dependent on the 
Helairdet status of the ship as 
well as her current flight deck 
certification.
Deck cycle 12 hours with 
embarked Helairdet.
Small Boats
Refueling
2 Zodiacs
1 Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB)
Facilities to tie up numerous 
craft (boats booms/ladders).
Aviation Fuel (JP5) 
Diesel/gasoline for small 
boats.
Cranage 
Work Parties
1 Stores Crane - 12001b SWL
Dependent on the other tasks 
ongoing, up to 50 man work 
parties could be made 
available for duties ashore 
including humanitarian 
assistance and security 
functions.
Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters. 
Ships company trained in 
shipboard firefighting and flood 
control.
Engineering Mechanical, electrical, 
construction journeyman 
personnel.
Workshops available.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
KINGSTON Class Maritime 
Coastal Defence Vessels 
(MCDV)
HMCS Glace Bay 
HMCS Goose Bay 
HMCS Kingston 
HMCS Shawinigan 
HMCS Moncton 
HMCS Summerside
Max Speed: 15 kts 
Max Range: 5000nm at 8 kts 
Complement: 31-40 (+ 8 if 
accommodations payload 
embarked)
18 days endurance provided 
RODs can be operated.
Pacific-based MCDVs 
HMCS Brandon 
HMCS Edmonton 
HMCS Nanaimo 
HMCS Saskatoon 
HMCSWhitehorse 
HMCS Yellowknife
Limited Command and Control 
Platform
Mine Hunting/Clearance
Can relocate to remote areas. 
Very limited capability to 
operate in ice.
Limited number of comms 
circuits but capable of 
HF/UHF/INMARSAT 
secure/unsecure voice/data 
comms.
VHF unsecure comms 
-secure briefing facilities 
-radar surveillance 
-no ESM
-rations and quarters 
-Internet/Titan/DIN.
Ship can embark Remotely 
Operated Vehicles (ROVs) or 
Side Scan Sonar systems to 
identify mine/objects on 
seabed.
Ship can embark 
Containerized Dive System 
and Clearance Diving Team, 
in which case ship can 
dispose of any non-NBC 
ordnance.
Ship can embark mechanical 
mine sweeping payloads to 
clear tethered mines
Search and Rescue On-scene Commander
Seaward Security 40mm and 50cals 
Visual engagements only 
Small Arms
Boarding Parties Nil.
Explosives Ordnance Disposal 
(EOD)
Nil - Unless ship is carrying 
Containerized Dive System 
and Clearance Diving Team 
embarked in which case ship 
can dispose of any non-NBC 
ordnance .
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
KINGSTON Class Maritime 
Coastal Defence Vessels 
(MCDV)
Casualty Clearing/Medical 
Assistance
Maritime Interdiction
CH-124 Helicopter 
Diving
Flight Deck
Small Boats
Refueling 
Cranage 
Work Parties
3 pers Casualty Clearing 
Team Advance First Aid 
qualified.
- hailing
- questioning
Nil
Nil -  3 rescue swimmers Ship 
can embark Containerized 
Dive System and Clearance 
Diving Team.
Nil -  Capable of VERTREP for 
personnel/stores transfer.
6 pers Zodiac
Can embark 10 pers RHIB.
Gasoline for small engines. 
20001b SWL.
Dependent on the other tasks 
ongoing and crew size, up to 
12 man work parties could be 
made available for duties 
ashore.
Fire Fighting Ship’s company trained for 
shipboard firefighting and 
damage control.
Engineering Electrical and Electronic 
journeymen embarked.
Very limited on board repair 
facilities as maintenance 
provided by civilian contractor.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
HMCS Preserver
As the only east coast AOR 
(Auxiliary Oiler -  
Replenishment) unique 
capabilities are her large size, 
capable of transporting men 
and materiel, her enhanced 
helicopter maintenance 
facilities, enhanced medical 
facilities and large number of 
small boats.
Max Speed: 20 kts
Max Range: 7500nm at 12kts
Complement: 365
Command and Control 
Platform
Good capability to relocate to 
remote locations and provide 
full suite of C2 services to both 
military and civilian agencies. 
Services include;
-secure/open Satellite and
radio comms
-workspaces
-briefing facilities
-radar/communication
surveillance
-rations and quarters
-Internet/Titan/DIN
-secure site.
Pacific-based AOR 
HMCS Protecteur
Air Defence Limited to self-defence of own 
ship.
Cargo Capacity Dry Cargo -  1000 tons. 
Ammo -1250  tons.
Search and Rescue On-scene Command, 
Helicopter equipped.
Boarding Parties 20 man team plus 50% in 
reserve.
Container search trained 
including rappelling.
Casualty Clearing/Medical 
Assistance
Diving
Maritime Interdiction
1 Medical Officer 
1 Dental Officer 
1 senior Physicians Assistant 
1 junior Physicians Assistant 
6 Bed Sick Bay with facilities 
for minor surgeries and X-ray
12-16 Steward/Cooks crossed 
trained as Casualty Clearers -  
Advanced First Aiders.
12 man dive team.
- hailing
- questioning
- searching
- rerouting
- seizing/arresting
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
HMCS Preserver CH-124 Helicopter 3 Hr PLE
125 kts (150 max)
4 aircrew.
Diving 
Flight Deck
12 man dive team.
Able to accommodate a 
variety of rotary wing from 
both Canadian and Allied 
forces. Dependent on the 
Helairdet status of the ship as 
well as her current flight deck 
certification.
Deck cycle 12 hours with 
embarked Helairdet.
Small Boats
Refueling
2 LCVP (40 man landing craft) 
2 Zodiacs 
1 RHIB
Facilities to tie up numerous 
craft (boats booms/ladders).
Distillate (ship)14,590 tons. 
Aviation Fuel (JP5) 400 tons. 
Diesel/gasoline for small 
boats.
Cranage 2 10 tonne flight deck/stores 
cranes.
Work Parties Dependent on the other tasks 
ongoing, up to 50 man work 
parties could be made 
available for duties ashore 
including humanitarian 
assistance and security 
functions.
Fire Fighting 6 professional Firefighters. 
Ships company trained in 
shipboard firefighting and flood 
control.
Engineering Mechanical, electrical, 
construction journeyman 
personnel.
Workshops available.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
Explosives Ordnance 
Disposal (EOD)
Military EOD team deals with 
conventional military ordnance 
on military property. If it is not 
something in military property 
then it becomes the problem 
of the local police/RCMP. If 
civilian organizations need 
help then it becomes a 
provision of service.
EOD can deploy 3 teams of 3 
at any one time. However, 1 
team will have all the kit and 
the other two teams will have 
partial kit.
EOD have a 1 hour roll (time 
from call to team until the truck 
is leaving FDU) out response 
for in area call after hours. 
During working hours it will be 
much faster.
Port Security Unit (PSU)
The mission of the PSU is to 
provide waterside security of 
harbours, anchorages and 
their immediate approaches to 
the high water mark in times of 
crisis or contingency in 
Canada and North America.
Surveillance.
Contact analysis and 
reporting.
Interdiction of vessels going in 
and out of the harbour.
Waterside security for military 
forces or OGDs.
EOD can short notice deploy 
away from FDU for 3-5 days 
before support issues start to 
cause difficulties. Otherwise, 
EOD really needs 72 hours 
heads up to move.
PSU is activated under the 
authority of Commander 
Canada Command in 
response to a threat to 
Canada.
Deployability - factors and 
limitations: the PSU requires 
combat service support and 
landward security 
commensurate with the threat.
Force Protection - a 
deterrence against waterborne 
threats.
Command, Control and 
Communications support 
vessel movement control -  i.e. 
assigning anchorages and 
berths.
The PSU may also require 
intelligence, communications 
and other operational support, 
dependant on the threat and 
mission.
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TABLE C -1  (continued)
NAVAL UNIT CAPABILITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT/DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
Units Capability Remarks
Port Security Unit (PSU) Port safety.
Law enforcement support. 
EOD operations.
Salvage and safe navigation. 
Aids to navigation.
Diving
Monitoring and enforcing 
safety and/or exclusion zones.
Through provision of 
transportation and C2
Port Inspection Dive Team
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Maps -  Marine Vessel Detection Patterns
Unless otherwise noted, the vessel data for all maps in Appendix D 
originated from Fisheries and Oceans Canada as PAL flight mission data. 
These data were parsed from all sensor sources at the Maritime Operations 
Centre at Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in 2002.
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Figure D-1. Cumulative Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  2002
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Figure D-2. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  January 2002
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Figure D-3. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  February 2002
D2
N.OS 
N.Ot' 
N.OS 
N.Ofr
Appendix D
60 °W 50 °W
C A N A D A
QUEBEC
NE W F O U N D L A N D
NEW
BRUNSWI CI
. NOVA
i COTi A
60°W
Figure D-4. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  March 2002
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Figure D-6. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  May 2002
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Figure D-7. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  June 2002
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Figure D-9. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  August 2002
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Figure D-10. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  September 2002
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Figure D-11. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  October 2002
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Figure D-12. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  November 2002
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Figure D-13. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  December 2002
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Figure D-14. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Summer 2002
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Figure D-15. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Fall 2002
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Figure D-16. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Winter 2002
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Figure D-17. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Spring 2002
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Figure D-18. Cumulative Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  2002
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Figure D-19. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  January 2002
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Figure D-20. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  February 2002
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Figure D-21. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  March 2002
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Figure D-22. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  April 2002
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Figure D-23. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  May 2002
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Moat Contacts
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Figure D-24. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  June 2002
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Figure D-25. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  July 2002
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Figure D-26. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  August 2002
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Figure D-27. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  September 2002
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Figure D-28. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  October 2002
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Figure D-29. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  November 2002
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Figure D-30. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  December 2002
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Figure D-31. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Summer 2002
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Figure D-32. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Fall 2002
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Figure D-33. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Winter 2002
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Figure D-34. Vessel Detections by PAL Flights -  Spring 2002
Figure D-35. Vessel Detections by Naval Vessels -  1999 to 2000
Source: Researcher’s contact logs aboard 13 naval vessels.
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MAPS -  SEARCH AND RESCUE ACTIVITY
Unless otherwise noted, data for all maps in Appendix E were collected 
from Canadian Coast Guard national headquarters through the Joint Rescue 
Co-ordination Centre at Halifax, Nova Scotia in 2002.
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Figure D-14. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Spring Months
Figure D-15. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Summer Months Surface Model
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Figure D-16. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Fall Months Surface Model
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Figure D-18. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Spring Months Surface Model
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Figure D-19. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Air
E10
40
°N
Appendix E
C A N A D A
Z
8
N*EW
%•
?§
CANADA
QUEBEC
u • ;• ,
N E W ff l UNDLA ND
NEW ^  
BRUNSWICI
!n o  t A  
tCOTIJ
Figure D-20. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Marine
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Figure D-21. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Humanitarian
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Figure D-22. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Air Surface Model
Figure D-23. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Marine Surface Model
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Figure D-24. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Humanitarian Surface Model
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Figure D-25. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Distress
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Figure D-26. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Potential Distress
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Figure D-27. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Distress Surface Model
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Figure D-28. SAR Incidents 1999-2002 -  Potential Distress Surface Model
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MAPS -  NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS
Maps of naval vessel tracks, and surface models of naval enforcement 
presence in Appendix F were created from 1980 to 1996 data found in 
individual Ship’s Logs at the National Library and Archives of Canada, and 
from 1999 to 2003 from research track logs maintained aboard naval vessels.
For the purposes of these maps, the following seasons are defined: 
Summer (June, July, August), Fall (September, October, November), Winter 
(December, January, February), and Spring (March, April, May).
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Figure F-1. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980 -  2003 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (87 vessels); Ship track logs (33 
vessels)
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Figure F-2. Naval Fisheries Presence 1980 to 1997 -  Surface Model
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (86 vessels)
NOVA 
COT IA
Figure F-3. Naval Fisheries Presence 1999 to 2003 -  Surface Model
Source: Ship track logs (33 vessels)
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Figure F-4. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-1984 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (17 vessels)
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Figure F-5. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1985-1989 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (23 vessels)
F3
N.OS 
N.O* 
N.OS 
N
.O
t-
NOVA
C O T M
Appendix F
60°W 50'W
60°W  50°W
Figure F-6. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1990-1994 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (29 vessels)
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Figure F-7. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1995-1999 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (27 vessels)
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Figure F-8. Naval Fisheries Patrols 2000-2003 -  Raw Tracks
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada (23 vessels)
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Figure F-9. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  January
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (11 vessels)
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Figure F-10. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  February
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)
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Figure F-11. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  March
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)
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Figure F-12. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  April
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (8 vessels)
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Figure F-13. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  May
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (12 vessels)
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Figure F-14. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  June
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (10 vessels)
C A N A D A
N E W F O U N D L A N D
60°W 50 °W
Figure F-15. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  July
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (9 vessels)
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Figure F-16. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  August
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (7 vessels)
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Figure F-17. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  September
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (14 vessels)
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Figure F-18. Naval  Patrols 1980-2003 -  October
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (13 vessels)
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Figure F-19. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  November
’ °8
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (12 vessels)
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Figure F-20. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  December
'  S3
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (3 vessels)
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Figure F-21. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  Summer
'  53
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (26 vessels)
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Figure F-22. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  Fall
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Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (39 vessels)
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Figure F-23. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  Winter
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (24 vessels)
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Figure F-24. Naval Fisheries Patrols 1980-2003 -  Spring
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, Ship track logs (30 vessels)
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Figure F-25. Hague Line Naval Fisheries Patrols by 1980-1997
Source: National Library and Archives of Canada, (7 vessels)
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CP-140 (AURORA) PATROLS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 7-4
Table G-1 contains the areas patrolled by CP-140 long-range maritime 
patrol aircraft during the year 2002. Dedicated fisheries patrols, i.e., those with 
a DFO fisheries enforcement officer embarked, are listed in under Flight Type 
as “fishpats.” Surveillance flights during which the primary surveillance 
mission was something other than support to fisheries, i.e. military 
surveillance, are listed as “surv.” All other flight missions, such as training, 
combat readiness proficiency, trials, and SAR are listed as “other.” The grids 
used to plan the CP-140 missions are found in Chapter Three as Figures 3-6, 
3-7, 3-8, and 3-12.
TABLE G-1
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol
02-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
04-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
06-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
07-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
09-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
11-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
11-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
12-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
13-Jan-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
15-Jan-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
15-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
16-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
17-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Jan-02 surv A-62, A-66 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
20-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
21-Jan-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
21-Jan-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
22-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
22-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
23-Jan-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
24-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
25-Jan-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol
25-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
28-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
28-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
30-Jan-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
30-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
30-Jan-02 other G1.G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
31-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
31-Jan-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
31-Jan-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
01-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
03-Feb-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
04-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
05-Feb-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
05-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Feb-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Feb-02 other F1 MARLOAS
07-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
07-Feb-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
09-Feb-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
11-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
12-Feb-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Feb-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Feb-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
22-Feb-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
22-Feb-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
26-Feb-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
27-Feb-02 other Unicom ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
27-Feb-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
28-Feb-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Mar-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
03-Mar-02 surv 96/Grand Banks CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
05-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
06-Mar-02 other 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-Mar-02 other F1 MARLOAS
08-Mar-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas
08-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
09-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
09-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
11-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
12-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-Mar-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
14-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
15-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Mar-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
17-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Mar-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Mar-02 surv 91 CP-140 Patrol Areas
20-Mar-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas
19-Mar-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Mar-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Mar-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Mar-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
21-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
23-Mar-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
28-Mar-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Mar-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
02-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
02-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
03-Apr-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
03-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
06-Apr-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
05-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
05-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
05-Apr-02 surv 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
09-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
11-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
11-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
12-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-Apr-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
14-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
17-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
20-Apr-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
21-Apr-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
22-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
23-Apr-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
24-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
24-Apr-02 other Unicom ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
26-Apr-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
26-Apr-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol
28-Apr-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Apr-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
30-Apr-02 other 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
30-Apr-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
01-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
03-May-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
05-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
09-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
09-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
10-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
11-May-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
12-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
13-May-02 other Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-May-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-May-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
15-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
17-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-May-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
21-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
22-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
23-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
23-May-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
26-May-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
27-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
28-May-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
25-May-02 SAR 3P, 3S NAFO
29-May-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
30-May-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
31-May-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-Jun-02 fishpat Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
05-Jun-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
05-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
06-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
07-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
07-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
08-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
09-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
10-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
10-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
11-Jun-02 fishpat OB, OA NAFO
11-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
12-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
12-Jun-02 other 2G, 2H, 2J NAFO
11-Jun-02 other G1.G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
11-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type_______ Areas of Patrol______________Grid Used for Patrol
13-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
16-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
17-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Jun-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
20-Jun-02 other OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
21-Jun-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
20-Jun-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Jun-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Jun-02 surv A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
25-Jun-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 1F NAFO
25-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
26-Jun-02 fishpat 1F, 2H, 2G NAFO
24-Jun-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
25-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
25-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other A, B, E3 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS
27-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
29-Jun-02 other 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
26-Jun-02 other A, B, E2 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other D1, D2, D3, D4 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
26-Jun-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS
28-Jun-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Jun-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
30-Jun-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
02-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
03-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
03-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
03-Jul-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-Jul-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
04-Jul-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Jul-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
07-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
09-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 1D, 1E, 1F NAFO
09-Jun-02 other 2H, 2J NAFO
10-Jul-02 other 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
11-Jul-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
11-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
16-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
17-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
17-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Jul-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Jul-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
20-Jul-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
22-Jul-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Jul-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas
24-Jul-02 surv 90/Gulf CP-140 Patrol Areas
24-Jul-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
30-Jul-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
31-Jul-02 fishpat 3L, 3M, 3N, 30 NAFO
01-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
02-Aug-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
03-Aug-02 surv 99, 100 CP-140 Patrol Areas
05-Aug-02 surv OA, OB NAFO
06-Aug-02 surv OA, OB NAFO
08-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
09-Aug-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
11-Aug-02 surv 97/NFLD East CP-140 Patrol Areas
13-Aug-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
14-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO
15-Aug-02 fishpat 1F NAFO
15-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Aug-02 surv 98/Belle Strait CP-140 Patrol Areas
16-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Aug-02 surv 91/NS Inner, 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas
19-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO
20-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J.2H NAFO
21-Aug-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Aug-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
25-Aug-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
27-Aug-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
28-Aug-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO
28-Aug-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
28-Aug-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Aug-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H, 1F NAFO
01-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
04-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO
05-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G.2H, 1F NAFO
06-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
06-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Sep-02 other 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
09-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
10-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
11-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
12-Sep-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
17-Sep-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
18-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2F, 1F NAFO
18-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
18-Sep-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J.2H NAFO
19-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J,2H,3K NAFO
20-Sep-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
20-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
22-Sep-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
23-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Sep-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
25-Sep-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 3K NAFO
26-Sep-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
28-Sep-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Sep-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
30-Sep-02 other A-10, A-11 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
02-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
03-0ct-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
03-0ct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
03-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
06-0ct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-0ct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-0ct-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
08-0ct-02 fishpat OB, 2G, 1F NAFO
08-0ct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-0ct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
09-0ct-02 fishpat 1F, 2J, 2H NAFO
09-0ct-02 other G1, G2, G3, G4 MARLOAS
09-0ct-02 other H1, H2, H3, H4 MARLOAS
10-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
10-Oct-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
10-Oct-02 surv OB, 2G, 2H NAFO
11-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
11-Oct-02 surv 0A,0B NAFO
12-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Oct-02 other Unicorn, Zebra ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Oct-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Oct-02 other 1E, 2D, 2E NAFO
23-Oct-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
23-Oct-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Oct-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
25-Oct-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
26-Oct-02 other A-10, A-11 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
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TABLE G-1 (continued)
CP-140 AURORA AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-4
Date Flight type Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
01-Nov-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
04-Nov-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
09-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
12-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
16-Nov-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Nov-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
19-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
21-Nov-02 surv 92/NS Outer CP-140 Patrol Areas
22-Nov-02 surv 91/NS Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas
22-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
24-Nov-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
27-Nov-02 other Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
27-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
29-Nov-02 other A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Dec-02 surv A-12, A-13, A-17, A-18 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
01-Dec-02 other A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
07-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
08-Dec-02 surv 93/NFLD Inner CP-140 Patrol Areas
08-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
09-Dec-02 other A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
10-Dec-02 other 0B, 2G, 2H NAFO
11-Dec-02 surv 0B, 2G, 2H NAFO
12-Dec-02 surv A-67 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
13-Dec-02 other A-62 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
14-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
15-Dec-02 other F1 MARLOAS
16-Dec-02 surv A-63 ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
18-Dec-02 surv F1 MARLOAS
18-Dec-02 surv Unicorn ATC & Restricted Danger Zones
28-Dec-02 surv 95/NFLD South CP-140 Patrol Areas
30-Dec-02 surv 94/NS South CP-140 Patrol Areas
Source: Maritime Air Component Commander (Atlantic) Staff, 2003.
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Appendix H
PAL AIRCRAFT SURVEILLANCE PATROLS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 7-7
Table H-1 contains the mission identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL 
surveillance aircraft during the year 2002. Table H-2 contains the mission 
identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL surveillance aircraft contracted by the 
Canadian Coast Guard for anti-pollution patrols during the same year. The 
grid used to plan the PAL missions is the North Atlantic Fisheries 
Organization depicted in Chapter Three at Figures 3-12 and 3-13. The first 
four digits of the mission identifier indicate for which DFO region the aircraft 
was tasked:
BKGR -  Gulf Region
BKNF -  Newfoundland Region
BKSF -  Scotia Fundy Region (now Maritimes Region)
BKQR -  Quebec Region.
TABLE H -1 
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
01-Jan-02 BKNF02-001 3L-OUTER NAFO
02-Jan-02 BKNF02-002 3N-OUTER NAFO
02-Jan-02 BKSF02-001 4X NAFO
03-Jan-02 BKGR02-001 4T NAFO
03-Jan-02 BKNF02-003 3M NAFO
03-Jan-02 BKSF02-002 4W NAFO
04-Jan-02 BKNF02-004 3LNO-INNER NAFO
04-Jan-02 BKSF02-003 5ZE/4X NAFO
05-Jan-02 BKNF02-005 3L-OUTER NAFO
05-Jan-02 BKSF02-004 4VW NAFO
06-Jan-02 BKSF02-005 5ZE/4X/4W NAFO
07-Jan-02 BKNF02-008 3L-OUTER NAFO
08-Jan-02 BKSF02-006 4WX NAFO
09-Jan-02 BKGR02-002 4T NAFO
09-Jan-02 BKNF02-010 3NO-OUTER NAFO
09-Jan-02 BKSF02-007 4VW NAFO
10-Jan-02 BKSF02-008 4X NAFO
11-Jan-02 BKNF02-011 3L NAFO
11-Jan-02 BKNF02-012 3PS NAFO
11-Jan-02 BKSF02-009 5ZE/4X NAFO
12-Jan-02 BKSFO2-010 4WX NAFO
13-Jan-02 BKNF02-013 3NO NAFO
13-Jan-02 BKSF02-011 4VW NAFO
14-Jan-02 BKSFO2-012 4WX NAFO
15-Jan-02 BKGR02-003 4T/4VS NAFO
15-Jan-02 BKNF02-014 3L-OUTER NAFO
15-Jan-02 BKNF02-015 3K/4R NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
15-Jan-02 BKSF02-013 5ZE/4X NAFO
16-Jan-02 BKSF02-014 4X NAFO
17-Jan-02 BKNF01-017 3L-OUTER NAFO
17-Jan-02 BKNF02-015 4VW NAFO
17-Jan-02 BKNF02-016 3NO-OUTER NAFO
17-Jan-02 BKNF02-021 4R/2J NAFO
18-Jan-02 BKGR02-004 4T- NAFO
18-Jan-02 BKNF02-018 3L3PS NAFO
18-Jan-02 BKNF02-019 3NO OUTER NAFO
18-Jan-02 BKSF02-016 4X NAFO
19-Jan-02 BKNF02-020 3LM NORTH NAFO
19-Jan-02 BKSF02-017 4VS NAFO
20-Jan-02 BKNF02-022 3NO-OUTER NAFO
20-Jan-02 BKSF02-018 4X NAFO
21-Jan-02 BKGR02-005 4T NAFO
21-Jan-02 BKNF02-019 4X NAFO
21-Jan-02 BKNF02-023 3NO-OUTER NAFO
23-Jan-02 BKSFO2-021 4X NAFO
24-Jan-02 BKNF02-026 3LMSOUTH NAFO
24-Jan-02 BKNF02-027 3LNO-INNER NAFO
24-Jan-02 BKSF02-022 4VW NAFO
25-Jan-02 BKNF02-028 3LM-NORTH NAFO
25-Jan-02 BKNF02-029 4R NAFO
26-Jan-02 BKNF02-031 S-AVALON NAFO
26-Jan-02 BKNF02-032 3NO-OUTER NAFO
26-Jan-02 BKSF02-023 4X NAFO
27-Jan-02 BKSF02-024 4X/5ZE NAFO
28-Jan-02 BKGR02-007 4T NAFO
28-Jan-02 BKNF02-034 3NO-OUTER NAFO
28-Jan-02 BKSF02-025 4V/SW NAFO
29-Jan-02 BKNF02-035 3L-OUTER NAFO
29-Jan-02 BKSF02-026 4X NAFO
30-Jan-02 BKNF02-036 3LNO NAFO
30-Jan-02 BKNF02-037 3K/2J NAFO
31-Jan-02 BKGR02-008 4T/4VN NAFO
31-Jan-02 BKSF02-028 5ZE/4X NAFO
01-Feb-02 BKNF02-038 S AVALON NAFO
01-Feb-02 BKNF02-039 3NO-OUTER NAFO
01-Feb-02 BKSF02-029 4WX NAFO
03-Feb-02 BKNF02-040 NO AREA NAFO
03-Feb-02 BKSF02-031 4WX NAFO
04-Feb-02 BKNF02-038 NO AREA NAFO
04-Feb-02 BKNF02-042 3LOUTER NAFO
04-Feb-02 BKSF02-032 4X/5ZE NAFO
06-Feb-02 BKNF02-043 3 NO-OUTER NAFO
06-Feb-02 BKNF02-044 S AV/3PS NAFO
06-Feb-02 BKSF02-034 4W-4X NAFO
07-Feb-02 BKGR02-009 4T NAFO
07-Feb-02 BKNF02-045 3L-OUTER NAFO
07-Feb-02 BKNF02-46 3LM-NORTH NAFO
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TABLE H - 1  (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
07-Feb-02 BKSF02-036 5ZE-4X NAFO
08-Feb-02 BKNF02-047 3L NAFO
08-Feb-02 BKSF02-037 4X NAFO
09-Feb-02 BKNF02-048 3NO NAFO
09-Feb-02 BKSF02-038 4VW- NAFO
10-Feb-02 BKNF02-052 3LNO-INNER NAFO
11-Feb-02 BKNF02-053 3L-OUTER NAFO
12-Feb-02 BKNF02-054 3NO-OUTER NAFO
13-Feb-02 BKNF02-055 3LM-S NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKGR02-008 4T/4VN NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKGR02-009 4T NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKNF02-056 3LOUTER NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKNF02-057 3PS NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKNF02-058 3M EAST NAFO
14-Feb-02 BKQr01-046 4S/T NAFO
15-Feb-02 BKGR02-011 4T NAFO
15-Feb-02 BKNF02-059 4R/2J/K NAFO
15-Feb-02 BKSF02-044 4VW NAFO
16-Feb-02 BKNF02-060 3L-OUTER NAFO
16-Feb-02 BKSF02-045 5ZE/4X NAFO
17-Feb-02 BKSF02-046 4X NAFO
18-Feb-02 BKNF02-062 3NO NAFO
18-Feb-02 BKNF02-063 30P-EDGE NAFO
18-Feb-02 BKSF02-047 4VSW NAFO
19-Feb-02 BKNF02-064 3NO-OUTER NAFO
19-Feb-02 BKNF02-065 3PS NAFO
19-Feb-02 BKSF02-048 4WX NAFO
20-Feb-02 BKGR02-012 4T NAFO
20-Feb-02 BKNF02-066 3PS NAFO
20-Feb-02 BKNF02-067 3NO-OUTER NAFO
20-Feb-02 BKNF02-068 4R-3K NAFO
20-Feb-02 BKSF02-049 5ZE/4X NAFO
21-Feb-02 BKSF02-050 4VW NAFO
21-Feb-02 BKSF02-069 4P/2J/3K NAFO
23-Feb-02 BKNF02-070 3L/3PS NAFO
23-Feb-02 BKNF02-071 3NL/OUTER NAFO
23-Feb-02 BKQR02-001 4T NAFO
23-Feb-02 BKSF02-051 4VW NAFO
24-Feb-02 BKNF02-072 3NO-OUTER NAFO
24-Feb-02 BKNF02-073 3LM-NORTH NAFO
24-Feb-02 BKSF02-053 4X NAFO
25-Feb-02 BKNF02-075 2J/3K/4R/S NAFO
25-Feb-02 BKNF02-076 3L OUTER NAFO
25-Feb-02 BKSF02-054 4VSW NAFO
26-Feb-02 BKNF02-077 3L/3PS NAFO
26-Feb-02 BKNF02-078 3LNO NAFO
26-Feb-02 BKSF02-055 4W NAFO
26-Feb-02 BKSF02-057 4X NAFO
27-Feb-02 BKSF02-059 4X NAFO
28-Feb-02 BKSF02-060 4X NAFO
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Appendix H
TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
12-Mar-02 BKNF02-099 3L NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4W NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4W NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKQR02-005 4T NAFO
12-Mar-02 BKSF02-072 4W/X NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-100 3LOUTER NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3K NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 4R NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKNF02-101 3L NAFO
13-Mar-02 BKSF02-073 5ZE/4X NAFO
14-Mar-02 BKNF02-102 3L NAFO
15-Mar-02 BKNF02-103 3PS NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKNF02-104 3LM-NORTH NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKNF02-105 3LMNO/INNER NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKSF02-074 4W/X NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKSF02-075 4W NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKSF02-077 4W/4VS NAFO
16-Mar-02 BKSF02-078 4X/5ZE NAFO
17-Mar-02 BKNF02-106 3NO-OUTER NAFO
17-Mar-02 BKQR02-006 4T NAFO
17-Mar-02 BKSF02-079 4W/5ZE NAFO
18-Mar-02 BKGR-02-018 4T NAFO
18-Mar-02 BKNF02-107 3PS NAFO
18-Mar-02 BKSF02-080 4VW NAFO
19-Mar-02 BKNF02-108 3K/2J NAFO
19-Mar-02 BKSF02-081 4VW NAFO
20-Mar-02 BKNF02-108 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
20-Mar-02 BKSF02-082 4X/5ZE NAFO
20-Mar-02 BKSF02-083 5ZE/4X NAFO
21-Mar-02 BKNF02-110 3NO-OUTER NAFO
21-Mar-02 BKNF02-111 3LM-NORTH NAFO
22-Mar-02 BKGR02-020 4T NAFO
22-Mar-02 BKNF02-112 3LOUTER NAFO
22-Mar-02 BKQR02-007 4T NAFO
23-Mar-02 BKNF02-113 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
23-Mar-02 BKNF02-114 3LNO-INNER NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
23-Mar-02 BKSF02-085 4X NAFO
24-Mar-02 BKNF02-115 3NO-OUTER NAFO
24-Mar-02 BKSF02-086 4WX NAFO
25-Mar-02 BKGR02-021 4VN/4T NAFO
25-Mar-02 BKNF02-117 3LM-OUTER NAFO
25-Mar-02 BKNF02-118 3K\2J NAFO
25-Mar-02 BKNF02-119 3LOUTER NAFO
26-Mar-02 BKNF02-120 2J/3K NAFO
26-Mar-02 BKNF02-121 3PS NAFO
26-Mar-02 BKQR02-008 4T NAFO
26-Mar-02 BKSF02-088 4X NAFO
27-Mar-02 BKNF02-122 4R-SEALS NAFO
27-Mar-02 BKSF02-089 4X NAFO
28-Mar-02 BKNF02-125 3L NAFO
28-Mar-02 BKSF02-090 4W NAFO
29-Mar-02 BKNF02-126 3L NAFO
29-Mar-02 BKSF02-091 4W NAFO
30-Mar-02 BKGR02-022 4W NAFO
30-Mar-02 BKNF02-128 3L NAFO
30-Mar-02 BKNF02-129 3L NAFO
31-Mar-02 BKQR02-010 4ST NAFO
31-Mar-02 BKSF02-093 4W NAFO
01-Apr-02 BKNF02-131 3M NAFO
02-Apr-02 BKNF02-132 3PS NAFO
02-Apr-02 BKSF02-094 5ZE/4X NAFO
03-Apr-02 BKSF02-095 4VW NAFO
04-Apr-02 BKNF02-135 3LOUTER NAFO
04-Apr-02 BKSF02-096 5Z3/4X NAFO
05-Apr-02 BKNF02-136 3K/2J SEAL NAFO
05-Apr-02 BKNF02-137 3PS/30 NAFO
05-Apr-02 BKQR02-011 4T NAFO
06-Apr-02 BKNF02-138 4R NAFO
06-Apr-02 BKNF02-139 3LM NAFO
06-Apr-02 BKQR02-4S 4S NAFO
07-Apr-02 BKSF02-098 5ZE/4X NAFO
08-Apr-02 BKNF02-140 3K/4R-SEAL NAFO
08-Apr-02 BKNF02-141 3L NAFO
08-Apr-02 BKQR02-013 4S NAFO
08-Apr-02 BKQR02-014 4T NAFO
09-Apr-02 BKNF02-142 3L NAFO
09-Apr-02 BKNF02-143 3LNO-INNER NAFO
10-Apr-02 BKNF02-145 3K- NAFO
10-Apr-02 BKSF02-100 4X/5ZE NAFO
11-Apr-02 BKNF02-146 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
11-Apr-02 BKNF02-147 3K NAFO
11-Apr-02 BKSF02-101 4WX NAFO
12-Apr-02 BKNF02-150 3LM NAFO
12-Apr-02 BKSF02-102 4VS NAFO
15-Apr-02 BKGR02-026 4T NAFO
15-Apr-02 BKQR02-013 4S NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
15-Apr-02 BKQR02-014 4T NAFO
16-Apr-02 BKNF02-154 3LNO-LINE NAFO
16-Apr-02 BKQR02-016 4S NAFO
16-Apr-02 BKSF02-105 4VW NAFO
17-Apr-02 BKQR02-027 4T NAFO
17-Apr-02 BKNF02-156 3NO NAFO
17-Apr-02 BKSF02-106 4X NAFO
18-Apr-02 BKNF02-159 3K NAFO
18-Apr-02 BKNF02-160 4L-OUTER NAFO
18-Apr-02 BKQR02-017 4T NAFO
18-Apr-02 BKSF02-107 4X/5ZE NAFO
19-Apr-02 BKNF02-161 3NO-OUTER NAFO
19-Apr-02 BKNF02-162 3K NAFO
19-Apr-02 BKSF02-108 4WX NAFO
20-Apr-02 BKSF02-109 4VW NAFO
21-Apr-02 BKNF02-164 3L NAFO
21-Apr-02 BKQR02-018 3L NAFO
22-Apr-02 BKNF02-165 3L NAFO
22-Apr-02 BKNF02-166 3L NAFO
22-Apr-02 BKQR02-019 3L/3PS/4W NAFO
23-Apr-02 BKGR02-028 4T NAFO
23-Apr-02 BKQR02-020 4T NAFO
23-Apr-02 BKSF02-110 4X NAFO
24-Apr-02 BKNF02-166 3L NAFO
24-Apr-02 BKQR02-022 4W NAFO
24-Apr-02 BKSF02-111 4X NAFO
25-Apr-02 BKNF02-167 3NO/K NAFO
25-Apr-02 BKNF02-168 3L NAFO
25-Apr-02 BKNF02-169 3LNO NAFO
25-Apr-02 BKSF02-112 4X NAFO
26-Apr-02 BKNF02-170 3LM NAFO
26-Apr-02 BKSF02-113 4W/4VS NAFO
27-Apr-02 BKNF02-171 3M-EAST NAFO
27-Apr-02 BKSF02-114 5ZE/4X NAFO
28-Apr-02 BKGR02-028 4T NAFO
28-Apr-02 BKNF02-173 3NO-OUTER NAFO
28-Apr-02 BKNF02-174 3PS/3L NAFO
29-Apr-02 BKGR02-030 4T NAFO
29-Apr-02 BKNF02-115 4WX NAFO
29-Apr-02 BKNF02-175 3K NAFO
29-Apr-02 BKNF02-176 3LOUTER NAFO
30-Apr-02 BKNF02-177 3K NAFO
01-May-02 BKNF02-178 3L -CRABS NAFO
01-May-02 BKNF02-179 3K NAFO
01-May-02 BKNF02-180 3LNO NAFO
01-May-02 BKQR02-024 4T NAFO
01-May-02 BKQR02-025 4T NAFO
01-May-02 BKSF02-116 5ZE/4X NAFO
02-May-02 BKNF02-181 4S-4R NAFO
02-May-02 BKNF02-183 3PS NAFO
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TABLE H - 1  (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
02-May-02 BKQR02-026 4SY-4SZ NAFO
03-May-02 BKSF02-118 4W NAFO
04-May-02 BKNF02-184 3L NAFO
05-May-02 BKNF02-185 3LM-NORTH NAFO
05-May-02 BKSF02-119 4W NAFO
06-May-02 BKGR02-031 4X NAFO
06-May-02 BKNF02-186 3L NAFO
07-May-02 BKNF02-187 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
07-May-02 BKNF02-188 3K/4R NAFO
07-May-02 BKSF02-121 5ZE/4X NAFO
08-May-02 BKNF02-189 3K-CRAB NAFO
08-May-02 BKSF02-122 4X NAFO
09-May-02 BKNF02-191 3L/N NAFO
09-May-02 BKQR02-026 4SY/4SZ NAFO
09-May-02 BKSF02-123 4W/4VS NAFO
10-May-02 BKNF02-193 3M NAFO
10-May-02 BKNF02-194 3L-INSIDE NAFO
10-May-02 BKSF02-124 4X/5ZE NAFO
11-May-02 BKNF02-195 3LOUTER NAFO
11-May-02 BKNF02-196 3PN/S NAFO
11-May-02 BKSF02-126 5ZE/4X NAFO
12-May-02 BKNF02-197 4N NAFO
12-May-02 BKQR02-028 4S NAFO
13-May-02 BKGR02-033 4T NAFO
13-May-02 BKNF02-196 3PN/S NAFO
13-May-02 BKNF02-198 3L-OUTER NAFO
13-May-02 BKNF02-199 3PN/4R NAFO
13-May-02 BKQR02-029 4SZ/4SY NAFO
13-May-02 BKQR02-030 4T NAFO
13-May-02 BKSF02-127 4VW NAFO
14-May-02 BKNF02-200 3L-OUTER NAFO
14-May-02 BKNF02-201 3K NAFO
14-May-02 BKQR02-031 4S NAFO
15-May-02 BKGR02-034 4T NAFO
15-May-02 BKSF02-129 4X NAFO
16-May-02 BKNF02-202 3L NAFO
16-May-02 BKSF02-130 4W NAFO
17-May-02 BKNF02-203 3NO-OUTER NAFO
17-May-02 BKNF02-204 3PS/PN-4R NAFO
17-May-02 BKNF02-205 3L/PS NAFO
17-May-02 BKQR02-032 12B/E/F NAFO
17-May-02 BKSF02-131 5ZE/4X NAFO
18-May-02 BKNF02-206 3NO-OUTER NAFO
18-May-02 BKSF02-132 4VW NAFO
20-May-02 BKGR02-035 4T NAFO
20-May-02 BKNF02-208 3NO-LINE NAFO
21-May-02 BKNF02-209 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
21-May-02 BKNF02-210 3L NAFO
21-May-02 BKQR02-033 4SZ NAFO
22-May-02 BKNF02-211 3LM-NORTH NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
22-May-02 BKQR02-034 4R/S NAFO
23-May-02 BKNF02-213 3PS NAFO
23-May-02 BKNF02-214 3LNO NAFO
23-May-02 BKNSF2-135 4VW NAFO
24-May-02 BKNF02-214 3LNO NAFO
24-May-02 BKNF02-215 3NO-OUTER NAFO
24-May-02 BKNF02-216 3K/3D NAFO
24-May-02 BKSF02-136 4X NAFO
25-May-02 BKNF02-217 3LM NORTH NAFO
25-May-02 BKNF02-218 3PS/PN NAFO
25-May-02 BKSF02-137 4WX NAFO
26-May-02 BKNF02-219 3L OUTER NAFO
26-May-02 BKNF02-220 3LNO NAFO
26-May-02 BKSF02-138 4VSW NAFO
27-May-02 BKGR02-037 4T NAFO
27-May-02 BKSF02-139 4VSW NAFO
04-Jun-02 BKSF02-145 4X/5ZE NAFO
05-Jun-02 BKNF02-228 3L-OUTER NAFO
05-Jun-02 BKSF02-146 4WX NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKGR02-040 4T NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKNF02-229 3PS NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKNF02-230 3L NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKNF02-231 3L-INNER NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKQR02-038 4S NAFO
06-Jun-02 BKSF02-147 4VSW NAFO
07-Jun-02 BKGR02-041 4T NAFO
07-Jun-02 BKNF02-232 4R NAFO
07-Jun-02 BKNF02-233 3PS NAFO
07-Jun-02 BKSF02-148 4X NAFO
08-Jun-02 BKNF02-234 3L NAFO
08-Jun-02 BKNF02-235 3K NAFO
08-Jun-02 BKNS02-149 4W NAFO
09-Jun-02 BKNF02-236 30P NAFO
09-Jun-02 BKNF02-237 3PS NAFO
10-Jun-02 BKQR02-039 4T/4S NAFO
10-Jun-02 BKSF02-150 4WX NAFO
11-Jun-02 BKNF02-239 2J/3K NAFO
11-Jun-02 BKNF02-241 3L NAFO
11-Jun-02 BKSF02-151 4VSNW NAFO
14-Jun-02 BKGR02-243 4T NAFO
14-Jun-02 BKNF02-246 3NO-OUTER NAFO
14-Jun-02 BKSF02-153 4X NAFO
15-Jun-02 BKNF02-247 3LM-NORTH NAFO
15-Jun-02 BKQR02-041 4T NAFO
15-Jun-02 BKSF02-154 5ZE/4X NAFO
17-Jun-02 BKSF02-155 4X5ZE NAFO
18-Jun-02 BKNF02-248 3LM NAFO
18-Jun-02 BKSF02-156 4X5ZE NAFO
19-Jun-02 BKGR02-044 4T NAFO
19-Jun-02 BKNF02-249 3LM NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
19-Jun-02 BKNF02-250 3LCRAB NAFO
20-Jun-02 BKNF02-251 3L NAFO
20-Jun-02 BKSF02-157 4VN NAFO
21-Jun-02 BKNF02-252 3L NAFO
21-Jun-02 BKSF02-159 4X NAFO
22-Jun-02 BKNF02-253 3M-NORTH NAFO
22-Jun-02 BKNF02-254 3PS/OP NAFO
22-Jun-02 BKQR02-041 4T NAFO
22-Jun-02 BKQR02-042 4T NAFO
23-Jun-02 BKSF02-160 5ZE/4X NAFO
24-Jun-02 BKGR02-045 4T NAFO
24-Jun-02 BKNF02-256 3K-CRAB NAFO
24-Jun-02 BKNF02-257 3L-OUTER NAFO
25-Jun-02 BKSF02-161 4VW NAFO
26-Jun-02 BKNF02-259 3NO-OUTER NAFO
26-Jun-02 BKSF02-162 5ZE/4X NAFO
27-Jun-02 BKNF02-261 3LM-NORTH NAFO
27-Jun-02 BKQR02-043 4T NAFO
28-Jun-02 BKNF02-262 3K NAFO
29-Jun-02 BKSF02-164 5ZE/4X NAFO
01-Jul-02 BKNF02-263 3NO-OUTER NAFO
01-Jul-02 BKSF02-165 4VSW NAFO
02-Jul-02 BKNF02-264 4R/3PN NAFO
02-Jul-02 BKSF02-265 3LNO NAFO
03-Jul-02 BKGR02-047 4T NAFO
03-Jul-02 BKNF02-266 3L-OUTER NAFO
03-Jul-02 BKSF02-166 4X/5ZE NAFO
04-Jul-02 BKNF02-268 3L3PS NAFO
04-Jul-02 BKQR02-044 4T NAFO
04-Jul-02 BKSF02-167 4X NAFO
04-Jul-02 BKSF02-267 3LINNER NAFO
05-Jul-02 BKNF02-269 4R NAFO
05-Jul-02 BKSF01-168 5ZE/4X NAFO
06-Jul-02 BKNF02-270 3LM NAFO
06-Jul-02 BKNF02-271 3LNO NAFO
06-Jul-02 BKSF02-169 4VW NAFO
08-Jul-02 BKSF02-170 5ZE/4X NAFO
09-Jul-02 BKNF02-272 GRANITE-LK NAFO
10-Jul-02 BKGR02-048 4T NAFO
10-Jul-02 BKNF02-273 3LM NORTH NAFO
10-Jul-02 BKSF02-171 4X5ZE NAFO
11-Jul-02 BKNF02-274 3PS NAFO
11-Jul-02 BKSF02-172 4WX NAFO
12-Jul-02 BKNF02-275 4R-CRAB NAFO
12-Jul-02 BKNF02-276 3LMNO NAFO
13-Jul-02 BKNF02-277 3NO NAFO
13-Jul-02 BKSF02-173 4VSW NAFO
14-Jul-02 BKNF02-279 3LNO NAFO
14-Jul-02 BKNF02-280 3LNO NAFO
15-Jul-02 BKNF02-280 3PS NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
15-Jul-02 BKNF02-281 3L-OUTER NAFO
15-Jul-02 BKSF02-174 4X NAFO
16-Jul-02 BKNF02-282 3M-EAST NAFO
16-Jul-02 BKQR02-045 4T NAFO
16-Jul-02 BKSF02-175 4VW NAFO
17-Jul-02 BKSF02-176 5ZE/4X NAFO
18-Jul-02 BKNF02-283 3NO-OUTER NAFO
18-Jul-02 BKQR02-046 4T NAFO
19-Jul-02 BKSF02-177 4X NAFO
19-Jul-02 BKSF02-178 4VSW NAFO
20-Jul-02 BKNF02-284 3NO-OUTER NAFO
20-Jul-02 BKNF02-285 4R NAFO
20-Jul-02 BKNF02-286 3LN-OUTER NAFO
21-Jul-02 BKNF02-287 2J/3K/4R NAFO
21-Jul-02 BKSF02-179 4W/4X NAFO
22-Jul-02 BKNF02-288 3PS NAFO
22-Jul-02 BKNF02-289 3M NAFO
23-Jul-02 BKNF02-290 3LN OUTER NAFO
23-Jul-02 BKSF02-180 5ZE/4X NAFO
24-Jul-02 BKNF02-291 3LM NORTH NAFO
24-Jul-02 BKSF02-181 4VSW NAFO
25-Jul-02 BKNF02-292 3LM (SOUTH) NAFO
25-Jul-02 BKNF02-293 3PS NAFO
25-Jul-02 BKQR02-047 4S NAFO
25-Jul-02 BKSF02-182 4X NAFO
26-Jul-02 BKNF02-294 3L-OUTER NAFO
27-Jul-02 BKGR02-051 4T NAFO
27-Jul-02 BKNF02-295 3NO OUTER NAFO
27-Jul-02 BKNF02-296 3K NAFO
27-Jul-02 BKQR02-048 4S NAFO
29-Jul-02 BKNF02-299 3L NAFO
29-Jul-02 BKNF02-300 3PN/3PS NAFO
29-Jul-02 BKSF02-185 4X NAFO
30-Jul-02 BKNF02-301 3LM NORTH NAFO
31-Jul-02 BKNF02-302 3 PS NAFO
31-Jul-02 BKNF02-303 3LM SOUTH NAFO
31-Jul-02 BKQR02-049 4T/4S NAFO
31-Jul-02 BKSF02-186 4WX NAFO
01-Aug-02 BKQR02-050 AREA 16 NAFO
01-Aug-02 BKSF02-187 4X/5ZE NAFO
02-Aug-02 BKNF02-304 3M NAFO
02-Aug-02 BKNF02-305 3NO NAFO
02-Aug-02 BKSF02-188 4VW NAFO
03-Aug-02 BKNF02-306 3-L-INNER NAFO
03-Aug-02 BKSF02-189 4X/5ZE NAFO
04-Aug-02 BKNF02-307 3P NAFO
04-Aug-02 BKNF02-308 3K NAFO
04-Aug-02 BKNF02-309 4R NAFO
04-Aug-02 BKQR02-051 4S NAFO
05-Aug-02 BKNF02-310 3L-OUTER NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
05-Aug-02 BKNF02-311 3M-EAST NAFO
05-Aug-02 BKSF02-190 4VSW NAFO
06-Aug-02 BKNF02-312 3M NAFO
06-Aug-02 BKNF02-313 3PS NAFO
06-Aug-02 BKSF02-191 4X/5ZE NAFO
07-Aug-02 BKGR02-052 4T NAFO
07-Aug-02 BKGR02-052 4T NAFO
07-Aug-02 BKNF02-314 3L NAFO
07-Aug-02 BKNF02-315 3L NAFO
07-Aug-02 BKSF02-192 4X NAFO
08-Aug-02 BKNF02-316 3L NAFO
08-Aug-02 BKSF02-193 4VW NAFO
09-Aug-02 BKSF02-194 5ZE/4X NAFO
10-Aug-02 BKQR02-051 4S NAFO
11-Aug-02 BKNF02-318 3NO OUTER NAFO
11-Aug-02 BKSF02-195 4WX-5ZE NAFO
12-Aug-02 BKNF02-320 4R NAFO
12-Aug-02 BKNF02-321 3LN NAFO
12-Aug-02 BKNF02-322 3L-OUTER NAFO
12-Aug-02 BKQR02-052 4S NAFO
13-Aug-02 BKSF02-196 4W NAFO
14-Aug-02 BKNF02-323 3NO WEST NAFO
14-Aug-02 BKNF02-324 3PS NAFO
14-Aug-02 BKSF02-197 5XE/4X NAFO
15-Aug-02 BKNF02-325 3K NAFO
15-Aug-02 BKNF02-326 3-PS NAFO
15-Aug-02 BKSF02-198 4X NAFO
16-Aug-02 BKNF02-327 3NO WEST NAFO
17-Aug-02 BKNF02-328 3M-EAST NAFO
18-Aug-02 BKNF02-329 3LNO LINE NAFO
18-Aug-02 BKSF02-200 44X/5ZE NAFO
19-Aug-02 BKSF02-201 4VW/4X NAFO
20-Aug-02 BKGR02-053 4T NAFO
20-Aug-02 BKNF02-330 3L-OUTER NAFO
20-Aug-02 BKNF02-331 3BC NAFO
20-Aug-02 BKSF02-202 4X NAFO
21-Aug-02 BKNF02-332 3M NAFO
21-Aug-02 BKSF02-203 4X NAFO
22-Aug-02 BKNF02-334 3PS NAFO
22-Aug-02 BKNF02-335 3LPS NAFO
23-Aug-02 BKNF02-336 3LM OUTER NAFO
24-Aug-02 BKGR02-054 4T NAFO
24-Aug-02 BKNF02-337 3LM NAFO
24-Aug-02 BKSF02-204 4VW NAFO
25-Aug-02 BKNF02-338 3NO NAFO
25-Aug-02 BKQR02-053 4S/R NAFO
25-Aug-02 BKSF02-205 5ZE/4X NAFO
26-Aug-02 BKNF02-339 2J/2H NAFO
26-Aug-02 BKSF02-206 4X NAFO
27-Aug-02 BKNF02-340 3L-OUTER NAFO
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PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
27-Aug-02 BKSF02-207 4XW NAFO
28-Aug-02 BKGR02-055 4T NAFO
29-Aug-02 BKNF02-342 3NO-OUTER NAFO
29-Aug-02 BKNF02-343 3PS NAFO
29-Aug-02 BKSF02-208 4VW NAFO
30-Aug-02 BKNF02-344 3NO NAFO
30-Aug-02 BKNF02-345 3KL NAFO
30-Aug-02 BKSF-02-209 5ZE/4X NAFO
31-Aug-02 BKNF02-346 3L NAFO
31-Aug-02 BKQR02-054 4S NAFO
01-Sep-02 BKNF02-347 3L NAFO
02-Sep-02 BKNF02-348 3KL NAFO
02-Sep-02 BKSF02-210 5ZE/4X NAFO
03-Sep-02 BKNF02-349 3M-EAST NAFO
04-Sep-02 BKNF02-350 3LM-OUTER NAFO
04-Sep-02 BKNF02-351 3PS NAFO
04-Sep-02 BKSF02-212 5ZE/4X NAFO
05-Sep-02 BKGR02-056 4T NAFO
05-Sep-02 BKNF02-352 4R NAFO
05-Sep-02 BKSF02-213 4WX NAFO
06-Sep-02 BKNF02-353 3L OUTER NAFO
06-Sep-02 BKSF02-214 5ZE/4X NAFO
07-Sep-02 BKNF02-354 3NO NAFO
07-Sep-02 BKSF02-215 4X NAFO
08-Sep-02 BKNF02-355 3L NAFO
09-Sep-02 BKNF02-356 3L-OUTER NAFO
10-Sep-02 BKNF02-357 3L-OUTER NAFO
10-Sep-02 BKSF02-216 4X NAFO
11-Sep-02 BKNF02-358 3M EAST NAFO
11-Sep-02 BKNF02-359 3L0 NAFO
11-Sep-02 BKSF02-217 5ZE/4X NAFO
12-Sep-02 BKSF02-218 4W NAFO
13-Sep-02 BKGR02-057 4T NAFO
14-Sep-02 BFNF02-361 3LOUTER NAFO
14-Sep-02 BKNF02-360 3L NAFO
14-Sep-02 BKNF02-362 3L NAFO
14-Sep-02 BKSF02-219 4W NAFO
15-Sep-02 BKNF02-363 3L NAFO
16-Sep-02 BKNF02-364 3NO-WEST NAFO
16-Sep-02 BKSF02-221 4VSW NAFO
17-Sep-02 BKNF02-365 3PS NAFO
17-Sep-02 BKSF02-222 5ZE/4X NAFO
18-Sep-02 BKGR02-058 4T NAFO
18-Sep-02 BKNF02-366 3PN-4R NAFO
18-Sep-02 BKSF02-223 4WX NAFO
19-Sep-02 BKNF02-367 3LM NAFO
19-Sep-02 BKSF02-224 4X NAFO
20-Sep-02 BKGR02-059 4T NAFO
20-Sep-02 BKNF02-368 3NO-OUTER NAFO
20-Sep-02 BKNF02-368 3PS NAFO
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20-Sep-02 BKSF02-225 4X NAFO
21-Sep-02 BKNF02-370 3NO-OUTER NAFO
21-Sep-02 BKNF02-371 3NO-OUTER NAFO
21-Sep-02 BKSF02-226 4VWX NAFO
22-Sep-02 BKNF02-372 3LN-OUTER NAFO
23-Sep-02 BKNF02-374 3NO NAFO
23-Sep-02 BKNF02-375 2HJ NAFO
23-Sep-02 BKNF02-376 3LM NAFO
24-Sep-02 BKNF02-377 3L NAFO
24-Sep-02 BKNF02-378 3NO-OUTER/3PS NAFO
25-Sep-02 BKGR02-060 4T NAFO
25-Sep-02 BKNF02-379 3L NAFO
25-Sep-02 BKSF02-228 4W/4X NAFO
26-Sep-02 BKNF02-380 3L NAFO
26-Sep-02 BKNF02-381 3N OUTER NAFO
26-Sep-02 BKSF02-229 4W NAFO
27-Sep-02 BKSF02-230 4X/5ZE NAFO
28-Sep-02 BKGR02-061 4T NAFO
28-Sep-02 BKNF02-382 3LM NAFO
29-Sep-02 BKNF02-383 4L OUTER NAFO
29-Sep-02 BKNF02-384 3NO OUTER NAFO
29-Sep-02 BKSF02-231 4W/4X/5ZE NAFO
30-Sep-02 BKSF02-232 4W/4X NAFO
01-Oct-02 BKSF02-233 4W/5ZE NAFO
02-0ct-02 BKGR02-062 4T NAFO
02-0ct-02 BKNF02-388 3NO OUTER NAFO
02-0ct-02 BKNF02-389 3PS NAFO
03-0ct-02 BKGR02-063 4T NAFO
04-0ct-02 BKNF02-391 3L NAFO
04-0ct-02 BKNF02-392 3NO OUTER NAFO
04-0ct-02 BKSF02-236 4X NAFO
05-0ct-02 BKNF02-393 3L NAFO
06-0ct-02 BKGR02-064 4T NAFO
06-0ct-02 BKNF02-394 3NO-WEST NAFO
06-0ct-02 BKSF02-237 4V/W NAFO
08-0ct-02 BKNF02-395 3NO-WEST NAFO
08-0ct-02 BKSF02-238 4W/4Y/5ZE NAFO
09-0ct-02 BKNF02-396 3LM-NORTH NAFO
09-0ct-02 BKNF02-397 30/PS NAFO
09-0ct-02 BKSF02-239 4W/4X NAFO
10-Oct-02 BKGR02-066 4T/4VN NAFO
10-Oct-02 BKNF02-398 3NO NAFO
10-Oct-02 BKSF02-240 4X/5ZE NAFO
11-Oct-02 BKNF02-399 3M EAST NAFO
11-Oct-02 BKQR02-055 4T NAFO
12-Oct-02 BKNF02-400 3L NAFO
12-Oct-02 BKSF02-241 4WX NAFO
13-Oct-02 BKNF02-401 3M-SOUTH NAFO
14-Oct-02 BKNF02-402 3L NAFO
14-Oct-02 BKNF02-403 3L NAFO
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14-Oct-02 BKSF02-242 4W NAFO
15-Oct-02 BKNF02-404 3L NAFO
15-Oct-02 BSFK02-243 5ZE/4X NAFO
16-Oct-02 BKNF02-405 3M NAFO
16-Oct-02 BKSF02-244 4WX NAFO
17-Oct-02 BKNF02-406 3PN/S NAFO
17-Oct-02 BKSR02-245 4VW NAFO
18-Oct-02 BKSF02-246 4X-5ZE NAFO
19-Oct-02 BKNF02-407 3L NAFO
19-Oct-02 BKQR02-056 4S/4T NAFO
20-0ct-02 BKNF02-408 3PS NAFO
20-0ct-02 BKSF02-247 4W/4X NAFO
21-Oct-02 BKNF02-409 3LN NAFO
21-Oct-02 BKQR02-057 4S NAFO
22-Oct-02 BKNF02-410 3NO-OUTER NAFO
22-Oct-02 BKSF02-248 5ZE/4X NAFO
23-Oct-02 BKNF02-411 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
23-Oct-02 BKNF02-412 3PS NAFO
23-Oct-02 BKSF02-249 4VW NAFO
24-Oct-02 BKGR02-067 4T NAFO
24-Oct-02 BKNF02-413 3PS NAFO
24-Oct-02 BKSF02-250 4W/4X NAFO
25-Oct-02 BKSF02-251 4W/X NAFO
26-Oct-02 BKNF02-415 NORTHERN P NAFO
26-Oct-02 BKNF02-416 3LNO NAFO
27-Oct-02 BKNF02-418 3-L-OUTER NAFO
27-Oct-02 BKSF02-252 5ZE/4X NAFO
28-Oct-02 BKNF02-419 3PS NAFO
28-Oct-02 BKNF02-420 TRANSIT NAFO
29-Oct-02 BKNF02-421 3M NAFO
29-Oct-02 BKSF02-254 4W/X NAFO
30-0ct-02 BKNF02-422 3L NAFO
30-0ct-02 BKNF02-423 3PS NAFO
30-0ct-02 BKSF02-255 5ZE/4X NAFO
31-Oct-02 BKNF02-424 3K NAFO
31-Oct-02 BKNF02-425 3NO NAFO
31-Oct-02 BKQR02-058 3S NAFO
31-Oct-02 BKSF02-256 4W/X NAFO
01-Nov-02 BKGR02-069 4T NAFO
01-Nov-02 BKNF02-426 3M OUTER NAFO
01-Nov-02 BKSF02-257 4W/X NAFO
01-Nov-02 BKSF02-258 4X NAFO
02-Nov-02 BKNF02-427 3LM NORTH NAFO
04-Nov-02 BKNF02-428 3PS NAFO
04-Nov-02 BKNF02-429 3NO-OUTER NAFO
04-Nov-02 BKSF02-259 4VW NAFO
05-Nov-02 BKNF02-430 5ZE/4X NAFO
05-Nov-02 BKSF02-260 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
06-Nov-02 BKNF02-431 3NO-OUTER NAFO
06-Nov-02 BKNF02-432 3PS NAFO
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06-NOV-02 BKRG02-072 4T NAFO
06-NOV-02 BKSF02-261 4X NAFO
09-NOV-02 BKNF02-435 3LM NORTH NAFO
09-NOV-02 BKSF02-264 4X NAFO
10-NOV-02 BKNF02-436 3NO OUTER NAFO
11-Nov-02 BKNF02-437 3K NAFO
11-Nov-02 BKSF02-265 4X NAFO
12-Nov-02 BKNF02-438 3LM-SOUTH NAFO
12-Nov-02 BKNF02-439 3K NAFO
12-Nov-02 BKNF02-440 3PS NAFO
12-Nov-02 BKSF02-266 5ZE/4X NAFO
13-Nov-02 BKNF02-441 3LM NAFO
13-Nov-02 BKSF02-267 4W/4VN/4VS NAFO
14-Nov-02 BKGR02-073 4T NAFO
15-Nov-02 BKNF02-443 3LM NORTH NAFO
15-Nov-02 BKQR02-059 4S NAFO
16-Nov-02 BKNF02-444 2NO NAFO
16-Nov-02 BKSF02-270 4W 4X5ZE NAFO
17-Nov-02 BKNF02-445 3PS/N NAFO
19-Nov-02 BKNF02-446 3LM NORTH NAFO
19-Nov-02 BKSF02-271 4VW NAFO
02-Dec-02 BKBF02-463 3LM NAFO
02-Dec-02 BKSF02-289 4X/5ZE NAFO
03-Dec-02 BKGR02-076 4T NAFO
03-Dec-02 BKSF02-290 4X NAFO
04-Dec-02 BKNF02-465 4R NAFO
04-Dec-02 BKNF02-466 3NO NAFO
04-Dec-02 BKSF02-291 4W/X NAFO
05-Dec-02 BKNF02-467 3-L-OUTER NAFO
05-Dec-02 BKNF02-468 4R/2J/3K NAFO
05-Dec-02 BKNF02-469 3PS NAFO
05-Dec-02 BKSF02-292 4X5ZE NAFO
06-Dec-02 BKNF02-470 3M NORTH NAFO
06-Dec-02 BKSF02-293 4VW NAFO
07-Dec-02 BKNF02-472 3NO OUTER NAFO
07-Dec-02 BKSF02-294 4W/4X/5ZE NAFO
08-Dec-02 BKNF02-473 3N OUTER NAFO
08-Dec-02 BKSF02-295 4X/5Z NAFO
09-Dec-02 BKGR02-078 4T NAFO
09-Dec-02 BKNF02-474 3LM SOUTH NAFO
09-Dec-02 BKSF02-296 4X NAFO
10-Dec-02 BKFN02-475 3NO OUTER NAFO
10-Dec-02 BKNF02-476 3-PS NAFO
10-Dec-02 BKSF02-297 4X, 5ZE NAFO
11-Dec-02 BKNF02-477 4R NAFO
11-Dec-02 BKNF02-478 3L INSIDE NAFO
11-Dec-02 BKSF02-298 4VW NAFO
12-Dec-02 BKNF02-479 3LNO NAFO
12-Dec-02 BKNF02-480 3NO NAFO
12-Dec-02 BKNF02-481 4R NAFO
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TABLE H -  1 (continued)
PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
12-Dec-02 BKNF02-482 3PS NAFO
12-Dec-02 BKSF02-299 4X/5ZE NAFO
13-Dec-02 BKNF02-483 3L NAFO
13-Dec-02 BKNF02-484 3K NAFO
13-Dec-02 BKNF02-485 3PS NAFO
13-Dec-02 BKSF02-300 4WX NAFO
14-Dec-02 BKGR02-079 4T NAFO
14-Dec-02 BKNF02-486 3NO NAFO
14-Dec-02 BKSF02-301 4X5ZE NAFO
15-Dec-02 BKSF02-302 4X NAFO
16-Dec-02 BKGR02-078 4T NAFO
16-Dec-02 BKNF02-487 3LOUTER NAFO
16-Dec-02 BKSF02-303 4X NAFO
17-Dec-02 BKSF02-304 4X/5ZE NAFO
18-Dec-02 BKGR02-080 4T NAFO
18-Dec-02 BKNF02-488 3K NAFO
18-Dec-02 BKNF02-490 4R NAFO
19-Dec-02 BKNF02-491 3NO-OUTER NAFO
20-Dec-02 BKNF02-492 3PS NAFO
20-Dec-02 BKNF02-493 3LM-NORTH NAFO
21-Dec-02 BKNF02-305 4X/5ZE NAFO
21-Dec-02 BKNF02-494 3NO NAFO
21-Dec-02 BKSF02-306 4WX NAFO
23-Dec-02 BKNF02-496 3LM SOUTH NAFO
23-Dec-02 BKSF02-307 4X/5ZE NAFO
23-Dec-02 BKSF02-308 4X/5ZE NAFO
24-Dec-02 BKNF02-497 3NO OUTER NAFO
24-Dec-02 BKSF02-309 5ZE/4X NAFO
25-Dec-02 BKNF02-498 3M NAFO
27-Dec-02 BKNF02-310 4W/4X NAFO
28-Dec-02 BKNF02-499 3NO-OUTER NAFO
28-Dec-02 BKSF02-311 4WX NAFO
29-Dec-02 BKNF02-500 3L OUTER NAFO
30-Dec-02 BKNF02-501 3NO OUTER NAFO
30-Dec-02 BKNF02-502 3PS NAFO
30-Dec-02 BKSF02-312 5ZE/4X NAFO
31-Dec-02 BKNF02-503 3NO NAFO
31-Dec-02 BKSF02-313 4X NAFO
Source: Maritime Operations Centre, Halifax, 2003.
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Table H-2 contains the mission identifiers and areas patrolled by PAL 
surveillance aircraft contracted by the Canadian Coast Guard for anti-pollution 
patrols during the year 2002. Except where no grid area is indicated, the grid 
used to plan the PAL missions is the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
depicted in Chapter Three at Figures 3-12 and 3-13. Where no grid area is 
indicated, the researcher used the NAFO area in which are located the 
features such as Hibernia, Virgin Rocks, Placentia Bay, and Conception Bay 
for creating Figure 7-7. The first three digits of the mission identifier indicates 
that the aircraft was tasked in support of the Canadian Coast Guard.
TABLE H - 2 
CCG PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
02-Jan-02 CCG02-001 HIBERNIA Nil
03-Jan-02 CCG02-002 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil
07-Jan-02 CCG02-004 S. COAST Nil
09-Jan-02 CCG02-005 HIBERNIA Nil
10-Jan-02 CCG02-006 S. COAST Nil
15-Jan-02 CCG02-008 HIBERNIA Nil
21-Jan-02 CCG02-009 S. COAST Nil
24-Jan-02 CCG02-010 HIBERNIA Nil
28-Jan-02 CCG02-012 SE. COAST Nil
29-Jan-02 CCG02-013 S. COAST Nil
30-Jan-02 CCG02-014 unknown Nil
31-Jan-02 CCG02-015 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil
04-Feb-02 CCG02-017 S. COAST Nil
07-Feb-02 CCG02-018 S. COAST Nil
11-Feb-02 CCG02-019 S. COAST Nil
12-Feb-02 CCG02-020 S. COAST Nil
13-Feb-02 CCG02-021 S. COAST Nil
14-Feb-02 CCG02-022 SOUTH Nil
15-Feb-02 CCG02-023 SW. COAST Nil
16-Feb-02 CCG02-024 SOUTH Nil
26-Feb-02 CCG02-026 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil
01-Mar-02 CCG02-027 HIBERNIA Nil
05-Mar-02 CCG02-028 S. COAST Nil
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
11-Mar-02 CCG02-031 3L NAFO
17-Mar-02 CCG02-032 unknown Nil
18-Mar-02 CCG02-033 S. COAST Nil
19-Mar-02 CCG02-034 3K/2J NAFO
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TABLE H -  2 (continued)
CCG PAL AIRCRAFT PATROLS IN FIGURE 7-7
Date Mission ID Areas of Patrol Grid Used for Patrol
20-Mar-02 CCG02-035 3K NAFO
21-Mar-02 CCG02-036 3K NAFO
22-Mar-02 CCG02-037 3KPS NAFO
23-Mar-02 CCG02-038 3K NAFO
26-Mar-02 CCG02-039 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
31-Mar-02 CCG02-040 3L NAFO
01-Apr-02 CCG02-041 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
01-Apr-02 CCG02-042 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
02-Apr-02 CCG02-043 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
02-Apr-02 CCG02-044 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
03-Apr-02 CCG02-043 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
03-Apr-02 CCG02-044 CONCEPTION BAY Nil
19-Apr-02 CCG02-046 HIBERNIA Nil
22-Apr-02 CCG02-047 3L NAFO
26-Apr-02 CCG02-048 SE. COAST Nil
27-Apr-02 CCG02-049 S. COAST Nil
11-May-02 CCG02-049 S. COAST Nil
17-May-02 CCG02-050 HIBERNIA Nil
22-May-02 CCG02-051 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
20-Jun-02 CCG02-054 3LO NAFO
11-Jul-02 CCG02-999 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
23-Jul-02 CCG02-057 SW. COAST Nil
24-Jul-02 CCG02-058 S. COAST Nil
26-Jul-02 CCG02-059 HIBERNIA Nil
16-Aug-02 CCG02-060 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
27-Aug-02 CCG02-061 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
28-Aug-02 CCG02-062 HIBERNIA Nil
06-Sep-02 CCG02-063 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
08-Sep-02 CCG02-064 3PS NAFO
09-Sep-02 CCG02-065 EAST COAST Nil
14-Sep-02 CCG02-066 S. COAST Nil
15-Sep-02 CCG02-067 3L NAFO
16-Sep-02 CCG02-068A 3L NAFO
19-Sep-02 CCG02-069 S. COAST Nil
27-Sep-02 CCG02-070 3L NAFO
30-Sep-02 CCG02-071 VIRGIN ROCKS Nil
10-Oct-02 CCG02-072 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
11-Oct-02 CCG02-073 SE. COAST Nil
15-Oct-02 CCG02-074 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
23-Oct-02 CCG02-075 SW COAST Nil
28-Oct-02 CCG02-076 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
19-Nov-02 CCG02-077 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
02-Dec-02 CCG02-081 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
09-Dec-02 CCG02-083 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
10-Dec-02 CCG02-084 S. COAST Nil
19-Dec-02 CCG02-086 S. COAST Nil
30-Dec-02 CCG02-089 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
31-Dec-02 CCG02-090 PLACENTIA BAY Nil
Source: Maritime Operations Centre, Halifax, 2003.
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NAVAL FISHERY AND PREVENTATIVE PATROLS 1980 -2003
This appendix provides in various tables the names and dates during 
the period 1980 to 2003 of naval vessels employed in fisheries patrols in 
support of Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and preventative patrols in support 
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Only patrols undertaken in the 
Atlantic Ocean were used in this study.
Tables J-1 and J-2 were constructed from primary source data at the 
National Library and Archives of Canada, Maritime Forces Atlantic, Director 
General Operational Research, and Fisheries and Oceans Conservation and 
Protection Branch Newfoundland Region. The maps and tables presented in 
this thesis were derived from each of these patrols, except where data 
unavailable is indicated in the column “Data source.” A variety of data were 
extracted from each patrol, such as patrol ship geographic positions, marine 
traffic geographic positions, and the locations of boardings for inspection.
Given the nature of the different sources of data, not all data sets were 
captured for each patrol. The primary data sources are listed in the tables as 
follows:
Ship’s Log - Held at the National Library and Archives of Canada at
Ottawa.
DFO CFINS - Data extracted from Fisheries and Oceans CFIN System 
(Canadian Fisheries Information Network.)
Patrol Report - Report sent post-patrol by individual units either by
message (ships) or by letter (submarines). Retained by 
Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in Halifax.
Template - Electronic templates in Microsoft Excel and Access
supplied by researcher to naval vessels prior to patrol 
commencement. Templates facilitated electronic 
recording of positional information concerning own ship 
and other contacts.
MOC CHDB - Data extracted from the Contact History Data Base
(CHDB) maintained by the Maritime Operations Centre at 
Maritime Forces Atlantic Headquarters in Halifax. This 
data base contains positional information of military units 
that provide geographic co-ordinates to the US military 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS).
J1
Appendix J
The numbers appearing in the column “Ship Type” correspond to the 
different classes of ships.
Type 1 - DDE Destroyer escort. Improved Restigouche and Mackenzie
classes
Type 2 - DDH Destroyer with helicopter. Annapolis and Improved St
Laurent classes
Type 3 - FFH Frigate with helicopter. Halifax class.
Type 4 - DDH Destroyer with helicopter. Command and control platform.
Iroquois class.
Type 5 - AOR Auxiliary oil replenishment vessel. Protecteur and Preserver
classes.
Type 6 - MSA Minesweeping auxiliary. HMCS Anticosti and HMCS
Moresby.
Type 7 - MCDV Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel. Kingston class.
Type 8 - ASXL Diving auxiliary. HMCS Cormorant.
Type 9 - SSK Conventional-powered submarine. Oberon and Victoria
classes.
Type 10 - CFAV Canadian Forces Auxiliary Vessel. Non-warship support
vessels crewed by civilians.
TABLE J-1
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003
Ship Name Ship Type Start Stop Data Sources
Date Date
Nipigon 2 22-Apr-80 09-May-80 Ship's Log
Assiniboine 2 12-Nov-80 28-Nov-80 Ship's Log
Algonquin 4 25-Nov-80 12-Dec-80 Ship's Log
Skeena 2 08-Jan-81 23-Jan-81 Ship's Log
Fraser 2 19-May-81 04-Jun-81 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 14-Oct-81 28-Oct-81 Ship's Log
Margaree 2 22-Oct-81 05-Nov-81 Ship's Log
Huron 4 21-Jan-82 05-Feb-82 Ship's Log
Nipigon 2 15-Feb-82 05-Mar-82 Ship's Log
Assiniboine 2 18-Jan-83 03-Feb-83 Ship's Log
Nipigon 2 15-Mar-83 28-Mar-83 Ship's Log
Iroquois 4 24-Nov-83 10-Dec-83 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 09-Jan-84 01-Feb-84 Ship's Log
Skeena 2 13-Feb-84 29-Feb-84 Ship's Log
Saguenay 2 12-Mar-84 29-Mar-84 Ship's Log
Assiniboine 2 02-May-84 09-May-84 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 28-May-84 23-Jun-84 Ship's Log
Skeena 2 15-Jan-85 07-Feb-85 Ship's Log
Saguenay 2 26-Feb-85 15-Mar-85 Ship's Log
Algonquin 4 07-May-85 24-May-85 Ship's Log
Athabaskan 4 26-Jun-85 02-Jul-85 Ship's Log
Iroquois 4 28-Jun-85 11-Jul-85 Ship's Log
Athabaskan 4 15-Jul-85 26-Jul-85 Ship's Log
Skeena 2 29-Oct-85 15-Nov-85 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 14-Jan-86 21-Feb-86 Ship's Log
Algonquin 4 01-Mar-86 05-Mar-86 Ship's Log
Nipigon 2 30-Sep-86 17-Oct-86 Ship's Log
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TABLE J-1 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003
Ship Name Ship Type Start
Date
Stop
Date
Data Sources
Assiniboine 2 28-Oct-86 14-Nov-86 Ship's Log
Margaree 2 28-Jan-87 08-Feb-87 Ship's Log
Saguenay 2 24-Feb-87 04-Mar-87 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 23-Mar-87 10-Apr-87 Ship's Log
Margaree 2 16-Jun-87 03-Jul-87 Ship's Log
Fraser 2 06-Aug-87 20-Aug-87 Ship's Log
Annapolis 2 19-Jan-88 03-Feb-88 Ship's Log
Gatineau 1 03-May-88 20-May-88 Ship's Log
Assiniboine 2 24-Oct-88 12-Nov-88 Ship's Log
Skeena 2 18-Jan-89 10-Feb-89 Ship's Log
Gatineau 1 15-Nov-89 20-Nov-89 Ship's Log
Cormorant 8 17-Nov-89 16-Dec-89 Ship's Log
Saguenay 2 04-Dec-89 18-Dec-89 Ship's Log
Terra Nova 1 14-May-90 unknown DFO CFINS
Margaree 2 22-Oct-90 09-Nov-90 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 03-Dec-90 14-Dec-90 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Gatineau 1 28-Jan-91 unknown DFO CFINS
Skeena 2 18-Feb-91 unknown DFO CFINS
Nipigon 2 29-Apr-91 unknown DFO CFINS
Margaree 2 10-Jun-91 21-Jun-91 Ship's Log
CFAV St Charles 10 -- Jun-91 unknown DFO CFINS
Margaree 2 23-Jul-91 16-Aug-91 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
CFAV St Charles 10 -- Aug 91 unknown DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 20-Aug-91 unknown Data unavailable
Ottawa 2 23-Sep-91 04-Oct-91 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Margaree 2 30-Sep-91 17-Oct-91 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
CFAV Riverton 10 -  Nov-91 unknown DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 -- Dec-91 -- Dec-91 DFO CFINS
CFAV Riverton 10 -- Jan-92 unknown DFO CFINS
Nipigon 2 10-Feb-92 28-Feb-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Nipigon 2 17-Mar-92 31-Mar-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Margaree 2 06-Apr-92 16-Apr-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Fraser 2 04-May-92 15-May-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Fraser 2 13-Jul-92 31-Jul-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Nipigon 2 10-Aug-92 unknown DFO CFINS
Skeena 2 05-Oct-92 30-Oct-92 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Ojibwa 9 05-Mar-93 12-Mar-93 Patrol Report
Anticosti 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Gatineau 1 03-May-93 27-May-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Skeena 2 25-May-93 04-Jun-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Nipigon 2 09-Jun-93 18-Jun-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 03-Aug-93 11-Aug-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Skeena 2 23-Aug-93 17-Sep-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 20-Sep-93 08-Oct-93 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 21-Feb-94 02-Mar-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 06-Apr-94 22-Apr-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 04-May-94 unknown Data unavailable
Fraser 2 10-May-94 21-May-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Fraser 2 04-Jul-94 29-Jul-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 25-Jul-94 14-Aug-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Gatineau 1 08-Aug-94 26-Aug-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Fraser 2 12-Sep-94 30-Sep-94 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
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TABLE J-1 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003
Ship Name Ship Type Start
Date
Stop
Date
Data Sources
Okanagan 9 26-Sep-94 10-Oct-94 Patrol Report
Cormorant 8 14-Nov-94 unknown Data unavailable
Cormorant 8 20-Mar-95 08-Apr-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Toronto 3 27-Mar-95 10-Apr-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 18-Apr-95 08-May-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Onondaga 9 23-May-95 unknown Data unavailable
Nipigon 2 -  Jun-95 unknown DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 04-Jul-95 14-Jul-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 17-Jul-95 unknown DFO CFINS
Halifax 3 19-Aug-95 unknown DFO CFINS
Gatineau 1 11-Sep-95 06-Oct-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 10-Oct-95 08-Nov-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 20-Nov-95 14-Dec-95 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Terra Nova 1 05-Feb-96 unknown DFO CFINS
Toronto 3 27-Feb-96 17-Mar-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Terra Nova 2 09-Apr-96 unknown DFO CFINS
Moresby 6 02-Jul-96 19-Jul-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 29-Jul-96 unknown DFO CFINS
Toronto 3 16-Sep-96 11-Oct-96 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Cormorant 8 28-Sep-96 unknown Data unavailable
Terra Nova 1 27-Jan-97 unknown DFO CFINS
Terra Nova 2 07-Apr-9 7 unknown DFO CFINS
Anticosti 6 05-May-97 21-May-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Montreal 3 26-May-97 06-Jun-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 02-Sep-97 18-Sep-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Kingston 7 29-Sep-97 17-Oct-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 06-Oct-97 24-Oct-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Fredericton 3 03-Dec-97 19-Dec-97 Ship's Log, DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 20-Oct-97 13-Nov-97 Ship’s Log, DFO CFINS
Nipigon 1 25-Apr-98 30-May-98 Data unavailable
Anticosti 6 01-May-98 19-May-98 DFO CFINS
Kingston 7 17-Aug-98 23-May-98 DFO CFINS
Charlottetown 3 21-Oct-98 11-Nov-98 DFO CFINS
Halifax 3 01-Dec-98 17-Dec-98 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
Charlottetown 3 08-Jan-99 25-Jan-99 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
Montreal 3 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 Template, DFO CFINS
St John's 3 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Fredericton 3 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Kingston 7 08-Aug-99 31-Aug-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 08-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Moncton 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 Template, DFO CFINS
Montreal 3 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 Template, DFO CFINS
St John's 3 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Goose Bay 7 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Moncton 7 08-May-00 13-May-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Toronto 3 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Athabaskan 4 25-Jul-00 29-Jul-00 DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 10-Aug-00 24-Aug-00 Data unavailable
Montreal 3 14-Sep-00 29-Sep-00 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
Athabaskan 4 20-Nov-00 01-Dec-00 Template, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 05-Dec-00 13-Dec-00 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
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TABLE J-1 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS 1980 - 2003
Ship Name Ship Type Start
Date
Stop
Date
Data Sources
Montreal 3 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 Template, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
Montreal 3 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 Template, DFO CFINS
Summerside 7 23-May-01 08-Jun-01 Patrol Report, DFO CFINS
Goose Bay 7 13-Jun-01 28-Jun-01 DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 Template, DFO CFINS
Ville de Quebec 3 26-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 Template, DFO CFINS
Fredericton 3 18-Feb-02 08-Mar-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Summerside 7 15-Apr-02 28-Apr-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Moncton 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 Data unavailable
Kingston 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Moncton 7 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Glace Bay 7 15-Oct-02 29-Oct-02 DFO CFINS
Goose Bay 7 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Halifax 3 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 Template, DFO CFINS
Charlottetown 3 03-Feb-03 21-Feb-03 Template
Halifax 3 19-Feb-03 01-Mar-03 Patrol Report
TABLE J-2
NAVAL PREVENTATIVE PATROLS 1997 - 2003
Ship Name Ship Type Start
Date
Stop
Date
Data Sources
Terra Nova 1 unknown 22-Jun-97 Data unavailable
Anticosti 6 14-Jul-97 25-Jul-97 Data unavailable
Fredericton 3 02-Jul-98 17-Jul-98 Data unavailable
Anticosti 6 16-Aug-99 27-Aug-99 Template
Anticosti 6 09-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 Template
Moncton 7 12-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 Data unavailable
Shawinigan 7 31-Jul-00 14-Aug-00 Data unavailable
Summerside 7 31-Jul-00 14-Aug-OO Data unavailable
Kingston 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 MOC CHDB
Glace Bay 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 MOC CHDB
Summerside 7 16-Jun-03 20-Jun-03 MOC CHDB
Kingston 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 MOC CHDB
Moncton 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 MOC CHDB
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Appendix J
TABLE J-3 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL TOTALS -  MAJOR WARSHIP 1980 TO 1997
Ship Year Patrol
Days
Distance
(nm)
Boardings SAR Helicopter
Hours
Arrests
Fraser 1994 11 2669 7 1 20.98 -
Fraser 1994 25 5136 20 - 53.18 -
Gatineau 1994 16 3578 11 - - 1
Fraser 1994 16 3158 6 3 27.85 -
Toronto 1995 15 2111 - - 26.30 -
Gatineau 1995 24 4483 12 1 - -
Toronto 1996 15 3506 13 - - -
Toronto 1996 20 4038 13 1 - -
Montreal 1997 12 2886 4 - - -
Ville de Quebec 1997 16 2854 3 - - -
Fredericton 1997 14 3242 2 - - -
Source: Ships’ Logs, National Library and Archives.
TABLE J-4
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL TOTALS -  MINOR WARSHIP 1980 TO 1997
Ship Year Patrol
Days
Distance
(nm)
Boardings SAR Helicopter
Hours
Arrests
Cormorant 1981 13 2467 7 - - -
Cormorant 1984 21 2950 13 - - -
Cormorant 1984 25 4298 3 - - -
Cormorant 1986 35 5217 17 - - -
Cormorant 1987 18 2657 6 - - -
Cormorant 1989 26 3867 - 1 - -
Cormorant 1990 12 2136 7 - - -
Anticosti 1993 12 2223 5 - - -
Moresby 1993 12 1826 6 - - -
Moresby 1993 9 1427 1 - - -
Anticosti 1993 18 3068 5 - - -
Moresby 1994 10 1678 - - - -
Anticosti 1994 16 3228 6 - - -
Anticosti 1994 17 3231 2 - - -
Cormorant 1995 16 2234 - - - -
Anticosti 1995 11 2058 3 - - -
Cormorant 1995 19 2181 - - - -
Cormorant 1995 23 3003 4 - - -
Cormorant 1995 28 3557 - - - -
Moresby 1996 13 2545 - - - -
Anticosti 1997 17 2514 2 - - -
Glace Bay 1997 15 2773 9 - - -
Kingston 1997 15 2974 - - - -
Glace Bay 1997 22 3421 8 - - -
Source: Ships’ Logs, National Library and Archives.
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TABLE J-5
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL BOARDINGS BY SHIP -  1990 TO 2002
Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Anticosti - - 1 1 1 6 3  4 1 6
Athabaskan - - .............................................................5 - -
Charlottetown - -  1 5 5 - - -
Cormorant 7 1 0  - - - 8 ..............................................................
Fredericton - ..........................................................2 - 9 - - 7
Gatineau - 5 - 1 3 1 3  20....... ..............................................................
Glace Bay - ..................................................................2 2 - - 1 - 2
Goose Bay - ................................................................................................ 13 10 -
Halifax  1 2 - - 2 - - - 3
Kingston - ...................................................................6 2 8 - - 2
Margaree - 3 .................................................................................................................
Moncton - - - ............................................................. 2 1 - -
Montreal - ...................................................................6 - 1 5 8 9 -
Moresby - - - 7 - 9 4 - .........................................
Nipigon - 6 10 5 - 1 2 ..............................................................
Ottawa - 9 ........................................................................................................
Riverton - 3 8 - ....................................................................................
Skeena - 5 5  22 - ................................................................................
St. Charles - 2 1 - - ............................................................................................
St.John's - ...............................................................................11 4
Summerside - ......................................................................................................25 4
Terra Nova 3 ........................................................15 1 4 .........................................
Toronto - - - - - - 30 - - - 18 - -
Ville de Quebec - - - - - - - 6 - 1 0 3  24 -
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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TABLE J-6
FISHERIES AND OCEANS CANADA BOARDINGS BY SHIP -  1990 TO 2002
Ship 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Alert - - - 96 - 22 - - - - - - -
Alexander - - - - - - 10 - - - - - -
Alfred Needier - - - - - 24 2 - - - - - -
Bernier - - - - - 7 8 - - 8 - - 6
Cape Roger 135 178 171 154 208 23 35 103 112 71 7 58 48
Chebucto 41 82 71 130 159 184 109 - - - - - -
CG 285 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - -
CSS Matthew - 9 1 - - - 2 - - - - - -
Cygnus 27 120 159 191 153 127 103 - - - - - -
L.J. Cowley 190 231 229 215 186 128 158 124 187 152 115 153 150
Louisbourg 136 213 28
Marinus 9 27 2
Mary Hichens - 50 15 - 11 90 57 - - - - - -
Parizeau - - - - 4 2 7 - - - - - -
Provost Wallis - - - - - 24 - - - - - - -
S.J. Franklin - - 13 - 33 - - - - - - - -
S.W. Grenfell 13 99 44 23 34 1 11 22 10 22 5 23 -
S.W. Templeton - - 5 - - - - - - - - - -
Humphrey Gilbert - - - - - - 24 - - - - 6 -
Tupper - - - - - 4 - - - - - - -
Observer - 5
Other DFO - - - - - - 29 - - - - - -
Not recorded - 2 - 74 - - - - - - - - -
Source: Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Newfoundland Region, 2002.
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TABLE J - 7
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE BY SHIP -  1999 TO 2003
Ship Name Start
Date
Stop
Date
Major Warship
Avg Radar 
Detection (nm)
Avg Area Covered 
by Radar (km2)
Montreal 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 15.8 217,594
St John's 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 18.8 224,160
Fredericton 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 13.8 306,626
Montreal 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 15.8 216,958
St John's 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 13.4 214,225
Ville de Quebec 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 16.9 251,529
Toronto 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 18.6 275,610
Montreal 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 17.1 332,161
Ville de Quebec 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 6.5 72,109
Montreal 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 18.1 116,428
Ville de Quebec 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 9.6 151,324
Halifax 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 11.9 237,536
Average Major Warship 14.7 218,022
Minor Warship
Moncton 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 14.2 106,132
Glace Bay 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 14.1 105,999
Goose Bay 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 8.5 45,667
Moncton 08-May-00 13-May-00 13.5 160,097
Kingston 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 6.9 43,660
Glace Bay 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 6.7 20,303
Moncton 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 9.2 61,333
Goose Bay 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 9.9 43,425
Average Minor Warship 10.4 73,327
Source: Track and contact data logs kept by ships; calculations carried out in ArcGIS.
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NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS DEPICTED IN VARIOUS FIGURES
Table K-1 contains the warship vessel names and patrol dates for 
fisheries patrols conducted during the period 1980 to 2003. The final column 
in the table lists the figures in which the naval vessels’ tracks were used. The 
key for the type of vessel listed is as follows:
Type 1 - Destroyer (Mackenzie and Improved Restigouche classes)
Type 2 - Destroyer (Improved St Laurent and Annapolis classes)
Type 3 - Frigate (Halifax class)
Type 4 - Destroyer (Iroquois class)
Type 5 - Auxiliary Oil Replenishment vessel (Preserver class)
Type 6 - Minesweeping Auxiliary (HMCS Anticosti, HMCS Moresby)
Type 7 - Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel (Kingston class)
Type 8 - Diving Auxiliary (HMCS Cormorant)
Type 9 - Submarine (Oberon class).
TABLE K-1
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURES
Unit Type Start Stop Used for Figures
Nipigon 2 22-Apr-80 09-May-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-12, F-24, F-4
Assiniboine 2 12-Nov-80 28-Nov-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4
Algonquin 4 25-Nov-80 12-Dec-80 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4
Skeena 2 08-Jan-81 23-Jan-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4
Fraser 2 19-May-81 04-Jun-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4
Cormorant 8 14-Oct-81 28-Oct-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-4
Margaree 2 22-Oct-81 05-Nov-81 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-4
Huron 4 21-Jan-82 05-Feb-82 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4
Nipigon 2 15-Feb-82 05-Mar-82 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-4
Assiniboine 2 18-Jan-83 03-Feb-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4
Nipigon 2 15-Mar-83 28-Mar-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-4
Iroquois 4 24-Nov-83 10-Dec-83 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-19, F-22, F-4
Cormorant 8 09-Jan-84 01-Feb-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-4
Skeena 2 13-Feb-84 29-Feb-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-4
Saguenay 2 12-Mar-84 29-Mar-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-4
Assiniboine 2 02-May-84 09-May-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4
Cormorant 8 28-M ay-84 23-Jun-84 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-4
Skeena 2 15-Jan-85 07-Feb-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5
Saguenay 2 26-Feb-85 15-Mar-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-5
Algonquin 4 07-May-85 24-May-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-13, F-24, F-5
Athabaskan 4 26-Jun-85 02-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-14, F-21, F-5
Iroquois 4 28-Jun-85 11-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-14, F-21, F-5
Athabaskan 4 15-Jul-85 26-Jul-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-15, F-21, F-5
Skeena 2 29-Oct-85 15-Nov-85 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-5
Cormorant 8 14-Jan-86 21-Feb-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5
Algonquin 4 01-Mar-86 05-Mar-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-11, F-24, F-5
Nipigon 2 30-Sep-86 17-Oct-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-17, F-22, F-5
Assiniboine 2 28-Oct-86 14-Nov-86 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-18, F-22, F-5
Margaree 2 28-Jan-87 08-Feb-87 8-24, 8-25, -1, F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5
Saguenay 2 24-Feb-87 04-Mar-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1, F-2, F-10, F-23, F-5
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TABLE K-1 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURES
Unit Type Start Stop Used for Figures
Cormorant 8 23-Mar-87 10-Apr-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-5
Margaree 2 16-Jun-87 03-Jul-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-5
Fraser 2 06-Aug-87 20-Aug-87 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-5
Annapolis 2 19-Jan-88 03-Feb-88 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5
Gatineau 1 03-May-88 20-May-88 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-5
Assiniboine 2 24-Oct-88 12-Nov-88 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-18 F-22, F-5, F-25
Skeena 2 18-Jan-89 10-Feb-89 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-9, F-23, F-5
Gatineau 1 15-Nov-89 20-Nov-89 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-19 F-22, F-5, F-25
Cormorant 8 17-Nov-89 16-Dec-89 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-19, F-22 F-5
Saguenay 2 04-Dec-89 18-Dec-89 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-20 F-23, F-5, F-25
Margaree 2 22-Oct-90 09-Nov-90 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22 F-6
Cormorant 8 03-Dec-90 14-Dec-90 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-20, F-23 F-6
Margaree 2 10-Jun-91 21-Jun-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-6
Margaree 2 23-Jul-91 16-Aug-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6
Ottawa 2 23-Sep-91 04-Oct-91 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-17 F-22, F-6, F-25
Margaree 2 30-Sep-91 17-Oct-91 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6
Nipigon 2 10-Feb-92 28-Feb-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-6
Nipigon 2 17-Mar-92 31-Mar-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-6
Margaree 2 06-Apr-92 16-Apr-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6
Fraser 2 04-May-92 15-May-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6
Fraser 2 13-Jul-92 31-Jul-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6
Skeena 2 05-Oct-92 30-Oct-92 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22 F-6
Ojibwa 9 05-Mar-93 12-Mar-93 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-11 F-24, F-6, F-25
Anticosti 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6
Moresby 6 19-Apr-93 30-Apr-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6
Gatineau 1 03-May-93 27-May-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6
Skeena 2 25-May-93 04-Jun-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6
Nipigon 2 09-Jun-93 18-Jun-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-14, F-21 F-6
Moresby 6 03-Aug-93 11-Aug-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6
Skeena 2 23-Aug-93 17-Sep-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6
Anticosti 6 20-Sep-93 08-Oct-93 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6
Moresby 6 21-Feb-94 02-Mar-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-6
Anticosti 6 06-Apr-94 22-Apr-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-6
Fraser 2 10-May-94 21-May-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24 F-6
Fraser 2 04-Jul-94 29-Jul-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6
Anticosti 6 25-Jul-94 14-Aug-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-6
Gatineau 1 08-Aug-94 26-Aug-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-16, F-21 F-6
Fraser 2 12-Sep-94 30-Sep-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6
Okanagan 9 26-Sep-94 10-Oct-94 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-6
Cormorant 8 20-Mar-95 08-Apr-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-7
Toronto 3 27-Mar-95 10-Apr-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-11, F-24 F-7
Cormorant 8 18-Apr-95 08-May-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-12, F-24 F-7
Anticosti 6 04-Jul-95 14-Jul-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-7
Gatineau 1 11-Sep-95 06-Oct-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-7
Cormorant 8 10-Oct-95 08-Nov-95 8-24, 8-25, 8-27, F-1, F-2, F-18 F-22, F-7, F-25
Cormorant 8 20-Nov-95 14-Dec-95 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-19, F-22 F-7
Toronto 3 27-Feb-96 17-Mar-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-10, F-23 F-7
Moresby 6 02-Jul-96 19-Jul-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-15, F-21 F-7
Toronto 3 16-Sep-96 11-Oct-96 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22 F-7
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TABLE K-1 (continued)
NAVAL FISHERIES PATROLS USED IN FIGURES
Unit Type Start Stop Used for Figures
Anticosti 6 05-May-97 21-May-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24, F-7
Montreal 3 26-May-97 06-Jun-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-13, F-24, F-7
Glace Bay 7 02-Sep-97 18-Sep-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22, F-7
Kingston 7 29-Sep-97 17-Oct-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-17, F-22, F-7
Ville de Quebec 3 06-Oct-97 24-Oct-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22, F-7
Fredericton 3 03-Dec-97 19-Dec-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-20, F-23, F-7
Glace Bay 7 20-Oct-97 13-Nov-97 8-24, 8-25, F-1 F-2, F-18, F-22, F-7
Montreal 3 22-Feb-99 12-Mar-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-7
St John's 3 14-Jun-99 29-Jun-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-7
Fredericton 3 28-Jul-99 17-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-7
Kingston 7 08-Aug-99 31-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-16, F-21, F-7
Anticosti 6 16-Aug-99 27-Aug-99 8-24, 8-26, 8-27, F-1, F-3, F-16, F-21, F-7, F-25
Ville de Quebec 3 08-Sep-99 29-Sep-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-7
Anticosti 6 09-Sep-99 28-Sep-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-7
Moncton 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-7
Glace Bay 7 12-Oct-99 22-Oct-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-7
Montreal 3 24-Nov-99 14-Dec-99 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-7
St John's 3 17-Jan-00 04-Feb-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-9, F-23, F-8
Ville de Quebec 3 20-Mar-00 04-Apr-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-11, F-24, F-8
Goose Bay 7 25-Apr-00 19-May-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-12, F-24, F-8
Moncton 7 08-May-00 13-May-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-13, F-24, F-8
Toronto 3 02-Jun-00 19-Jun-00 8-22, 8-24, 8-26, F-1, F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8
Athabaskan 4 20-Nov-00 01-Dec-00 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8
Montreal 3 24-Jan-01 18-Feb-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-9, F-23, F-8
Ville de Quebec 3 19-Mar-01 02-Apr-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-11, F-24, F-8
Montreal 3 04-Apr-01 12-Apr-01 8-24, 8-65, F-1 F-3, F-12, F-24, F-8
Ville de Quebec 3 03-Jul-01 20-Jul-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-8
Ville de Quebec 3 26-Nov-01 14-Dec-01 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8
Fredericton 3 18-Feb-02 08-Mar-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-8
Kingston 7 24-Jul-02 03-Aug-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-15, F-21, F-8
Glace Bay 7 06-Sep-02 23-Sep-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-8
Moncton 7 23-Sep-02 11-Oct-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-17, F-22, F-8
Goose Bay 7 31-Oct-02 06-Nov-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-18, F-22, F-8
Halifax 3 25-Nov-02 12-Dec-02 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8
Charlottetown 3 03-Feb-03 21-Feb-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-10, F-23, F-8
Kingston 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8
Glace Bay 7 12-Jun-03 16-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8
Summerside 7 16-Jun-03 20-Jun-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-14, F-21, F-8
Kingston 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8
Moncton 7 03-Nov-03 07-Nov-03 8-24, 8-26, F-1 F-3, F-19, F-22, F-8
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NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL -  HMCS HALIFAX
DATA RECORDING
Comd MARLANT has been tasked by CMS to evaluate the benefit to the Navy of 
operations in support of OGD. The overall aim of this record keeping is to provide 
accurate data for geographical and financial analysis in support of this evaluation.
This particular analysis seeks to measure the effectiveness of a naval asset, in this 
case a frigate, to carry out surveillance and enforcement activities over a large 
maritime area.
The following data is needed to determine the actual level of effort expended in 
surveillance activities. Previous units that have gathered this data state that there is 
little extra effort required of the ship’s company to gather this data, save for some 
time spent in collation. Templates in the form of MS Access databases have been 
provided for ease of data input. Please deliver the completed floppy disk and a hard 
copy of the data to LN 31-3 Lt(N) Ian Anderson, ext. 3203, or LN3 Capt(N) Larry 
Hickey.
Data required:
Own ship position hourly (on the even hour) Template:
Weather log (data entry every six hours) Template:
Contact log Template:
Notes: Enter position of contacts when initially detected
Record total number of contacts detected (all types of ships and aircraft) 
Indicate vessels boarded with a "B" in appropriate column 
If at anchor, continue to record positions 
If alongside in port, indicate arrival/departure in remarks column 
If detached on SAR, continue to record positions. Indicate start/stop in 
remarks
Data summary sheet Template: hal07-02 summary.doc
Notes: Normally, patrols will start/stop at Chebucto Head
Fuel figures are important. They provide the constant for measuring 
expenses
Record individual CRRs completed during fishpat
It is important to capture the perceived value of fisheries patrols. In addition to 
CRRs, Commanding Officers are encouraged to record their thoughts vis-a-vis 
training, maintenance, morale, etc. It is vital that care is taken when entering 
positional data to ensure accuracy.
Comd MARLANT appreciates your support of this new performance measurement 
activity.
hal0702trk.mdb
hal07020wx.mdb
hal0702cont.mdb
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| 0le Ed* Sflew Insert Fgrmat Records loots Window fjelp
^ y j i z t i E H
i L *  y | « a ^  < H u  ^  m  > • * ;  •• ©  O  -1
-inlxla P osition Log Form
La*Port* | HMCS VILLE de QUEBEC
I 380 FishPat 05-01 Own Ship's Position Log
Pom# DTGZuki
| 261430 | Nov j J  ( 2001
Remarks: |
OwnsNp Lai North | Ownthfi Long Wert | irW n irrnM  
I 44.26.85 | 06.32 89
Example: 43 deg 33.28'N 063deg31.54'W 
is recorded as: 43.33.28 63.31.54
Record: H 1 < 1 ► | h |> >|  of  380
m a r t  I a l r S ) * ®  Ewove«...| ^  Inbox... | j^ O w e ...  | j> « m p l-  | |g lM k r « -  J i  N 2: 57PM
Figure L-1. Microsoft Access Template for Own Ship’s Position Log
E  Microsoft Access
Fie t<* Bew Insert Fgrmat Records loots Window tfelp
id'! u a a % a - v 'n  *  n i l  ^ ^  *  «< a / - '  0 .
HMCS VILLE de QUEBEC
FishPat 05-01 Contact Log
DTGZiiu y I 2001 jJ
Track Number |
r ~ r
Target Name 
jPESCA VAGUE IRO
Sensor Leoend
A -  CPI 40 Aurora P-PAL
G -  GCCS M R -  Ship's Radar
H -Sea King Z-RADAR SAT
E-ESM/EUNT VX-Commt
V-Visual
Boarded | TargetLatN | Target LongV/|
|"T“ | 43.09.30 | 05.13.16
B -  Boarded
T arget Country |
|sp5! 3
•V  I Remarks: | Total Contacts: | | 15
Record: 14 | r  I I T  ► |» l|»  I of 17
J 8 » a r t | i &  H fflNoveM el...| g f o b o x j j C u t e n t R . . . H g ]M to >Wo f .  J *  N 2: 56PM
Figure L-2. Microsoft Access Template for Vessel Contact Log (Vessels Detected)
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NAVAL FISHERIES PATROL -  DATA SUMMARY
HMCS
DND Patrol #:
Hourly position, contact, and weather logs to
i) Points at which fishpat started and ended:
3) Total distance travelled during fishpat: 
nautical miles
3) Avg ranges of sensors against F/Vs:
Kelvin Hughes nautical miles
SG 150 nautical miles
Other nautical miles
i) Avg difference from predicted ranges: 
percent [H over ranging 
Q  under ranging
?)Total # of fishing vessels boarded:
(indicated in contact log by B for "boarded")
} Total # of violations detected:
I) Violator vessel names and positions:
Patrol Dates:
DFO Patrol #:
be kept as separate files. Template provided.
j) Total # of hours of ship's helicopter 
surveillance:
hours
k) Average ranges of helicopter sensors against 
fishing vessels:
nautical miles
1) How far did helo extend surveillance range:
nautical miles
n) Total # of PAL flights in support:
o) Total # of hours of PAL support:
hours
p) PAL Flight Mission Numbers:
(Obtain from DFO/PAL faxes)
q) Names of DFO / NAFO ships in support:
r) Total # of MPA flights in support:
s) Total # of hours of MPA support:
hours
t) DTGs of Forms Purple:
Vote: Expense Data on next page
1) Total # of violators arrested:
) Arrested vessel names and positions:
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Cxpense Data
i) Ship's fuel expended on patrol: 
r) Helo fuel expended on patrol:
cums
cums
v) Fuel expended in transit to patrol start point, 
f not Halifax or St John's:
cums
:) Fuel expended in transit from patrol end 
>oint to next tasking if not into Halifax or St 
ohn's:
cums
r) Cost o f own ship fuel expended on patrol:
dollars Cdn
:) Cost o f helicopter fuel expended on patrol:
dollars Cdn
a) Fuel price per bbl during patrol:
dollars Cdn
b) Names of Fisheries Protection Officers:
c) Name of Commanding Officer:
Value of Patrol for Crew Training
dd) List CRRs (by number) completed during 
patrol:
ee) Seamanship requirements completed during 
patrol:
ff) Any other useful training carried out during 
patrol:
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PARTICIPATION OF FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONS
The table in this appendix lists by province the fisheries associations that 
were active in 2003, the year that the Deterrence Survey was conducted. The 
columns to the right of the table indicate the number of questionnaires sent to 
each association.
TABLE N -1
PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONS
Province Name of Fisheries Association No. of Copies
Members sent
NS 45' Shelburne Co. Fixed Gear Quota Group unk -
NS Area 19 Crab Fishermen's Association unk 6
NS Area 30 Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Atlantic Canadian Mobile Shrimp Association unk -
NS Atlantic Coast Scallop Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Atlantic Herring Co-op Ltd. unk 5
NS Bay of Fundy Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Canso Trawlermen's Co-op unk 5
NS Cape Breton East Fishers Association unk -
NS Cheticamp & Area Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Cumberland North Fishermen's Association 50 10
NS East Cape Breton Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Eastern Nova Scotia Mobile Gear Association unk -
NS Eastern Shelburne Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Eastern Shore Fishermen's Protective Association 260 20
NS Federation of Gulf Nova Scotia Groundfishermen unk -
NS Full Bay Scallop Association unk -
NS Fundy East Fishermen’s Association unk -
NS Glace Bay Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Groundfish Generalists Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Gulf-Nova Scotia Bonafide Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Gulf-Nova Scotia Tuna Association unk -
NS Guysborough County Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Halifax West Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Inverness North Fishermen's Association unk 30
NS Inverness South Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Jonah Crab Association unk -
NS LFA District 34 Lobster Committee unk -
NS Margaree Harbour Inshore Fishermen’s Association unk -
NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 4) unk -
NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 6) 100 15
NS Maritime Fishermen's Union (Local 9) unk 10
NS North of Smokey Fishermen's Association unk -
N1
Appendix N
TABLE N -  1 (continued)
PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONS
Province Name of Fisheries Association No. of Copies
Members sent
NS Northern Cape Breton Fishing Vessels Association unk -
NS Northside Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Northumberland Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Nova Scotia Fishermen's Association (Scallop Sector) unk -
NS Nova Scotia Fixed Gear 45-65' unk -
NS Nova Scotia Mackeral Association unk -
NS Nova Scotia Swordfishermen's Association unk -
NS Nova Scotia Women's Fish Net unk -
NS Prospect Area Full Time Fishermen's Association unk 10
NS Richmond County Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Scotia Fundy Inshore Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Scotia Fundy Mobile Gear Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Shelburne County Competitive Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Shelburne County Gillnet Fishermen's Association unk -
NS South Shore Gillnet Fishermen's Association unk -
NS South Shore Independent Fishermen's Association unk -
NS Southwest Fishermen's Quota Group unk -
NS Southwest Nova Fixed Gear Association unk -
NS Southwest Nova Tuna Association 35 1
NS Upper Bay of Fundy Fish Draggers Association 5 5
NS West Nova Scotia Fishermen's Coalition unk -
PE Central Northumberland Fishermen’s Association unk -
PE Eastern Kings Fishermen’s Association unk 5
PE North Shore Fishermen’s Association unk -
PE P.E.I. Fishermen’s Association unk -
PE P.E.I. Groundfish Association unk -
PE P.E.I. Shellfish Association unk -
PE Prince County Fishermen’s Association unk -
PE Prince County Shellfish Association unk -
PE Queens County Shellfish Association unk -
PE Snow Crab Fishermen Inc unk -
PE Southern Kings & Queens Fishermen’s Association unk -
PE Western Gulf Fishermen’s Association unk 10
NB Alma Fishermen's Association unk -
NB Area 18 Crab Fishermen's Association unk -
NB Association des crabiers acadiens unk -
NB Association des crabiers du Nord-Est inc. unk -
NB Association des crevettiers acadiens du Golfe inc. unk -
NB Association des seineurs du Golfe, inc. unk -
NB Assoc des pecheurs professionnels membres d’equipage unk -
NB Botsford Professional Fishermen's Association unk -
NB Campobello Fishermen’s Association unk -
NB Eastern Fishermen's Federation unk -
NB Federation r6gionale acadienne des pecheurs professionnels unk -
NB Fundy North Fishermen's Association unk -
NB Grand Manan Fishermen’s Association unk -
NB Island Fishermen Association unk -
NB Southern New Brunswick Scallop Draggers Association unk -
NF Barry Group Inc Ltd unk -
NF Beothuk Fish Processors Ltd unk -
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TABLE N -  1 (continued)
PARTICIPATION OF ATLANTIC CANADA FISHERIES ASSOCIATIONS
Province Name of Fisheries Association No. of 
Members
Copies
sent
NF Davis Strait Management Ltd unk -
NF Fisheries Association of Newfoundland & Labrador unk -
NF Fishery Products International Ltd unk -
NF Grand Banks Seafoods Ltd unk 12
NF Quin-Sea Fisheries Ltd unk -
Note: Column “Copies sent” records the number of copies of the questionnaire that were 
despatched to the fisheries associations once contact had been made and agreement to 
participate was obtained.
Table N -2  lists by province the number of licensed fishers that were 
represented by the fisheries associations in the Maritime provinces during the 
period that the Deterrence Survey was being carried out.
TABLE N - 2
NUMBER OF LICENCED FISHERS BY PROVINCE AND REGION - 2002
Province Region Licences 
Core Non-core
Total
Nova Scotia Scotia-Fundy 2,895 9,222 12,117
Nova Scotia Gulf 651 1,790 2,441
Prince Edward Island Gulf 1,315 3,446 4,761
New Brunswick Scotia-Fundy 353 1,487 1,840
New Brunswick Gulf 1,303 3,816 5,119
Newfoundland Newfoundland 4,154 11,161 15,315
Total 10,671 30,922 41,593
Source: Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Commercial - Licences: 
Fishers Information, 9 December 2005, <http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/ 
communic/statistics/commercial/licensing/fishers_info/fishers02_e.htm> 
(29 November 2007).
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Survey of Fishers' Views 
on the Effectiveness of Maritime Patrol Activities 
in Canadian Waters
Cardiff University Maritime Studies Project 
P.O. Box 48051 
Bedford, Nova Scotia 
B4A 3Z2
September 2003
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Survey of Fishers' Views on the Effectiveness 
of Maritime Patrol Activities in Canadian Waters
Purpose:
The Questionnaire:
Why You ?
The Importance of 
Your Participation:
Guarantee of 
Confidentiality:
Questions ?
In cooperation with local fisheries associations, this survey is being 
conducted for scholarly purposes by a Canadian graduate student at 
Cardiff University of Wales, forming part of his PhD project relating to 
aspects of oceans management in Canada.
This questionnaire was designed to record opinions concerning the 
perceived effectiveness of various maritime patrol activities in 
Canadian coastal zones. It consists of 19 short questions, and 
should take only about 15 minutes of your time.
As a person employed in the fisheries, you spend long periods at sea 
and observe first-hand the patrol activities of various government 
departments.
As a person whose livelihood is tied to the sea, your views are 
important to understanding what is really happening on the water. 
Your participation in completing the questionnaire, or any specific 
question, is entirely voluntary; however, the participation of everyone 
who receives a questionnaire is very important to help the researcher 
better understand the true picture.
This is an anonymous survey. All information provided by you will 
be kept strictly confidential. The researcher is guided by, and must 
adhere to, ethical principles concerning research that involves 
people. At no time, under any circumstance, will individual 
responses be made known. All responses will be pooled for 
analysis.
If you have questions about the questionnaire, or the survey in 
general, please contact Mr. Larry Hickey (902) 832-6268 or by email 
at: larry.hickey@ns.sympatico.ca
Completed questionnaires should be returned to the individual who 
distributed them, or sent to:
Mr. L.M. Hickey
Cardiff University Maritime Studies Project 
P.O. Box 48051 
Bedford, Nova Scotia 
B4A 322
Abbreviations used in this questionnaire:
CCG Canadian Coast Guard
DFO Fisheries and Oceans Canada Your participation in this study
DND Department of National Defence is very much appreciated.
EC Environment Canada
NAFO North Atlantic Fisheries Organization
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
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Instructions for Completing the Questionnaire:
Please take the time to read each question carefully. Some questions contain multiple 
parts.
The majority of the questions are arranged so that you simply put a mark in the
box □ to indicate your response. A few questions request that you fill in the blanks with
short one or two word responses, or circle a number on a scale from 0 to 6.
There are no wrong answers to any of these questions. You may not think that you have 
enough information upon which to base a response. However, you probably have a "gut 
feel" and this is what you should use to answer the question. The purpose of this survey is 
to determine what are your perceptions of an issue, irrespective of what other individuals or 
agencies might say about it.
This survey is strictly voluntary. If you do not wish to answer a particular question, please 
write "No answer" in the margin beside the question number to indicate that you 
considered the question and did not inadvertently skip over it.
Background Information:
1) How many years have you been going 
to sea (fishing or otherwise) ?
□ Less than 2
□ 2 to 5 years
□ 6 to 10 years
□  11 to 15 years
□ 16 to 20 years
□ 21 to 25 years
□ More than 25
2) How many weeks per year do you 
fish?
□ Less than 8
□ 8 to 16 weeks
□ 17 to 24 weeks
□ 25 to 32 weeks
□ 33 to 40 weeks
□ 41 to 48 weeks
□ 49 to 52 weeks
3) From what size of boat do you
normally fish for the majority of your 
weeks at sea?
□ Less than 45 ft
□  45 to 65 ft
□ 66 to 100 ft
□  More than 100 ft
4) What average distance from the coast 
do you fish the majority of your 
weeks at sea?
5) The majority of the time, you fish the:
□ Inshore □ Offshore
6) Fishing is your:
□ Sole source of income (100%)
□ Major source of income (50 to 99%)
□ Minor source of income (less than 50%)
7) What type of gear do you use? Please 
select all types.
□ Otter Trawls
□  Drags or Rakes
□ Seines
□ Gillnets
□  Traps
□ Longlines
□ Handlines
□ Other
8) For which two (2) types of licence or 
species do you spend the most time 
fishing, and for how many weeks 
each?
Between to nautical miles.
Example:
Primary
Second
Groundfish Weeks 20 
Lobster Weeks 8
Weeks
Weeks
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Common Canadian Atlantic Maritime Patrol Platforms
CrMWWJ
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Presence o f Maritime Patrol Assets and Nature o f Fisheries Violations:
9) How many times per week that you are fishing or travelling to and from your fishing 
area do you see each of the patrol vessels or aircraft pictured on the opposite page?
Please indicate your response by circling the appropriate number of sightings.
Photo Dept Type of Platform least Sightings per Week______  most
A CCG Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
B DFO Beechcraft Aircraft ’ 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
C DND Air Force Aurora Aircraft 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
D DND Navy Sea King Helicopter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
E RCMP Small multi-task Patrol Boat 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
F DFO Offshore multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
G DND Navy Patrol Frigate 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
H DFO Small multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
I DND Navy Minor War Vessel 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
J DFO Inshore multt-.ask Patrol Vessel 0 1-2 3-4 5-6 7 or more
10) What are the two most common types of fisheries violations in your fishing areas?
Examples : registration number not displayed properly on boat, fishing without a licence, using 
illegal mesh sizes or illegal traps, fishing in a prohibited or closed area, etc.
Most common Next most common___________________
The aim of Question11 is to get a feel for whether or not spending resources on vessel and 
aircraft patrols has any value in preventing people at sea from breaking laws. Please indicate 
your response by circling a number from 0 t o6  for each type of vessel or aircraft. High numbers 
mean that you feel that the presence of that vessel or aircraft is likely to prevent a violation. Low 
numbers mean that there is less deterrent value; a 0 means there is no deterrent value at all.
11) In your opinion, would the visual or radar presence of a maritime patrol vessel or 
aircraft deter a person from committing a serious fisheries violation in your fishing area?
Photos of common maritime patrol vessels and aircraft are on the opposite page.
Examples:
Serious violation: no licence, illegal traps or meshes, fishing in a prohibited or closed area 
Minor violation: registration number not displayed properly on boat
Photo Dept Type of Platform least Deterrent Value______ most
A CCG Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
B DFO Beechcraft Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
C DND Air Force Aurora Aircraft 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
D DND Navy Sea King Helicopter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
E RCMP Small multi-task Patrol Boat 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
F DFO Offshore multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
G DND Navy Patrol Frigate 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
H DFO Small multi-task Patrol Cutter 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
I DND Navy Minor War Vessel 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
>el 0 1 2  3DFO inshore multi-task Patrol Vesse  2  4 5 6
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12) Please indicate whether or not you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Patrols required
Agree Disagree More Fewer
a) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels 
and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate 
to ensure compliance with fisheries 
regulations.
b) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels 
and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate 
to ensure compliance with environmental 
regulations.
c) The surveillance effort by patrol vessels 
and aircraft in my fishing areas is adequate 
to prevent violations of other laws, such 
as illegal immigration, drug smuggling, etc.
d) Frequency of onboard inspections at sea is 
adequate to ensure compliance with 
fishing regulations.
e) Fisheries and Oceans Canada conducts 
the right number of patrols in my fishing 
areas.
f) The Canadian Coast Guard conducts the 
right number of patrols in my fishing areas.
g) The Department of National Defence 
conducts the right number of patrols in my 
fishing areas.
h) The RCMP conducts the right number of 
patrols in my fishing areas.
Agree Disagree
Agree Disagree
Agree Disagree
Agree Disagree
Agree Disagree 
Agree Disagree
Agree Disagree
More Fewer
More Fewer
More Fewer
More
More
More
More
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
13) What percentage of the time do you believe that either DFO Fisheries Protection 
Officers or RCMP officers are embarked aboard Navy ships for enforcement 
purposes? Please circle the number that is closest to your estimate of the percentage.
DFO 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
RCMP 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
14) What percentage of the time do you believe that either DFO Fisheries Protection 
Officers or RCMP officers fly aboard Air Force aircraft for enforcement purposes?
DFO 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
RCMP 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
15) In your opinion, which of the following federal departments is the most effective at 
deterring illegal activities the Canadian coastal zone? Select only one.
□ CCG □ DFO □ DND □ EC □ RCMP
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16) In your opinion, how often do FISHERMEN / FISHERS violate regulations in the 
Canadian coastal zone? Please read across for each type of regulation.
Fishing Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
Environmental Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
Other Regs / Laws □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
17) In your opinion, how often do other MARINERS I BOATERS in general violate 
regulations in the Canadian coastal zone? Please read across for each type.
Fishing Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
Environmental Regs □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
Other Regs I Laws □ Never □ Seldom □ Sometimes □ Frequently □
Always
18) Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
Neither
Strongly agree nor Strongly
agree Agree disagree Disagree disagree
a) Over-regulation by government is having
an adverse effect on the fishery. □ □ □ □ □
Competition with other boats in my fishing
area is causing depletion of the resource. □ □ □ □ □
Conserving fisheries resources is the
responsibility of each person who fishes as 
well as the agencies involved in fisheries 
management.
□ □ □ □ □
The Canadian Coast Guard should be
given a greater role in conservation and 
protection activities than it has at present.
□ □ □ □ □
The Dept of National Defence should be
given a greater role in conservation and 
protection activities than it has at present.
□ □ □ □ □
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police
should be given a greater role in 
conservation and protection activities than 
it has at present.
The following additional surveillance 
technologies should be employed in the 
Canadian coastal zone:
□ □ □ □ □
• Onboard automatic identity and 
location reporting systems such as 
AIS and INNAV
□ □ □ □ □
• Satellite technology □ □ □ □ □
• Naval submarines □ □ □ □ □
• High frequency surface wave radar □ □ □ □ □
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NAFO Fishing Areas
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Canadian Lobster Fishing Areas (LFA)
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Crab Fishing Areas
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TOOLS FOR MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS
The military’s Director General Public Affairs (DGPA) subscribes to a 
service that captures electronic newspaper stories published in over 30 Canadian 
newspapers. Table Q-1 contains the list of key words or text strings that DGPA 
uses to categorise electronic news articles as “naval” stories.
TABLE Q-1
KEY W ORDS FOR NAVAL STORY CATEGORIZATION
Key Word Key Word Key Word
Canad% & Navy HMCS & Yellowknife HMCS & Scotian
Maritime Command HMCS & Goose Bay HMCS & Cabot
marin & canad% HMCS & Brunswicker HMCS & Queen
canad% & sailor% HMCS & Nonsuch HMCS & Nanoose
commandement maritime HMCS & Huron HMCS & Provider
Canadian Forces base HMCS & Summerside HMCS & Protecteur
Canadian Forces station HMCS & Frontenac HMCS & Preserver
course du canon HMCS & Brandon HMCS & Vancouver
Canadian patrol frigate HMCS & Edmonton HMCS & Shawinigan
Canadian submarin% HMCS & Nanaimo HMCS & Toronto
Upholder & submarin% HMCS & Whitehorse HMCS & Regina
Oberon & submarin% HMCS & Fredricton HMCS & Calgary
fregate canadienne HMCS & Winnipeg HMCS & Montreal
Navire canadien de sa majeste HMCS & Charlottetown HMCS & Ottawa
Her Majesty%s Canadian Ship HMCS & Athabaskan HMCS & Glace Bay
afloat logistic% HMCS & Saskatoon HMCS & Ojibwa
sealift capability HMCS & Tecumseh HMCS & Kingston
MARCOM HMCS & Cataraqui HMCS & Moncton
MARLANT HMCS & Stadacona HMCS & Algonquin
MARPAC HMCS & Assiniboine HMCS & Iroquois
base de HMCS & Stettler HMCS & Onondaga
station de HMCS & Malahat HMCS & Okanagan
Gun Run HMCS & Griffon HMCS & Ville de Quebec
frigate HMCS & Gatineau HMCS & Discovery
destroyer HMCS & Cornwalli HMCS & Donnacona
minesweeper HMCS & Victoria HMCS & Glace Bay
Sea King% HMCS & Corner Brook HMCS & Moresby
Kingston Class HMCS & Chicoutimi HMCS & Bonaventure
CFS HMCS & Fredericton HMCS & Nipigon
CFB HMCS & Restigouche HMCS & Grandby
BFC HMCS & Chippewa HMCS & Fraser
HMCS HMCS & Carleton HMCS & Terra Nova
NCSM HMCS & Windsor HMCS & Oriole
Halifax HMCS & York HMCS & Montcalm
Esquimalt Masset HMCS & Star
Source: DND Director General Public Affairs, 2002.
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Figure Q-1 below is a screen shot of the MS Access template provided to 
the research assistant who reviewed the electronic “naval” stories captured on 
the DGPA web-site.
Be Media Content Analysis 3 EM!®
MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 00-02
Headline
Newspaper
Date
IBusbation
Journalist
Navy gets new submarine
KWR
10/25/2000
1 -Yes 
0-No
Page
9 - Unknown
|aT
OGO Type
1 - Search + rescue
2- Pollution, environment
3- Fisheries enforcement
4 - CD, terrorism
5 • I legal immigration
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Appendix R
VARIOUS TABLES AND CO-ORDINATES
This appendix contains tables and figures that were not appropriate for 
inclusion in other appendices.
TABLE R-1
AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF MILITARY DATA
Year______________Name________________________ Authority__________
1999 Rear-Admiral Duncan Miller Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
2000 Rear-Admiral Bruce MacLean Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
2002 Rear-Admiral Glenn Davidson Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
2004 Rear-Admiral Dan McNeil Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
2006 Rear-Admiral Dean McFadden_____ Commander, Maritime Forces Atlantic
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Figure R-1. Locations Named in Various Map Analyses
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Figure R-2. Monthly SAR Caseload in Halifax SRR -  2002 to 2005 
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002.
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Figure R-3. SAR Incidents by User Type -  Victoria SRR 2002 
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Victoria, 2002.
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TABLE R-2
SAR INCIDENTS BY TYPE -  1997 TO 2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Halifax Search and Rescue Region
Air 125 150 206 191 164 152
Marine 1,702 1,927 2,325 2,191 1,995 1,947
Humanitarian 172 158 119 98 115 103
Unknown 93 103 181 121 102 126
Total Halifax SRR 2,092 2,338 2,831 2,601 2,376 2,328
Victoria Search and Rescue Region
Air 223 220 232 289 221 202
Marine 1,579 1,623 2,255 2,325 2,229 1,952
Humanitarian 329 365 305 319 298 372
Unknown 233 201 202 181 200 184
Total Victoria SRR 2,364 2,409 2,994 3,114 2,948 2,710
Sources: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002; Joint Rescue Co­
ordination Centre, Victoria, 2002.
TABLE R-3
MARINE RESPONDERS IN SAR CASES - 2002
Marine Resources Taskings Hours
Halifax SRR
CCG Marine (SAR) 947 3,418
CCG Marine (non-SAR) 164 855
CCG Auxiliary 146 397
Federal Vessel (Other) 1 1
Provincial Vessel 1 1
Police Vessel 10 9
Commercial Vessel 16 266
Fishing Vessel 90 278
Other 163 446
Pleasure Craft (Private) 9 24
Victoria SRR
CCG Marine (SAR) 1,800 4,444
CCG Auxiliary 993 2,242
Naval Vessel 33 48
Federal Vessel (Other) 46 44
Provincial Vessel 41 27
Police Vessel 78 104
United States Coast Guard 6 5
Fire Boat 11 6
Commercial Vessel 179 236
Fishing Vessel 96 224
Other 78 104
Pleasure Craft (Private) 365 462
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2002;
Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Victoria, 2002
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TABLE R-4
LOCATION OF CCG LIFEBOAT BASES -  ATLANTIC REGION
Home Port CCG Vessel Length(m) Latitude Longitude
Saint John, NB Courtney Bay 16.3 45.271388889 -66.071388889
Westport, NS Westport 16.3 44.264166667 -66.348888889
Clarks Harbour, NS Clarks Harbour 16.3 43.459444444 -65.653333333
Sambro, NS Sambro 16.3 44.468055556 -63.599444444
Port Bickerton, NS Bickerton 16.3 45.100555556 -61.722500000
Louisbourg, NS Spindrift 16.3 45.917222222 -59.970833333
lies de la Madeleine, QC Cap aux Meules 16.3 47.380555556 -61.856111111
Burgeo, NL W.G. George 16.3 47.614722222 -57.607777778
Burin, NL W. Jackman 16.3 47.036111111 -55.163611111
Souris, PE Cape Spry 14.6 46.344722222 -62.248888889
Summerside, PE Cap Nord 14.6 46.383611111 -63.787777778
Shippegan, NB Cap Breton 14.6 47.744444444 -64.698055556
Riviere au Renard.QC Cap Rozier 14.6 48.995277778 -64.386944444
Tadoussac, QC Cap D'Espoir 14.6 48.138055556 -69.714722222
Havre Saint Pierre,QC Cap De Rabast 14.6 50.236944444 -63.603611111
Port aux Choix, NL Cape Norman 14.6 50.705277778 -57.350555556
Lark Harbour, NL Cape Fox 14.6 49.095555556 -58.378888889
Source: Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Halifax, 2007.
TABLE R-5
LOCATION OF GOVERNMENT PATROL BASES -  ATLANTIC REGION
Name of Base Dept Type Latitude Longitude
Halifax DND Port 44.655556 -63.575556
Shearwater DND Airport 44.639444 -63.503056
Greenwood DND Airport 44.991667 -64.900000
Gander DND Airport 48.937222 -54.567778
Goose Bay DFO Airport 53.318056 -60.422222
Dartmouth DFO Port 44.660000 -63.556944
Yarmouth DFO Port 43.830000 -66.121944
Sydney DFO Port 46.138333 -60.200000
St John's DFO Port 47.558056 -52.706667
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EN H A N C IN G  TH E NAVAL MANDATE  
FOR LAW ENFORCEM ENT:  
HOT P U R S U IT  OR HOT POTATO?
by C a p ta in  (N ) L au ren ce  M. H ickey
Introduction
Days after the 1995 apprehension of the fishing vessel Estai on the Grand Banks, the Toronto Sun carried 
a provocative front-page periscope photograph of a 
Spanish stern trawler at close range. This so-called ‘Turbot 
Crisis’ brought fisheries and sovereignty issues into focus 
for Canadians. Moreover, the reporting of this unusual 
employment of a submarine was, for many, the first 
indication that their navy played an active role in the 
enforcement of domestic and international law in Canada’s 
maritime zones.
While Canada’s navy has always been active in the 
nation’s maritime affairs, there is a case to be made for 
expanding the naval role with respect to domestic maritime 
enforcement in support of safeguarding national security 
and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. The intent of this 
article is to suggest why a more comprehensive role is both 
practical and necessary. The Canadian Navy maintains a 
significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones, and it 
should have all the legal tools required to enforce Canadian 
law in those regions. This is not to suggest that the navy
would shift its primary emphasis from preparing for combat 
at sea to coast guard duties. Rather, it is an appeal for powers 
that would enable the navy to act upon violations detected 
while carrying out its fundamental military role. Other 
government departments have become increasingly reliant on 
the navy during a decade of government-wide retrenchment. 
The issues that shape attitudes towards the employment of 
armed forces for law enforcement tasks also need to be 
identified and challenged. Finally, a simple model for executing 
this new role will be proposed. But first, it is necessary to 
examine what the navy’s enforcement role is at present.
Naval Contribution to Maritime Enforcement
For the past several years, all federal departments and agencies have suffered the consequences of reduced 
budgets. Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) have experienced 
significant pressures with respect to operating aging fleets in
Captain Hickey is both Commander Fifth Maritime Operations Group 
and Deputy Commander Canadian Fleet Atlantic.
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the face o f increased demand for post-9/11 patrol 
activities. Indeed, Senator Colin Kenny complained in 2004 
that the CCG, the navy, and by extension, the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), were not defending 
Canada's coasts in “ any meaningful way”.1 While this 
may be an overstatement, in reality no single government 
department or agency on its own can assure the safety, 
security or sovereignty o f Canada. Thus, any additional 
contribution the navy can make -  either by itself or in 
partnership with other government departments -  could 
enhance significantly Canada’s ability to exercise national 
sovereignty.
At present, the navy’s contribution to domestic 
maritime enforcement is maintaining a comprehensive 
surveillance and domain awareness capability, providing 
routine support to departments with enforcement mandates, 
and being prepared to apply coercive force in emergent 
crises. Over the past decade, on the Atlantic coast, Canadian 
naval vessels spent between 150 and 250 days at sea per 
year, many o f them on overseas deployments, but the 
majority of them within the nation's Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ). While many of these sea-days were devoted 
to training and exercises, they provided many ‘eyes 
on the water’ , and constituted a distinct federal presence 
in Canada's maritime approaches.2 In recent years, the 
navy has spent fewer and fewer days at sea, due to 
reductions in fleet size and annual budgetary constraints.
In addition to its at-sea presence, the navy is already 
an active participant in fisheries enforcement through a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) negotiated 
between the Department o f National Defence (DND) and 
DFO. This MOU defines the terms and procedures 
for the provision of support by the navy and the air 
force, and it sets the number o f sea-days (Figure 1) and 
flying-hours allocated to surveillance and fisheries 
enforcement. Naval vessels and m ilitary maritime patrol 
aircraft, with DFO officers embarked, conduct fishery 
patrols in the inshore and offshore maritime zones. 
Essentially, they provide the means to transport fisheries 
officers into areas o f fishing activity so that the 
appropriate authorities can monitor, inspect, and, i f  
necessary, arrest anyone violating domestic and/or 
international law.
iw t ivm  i w  2mm m t  x m  m *
Figure 1 -  Naval Fisheries Patrol Sea Days -  Atlantic. (Maritime Forces 
Atlantic Sea Operations staff. 2004)
Figure 2 -  Boardings by Fisheries Officers Embarked aboard Naval 
Ships -  Atlantic. (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002)
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Figure 3 -  Navy’s Percentage of Total DFO Boardings for Newfoundland 
Region. (Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 2002)
Over the past several years, DFO has, in fact, begun 
to rely increasingly on the navy for support, particularly 
since DFO reduced its offshore enforcement fleet. While 
the number of boardings carried out by DFO officers 
embarked aboard naval vessels remains relatively 
constant (Figure 2), the overall percentage of boardings 
instigated by fisheries officers embarked in naval vessels 
is increasing (Figure 3).
Historically, the navy has focused its fisheries 
patrols upon the Grand Banks, resulting in the emergence 
o f distinct patterns of naval presence. Figure 4 shows a 
concentration of patrol effort on the Tail o f the Grand 
Banks, with increased presence on the routes to and from 
Halifax and St. John’s.’ The focus on the Tail was due in 
large measure to the plethora of foreign vessels attracted 
to this particularly abundant fishing ground, and then 
later in the 1990s, to the requirement to enforce the 
moratorium imposed on the Tail as a result of plummeting 
ground fish stocks. Figure 5 captures the shift in 
concentration away from the Tail where, by 1999, only 
a small total allowable catch had been allocated. The new 
direction was towards the Flemish Cap, where other 
species such as shrimp were, and still are, commercially 
viable. Figure 6 depicts the coverage and, by extension, 
the presence of military maritime patrol aircraft during 
a routine 30-day period.
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navy’s tendency to revisit areas of high activity and traffic 
density -  coupled with its sophisticated modern sensor capa­
bility -  predisposes its vessels to detect breaches of domestic 
and international law. However, at present, unless a peace 
officer from another government department is embarked, there 
is little recourse open to a naval vessel other than to report 
the situation to the appropriate law enforcement authority, 
and to wait for action to be taken by others. Why then has 
Canada been so reticent to take the next step, as have many 
other nations, to employ the navy for enforcement of federal 
statutes in all Canadian maritime zones in a more primary 
manner than relegating it to its present supporting role?
Reticence to Use Armed Forces 
for Domestic Enforcement
T here is no simple answer to this question. However, an explanation can be found in a number of separate but 
related issues. Public perceptions of the army, and a general 
unease with the use of the army for law enforcement on land, 
have influenced how constabulary naval roles are viewed. At 
heart is the public’s apparent inability to distinguish between 
the army and the navy in terms of domestic operations. In 
addition, some also question whether law enforcement is 
truly a legitimate use of the Canadian Forces in the first 
instance. Lastly, there are those who argue that constabulary 
duties are non-traditional, that they detract from the status 
of a navy, and that they erode its war fighting capability. On 
further examination, it becomes evident that these concerns 
do not present such an insurmountable obstacle as may 
first have been thought.
The Army and Law Enforcement
A s instruments of national power, most Western armed forces have been conceived and maintained to execute 
state policy abroad -  although they can also be employed 
domestically in certain situations where their unique military 
attributes can be used very effectively. In practice, democratic 
governments constrain the internal use of their militaries, 
usually to avoid potential political fallout, and also, to maintain 
the legitimacy of their democratic governance. Canada is 
no exception, and this tradition has its roots in British legal 
heritage, which was imported to British North America 
before Confederation.
It is argued that the perceived unwillingness to employ 
the Canadian Army in law enforcement roles during modern 
times comes from long-standing prejudices resulting from 
misuse of the army in foregone times. The British B ill o f  
Rights of 1688 is the point of departure for an analysis of 
civil-military relations in the British Isles, and, by extension, the 
Dominion of Canada. This Act rendered the army subordinate to 
Parliament, and restricted its use by the Crown.4 Interestingly, 
the B ill o f  Rights of 1688 makes no reference to the Royal 
Navy, a powerful arm of the state during that particular 
period of empire building. Clearly, it was not viewed as 
a threat to the domestic political structure of the era. After 
the B ill  o f  Rights, there followed a series of acts that 
provided statutory authority and funding for armed forces 
to operate on land.
Figure 5 -  Enforcement Presence by Naval Ships on Fisheries 
Patrol: 1999 -  2000. (Data from 13 naval fisheries patrols)
Figure 6 -  Presence of CP-140 Aurora Maritime Patrol Aircraft: 
15 Jan -  15 Feb 2004. (Data from 18 flights)
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As demonstrated by the preceding figures, the Canadian 
Navy is fully engaged in safeguarding both national security 
and the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. In a period when 
patrol activities by other government departments has been 
waning, the navy continues to maintain a not insignificant 
‘on-the-water’ presence in Canada’s maritime zones. The
Figure 4 -  Enforcement Presence by Naval Ships on Fisheries 
Patrol: 1980 — 1996. (National Library and Archives data from 59 ship’s logs)
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“In recent years, 
the navy has spent 
fewer and fewer 
days at sea, due to 
reductions in fleet 
size and annual 
budgetary constraints.”
For well over two 
centuries, the army remained an 
important tool in the execution 
o f domestic policy, largely 
because it was the only organ­
ized body o f men that the 
Crown could call upon for its 
coercive ends. Consequently, 
well into the 19lh Century, 
soldiers were employed fre­
quently to maintain public 
order, notwithstanding the potential risk to civil liberties. Over 
time, public figures began to question the means employed to 
maintain law and order, as well as the appropriateness o f the 
use of the army for this purpose. This evaluation coincided 
roughly with the M etro p o litan  Police A ct o f 1829, and the 
creation of Britain’s fledgling police forces.
Attitudes toward the use o f the army in the domestic 
context ultimately migrated to Canada. Here, the army was 
used prior to the Second World War to quell disturbances, to 
suppress election disorder, and to put down uprisings, such as 
the Riel Rebellion of 1885. Some argue that the negative 
memory of these actions remains embedded with today’s 
population, resulting in resentment towards using the 
Canadian Army to quell c iv il disorder. However, it is d ifficu lt 
to gauge accurately public sentiment about the use of the 
army for law enforcement purposes. There have been only 
four instances of the use of Canadian military forces in their 
most intrusive form since 1945.5 In the case o f both the 1970 
FLQ and the 1990 Oka crises, the armed forces were praised for 
the calm and disciplined manner in which they both contained 
the crisis and prevented its escalation.6 I f  there is truly lingering 
resentment over use of the Canadian Forces for law enforcement 
tasks, it is difficult to explain why visible military assistance 
is requested for major politically-charged events, such as 
the G8 Ministers’ conferences in Kananaskis and Halifax, 
or the Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.
Legitimacy of the Canadian Forces 
for Law Enforcement
Contrary to what many might think, law enforcement is, indeed, a legitimate function of the Canadian Forces. 
Parliament has indicated clearly both its acceptance o f and 
its expectation that the armed forces have a role in law 
enforcement in certain circumstances. This statutory basis 
can be found in the N a tio n a l Defence A ct (NDA). This Act 
codifies the principles for control of the armed forces, and 
provides the legal framework for the provision of military 
support to provinces or other government departments for 
maintaining public order.
Parliament has two major expectations 
in relation to the armed forces and law 
enforcement. First, the Canadian Forces 
must be capable o f a broad spectrum o f 
services provision in both crisis and non-crisis 
scenarios. Through the NDA, Parliament 
empowers the Minister of National Defence 
or the Governor-in-Council to authorize the
“Attitudes towards 
the use of the army 
in the domestic context 
ultimately migrated 
to Canada”
armed forces to “ perform any duty involving public service” , 
including the “ provision of assistance in respect of any law 
enforcement matter” . This commonly takes the form of 
humanitarian assistance -  including ground search and rescue, 
aid to civil disasters, such as floods and fires, environmental 
emergencies and other humanitarian situations, such as missing 
persons and mercy flights. The “ provision of assistance 
in respect of any law enforcement matter” clause also 
encompasses what is known as assistance to law enforcement 
agencies (ALEA). Within this category, support from the 
armed forces runs the gamut from the benign, such as provision 
of ranges or training areas for police use, to situations in which 
a disturbance of the peace is occurring or is about to occur, and 
when armed forces personnel or equipment may be required 
for support. The NDA also sets the conditions for armed 
forces support to federal penitentiaries for assisting in the 
suppression of prison disturbances, and it provides authority for 
the earlier mentioned MOUs with DFO, the RCMP, and with 
Environment Canada (EC). These MOUs provide the legal 
basis for the navy to assist the other federal departments to 
enforce narcotics, fisheries and environmental laws through 
use of naval assets for surveillance, information sharing and 
interdiction support.
Second, Parliament expects the Canadian Forces to be 
capable of taking responsibility for restoring public order 
when necessary -  that is, for coming to the aid of the civil 
power. Pursuant to the N ational Defence Act, military ‘service’ 
can be furnished “ in any case in which a riot or disturbance of 
the peace, beyond the powers o f civil authorities to suppress, 
prevent or deal with and requiring that service” . The Chief of 
the Defence Staff is accorded the discretion to determine the 
scope and nature of military ‘service’ in these situations. 
Under aid of the civil power, armed forces members possess 
the powers and duties of ‘constables’ , but they remain under 
military command and control.
Aid of the civil power is an arguably controversial ‘service’ , 
since it conjures up images of soldiers with rifles patrolling 
Canadian streets, and, in the view of some citizens, it embodies 
the idea of a police state with the threat of concomitant 
suspension of civil liberties. Historian Sean Maloney asserts 
that employing military forces domestically is a “ politically 
provocative act, one that carries much weight regardless of 
the situation” .7 Others argue that the use of military forces for 
law enforcement purposes obfuscates military and civilian 
roles, undermines civilian control o f the armed forces, and 
is not an appropriate use of resources/ This criticism 
notwithstanding, the police state has never been an acceptable 
concept in Canada, and the infrequent requisitions for 
aid to the civil power are always undertaken as a means 
of last resort. Moreover, as stated earlier, recent examples of 
armed forces employment in aid to 
the c iv il power met with overall 
approval. More importantly, however, 
Parliament has demonstrated, through 
various legal instruments, that it both 
accepts and expects Canada’s military 
to play a role in law enforcement, but 
that role w ill be subject to tight political 
control.
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Do constitutional issues prevent the 
navy, as opposed to the army, from enforcing 
Canadian law? A review o f the Constitution  
Act indicates otherwise. The Act states that 
“ ...the exclusive Legislative Authority o f 
the Parliament o f Canada extends to...
M ilitia , M ilitary and Naval Service, and 
Defence... Beacons, Buoys, Lighthouses...
Navigation and Shipping... Sea Coast and 
Inland Ferries”. Such subjects are clearly 
related to maritime activities on or beyond the coasts, and the 
Act codifies federal responsibility for each. The Act also 
prescribes the exclusive powers o f the provinces, powers that 
focus on activities and issues affecting provincial territory, 
namely, terra f irm a *  Thus, the Constitution A ct clearly implies 
that Canada’s ocean zones are federal jurisdictions. As such, 
appropriate organs o f the federal government may enforce 
Canadian law within these jurisdictions, provided they have 
the legal mandate. In order for the navy to enforce rather than 
just assist in enforcement, relatively minor amendments to 
various maritime-related enabling statutes are required.
Lack of Distinction between Army and Navy 
in ‘ Domestic Operations'’
Notwithstanding Kananaskis and other fora, in which the Canadian Forces deployed in high profile support of 
enforcement agencies, public perception commonly views 
‘traditional’ military law enforcement operations as those in 
which the army is the ‘agency o f last resort’ . For many, no 
distinction exists between the navy dealing with narcotics 
smuggling, pollution, and fisheries violations at sea, and the 
army conducting aid to c iv il power operations on land. The 
latter are very visible, affect large numbers of citizens, and 
can be intrusive upon normal life, whereas naval enforcement 
operations are largely invisible to the majority o f Canadians. 
Due to this lack of distinction, negative biases derived from 
perceptions of the army's operations are unconsciously 
applied to those of the navy.
Enforcement as Noii-Traditional Employment
W hen the question o f naval law enforcement is raised, policymakers, lawyers, and senior bureaucrats are 
naturally reticent to concede any case for enhancing the 
Canadian Navy’s constabulary role, because such activities are 
‘non-traditional’ . It can be argued that MOU-based counter­
narcotics. fisheries, customs, and immigration law enforcement 
operations carried out by the navy are not considered in the 
same category as the ‘force o f last resort’ missions. Rather, 
these types of operations are deemed more to fall into the 
realm of support to law enforcement agencies. That these 
operations are seen to be a ‘non-traditional’ role for the navy 
is both unfortunate and misinformed. Indeed, the need for 
fisheries protection from American interests in Canadian 
waters at the turn o f the century was a major factor with 
respect to the creation o f an indigenous navy.
Among naval analysts, the employment of navies for 
constabulary tasks is not a universally popular concept. 
Vice-Admiral (ret’d) Gary Garnett stresses the importance of
S p rin g  2 0 0 6  •  C a n a d ia n  M ilita ry  Jo u rn a l
maintaining a distinction between the 
enforcement roles of the Canadian military 
and civilian authorities. He notes, as have 
many other analysts, that, in Canada, law 
enforcement has been traditionally a civilian 
function. With respect to naval law enforce­
ment, there are disadvantages to employing 
naval vessels in these roles. The most 
apparent is that navies are designed generally 
for war-lighting, not necessarily constabulary 
tasks. In fact, during the ‘Cod Wars' with Iceland in the 1970s, 
British frigates proved to be too ‘overly-sophisticated’ for the 
task.10 Garnett's principal concern is to avoid the watering down 
of combat skills, and his point, in my view, has some validity. 
However, the intent would not be to convert the Canadian 
Navy into a fleet of coast guard cutters. Rather, naval ships 
would continue to train for their primary combat roles, and 
small teams would receive additional specialized training to 
become proficient at their secondary constabulary duties.
Maritime Warfare expert Commander (ret’ d) Peter 
Haydon argues that the navy should be the key contributor to 
sovereignty and security patrols of Canada’s maritime zones, 
because Defence is the sole department that has the capability 
to do the patrols properly and efficiently, and the navy is the 
only organization that understands and can implement the 
concept of sea control." But he also cautions against too much 
‘constabularization’ , to the point that the nation possesses 
only a coast guard. In that scenario, he argues that Canada 
would find itself excluded from multinational naval operations. 
Both Haydon and Garnett suggest that sending forces perceived 
to be of a constabulary nature to international operations 
would signal a weak commitment by Canada to alliance or 
coalition objectives. Haydon argues that Canada’s overseas 
commitments would then be limited to token army and light 
a irlift participation, largely because Canada would lose its 
seat at the table at m ajor international crisis management 
events. Canada’s use of the navy to further diplomatic ends, to 
strengthen alliance relationships, and to engage in confidence- 
building measures would not be possible, and that would 
marginalize Canada on the world stage.1- This effect runs 
counter to the government’s stated desire to regain Canada’s 
stature and influence in the international system.
This potential for marginalization expressed by both 
Haydon and Garnett would be legitimate, i f  the Canadian 
Navy were to be viewed in the future largely as a constabulary 
force. However, as long as the navy maintains the primacy of 
combat operations as its raison d ’etre, and trains to that end, 
the likelihood of such marginalization is remote.
Garnett also suggests that the presence of a combined 
civil-m ilitary force that executes law enforcement tasks on a 
routine basis could potentially inflame sensitive international 
situations, as was the case during the British/Icelandic ‘Cod 
Wars’.13 However, it can be argued that concern with respect to 
provocation is really an issue of expectation. The Canadian 
tradition has been that of civilian law enforcement in the 
marine environment, and other nations have come to expect 
that reaction. As political scientist Colin Gray points out: “ If 
Canadian law is accepted as authoritative, and i f  the law is
4 5
“Among naval 
analysts, the 
employment of navies 
for constabulary tasks 
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invoked against a single vessel and not against a state, there j  
should be no provocation.”  Likewise, he adds, since so many j  
other countries use their navies for fisheries protection, it can ! 
be argued that there is a strong prim a fa c ie  case for Canada 
to follow suit.14
Garnett is not alone in his reservations. Other serving { 
and retired flag officers are opposed to their Service taking j  
on a more active domestic maritime enforcement posture. In | 
attempting to understand why this is the case, and one cannot ! 
discount simple deep-seated biases. Naval analysts, such j  
as Mark Janis, Richard H ill and Eric Grove, offer various I 
topologies for ranking navies by class. Generally, super- ! 
powers sit at ‘the top o f the pecking order’ , while at the 
lowest rungs are found the ‘constabulary and token’ navies. 
Canada ranks its own navy at Level Three, far away 
from those navies described as being ‘constabulary’.15 
The relevance? Simply put, there is a general correlation 
between ranking of a nation's navy and a nation’s status in I 
the international system. The majority of navies of developed i 
countries occupy the upper tiers, whereas the navies o f j 
developing nations, those of a more constabulary nature, are j 
found in the lower end o f the ranking spectrum.16 
The Canadian Navy, given its early roots as a fisheries j  
protection force, wished to shed that image and become a ! 
‘real’ navy. Arguably, some senior naval leaders may j 
perceive a certain stigma i f  their fleets are associated with j  
constabulary rather than combat-capable functions that rank | 
them higher on the international stage. Thus, the attitudes of j  
modern naval officers might well be a legacy of concern j  
with respect to image.
Both Garnett and Haydon have cautioned against 
‘non-traditional’ law enforcement by Canada's naval forces. 
However, John Thomas, former Commissioner of the 
Canadian Coast Guard, is more blunt:
I do not think that DND should have the role of 
coastal security... Navy personnel are trained for war 
and navy systems are developed for war, not to fu lfil 
a policing role on the coast... the navy should 
be called upon only when the police force cannot 
do the job... there is a need for a flexible response. 
The military should be seen, from a policy 
perspective, as a force of last resort, in the same 
way as they are for land-based police operations.17
Thomas -  and, to a lesser extent, Haydon and Garnett -  
speaks to a bipolar world of a bygone era, during which 
Canada’s Navy was structured to counter symmetric threats. 
It is unlikely that North America will face a conventional 
military threat, such as had been the case during the Cold 
War. The maritime security environment changed with the 
fall o f the Berlin Wall, and its continuing evolution was 
punctuated with the terrorist attacks of 2001. Globally, societies 
are witnessing an increased emphasis on asymmetric capabilities 
by organized crime and a variety of trans-state actors. It is 
reasonable to assume that terrorist groups are prepared to use 
merchant vessels to transport their personnel and weapons. 
Any number of scenarios can be imagined here.
In addition to counter-terrorism, the protection of fishing 
rights, the prevention of illegal activity at sea, and the protection 
of the environment w ill continue to require vigilance on the 
part of the federal government. Canada’s national security 
policy, Securing an Open Society, calls for effective, integrated 
multiple-agency threat assessment, protection, and prevention 
capabilities. However, it is no longer easy to divine what the 
sovereignty protection role of the Canadian Navy is when, as 
observed in Canada’s In ternational Policy Statement (IPS), 
‘‘the boundary between the domestic and international continues 
to blur”.'B The IPS insists that security and defence policy must 
change. Thus, it is time to discard old ideas about traditional 
employment, and to consider what is practical and relevant 
for the future maritime security environment. Other nations 
have already done so.
Fisheries protection has long been a traditional role for 
European naval and coast guard forces. Britain’s naval 
experience in this role dates back to the 16lh Century. At present, 
the Royal Navy undertakes quarantine enforcement, fishery 
protection, contraband operations, drug interdiction, oil and 
gas field patrols, anti-piracy operations, support to counter­
insurgency operations and maritime counter-terrorism. 
Moreover, the Royal Navy maintains a Fishery Protections 
Squadron, equipped with six offshore patrol vessels and four 
mine counter-measures vessels. Looking at other parts of 
Europe, the French Navy, for example, acquired patrol vessels 
several years ago for policing duties. Farther north, the 
Norwegian Coast Guard forms part of the Royal Norwegian 
Navy, whereas Denmark has no coast guard. However, the 
Danish Navy exercises police authority for enforcement of 
sovereignty issues. European navies generally furnish law
m m  singe* m  m .  Tu**et
until* #«
The provocative, front-page periscope photograph.
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enforcement services directly to national 
authorities through MOUs. Usually what 
these navies provide are naval platforms and 
facilities. In some cases, such as the Danish 
model, the navy carries out constabulary and 
traffic-police duties, whereas the appropriate 
civil authority conducts the criminal inves­
tigations. From a European perspective, 
naval participation in law enforcement 
is a significant contribution to good 
governance at sea.1"
United States Experience w ith Posse Comitatus
It is interesting to compare the Canadian position to that of the United States -  where the law has, until recently, prohibited 
the use of the armed forces for domestic enforcement. The 
Posse Comitatus Act was passed in 1878 to prevent the US 
Army from carrying out law enforcement tasks in the United 
States. This was a reaction to the use o f m ilitary forces in the 
Confederate states for the maintenance o f peace and good 
order, to the enforcement o f policies for post-Civil War 
reconstruction, and to ensure that rebellious sentiments did 
not re-ignite. The US Congress became concerned when the 
army stationed troops at political events and polling stations 
under the premise of ensuring c iv il order. The intent o f the 
Posse Comitatus A ct was to prevent the Army from becoming 
‘the national police force’ , and to return the army to its 
proper role in defence of US territory.20
Interestingly, the Posse Com itatus A ct did not apply to 
the US Navy, only the US Army. It is possible that, as with 
Britain’s B ill o f  Rights o f 1688, the navy was not viewed as a 
threat to the US domestic political structure of the era. In 
1956, the Posse Com itatus A ct was amended to apply to the 
US A ir Force, but, curiously, it made no mention of the US 
Navy. By 1974, it was interpreted that, although the Act did not 
specifically apply to the navy, its principles were to be upheld. 
However, a loophole allowed the navy to be employed for 
civilian law enforcement purposes, given the express permission 
of the US Secretary of the Navy, a civilian official. Thus, the 
paramount principle o f civilian control over military forces 
could be maintained.21
In 1982, at the request o f the US Department of 
Transport, the US Secretary o f Defense approved US Navy 
support to the US Coast Guard for law enforcement purposes. 
Specifically, the US Navy could conduct surveillance, tow or 
escort seized vessels, transport prisoners, provide logistic 
support to Coast Guard units, and embark Coast Guard 
personnel to conduct boardings of American and stateless 
vessels. These powers and procedures marked a considerable 
departure from the outright prohibition of US naval involvement 
in law enforcement, and they indicate American acceptance 
of this role for their navy.
Having established the legitimacy o f the use of the navy 
for law enforcement purposes, and having challenged some 
perceptions about constabulary and non-traditional naval 
employment, it remains to be discussed what an enhanced 
mandate for naval law enforcement would really entail.
Proposal for Naval M aritim e  
Enforcement of Canadian  
M aritim e Zones
his article calls for the navy to be 
empowered with the legal authority to 
enforce directly selected federal statutes on 
a routine basis throughout the maritime 
zones of Canadian jurisdiction. At present, 
Canadian naval forces are relegated to a 
support function only, except under special circumstances 
when coercive force is required, and is requested by the 
appropriate Minister.
I f  these legal powers were to be granted, what would this 
new role entail? The navy’s fundamental mission would 
remain the “ generation and maintenance of combat-capable, 
multi-purpose maritime forces to meet Canada’s defence 
objectives” . Nonetheless, i f  naval vessels detected violations to 
Canadian law while conducting their defence or sovereignty 
missions, they would have the requisite legal tools to act 
upon those discoveries. However, there is no suggestion that 
the navy would be obliged to cease its principal operations to 
deal with violations detected. Rather, the naval commanding 
o ffice r’s decision whether to enforce the law would be 
shaped by the priority of his naval operations -  and by the 
circumstances of the violation detected. In practice, this 
precedent already exists. Throughout Canada, police officers 
have similar discretion to choose when and where to enforce 
laws, with due consideration to the severity of the offences, 
the risk to the public, and so on. As well, the navy would not 
be expected to enforce all federal statutes, only those that 
apply to specific activities on the seas. These interventions 
would be limited only to those offences that are directly 
linked to the protection of Canadian sovereignty, and this 
constraint should allay concerns referred to earlier about 
placing police power in the hands of military personnel.
The proposed new role would not envisage the navy 
conducting investigations of violations detected at sea. Rather, 
naval personnel would carry out the preliminary work 
designed to contain the scene of the violation. Again, an analogy 
of normal police work is useful. Throughout Canada, general 
duty police officers are normally first at the scene. They then 
turn over d ifficu lt or serious cases to specialist officers 
or detectives. The general duty officer is trained in basic 
policing functions -  such as understanding how not to 
contaminate a crime scene, how to maintain care and custody 
of evidence, and so on -  so that qualified detectives can 
investigate the case in detail. This basic knowledge is necessary 
to ensure that the Crown's case is not undermined by procedural 
errors at the outset of an investigation. In the model 
proposed, naval personnel would act as the general duty 
officers, and would turn over the case for investigation by 
DFO or by EC representatives, or by the RCMP as appropriate. 
Moreover, the support to enforcement already established by 
interdepartmental MOUs would not change. Thus, routine 
patrols with fisheries or RCMP officers embarked would 
continue, and reactive operations, such as counter-drug 
interdictions, would be carried out with the appropriate 
enforcement officers embarked.
“Fisheries protection 
has long been 
a traditional role 
for European naval 
and coast guard 
forces.”
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Some argue that the 
Canadian Navy would not 
be qualified to undertake 
a more direct enforcement 
role, primarily because naval 
personnel are not conversant 
w ith the requirements o f a 
court case. Essentially, this 
question involves training and 
shipboard organization. One 
solution would be to confer peace officer status on all watch- 
keeping officers, as well as a small cadre o f sailors.”  These 
people would train specifically for law enforcement duties, 
and would become the ship’s experts with respect to the use of 
force, the care and custody o f evidence, and other related 
matters. The logical choice for these teams would be the 
personnel who form the navy’s existing naval boarding parties. 
At present, naval boarding party team training is very similar 
to, but shorter than, that received by Canadian police officers, 
and it would require minimal adjustment to cater to at-sea 
enforcement requirements. It would mainly entail becoming 
familiar with the minimal number o f federal statutes that 
would be enforced by the navy, and to ‘top up’ the team’s 
legalistic understanding o f requirements for court.2'’
In the end, there is little  doubt that the navy could 
execute an enhanced enforcement role, given its considerable 
experience in maritime interdiction operations abroad. 
Whether it w ill be given the chance to do so remains an 
open question.
Conclusions
Policing Canada’s maritime zones and approaches presents no shortage of difficulties to overcome, particularly as the 
federal government struggles to allocate finite resources to a 
plethora of ministries charged with maintaining national security. 
While the navy has always had a major part to play in protecting 
Canadian sovereignty, the burden of law enforcement has fallen 
largely upon other government departments. This reality 
reflects a Canadian tradition of law enforcement by civilian 
agencies. However, in light of the evolving post-9/11 asymmetric 
security environment, there is a case to be made for expanding 
the naval role in domestic maritime enforcement. Influenced 
to a degree by land-oriented aid to civil power operations, 
detractors question the legitimacy of this use of armed forces 
or denounce the idea as non-traditional. However, none of 
these issues presents an insurmountable obstacle to developing 
an enhanced role for Canada’s naval forces.
With federal enforcement departments becoming increas­
ingly reliant on naval assets for support of their operations, 
the navy’s significant presence in Canada’s maritime zones 
should be leveraged, and the Canadian Navy, empowered 
with appropriate legal authority, should be granted the option 
to enforce Canadian law in those vast areas. Doing so would be 
yet another important step in realizing the goals articulated in 
Canada’s national security policy. Specifically, that entails 
the provision of maritime security to Canadians in an effective 
integrated manner.
“The proposed new role 
would not envisage 
the navy conducting 
investigations of 
violations detected 
at sea ”
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rhe tragic events o f September 11th, 2001 have become the catalyst for a long-overdue appraisal o f security provisions and relationships within North America. In Canada, government departments conducted this self-examination with considerably less urgency than in 
the United States, on whose territory the attacks were directed. Nonetheless, the Canadian 
population was awakened, and an ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public Security Anti-Terrorism 
was set up to divine the way ahead and to assuage this public concern. Further, the Standing 
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence turned its attention to the requirement for a 
national security policy, with maritime security as a subset. While these activities provided 
ample debate for policy makers and bureaucrats in Ottawa, the real operational impacts w ill be 
felt in the regions, particularly in the maritime context. The aim o f this paper is to discuss, at the 
regional level, the relationships and methods o f interdepartmental cooperation among federal 
departments in Atlantic Canada.1
Renaissance o f Cooperation
Although interdepartmental cooperation appears to have become topical only during the past two 
years, in fact, it has existed in varying degrees since Confederation. However, in the recent past, 
the impetus for greater emphasis was a 1990 Treasury Board study led by Senator Gordon 
Osbaldeston. The study’s purpose was to identify opportunities for enhancing the efficiency, and 
improving delivery, o f the federal marine fleets’ programs. Ultimately, the Senator’s report, 
titled A l l  the Ships That Sail: A  Study o f  Canada’s Fleets, led to the consolidation o f the 
Canadian Coast Guard and Department o f Fisheries and Oceans fleets. More importantly, for 
our discussion, the study observed that cooperation among federal departments was poor and, as 
a remedy, recommended the establishment o f a strategic-level committee to guide the 
departments with maritime fleets towards more effective operations and interactions. This 
recommendation was acted upon in 1991 with the convening o f the Interdepartmental 
Programme Coordination and Review Committee (IPCRC).
Although Ottawa-based, IPCRC was important from a regional perspective because with 
it came a structure o f sub-committees and working groups. These covered operations, 
surveillance, hydrographies, communications, vessel design and vessel utilisation. Operations 
sub-committees were formed on the east and west coasts, and set in motion tangible progress 
towards interdepartmental cooperation. The Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee met regularly, 
and oversaw the development and implementation o f an unclassified wide-area information-
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sharing network known as the Canadian Maritime Network. Likewise, an Interdepartmental 
Concept o f Maritime Operations (ICM O) document was developed and accepted for use among 
the major departments w ith maritime security and enforcement mandates. It seemed as though 
the federal actors were well on the way to cracking the code to real interdepartmental co­
ordination and effective employment o f maritime human and materiel resources.
Regrettably, that was not to be the case. The 1990s saw the stagnation o f 
interdepartmental relationships, and both the CANM ARNET and the Interdepartmental Concept 
o f Maritime Operations fell into disuse. There was little funding available to progress 
interdepartmental issues, and public sector managers’ priorities turned inwards to their own 
departmental needs during periods o f budgetary constraint. Relations with other government 
departments were buoyed by occasional spikes o f activity that necessitated multi-departmental 
responses, such as the Turbot Crisis in 1995, and the Swiss A ir disaster o f 1998 but, in general 
terms, many o f  the benefits set in motion by the Osbaldeston study simply stopped dead in their 
tracks. Sadly, IPCRC was stood down in September 2001.
Current Situation
While IPCRC was ultimately abandoned, it provided both an example and a workable framework 
upon which to build. Interdepartmental cooperation exists now in an environment o f complex, 
multi-agency relationships that, as a simple rule-of-thumb, spans three levels o f interaction. The 
first o f these levels is the strategic. Issues at the strategic level are those that are international in 
nature, usually concerning policy, and are addressed by national headquarters in Ottawa. The 
next level is the operational or regional level. Issues at the operational level are those that are 
province-wide or cover multiple provinces and large areas o f the Atlantic approaches. The last 
level is the tactical or local level. Tactical level issues tend to be more narrowly focussed, often 
pertaining to specific incidents or operations that do not employ region-wide resources. 
Interdepartmental relationships at all levels can be categorised as being:
•  informal versus formal;
• proactive versus reactive; and
•  intelligence versus operational response.
Security -  Law E nforcem ent or D efence?
To understand how departments relate to one another locally, it is important to note that in 
Canada maritime security is viewed by government, first and foremost, as a law enforcement 
issue rather than a defence issue, even in the case o f terrorism.2 This significant point seems not 
to have been completely understood by SCONSAD in their investigation o f the need for a 
national security policy. The Committee, in their recent report Canada’s Coastlines: The 
Longest Under-Defended Borders in the World, waxes nostalgically about the Royal Canadian 
Navy’s success in coastal protection when the country was on a war-time footing during the 
1940s, and suggests that the present Canadian Navy has abandoned patrols o f its home coasts.3 
However, in the present governance structure, the Canadian Navy as a part o f the Canadian 
Forces, has no legal mandate fo r law enforcement and fu lfils  its constabulaiy role by supporting
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those departments that do: the key ones being the Solicitor General and Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, and Environment Canada. This is done primarily 
through the provision o f naval ships and maritime aircraft as transport for peace officers or 
conservation and protection officers while other m ilitary capabilities are used for surveillance 
and monitoring o f the Canadian ocean areas. As such, short o f a direct attack on Canada or some 
threat so overwhelming that the responsible departments simply couldn't cope, the Navy would 
not become the lead agency for most maritime security scenarios in the current federal construct.
Informal and Form al Cooperation
Informal liaison occurs across the broad spectrum o f government affairs. It may be simply a 
matter o f regional s taff sounding out their counterparts o f the same level in another departments’ 
regional headquarters about a routine issue or pending initiative. It could be national staffs 
chatting unofficia lly about upcoming policy deliberations or changes to programmes. Informal 
liaison at the tactical level could, for example, involve Royal Canadian Mounted Police or 
Halifax Regional M unicipality Police talking to M ilitary Police about local security patrols. 
Informal cooperation is highly dependent upon individual personality and networking skills. By 
contrast, formal cooperation is that which is established through official appointments, 
secondments, memberships in various committees and working groups, ad hoc or otherwise. In 
many cases, the o ffic ia l nature o f  this liaison is captured in an incumbent’ s job  description or 
terms o f reference.
Proactive Initiatives
Regional authorities deal w ith the management o f their departmental mandates and emergent 
crises through both proactive and reactive means. In general, proactive measures reflect the 
interdepartmental working group and committee structure that convenes with various periodicity 
to resolve issues spanning departmental mandates, as well as existing Memoranda o f 
Understanding between selected departments. This proactive structure, especially since 
September 11th, has become the foundation upon which departments can manage their individual 
and jo in t responses to reactive operations.
Proactive cooperation takes many forms and occurs as part o f normal daily activities. 
Longstanding relationships have ensured that lines o f communication remain open so that 
contact leading to action can be made easily when the need arises. These relationships have been 
created and maintained through day-to-day liaison, through participation in official working 
groups and committees, and through various local and regional training exercises.
Day-to-day Liaison
Using the case o f Maritime Forces Atlantic as a single department having relationships with 
many other departments and agencies, the following are examples o f proactive day-to-day 
liaisons being undertaken on a year-round basis:
•  Liaison w ith the Conservation and Protection staffs o f Fisheries and Ocean Canada 
(DFO) to coordinate naval support to fishery patrols in accordance with a MOU;
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•  Liaison w ith  the Oceans Management Branch o f DFO to provide surveillance 
information to assist w ith  the scientific study, management, and potential enforcement o f 
the proposed Sable G ully  Marine Protected Area;
•  Liaison w ith Environment Canada (EC) for assistance in detecting and investigating 
pollution incidents. Naval vessels have also carried Canadian W ild life  Service scientists 
during fishery patrols to assist w ith ongoing pelagic bird surveys;
•  Liaison w ith the RCMP to provide support for counter-narcotics operations in accordance 
with an MOU. M A R L A N T  also provides logistical support in the form o f transportation 
to assist the RCMP w ith  its Coastal Watch program;
• Liaison w ith Health Canada to coordinate support o f the Navy’s Nuclear Emergency 
Response Team during visits to Halifax by nuclear-powered vessels;
•  Liaison w ith various agencies for jo in t security efforts such as the G-7 Finance Ministers’ 
Conference;
• Liaison w ith United States Navy commands such as the Commander-in-Chief Atlantic 
Fleet, Commander Second Fleet, and the Office o f Naval Intelligence (ONI) on naval 
matters o f Homeland Defence;
•  Liaison w ith the United States Coast Guard First District (Boston) on matters o f safety, 
security, and Homeland Security.
Interdepartmental Committee and  Working Group Structure
The relationships among A tlantic Canadian interdepartmental committees and working groups at 
all three levels are depicted in Figure 1. There are more interdepartmental groups in existence, 
however, those included in the diagram are the ones that are either operationally or security 
oriented, and they are also the most active.
The two main Ottawa-based groups that address maritime security issues are shown in 
Figure 1 as proactive activities at the strategic level. The ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Public 
Security Anti-Terrorism has minister-level representation from the Privy Council Office, 
Solicitor General, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, 
Canadian Coast Guard, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, Transport Canada, Department o f 
National Defence and police agencies. Over the past two years, PSAT has provided Cabinet 
with advice on proposed marine security measures and their prioritisation. The second strategic 
level initiative, the Interdepartmental Maritime Security Working Group, is a working body that 
furnishes PSAT w ith  fu lly  staffed conclusions and recommendations on security issues.4 The 
membership o f  IM SW G is equally diverse. Elsewhere in this volume, Captain (N) Peter Avis 
discusses the composition and roles o f these two groups, so I won’t go into specific detail here.
The Arctic Security Interdepartmental Working Group is the third strategic-level body 
with regional security on its agenda. Participants from 15 federal departments, as well as 
territorial representatives, meet semi-annually to discuss Arctic issues. Sub-committees have 
been established recently for A rctic sovereignty, security, interoperability and the environment.5
Moving to the operational level, several groups are depicted as proactive activities in 
Figure 1. Three o f  the bodies concern themselves with the broader scheme o f oceans 
management rather than the more focussed topic o f maritime security. These are the Eastern 
Scotian Shelf Integrated Management group (ESSIM), the Atlantic Coastal Zone Information 
Steering Committee (ACZISC), and the Interdepartmental Committee on Oceans (ICO). Their 
relevance to this discussion is simply that many o f their members are the same representatives
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Figure 1: Interdepartmental committees and working groups.
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to the other various security groups and, as such, use opportunities afforded by oceans 
management venues to further foster longstanding relationships.
Originally conceived in British Columbia in 1996 to address cross-border crime, 
Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) have been established in 14 locations across the 
country, including the A tlantic region. These teams comprise representatives from the RCMP, 
CCRA, CIC and other police agencies in Canada, and their American counterparts in the U.S. 
Customs Service, U.S. Border Patrol, and the U.S. Coast Guard. IBET’s focus is on potential 
threats o f terrorism, impeding the smuggling o f drugs, humans, contraband cigarettes, or other 
illegal substances.6 CCRA is in the process o f setting up Joint In-Transit Targeting Teams 
(JITT) w ith other agencies and American officials in Halifax, Montreal, Vancouver, Newark, and 
Seattle to monitor and intervene suspicious sea and air cargos and containers both in Canada and 
at international points o f departure.
In A tlantic Canada, at the operational level, there are two key bodies that have the 
greatest influence on how enforcement and maritime security are managed within the region. The 
first is the Eastern Canada Interdepartmental Maritime Operations Committee (ECIMOC), which 
was formerly IPCRC’s Atlantic Operations Sub-Committee prior to IPCRC’s demise. ECIMOC
T he C E N T R E  fo r  F O R E IG N  P O L / C l  ~ S T U D IE S  - 2003
S14
Appendix S
14 ^
is made up o f  federal departments that either conduct, or have an interest in, operations in the 
maritime environment. Principal members include M AR LAN T (the current chair), DFO 
including representatives from both the CCG Maritimes, and Newfoundland and Labrador 
Regions, CCRA, CIC, TC, EC, and the Office o f Critical Infrastructure Preparedness and 
Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP). Recently, Health Canada participated in view o f their 
major involvement in the merchant vessel Wadi Alarab anthrax incident. ECIMOC’s aim is to 
identify and develop the most practical means o f applying operational resources to facilitate jo in t 
and effective employment. It  is through ECIMOC that a tentative link to the strategic-level 
IMSWG has been established through the distribution o f each group’ s records o f discussion. 
This link is shown in Figure 1 as a dashed double-headed arrow.
The other significant organ is the Nova Scotia Federal Council’ s Security Committee. 
This ad hoc committee, comprised o f Regional Directors General o f federal departments with 
enforcement or security mandates, meets every two months to discuss a broad range o f security- 
related issues. In the aftermath o f  September 11th , it was this committee that recognised that the 
federal departments in the A tlantic region needed to improve their ability to work together in 
order to respond to future security incidents. This committee initiated a series o f table top and 
command-post exercises, designed to stimulate and, i f  necessary, to force interaction between 
departments through the resolution o f  complex scenarios containing both terrestrial and marine 
elements.
Program o f  Interdepartmental Exercises
Although there have been several exercises held in the Atlantic region since September 11th, the 
most noteworthy was held in May, 2002. This two-day exercise, ATLANTIC GUARD was 
championed by the members o f  Nova Scotia Federal Council Security Committee, sponsored by 
OCIPEP and hosted by D N D ’ s Land Force Atlantic Area (LFAA). ATLANTIC GUARD 
challenged 13 federal and three provincial agencies with three different scenarios that presented 
security, health and environmental disaster problems. The ATLANTIC GUARD Final Report, 
prepared by an independent assessor from outside o f government, highlighted the requirement to 
regularly exercise interdepartmental cooperation in order to standardise such things as tele­
communications, public affairs and command and control.7 A  similar exercise, ATLANTIC  
GUARD II  was conducted 28-31 October, 2003. This command-post exercise met the basic 
interoperability objectives, but reiterated the need for continued effort in resolving jo in t 
command and control issues among many departments.
Other multi-agency exercises undertaken in the Atlantic region post-September i f  
include:
• CCRA Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Table Top Exercise - 24 
September, 2002. This exercise was one in a series o f table top exercises held across 
the country by CCRA. The scenario presented was that o f a “ dirty bomb”  entering 
Halifax by container ship;
•  Exercise ATLANTIC SPEAR - 18-22 November, 2002. Hosted by LFAA, the 
scenario was a G8 meeting to be held on Campobello Island, New Brunsick at very 
short notice. While primarily an LFAA  initiative to train its headquarters staff, it 
included participation from several federal government departments such as DFAIT, 
RCMP, CIC, and Health Canada. Maritime Forces Atlantic staff provided a maritime 
component;
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•  Exercise A TLA N TIC  SHIELD - 12 May, 2003. Hosted by the Halifax Port 
Authority, this exercise was designed to test the response to a bomb threat against a 
v isiting cruise ship. The exercise served two purposes: one, it satisfied the Port 
Authority ’ s need to demonstrate a specified level o f security to the cruise industry in 
order to ensure continuing visits to Halifax, and; two, it presented an opportunity to 
determine the level o f  response required from the Halifax Regional Municipality, the 
province and from federal departments.
Shown in Figure 1 is an arrow that represents the ability to deal with unforeseen or emergent 
crises through the experience, insight, and contacts gained in multi-agency problem-solving 
scenario-based exercises in a proactive programme.
Regional Interdepartmental Concept o f  Maritime Operations
Under the aegis o f ECIMOC, a sub-committee is drafting, in one umbrella document called 
RICMO, the procedures necessary to accomplish maritime-related tasks requiring inter­
departmental cooperation. These guidelines include, but are not limited to counter-terrorism 
operations, environmental responses, illegal migrants, counter-drug operations, preventative 
patrols, and surveillance operations. As well, RICMO w ill contain regional interdepartmental 
communications and points o f  contact, inventories o f air, sea and shore-based assets, an 
inventory o f M OU among departments, and legislative or regulatory mandates, and statutory 
authorities including the use o f force. In Figure 1, an arrow represents the link between RICMO 
and the operational response to an emergent crisis.
Reactive R elationships
Figure 2 depicts the elements that are in place to enable authorities to respond to an emergent 
situation based on information garnered through the various intelligence networks. The diagram 
shows departmental intelligence sections represented at all three levels, linked with each other, 
and with international intelligence agencies at the strategic and operational levels. The main 
departments contributing to this community within Canada are CSIS, RCMP, CCRA, DND CIC, 
and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). A llied links in the United States include 
ONI, the Defence Intelligence Agency (D IA), the U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination 
Center, and the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East. Information is shared with 
departments depending upon the recipient’s need to know and, in most cases, departments can 
respond effectively w ith in individual department mandates.
Threat Assessment Group (TAG)
Unfortunately, or fortunately depending upon your point o f view, the intelligence networks 
uncover large numbers o f items requiring investigation and the determination o f credibility, level 
o f threat, and so on. The ability to ‘ filte r’ this information varies among departments, as does 
each department’ s understanding o f what is o f significance to another. In the fall o f  2002, a 
vessel with a suspect container arrived in Halifax. Four departments or agencies were aware o f 
this container, but the information about the container and potential responses to it were 
interpreted differently by each department. This pointed to a need to formalise a process to 
transition from compiling information, to determining whether an operational response is
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required, to mounting the actual operation. As a result, in the Atlantic region, the RCMP 
sponsored the development o f a body known as the Threat Assessment Group (TAG).
Figure 2: The relationship of intelligence to operational response.
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A TAG meeting is the genesis o f a coordinated interdepartmental operational response to an 
emergent issue that transcends the mandate o f any one department. The TAG w ill also assist 
with the determination o f a lead agency. TAG members belong to four principal departments: 
CSIS , RCMP, CCRA, and DND. Other departments may be called i f  the issue is obviously 
relevant to a particular department. TAG members include both intelligence analysts and 
operators, and the aim o f the TAG is to ensure that a common understanding o f a potential event 
is reached, so that each agency can then plan and coordinate its response.8
Maritime D om ain Awareness
There is an inherent need to develop and maintain an understanding o f what activities are 
happening in Canada’s coastal zones and its approaches. This situational awareness is required 
by multiple government departments with overlapping mandates and interests in our maritime 
security environment. The Navy uses a specific tool to acquire this domain awareness, and
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shares it w ith other government departments. It is known as the “ recognised maritime picture”  
and is represented in Figure 2 w ith the circular symbol (RMP). The term “ recognised”  is used to 
indicate that the picture has been evaluated prior to its dissemination. In other words, rather than 
having stations simply pass data between themselves, there is a central authority to whom data is 
forwarded for compilation, evaluation and dissemination as a recognised picture: an analyst’ s 
evaluation o f what is happening in a given area. Generation o f the RMP is worthy o f discussion 
here due to its inherent relationship to intelligence, and as a good example o f inter-agency 
cooperation.
The RMP compiled by the Navy is produced for an ocean area that encompasses Atlantic 
waters well past the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, extending north to the Pole and 
west to the end o f the Great Lakes and encompassing the entire St. Lawrence Seaway, following 
the Canada-U.S. border where appropriate. This area has been adopted for picture management 
purposes, not to suggest a legislated mandate for control within that area. Although this arbitrary 
area o f responsibility is assigned for management purposes, the various databases supporting the 
picture actually contain data for the entire globe.
A t present, sufficient resources would not be available for comprehensive surveillance o f 
the large area o f responsibility, were only m ilitary assets to be used. Accordingly, the RMP is 
compiled in cooperation w ith many other agencies that possess data on maritime activity. The 
benefits o f this are clear; a wider collective awareness and links through which to share 
information, plus a growing ability to reduce duplication o f effort and use resources efficiently. 
As such, the picture combines data o f the follow ing nature:
•  Reports from Canadian m ilitary ships and aircraft. M ilitary aircraft fly  a number o f hours 
each week for dedicated surveillance, and conduct surveillance as a secondary task even 
when on training missions. Ships are also under standing direction to hail merchant 
vessels, and this communication results in further information on each vessel;
•  Reports from aircraft contracted by DFO. The contractor, Provincial Airlines, flies these 
patrols w ith a well-equipped air platform that provides radar, infrared and photographic 
data. A  key aspect o f these flights is that the data can be forwarded in flight for 
integration into the picture (except the photo data), resulting in near real time picture 
compilation. This makes the fisheries patrol aircraft one o f the most capable surveillance 
assets on the east coast o f Canada. Although normally limited to the fisheries context, 
these flights are reporting pollution incidents and have started to report merchant 
shipping as well. An initiative is in place to allow the Navy to redirect or task one o f 
these flights, should that be required, to monitor a vessel o f interest;
•  Reports from CCG, including the mandatory reports required from commercial vessels at 
96 and 24 hours prior to reaching a Canadian port. This data is hosted in the CCG’s own 
picture and accessed by a direct link between the DND and CCG systems. The Coast 
Guard system is a fundamental cornerstone o f maritime picture building in Canada; it 
contains the reports mandated by Canadian legislation, and has been identified as the data 
path for Automated Identification System data (transponder beacons.) Transponder 
beacons are important because they provide position and identity automatically by radio 
signal, without the need for surveillance assets to go forth to find them;
• Reports based on fishing vessel transponder beacons. These are automated radio signals 
from fishing vessels, w ith their positions and identities. DFO receives these reports for 
European Union fisherman when those vessels are operating in certain areas near
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Likewise, Canadian vessels fishing in domestic areas started carrying these beacons in 
the summer o f 2003;
• Reports based on positions included in merchant vessel voluntary weather reporting, on a 
global scale. Merchant ships report the weather in their local area, typically at 4-6 hour 
intervals. Pooled by weather bureaus worldwide, Environment Canada receives the sum 
o f all this data. Since these reports contain the call sign and position o f the vessels, they 
are o f use to the RMP. These reports are forwarded to the Navy via the Internet, and 
converted to the format necessary for inclusion in the picture;
•  Reports from various NATO sites, as a result o f their own local picture-building efforts. 
The four main NATO centres each produce a picture for their area and share that with 
each other, and NATO allies. Although they do not report ships o ff  the east coast o f 
Canada, the data is included in the RMP for long-range cueing and to support naval ships 
when deployed. Although NATO has not typically been a large reporting source for 
merchant vessels, the focus in this regard is changing;
•  Reports from various centres in the U.S. Navy. The data forwarded from the United 
States contains locator messages for merchant vessel traffic on a global scale. As well, 
the U.S. Navy shares its list o f high interest vessels w ith Canada and the names o f these 
vessels are placed on an alert list. When a report on any o f the vessels is received in the 
Canadian RMP, the information is passed on to the applicable U.S. agency;
• Reports based on national technical sensors. Data from classified systems can provide 
information on shipping movements; and
•  Commercial sources. Many shipping companies currently maintain their own plot o f 
where their ships are operating and often that data can be seen on internet. This data is 
not routinely included in the RMP, but can be used to investigate vessels o f interest and is 
a growth area for inclusion in the picture.
It is clear that the RMP’s foundation is a shared effort between many partners. Canada 
undertakes data sharing with as many other maritime agencies as security considerations and 
legislation allow, since this logically increases the potential for early warning o f vessels o f 
interest. Many successful uses o f the RMP have been made follow ing notification by an outside 
agency o f a vessel o f interest or concern. A ll told, this effort attempts to produce a level o f 
‘ surveillance in depth’ to protect Canadian interests.
Hindrances to Cooperation
Robust interdepartmental cooperation w ill always have its challenges, some o f which have 
nothing to do with personalities. The administrative structure o f the federal ministries itself 
complicates cooperative efforts. For example, a single security or enforcement issue within the 
Atlantic region could involve consultation with only 1 Regional Director o f Citizenship and 
Immigration but up to 4 Regional Directors o f Fisheries and Oceans Canada and 3 Regional 
Directors for the Coast Guard simply due to the manner by which regional administrative 
boundaries o f each department have been established. Equally, jurisdictions vary among and 
within departments depending upon the statute to be enforced, adding yet another level o f 
complexity. A  single department may have jurisdiction only out to 24 nautical miles for one
The C E N TR E  fo r  F O R E IG N  P O L IC h  'STUDIES  -  2003
S19
Appendix S
PUBLISHED ARTICLES Continental Security and Canada — U.S. Relations 154
statute, while the same department can legally enforce a different statute, or element o f the same 
statute out to the lim it o f the 200 nautical mile EEZ.
Arguably, the most significant impediment to interdepartmental cooperation is the 
historic evolution from departmental cultures bred o f narrow mandates. These mandates are 
premised on the enforcement o f a single federal statute, or the delivery o f an equally constrained 
number o f programmes. Departments with this type o f organisational culture approach complex
Figure 3: Composite diagram of interdepartmental cooperation in Atlantic Canada.
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scenarios from their own limited viewpoint, and tend not to look beyond their own needs until 
forced to do so by extenuating circumstance. Employee unions have some impact on these 
cultures, but their attitude towards cooperation varies from union to union. The proactive 
committee work and exercises attempt to educate federal staffs in prioritisation based on the 
requirements o f particular scenarios rather than simply the specific aspects that affect their 
departments, but it is often an uphill battle. Continuous budget cutbacks over a prolonged period 
have made public sector managers more focused on cost avoidance rather than mission 
accomplishment. This is the culture o f the business plan. The managers that have succeeded in 
the past are those that have managed declining budgets well, and they have been rewarded for it. 
There is a different mind-set in that type o f manager than in the type needed for tackling 
complex situations with a multitude o f agencies.
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Although there has been significant progress since Sept 11th, there remains systemic 
reticence to share information, as opposed to intelligence, among departments. To be fair, in 
some cases there are legal and privacy issues, but in many others it is simply a matter o f 
defaulting to the safe position o f withholding information. Returning to my point about a 
‘business case mentality,’ cost recovery continues for information, sometimes within the same 
department. Remarkably, in almost all federal departments there is both mistrust and poor 
communication between a department’s regional office and its headquarters. It is a common 
occurrence in the Atlantic region that departmental staffs learn o f strategic-level initiatives not 
through their own departments, but rather through attendance at a multi-agency working groups 
and hearing about it from other departments.
Although the working group and committee structure certainly fosters closer working 
relations between departments, its main weakness is that virtually none o f the bodies has 
executive authority to hold accountable any department or representative who fails to follow  
through w ith an agreed-upon initiative. It is incumbent upon a department to complete a task for 
which it has volunteered; there is no real penalty for not holding up one’ s end o f the bargain. 
This explains why some initiatives seem to drag on for years before coming to fruition, 
particularly i f  the individual championing the issue is transferred elsewhere.
C onclusion
Interdepartmental cooperation is alive in the Atlantic region, employing official working groups 
and committees as its framework. Through this structure, frequent multi-agency exercises have 
been conducted that have begun the long-term education process o f staffs at all levels. Although 
in itia lly  premised on emergent disaster relief situations, the relationships cultivated through 
informal and formal initiatives have enabled departments to deal with maritime security issues 
with greater confidence and ability. However, because executive authority has not been 
bestowed on any one body, interdepartmental relationships require continual nurturing, lest they 
wither and fall into disuse during periods when departmental bureaucracies turn their attention to 
internal problems, as was the fate o f IPCRC.
The interdepartmental cooperation described in this paper exists despite the lack o f 
Government o f Canada strategic security and surveillance policies. This policy vacuum set in 
motion the evolution o f this ad hoc structure. It works adequately, in my view, due in large part 
to the professionalism and influence o f a small number o f individuals in key departments, and 
their genuine desire to do what is right for Atlantic Canadians despite limitations imposed by 
various bureaucracies. However, there are better ways ‘to do business,’ although some may 
require wholesale shifts o f mindset in governance and accountability; at least i f  the findings o f 
SCONSAD are any example.9 We can only hope that the same collaborative spirit manifests 
itse lf nation-wide as these new constructs are examined and potentially adopted.
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